Honble YADAV, J.–The present writ petition has been filed by the petitioner, challenging the legality and validity of the impugned order dated 14.8.87 Annex. 35 and order dated 18.3.88 Annex. 37 to the writ petition, discharging him from his services as a probationer within the terms and conditions of his appointment order dated 2.2.85 Annex. 1 to the writ petition, by virtue of which, he was appointed in the bank services as Officer for a period of two years subject to further extension by the Bank at its discretion upto maximum of one year. It was also stipulated in the appointment order dated 2.2.85 Annex. 1 that during the probation period, the services of the petitioner can be terminated by three months notice or on payment of three months pay and allowances in lieu thereof. (2). Admittedly, the probation period of the petitioner which was initially for two years was extended to further one year. It is not disputed before me that a regular charge-sheet dated 29.4.87 Annex. 4 to the writ petition was served on the petitioner and Shri L.R. Lachwani Manager (Inspection) was appointed as inquiry officer to inquire into the charges of mis-conduct of the petitioner and report to the disciplinary authority the findings thereof vide order dated 5.6.87 Annex. 8 to the writ petition. (3). The above-named officer appointed as inquiry officer by disciplinary authority vide his letter dated 5.6.87 Annex. 8 to the writ petition informed to the petitioner to attend the hearing with all relevant documents on 22.6.87 together with list of witnesses at Head Office at 11 AM. A true copy of the information sent by inquiry officer to the petitioner to attend the hearing with all relevant documents together with list of witnesses dated 5.6.87 is filed and marked as Annex. 9. (4). It is averred in the writ petition by the petitioner that irrespective of pendency of disciplinary proceedings against him he was discharged from his ser- services as a probationery simpliciter. In fact according to the petitioner the order impugned Annex. 35 is passed in the form of punishment which is not in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Service Rules applicable to him. (5). The respondent-Bank has filed a detail return, denying the averments made in the writ petition. It is averred in the reply filed by the respondent-Bank that the impugned order of discharge Annex. 35 is passed in the form of punishment which is not in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Service Rules applicable to him. (5). The respondent-Bank has filed a detail return, denying the averments made in the writ petition. It is averred in the reply filed by the respondent-Bank that the impugned order of discharge Annex. 35 has not been passed by way of penalty and the disciplinary proceedings are not at all relevant to the controversy in issue as the impugned order has neither been founded nor based on the allegation of mis conduct or for that matter it is not based on inquiry report. It is also averred in the return that the impugned order Annex. 35 is an order of discharge simpliciter for the reason that the petitioners services were not found to be satisfactory during his probation period. (6). I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. Perused the averments made in the writ petition as well as the return filed by respondent-Bank. I have also gone through the relevant materials on record which are necessary for just decision of the controversy involved in the present writ petition. (7). It is urged by Senior Advocate Mr. M. Mridul, assisted by Mr. R.S. Saluja that it is well settled that in case of an order of discharge simpliciter, the Court has to see whether the order was made on account of the misconduct if such a complaint was made and in that process the Court would examine the real circumstances as well as the basis and foundation of the order complained of and if the Court is satisfied that the impugned order of discharge simpliciter is not so innocuous as claimed to be by the respondent-Bank and if the circumstances further discloses that it is only a camouflage with a view to avoid a disciplinary inquiry as envisaged in the Service Regulations of 1985 made in this regard by respondent-Bank which is known as Bhilwara-Ajmer Kshetriya Gramin Bank (Staff) Service Regulations, 1985 then in such situation the impugned order of discharge simpliciter Annex 35 is liable to be quashed. In support of his argument he placed reliance on a decision rendered by the Supreme Court in case of Om Prakash Goel vs. Himachal Pradesh Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. Shimla & Anr. (1). (8). Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Mr. In support of his argument he placed reliance on a decision rendered by the Supreme Court in case of Om Prakash Goel vs. Himachal Pradesh Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. Shimla & Anr. (1). (8). Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Mr. M.S. Singhvi vehe- mently urged before me that it is settled law that the Court can lift the veil of the innocuous order to find whether it is the foundation or motive to pass the offending order. If misconduct is the foundation to pass the order then an enquiry into misconduct should be conducted and an action according to law should follow. But if it is motive, it is not incumbent upon the disciplinary authority to have the enquiry conducted and the service of a probation can be discharged in terms of the appointment order Annex. 1 or rules applicable to him. It is further urged by Mr. Singhvi that even if an enquiry was initiated it could be dropped midway and action could be taken in terms of the rules or order of appointment Annex. 1 to the writ petition. He invited my attention to appointment letter Annex.1 wherein the services of the petitioner could be discharged by an order of discharge simpliciter during his probation period by three months notice or on payment of three months pay and allowances in lieu thereof. According to Mr. Singhvi, the order of discharge simpliciter Annex. 35 reveals that the petitioners services are discharged as it was no more required by the respondent-Bank with immediate effect with an order to pay Rs. 5747.40 being three months emoluments in lieu of three months notice as per terms of the order of appointment dated 2.2.95 Annex. 1 and Staff Service Regulation of the Bank applicable to the petitioner. (9). In support of his aforesaid contention he placed reliance on a decision rendered by the Apex Court in case of State of U.P. & Anr. vs. Prem Lata Misra (KM) & Ors. (2) wherein it is held in paragraph 6 of the judgment that there is no need to conduct an inquiry into the alleged misconduct of the termination of service in terms of the contract. It is further held in the aforesaid paragraph that it is settled law that the Court can lift the veil of the innocuous order to find whether it is foundation or motive to quash the offending order. It is further held in the aforesaid paragraph that it is settled law that the Court can lift the veil of the innocuous order to find whether it is foundation or motive to quash the offending order. If misconduct is the foundation to pass the order then an inquiry into misconduct should be conducted and an action according to law should follow. But if it is motive, it is not incumbent upon the competent officer to have the enquiry conducted and the service of temporary employee could be terminated, in terms of the order of appointment or rules giving one months notice or pay/salary in lieu thereof. Even if an enquiry was initiated, it could be dropped midway and action could be taken in terms of the rules or order of appointment. (10). After hearing learned counsel for the parties a pointed question was asked to learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent-Bank Shri M.S. Singhvi as to whether any specific order of dropping the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner by respondent-Bank was passed ? He replied the aforesaid question in negative. No material has been brought on record which may lead to an inference that disciplinary proceedings initiated against the petitioner were dropped in the midway. (11). In the present case, it is not disputed that a regular charge-sheet dated 29.4.87 Annex. 4 was served on the petitioner. Indisputably, inquiry officer was also appointed by disciplinary authority vide his order dated 5.6.87 Annex. 8 to the writ petition. The respondent-Bank has not passed any order, dropping the disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner in the mid way before passing the impugned order of discharge simpliciter. Contrary to it Annex. 9 to the writ petition dated 5.6.87 passed by enquiry officer indicates that 22.6.87 was fixed for hearing in disciplinary proceedings and the petitioner was directed to attend the enquiry with all relevant documents and list of witnesses with the warning that if he failed to attend the enquiry on the appointed date, the inquiry officer will proceed ex parte. (12). It is also evident from perusal of Annex. 22 dated 24.6.87 passed by disciplinary authority that he has decided to proceed further in disciplinary inquiry. The order dated 30.6.87 Annex. 24 to the writ petition passed by disciplinary authority further indicates that he was determined to proceed with the disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner. (13). (12). It is also evident from perusal of Annex. 22 dated 24.6.87 passed by disciplinary authority that he has decided to proceed further in disciplinary inquiry. The order dated 30.6.87 Annex. 24 to the writ petition passed by disciplinary authority further indicates that he was determined to proceed with the disciplinary inquiry against the petitioner. (13). With the assistance of learned counsel for the parties, I have gone through with the materials available on record and after going through all these materials available on record I am satisfied that the order of discharge though appears to be innocuous was only intended to punish the petitioner for the misconduct which was mentioned in the charge-sheet Annex. 4 dated 29.4.87 which was served on the petitioner. After serving charge- sheet Annex. 4 on the petitioner, the inquiry was continued to be conducted by the inquiry officer and it was not dropped. I am further satisfied that before conclusion of the disciplinary inquiry the impugned order of discharge simpliciter was passed. I am of the view that the order of discharge simpliciter passed in innocuous form is only a cloak for an order of punishment which is not sustainable in eye of law and is liable to be quashed. (14). The controversy involved in the present case is squarely covered by the decision rendered by Apex Court in case of Om Prakash Goel (supra) and the facts and circumstances of the case relied upon by learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent- Bank in case of State of U.P. & Anr. (supra) are distinguishable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. (15). It is admitted by learned counsel for the parties that the petitioner is practising as a lawyer after his services are discharged from respondent-Bank. It is argued by learned counsel for the respondent that since the petitioner is admittedly practising as a lawyer, the question of granting back wages in any event does not arise and that even otherwise there cannot be a roving enquiry to the earnings he has made as a lawyer at this stage. (16). An identical question came up for consideration before the Apex Court in case of S.M. Saiyad vs. Baroda Municipal Corporation (3) where the employee was directed to be reinstated in service by the Labour Court. (16). An identical question came up for consideration before the Apex Court in case of S.M. Saiyad vs. Baroda Municipal Corporation (3) where the employee was directed to be reinstated in service by the Labour Court. In case of S.M. Saiyad (supra) on the question of back wages it was held by the Apex Court that although the petitioner was practising as a lawyer after enrolment during that period still he was entitled for back wages. (17). The view taken by the Apex Court in case of S.M. Saiyad (supra) was rei- terated in case of Om Prakash Goel (supra). Thus I am of the view that this Court cannot afford to refuse to grant back wages to the petitioner simply on the ground that he was practising as a lawyer during the relevant period. On the other hand, I would like to look into the probable income of the petitioner as a practising lawyer and after deducting the same, the balance of back wages are liable to be paid to him. (18). In the present case, no foundation has been laid either in the writ petition or in the return filed by respondent-Bank as to when the petitioner was enrolled as an advocate. The aforesaid fact can be easily verified from the Rajasthan Bar Council and the date recorded in the rolls of advocates maintained by Rajasthan Bar Council would be final and conclusive regarding the date of enrolment of the petitioner as a lawyer. It is true that in the present case, the income of the petitioner has also not been averred either in the writ petition or in the return filed by respondent-Bank but in order to avoid cumbersome proceedings I assess the income of the petitioner to be Rs. 50,000/- as a practising lawyer irrespective of his length of practice which shall be liable to be deducted from the balance amount to paid to him. In the facts and circumstances of this case the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service with full back wages upto the date of enrolment as a lawyer and thereafter he is entitled to be paid back wages at the rate of half of the subsistence allowance. (19). On the premises of the aforesaid discussion, the order of discharge which is in the nature of punishment is hereby quashed and the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service. (19). On the premises of the aforesaid discussion, the order of discharge which is in the nature of punishment is hereby quashed and the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service. He shall be entitled to the full back wages upto the date of his enrolment and the certified copy in this regard from Rajasthan Bar Council shall be deemed to be conclusive proof of his date of enrolment as an advocate. From the date of his enrolment as an advocate upto the date of his reinstatement he shall be entitled to the back wages at the rate of half of the subsistence allowance per month and the total amount shall be computed on that basis. After computing the back wages of the petitioner, a sum of Rs. 50,000/- deemed income earned by him as a practising lawyer shall be deducted and the balance amount shall be paid to him with a direction to the respondent-Bank to pass a fresh order of suspension and to proceed to pass any order in accordance with law on the facts and circumstances which existed on 14.8.87 when the impugned order Annex. 35 was passed. (20). As a result of aforementioned discussion, the instant writ petition is allowed and the order of discharge Annex. 35 dated 14.8.87 and Annex. 37 dated 18.3.88 are hereby quashed and the petitioner is reinstated subject to payment of back wages mentioned in the preceding paragraph of this judgment. The respondent-Bank is directed to proceed aforesh in accordance with law and also in the light of observations made in the body of this order. (21). In peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, parties directed to bear their own costs.