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1998 DIGILAW 678 (BOM)

Savita Bandodkar and others v. Edmundo Rodrigues and others

1998-12-01

R.M.S.KHANDEPARKAR

body1998
JUDGMENT - R.M.S. KHANDEPARKAR, J.:---By the present petition the petitioners challenge the orders passed by the respondents 4 and 5 rejecting the claim of the petitioners for mundkarship in respect of house No. 932 situated at Benaulim Accona, Salcete, Goa by impugned orders dated 11th August, 1988 and 18th April, 1995 respectively. 2.The facts in brief are that the respondents 1 and 2 herein and Smt. Elvita Rosita Ozario Rodrigues, Shri Iraquinho Rodrigues and Smt. Prazy C. Rodrigues filed a suit against the petitioners for their eviction from the suit house being Regular Civil Suit No. 29/83 in the Civil Court at Margao wherein the petitioners in their written statement claimed to be the mundkars in respect of the said suit house. It was the case of the said respondents that they are the owners of the suit house which is situated in the property belonging to the respondent No. 3 herein. On account of issue of mundkarship being raised by the petitioners, the same was referred to the Mamlatdar of Salcete, respondent No. 4 herein for his decision in terms of section 32 of the Goa, Daman and Diu Mundkars (Protection and Eviction) Act, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act'). 3.The Mamlatdar issued notice to the respondents excluding respondent No. 3 and, therefore, the petitioners herein by their application dated 15th November, 1985, prayed for necessary notice to the respondent No. 3 on the ground that inspite of the fact that respondent No. 3 is undisputedly the owner of the property, it had not been joined as party to the proceedings before the Mamlatdar and no notice has been issued to the respondent No. 3. Before taking any decision on the said application the Mamlatdar, respondent No. 4 herein, issued notice of the said application to the respondent No. 3 herein, who objected to the said application being granted on the ground that the said Act does not apply to the respondent No. 3 in view of judgment dated 13th June, 1984, passed by the Additional Collector of Goa in the appeal filed by one Shri Harichandra Vassu Gaude v. Shri Manghesh Devalaya. The Mamlatdar, the respondent No. 4 herein upon hearing the parties on the said application dismissed the same by the impugned order dated 11th August, 1988 and the revision application preferred against the same by the petitioners was rejected by the Additional Collector, South Goa, the respondent No. 5 herein by his order dated 18th April, 1995 on the basis of the said earlier order of the Additional Collector in the matter of Shri Harichandra Vassu Gaude v. Shri Manghesh Devalaya. 4.Shri S.S. Kantak, the learned advocate appearing for the petitioners, while assailing the orders, submitted that undisputedly the land belongs to the respondent No. 3 and the petitioners are in occupation of the house since prior to the appointed day, that is, since more than one year prior to 12th March, 1976. The appointed day under the said Act was 12th March, 1976. It is also not disputed that no proceedings were initiated by the respondent No. 3 against the petitioners for their eviction from the suit house within the period of one year prior to the appointed day. He further submitted that section 39 of the said Act deals with the cases to which the said Act is not applicable and in terms of the said section the land owned or held by Government, local authority or Prevedoria de Assistencia Publica are excluded from the applicability of the said Act. There being specific provision in the said Act providing for the exclusion of its application, it was not permissible for the respondents 4 and 5 to refer to the provisions of the said Act to decide the applicability and non-applicability of the Agricultural Tenancy Act to the lands belonging to Churches and the respondent No. 3. According to the learned Advocate, therefore, the authorities have acted with material irregularity and have deliberately refused to act in accordance with the provisions contained in the said Act, inspite of the fact that the land on which the house of the petitioners is situated is not excluded from the applicability of the said Act. According to the learned Advocate, therefore, the authorities have acted with material irregularity and have deliberately refused to act in accordance with the provisions contained in the said Act, inspite of the fact that the land on which the house of the petitioners is situated is not excluded from the applicability of the said Act. Being so, the Mamlatdar could not have avoided the respondent No. 3 being made a party to the proceedings and the issue referred to the Mamlatdar could not be decided without the presence of the respondent No. 3 which, according to the petitioners, is a Bhatkar of the property in relation to the house which is in occupation of the petitioners, which the petitioners claim to be their dwelling house and claim protection under the said Act. 5.Upon hearing the advocate for the petitioners and on perusal of the impugned orders, it is seen that the Mamlatdar while rejecting the application dated 15th November, 1985, held that the said Act cannot be made applicable to the land held by association/institution in view of the decision of the Additional Collector passed in appeal filed by (Shri Harichandra Vassu Gaude v. Shri Manghesh Devalaya)1, being Case No. Mund/AC/APL/67/83 dated 13th June, 1984. The respondent No. 3 in this respect has relied upon certain observations from the judgment of the Additional Collector wherein the Additional Collector has observed that under the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964, the term 'person' is defined to include joint family, communicate, temple, church, mosque or any other religious or charitable institution whereas in the said Act the term 'person' is defined to include only joint Hindu family and there is no reference to any institution and considering that both the Acts give protection to certain class of persons, there ought to have been same reason to give different definitions for the same term and, therefore, anyone occupying Devasthan land could not be held to be entitled to claim protection under the said Act. The respondent No. 4 without considering any other aspect of the case and without going through the provisions of the said Act merely referring to the said observations made by the Additional Collector in the said Order dated 13th June, 1984, rejected the application filed by the petitioners. The respondent No. 4 without considering any other aspect of the case and without going through the provisions of the said Act merely referring to the said observations made by the Additional Collector in the said Order dated 13th June, 1984, rejected the application filed by the petitioners. The respondent No. 5 on its part held that the control of churches and administrations of churches is under the Canon Law and Regulamenta das Confrarias and, therefore, there was no justification for impleadment of the respondent No. 3 in the proceedings. 6.The section 39 of the said Act clearly provides as under :-- "39. Exemptions - Nothing in this Act shall apply to the land owned or held by Government, Government of any other State in India, Government of India, a local authority or Provedoria da Assistancia Publica." On a plain reading of section 39 it is evident that the land owned by Government and local authorities are excluded from the applicability of the said Act. It is, therefore, clear on the face of the said Act that legislature thought if fit to exclude the land owned by the Government and the local authorities including Provedoria de Assistancia Publica from its applicability. 7.In view of the said clear provision in the said Act it was the duty of the authorities below to decide the issue regarding the necessity of joining the respondent No. 3 as party to the proceedings by referring to the said section 39 of the said Act rather than proceeding to decide whether the petitioners can claim to be mundkars of the suit house or not only because the respondent No. 3 happens to be an institution dealing with the administration of churches and its properties. The records, therefore, exfacie disclose total non-application of mind by the respondents 4 and 5 while dealing with the application filed by the petitioners for joining the respondent No. 3 as the party to the proceedings for decision on the issue regarding mundkarship. That apart undisputedly the respondent No. 3 was a party to the suit filed against the petitioners wherein the issue of mundkarship was raised and referred to the Mamlatdar for decision. That apart undisputedly the respondent No. 3 was a party to the suit filed against the petitioners wherein the issue of mundkarship was raised and referred to the Mamlatdar for decision. The respondent No. 3 being a party to the suit wherein the issue of mundkarship was framed, it was not permissible for the Mamlatdar and for the same reason for the Additional Collector to refuse to join the respondent No. 3 as party in the proceedings in question. 8.As rightly submitted by the learned Advocate for the petitioners, the reasons given for rejecting the application is also not justifiable. As already seen above section 39 of the said Act clearly provides that certain classes of lands are excluded from its applicability and such classes of land do not include the lands belonging to churches or institutions like the respondent No. 3. Being so, before deciding the issue of mundkarship claimed by the petitioners, it was necessary for the respondents 4 and 5 to hear the respondent No. 3 by joining it as the party to the proceedings and then decide the issue based on the materials placed before them by all the parties to the suit. It was not permissible for the respondents 4 and 5 to pre-judge the issue of mundkarship claimed by the petitioners by referring to a judgment passed by Additional Collector in some other matter totally unconnected with the subject matter of the dispute in the present case. In any case, the observations made by the Additional Collector cannot be considered as laying down the law interpreting the provisions of the said Act. Reference to certain words/terms in the Agricultural Tenancy Act to interpret the provisions contained in the said Act is certainly improper and not permissible. The two statutes cannot be considered in pari materia with each other in the strict sense inasmuch as the class of people which are afforded protection under the Agricultural Tenancy Act, are different from those given protection under the said Act. 9.In this view of the matter, the impugned orders cannot be sustained and are liable to be quashed and set aside and the application dated 15th November, 1985, filed by the petitioners before the respondent No. 4 be allowed. 9.In this view of the matter, the impugned orders cannot be sustained and are liable to be quashed and set aside and the application dated 15th November, 1985, filed by the petitioners before the respondent No. 4 be allowed. The respondent No. 4 shall dispose of the reference in respect of the issue of mundkarship by joining the respondent No. 3 as party to the proceedings and after giving opportunity to all the parties to place before it all the materials regarding their contentions and decide the issue on merits. 10.In the result the petition succeeds. The impugned orders are hereby quashed and set aside. The application dated 15th November, 1985, filed by the petitioners is, hereby, allowed. The respondent No. 4 shall issue necessary notice to the respondent No. 3 in the said proceedings and decide the said issue on merits after hearing all the parties and giving opportunity to all the parties to place before it all the materials regarding their contentions. Considering the fact that the civil suit pertains to the year 1983, Mamlatdar shall dispose of the reference as expeditiously as possible and in any case before 31st December, 1998 and shall submit the compliance report to this Court in the first week of January, 1999. Rule is made absolute in above terms. There shall be no order as to costs. Petition allowed. *****