ORDER R.S. Garg, J. 1. By this petition under Article 226 of Constitution of India, the petitioners impugn the promotion order dated dated 16.8.88 promoting the respondent no. 5 as Reveune Officer, with a further relief of quashment of order dated 25.11.88 promoting the respondent no. 5 as Revenue Officer. 2. Brief facts leading to the petition are that the petitioner Kishorilal Pandey was appointed as Revenue Inspector on 5.7.79; petitioner no. 2, 3, 4 and respondent no. 5 Gokul Prasad Khare were also made Revenue Inspectors with effect from 20.11.84. Vide order dated 9.2.88 (15.2.88), the respondent no. 5 G.P. Khare was promoted as Revenue Officer on adhoc basis for a period of six months or till the approval of M.P. PSC, whichever was earlier. This order was challenged by the petitioners in M.P. No. 866/88. On 27.4.88, the said petition was admitted and an interim order was also granted. As the Public Service Commission did not concur to the promotion order, by order dated 12.8.88, the respondent no. 5 was reverted back to the post of Revenue Inspector. By Order Annexure R/6, the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Katni exercising powers under Section 58 (2) of the Municipal Corporation Act promoted the petitioner to the post of Revenue Officer, on probation, for a period of one year. Thereafter the petitioner has been promoted as Deputy Commissioner of the Corporation under Order dated 11.10.89 by the Commissioner. This subsequent promotion was also for a period of one year and on probation. The petitioners say and submit that the respondent no. 5 could not be promoted to the post of Revenue Officer as firstly he was junior to the petitioner no. 1 and secondly he did not have the experience required for the purposes of promotion. At this stage, it is necessary to see the rules relating to promotion. Undisputedly, the promotion is governed by the Rules framed by the State Govt. exercising powers under Section 95 of the M.P. Municipalities Act. It is also not in dispute that the Corporation, Katni was earlier a Municipality, it was governed by the said rules, and even after its incorporation as a Municipal Corporation, it is being governed by the said Rules, known as M.P. Municipal Services (Scale of Pay & Allowances) Rules, 1967. exercising powers under Section 95 of the M.P. Municipalities Act. It is also not in dispute that the Corporation, Katni was earlier a Municipality, it was governed by the said rules, and even after its incorporation as a Municipal Corporation, it is being governed by the said Rules, known as M.P. Municipal Services (Scale of Pay & Allowances) Rules, 1967. According to Schedule III of 1967 Rules, a Revenue Inspector is entitled to be promoted as a Revenue Officer, if he possesses a certificate of having passed the higher secondary examination or equivalent examination with previous experience of at least six years as Revenue Inspector or experience of at least six years on an equivalent post. According to Rule 12 of M.P. Municipal Employees (Recruitment & Conditions of Service) Rules, 1968, Rule 12 provides recruitment by promotion. The Rule provides that recruitment by promotion shall be made on consideration of merits; seniority be taken into account where merits are equal. 3. On an earlier occasion, one B.L. Dubey and another had filed M.P. No. 1141/81 against the State of M.P, and others challenging the orders of promotion/appointment of the said respondents S.P. Shukla, G.P. Khare (respondent no. 5 of the present petition), A.K. Tiwari and J.P, Trivedi. It was submitted before the High Court that promotions of those Revenue Sub-Inspectors were illegal as cases of the competent candidates were not considered. The High Court allowed the petition and quashed the promotion/appointments of S.P. Shukla, G.P. Khare, A.K. Tiwari and J.P. Trivedi. The High Court further directed the Corporation to consider afresh the cases of promotion to the post of Revenue Inspector under Section 58 of M.P. Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. The said order was passed on 28.10.83. As a consequence of the said order passed by the High Court, the respondent no. 5 and others were reverted back to their original post of Revenue Sub-Inspectors. It was further directed by the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Murwara on 22.11.83 (Annexure R/7) that seniority of the respondent no. 5 shall continue on the post of Sub-Inspector Revenue with effect from 11.4.79. By Order dated 20.11.84, the petitioner no. 2, 3, 4 and respondent no. 5 were again promoted on adhoc basis to the post of Revenue Inspector. The grievance of the petitioners is that the respondent no. 5 shall continue on the post of Sub-Inspector Revenue with effect from 11.4.79. By Order dated 20.11.84, the petitioner no. 2, 3, 4 and respondent no. 5 were again promoted on adhoc basis to the post of Revenue Inspector. The grievance of the petitioners is that the respondent no. 5 was firstly not entitled to be appointed as a Revenue Inspector, he was so appointed and the order was required to be challenged before the High Court. The High Court quashed that order, as a consequence of which the respondent no. 5 was reverted back to his original post. Further submission of the petitioners is that the respondent no. 5 did not fulfil the qualification criteria, therefore, he could not be made a Revenue Officer. According to them, if the P.S.C. did not concur and the respondent no. 5 was reverted back to the post of Revenue Inspector, then within a short while, that is, on 25.11.88, the respondent no. 5 could not be promoted by the Commissioner. The respondent no. 1 and respondent no. 5 placing their strong reliance upon the eligibility criteria, have submitted that requirement of law is not that a man should hold the post for a period of six years, but the requirement is that he must have the experience of the said post. Learned counsel for the respondents contend that even if the promotion order was quashed or set aside by the High Court on a technical ground, at best, the promotion can be withdrawn, but the experience gained by the respondent no. 5 would always be to the credit of respondent no. 5. 4. Referring to the eligibility criteria, it is contended by the respondents that for the departmental promotees, the incumbent must have a certificate of having passed the higher secondary examination or equivalent examination with previous experience of at least six years as Revenue Inspector or experience of at least six years on an equivalent post, therefore, the respondent no. 5 who had worked as a Revenue Inspector and on the equivalent post for a period of six years, would certainly be entitled to count the experience gained by him while working on the post, irrespective of the fact that the promotion order was later on withdrawn and the respondent no. 5 was reverted back to his original post. 5 who had worked as a Revenue Inspector and on the equivalent post for a period of six years, would certainly be entitled to count the experience gained by him while working on the post, irrespective of the fact that the promotion order was later on withdrawn and the respondent no. 5 was reverted back to his original post. The respondents contend that the petitioner worked as a Property Tax Officer for a period of 2 years and 2 months between 22.2.77 to 11.4.79 and also as a Property Tax Officer on regular basis vide order dated 2.3.81 for a period of four tears and seven months from 11.4.79 to 22.11.83, and also worked as a Revenue Inspector for a period of two years and eight months from 20.11.84 to 25.5.87, and as a Revenue Inspector for a period of two months from 26.11.87 to the date of DPC, therefore, he has experience of the post of Revenue Inspector or equivalent post for a period of more than six years, therefore, he was entitled to be promoted as a Revenue Officer. 5. I have heard the parties at length. 6. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that if the promotion order made in favour of the petitioner was quashed by the High Court in the first instance and he was reverted back as a Revenue Sub-Inspector, then it cannot be held that he had gained experience either as a Revenue Inspector or on an equivalent post. The further submission is that the promotion, if is quashed, then the experience gained by the respondent no. 5 cannot be taken into consideration because the incumbent was not entitled to occupy the chair. According to him, if the petitioner has worked as Revenue Inspector or has worked on an equivalent post between 1977 to 1983 and the said order has been quashed, then the petitioner cannot rely upon the experience gained by him during the period for which he worked as Property Tax Officer. It is further contended that the period of promotion in anticipation of the concurrence by the P.S.C. can also not be taken as a period where the petitioner gained the experience because the said period was also not on the regular basis. 7. Shri Shroti, learned counsel for respondent no. It is further contended that the period of promotion in anticipation of the concurrence by the P.S.C. can also not be taken as a period where the petitioner gained the experience because the said period was also not on the regular basis. 7. Shri Shroti, learned counsel for respondent no. 5 contends that as the requirement is only the experience of at least six years as Revenue Inspector or experience of at least six years on an equivalent post, therefore, the respondent no. 5 was entitled to be promoted as Revenue Officer. According to him, the principles of defacto doctrine would be applicable to a case like present. In his submission, if the requirement is only in relation to the experience, then experience alone is to be considered irrespective of the fact whether the person was entitled to hold charge or not and whether the appointment was later on set aside or quashed. According to him, once it is held that the petitioner was competent to be promoted to the post of Revenue Inspector, then it cannot be held that he would not gain experience on the post after his promotion. In his submission, the reversion of the petitioner because of the orders of the High Court or non-grant of the concurrence by the P.S.C. would not come against him because while holding the post, the petitioner was gaining experience. Placing reliance upon the judgments of the Supreme Court reported in AIR 1981 SC 1473 (Gokaraju Rangaraju Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh), AIR 1988 SC 162 (State of U.P. Vs. Rafiquddin and others) and reported in 1979 MPLJ 409 (Supreme Court) (State of M.P. and another Vs. Laxmishankar Mishra), it was contended that whenever the appointment is illegal or is bad or cannot be approved, then the acts done by such an incumbent are accepted to be validity done and the orders are received by all concerned as validity made, therefore, if all the orders made by such a person are accepted to be validity made, then the principles of defacto doctrine is required to be stretched a little to propose that while working on the said post, the man did gain experience. He further submits that the orders passed in his favour even if were quashed, would not by any stretch of imagination, tentamount to with drawing the experience gained by him. 8. He further submits that the orders passed in his favour even if were quashed, would not by any stretch of imagination, tentamount to with drawing the experience gained by him. 8. In the matter of Gokaraju Rangaraju (supra), the facts before the Supreme Court were that a person was tried by a Sessions Judge and was convicted. The appointment of the said Sessions Judge was subsequently declared invalid on ground that his appointment was in violation of Article 233. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the acts done or the orders made by the said person while he was occupying the office as Sessions Judge could be set aside as made by a person who was not validity appointed. The Supreme Court in the said judgment observed that the defacto doctrine is well established, that the acts of the Officers defacto performed by them within the scope of their assumed official authority, in the interest of the public or third persons and not for their own benefit, are generally as valid and binding, as if they were the acts of officers de jure. 9. As the observations made by the Supreme Court are read in their true perspective, it would clearly show that the Supreme Court was considering the matter from the angle of the public faith in the judicial orders. The Supreme Court has clearly observed that the acts of such Officers performed by them within the scope of their assumed official authority are in the interest of public or third persons and not for their own benefits. If the orders were made by such person in the interest of public or third persons, then the orders could be held to be valid because those were not made in favour of the officer making it, but the moment an order is made in ones own favour or the moment the incumbent claims the benefits flowing from that office, then the principles of defacto doctrine would not be applicable. It is not a case before this Court that some orders of that Officer are under challenge. The case before this Court Is that whether the experience gained on the post can be taken into consideration In favour of the said officer. It cannot be disputed that the period spent on the promotional post is sought to be taken advantage of by the respondent no. The case before this Court Is that whether the experience gained on the post can be taken into consideration In favour of the said officer. It cannot be disputed that the period spent on the promotional post is sought to be taken advantage of by the respondent no. 5 in his own favour. The principles of defacto doctrine cannot be stretched to the extent that even If there was no authority of Law or even if the appointment or promotion was held to be illegal, then too the experience gained during the period of illegal occupation of the office or post, the said experience would be taken to the credit of the person. 10. In the matter of Gokaraju (supra), the Supreme Court has observed that a Judge de facto is one who is not a mere intrude or usurper, but one who holds office under colour of lawful authority, though his appointment is defective and may later be found to be defective. Whatever be the defect of his title to the office, judgments pronounced by him and acts done by him when he was clothed with the powers and functions of the office, albiet unlawfully, have the same efficacy as judgments pronounced and acts done by a Judge de jure. 11. It is to be appreciated that a person who holds the office under the legal title is entitled to pass any orders, but a person who was asked to hold the office under some defective order or under some order which was later on found to be defective cannot say that he had the right to hold the post. Infact while holding the post or the office, he was required to discharge the functions of the said post or office. If an order is made by such incumbent is challenged before the Court of law, then the principles of defacto doctrine can be applied. Present is not a case of that nature. 12. Placing further reliance on the judgment of the Supreme Court in the matter of State of U.P. Vs. Rafiquddin and others ( AIR 1988 SC 162 ), it was contended that the principles of defacto doctrine should be applied with its full force. Placing reliance upon the observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 20, it was contended that the principles of defacto doctrine would be applicable to a case like present. Rafiquddin and others ( AIR 1988 SC 162 ), it was contended that the principles of defacto doctrine should be applied with its full force. Placing reliance upon the observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 20, it was contended that the principles of defacto doctrine would be applicable to a case like present. In the said matter, the Supreme Court placing reliance upon its earlier judgment in the matter of Gokaraju observed that their Lordships were adverting to that aspect of the case in order to avoid any challenge to the validity of judgments and orders by the unplaced candidates of 1970 examination on the ground of legal infirmity in their appointments. The Supreme Court was of the opinion that because of the lapse of period of 12 years it was not advisable to strike down their appointments while considering the case further the Supreme Court observed that those incumbents were entitled to be placed below 1972 candidates. In the said case, Supreme Court did not observe that experience gained by those officers should be given any credit in their favour. 13. In the matter of State of M.P. and another Vs. Laxmishankar Mishra (1979 MPLJ 409) (Supreme Court) the facts were little different. There the Supreme Court was required to consider Rule 3 (b) of the Rules relating to absorption. The Rule read as under- 3 (b). For absorption on the post of Headmaster/Principal of a High/Higher Secondary School, the person concerned should possess the post graduate degree and should have worked on the post for minimum period of seven years in the same institution and should have ten years teaching experience in any recognised institution of Madhya Pradesh. 14. The Supreme Court interpreting the words "should have worked on the post for a minimum period of 7 years in the same institution" observed that the said rule means that the person claiming to be absorbed must have worked on the post for a minimum period of seven years. The Supreme Court observed that emphasis was on experience gained by working on post of Headmaster/Principal meaning thereby performing the duties and discharging functions assigned to the post and not the capacity in which the post is held. The post is independent of the holder thereof and the element of rank cannot be introduced for the purpose of Rule 3 (b). The post is independent of the holder thereof and the element of rank cannot be introduced for the purpose of Rule 3 (b). According to the Supreme Court, absorption for the purposes of Rule 3 (b) did not depend on the rank, but on the nature of functions and duties that an incumbent discharged for a particular number of years. In the present case, it is not simply the experience, but the experience must be as Revenue Inspector or experience on an equivalent post at least for a period of six years. The observations made by the Supreme Court in the matter of State of M.P. (supra) would not be of any assistance to the respondent no. 5 because there the question was of experience simpliciter and not on the post, but in the given rules experience is not in any capacity, but the capacity should be of a Revenue Inspector. Words "with previous experience of at least six years as Revenue Inspector or experience of at least six years on equivalent post" are to be read in their true perspective. In the opinion of this Court, there is no scope for any confusion specially to say that the experience must be on the post of the Revenue Inspector and not as Revenue Inspector. The moment law requires that the experience must be as Revenue Inspector, then it must be shown to the Court that the experience was as Revenue Inspector and the post was held validity as Revenue Inspector. 15. Contention of the learned counsel for the respondents is that the requirement is only the experience and not the capacity in which the post was held, cannot be accepted. The words employed in Schedule III Section 2 (Revenue Officer) clearly require that the incumbent must have worked as a Revenue Officer and not on the post of the Revenue Officer. Even otherwise, it is settled law that the experience must be gained on the post and of the post under a valid appointment order. The principles of defacto doctrine cannot be stretched to the extent of saying that even if under some order which was later on set aside or quashed, recalled or withdrawn, it would only affect the right to hold the post and would not amount to withdrawal of the experience. The principles of defacto doctrine cannot be stretched to the extent of saying that even if under some order which was later on set aside or quashed, recalled or withdrawn, it would only affect the right to hold the post and would not amount to withdrawal of the experience. If the law requires that the man must acquire the experience on the post as the officer entitled to hold the post, then there is no scope for holding that despite recall of the promotion order, the experience would still be counted for the purposes of promotion. 16. In the matter of State of M.P. (supra), the Supreme Court, looking to the language of the requirement/criteria, has observed that an officiating incumbent of the cost, does discharge the functions and duties of the post, therefore, while computing the period of seven years for the purposes of Rule 3 (b), the determining factor is performance of the duties and discharge of the functions of the post irrespective of the capacity in which the post was held. As observed above, the promotion rules do not provide that the man should only have the experience dehors the right to hold the post. The words "as Revenue Inspector" are the key words which would clearly provide that the experience must be gained not on the post simpliciter by occupying it, but on the post occupying it under the colour of title to the post and as Revenue Inspector. 17. The contention of the learned counsel for respondents that his experience for the period between 22.2.77 to 11.4.79 when he worked as a Property Tax Officer and the period between 11.4.79 to 22.11.83 when he worked as a Property Tax Officer on regular basis deserves to be counted, is not properly placed. Once the High Court observed in M.P. 1141/81 that the promotion of the petitioner from the post of Revenue Sub-Inspector was illegal, then it cannot be held that the petitioner was entitled to hold the post on day one, the parties, immediately after the judgment of the High Court, was relegated back or reverted back to the original post held by him prior to the promotion orders. Once the promotion order is quashed, it would be deemed to be written off as if nothing came into existence, as if there was no promotion order, and the petitioner intact was a Revenue Sub-Inspector. Once the promotion order is quashed, it would be deemed to be written off as if nothing came into existence, as if there was no promotion order, and the petitioner intact was a Revenue Sub-Inspector. If the petitioner could not be promoted or his promotion order was held to be invalid and was quashed by the High Court, then period on which he worked as a Property Tax Officer cannot be counted for the purposes of experience. He did not acquire the experience on the said post under a valid promotion order. Undisputedly if this period is excluded then on the date when he was promoted as a Revenue Officer, he did not have six years experience to his credit. If the petitioner did not have six years experience to his credit, then contrary to the requirement of law, he could not be promoted from the post of Revenue Inspector to the post of Revenue Officer. 18. At this stage, it also cannot be lost sight of that the petitioner was promoted on 15.2.88 (Annexure-C) for a period of six months or till concurrence was given by the P.S.C., whichever was earlier. Undisputedly the Public Service Commission did not give its concurrence to the promotion. The petitioner was required to be reverted back to his original post. I am at a loss to understand that if, because of the non-concurrence by P.S.C. the respondent no. 5 was required to be reverted back by Order dated 12.8.88, what persuaded the respondent no. 1 to promote the petitioner to the post of Revenue Officer on 25.11.88, that is, within about 3 months of the first reversion. It appears that the respondent no. 5 was blessed by the then Commissioner of the Municipal Corporation without applying the mind to the legal provisions or facts of the case, the respondent no. 5 was being promoted time and again. On the first occasion, the High Court had to interfere to quash his promotion; on the second occasion the P.S.C. did not concur. Despite these two orders, the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Katni, for the reasons best known to him, again promoted the respondent no. 5 to the post of Revenue Officer. It is further to be seen that not only the respondent no. Despite these two orders, the Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Katni, for the reasons best known to him, again promoted the respondent no. 5 to the post of Revenue Officer. It is further to be seen that not only the respondent no. 5 was made a Revenue Officer on probation for a period of one year, but within a period of eleven months he was made the Deputy Commissioner. Neither the respondent-Corporation nor the respondent no. 5 have placed before this Court, even for perusal, any order; which could show that the respondent no. 5 was confirmed as a Revenue Officer within that period of one year of probation. It appears that the respondent no. 5 was given the best benefits by the then Commissioner. 19. The orders passed by the Commissioner appointing the respondent no. 5 as Revenue Officer cannot be approved, being contrary to law. The Order dated 25.11.88 deserves to and is accordingly quashed. As a consequence, the Order Annexure R/1 issued on 11.10.89 falls to ground. The respondent/Corporation is required to reconsider the whole matter afresh in accordance with law. It is, however, made clear that the case of respondent no. 5 shall be reconsidered with the case of the present petitioners, in view of the requirements as provided under the appointment promotion rules. 20. It is expected of the Corporation that it would pass final orders within a period of two months from today. 21. In view of this Order, nothing is required to be done in M.P. No. 866/88. The contempt proceedings in MCC 275/88 are also dropped because in the opinion of this Court no useful purpose would be served by continuing the proceedings. 22. The petition is allowed. There shall be no orders as to cost. Security amount, if any, deposited by the petitioners be refunded back, after due verification. Petition allowed