V. P. MOHAN KUMAR, J. ( 1 ) A complaint made by the Article Clerk of a Chartered Accountant has given rise to this complaint of the petitioner before this Court. The facts in brief are as follows :the 1st petitioner is a partner of the 2nd petitioner-firm of Chartered Accountants. The 2nd respondent, who is his own niece, was taken as an Article Clerk under the 1st petitioner on 21-6-1989. She claims to have been working diligently while the 1st petitioner has different story to tell. She, according to him, was a chronic absentee and apparently as an indulgent uncle, the 1st petitioner condoned the absence allowing her to continue and he did not terminate the articleship. She, according to the 1st petitioner, worked for 22 days in a span of two years. It is alleged by the 1st petitioner that at the end of two years, she sought for termination voluntarily; this is the disputed part in the pleading of the 2nd respondent-she claims that a consent letter to terminate was taken clandestinely. Whatever it be, this dispute need not be adjudicated at this stage. Annexure-A is the certificate issued to the 2nd respondent by the 1st petitioner and that landed her as a complainant before the 1st respondent. ( 2 ) ). The 2nd respondent made a complaint before the 1st respondent against the 1st petitioner complaining inter alia as under : (I) That she had worked for more number of days than certified by the petitioner; (II) That the petitioner had not paid the stipend throughout the period she worked; (III) That the petitioner made the 2nd respondent open a Bank Account in the name of the 2nd respondent; (IV) That the petitioner did not maintain any attendance register. Annexures-B and D are the copies of the complaints made by the 2nd respondent. This complaint was received by the 1st respondent. Regulation 67 of the Chartered Accountants Regulations of 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "the Regulations") deals with the procedure to be followed in relation to a complaint received from an Article Clerk against his principal "on a matter concerning his training". Regulation 50 deals with an item of training, namely the practical training. Thus when the complaint received from the Article Clerk related to this part of the training, automatically Regn. 67 stood attracted. The said regulation read as hereunder :"67. Regulation 50 deals with an item of training, namely the practical training. Thus when the complaint received from the Article Clerk related to this part of the training, automatically Regn. 67 stood attracted. The said regulation read as hereunder :"67. Complaint against the principal (1) Where an articled clerk makes a complaint against his principal on a matter concerning his training as an articled clerk, the President or the Vice-President as the Executive Committee may decide from time to time, may cause an investigation to be made and submit a report to the Executive Committee. (2) The Executive Committee shall submit the report of the investigation to the Council with its recommendations. (3) The Council may, on a consideration of the report of the Executive Committee, pass such order as it may consider expedient, including an order withdrawing the entitlement of the principal to train one or more articled clerks either permanently or for a specified period :provided that no order withdrawing the entitlement of the principal to train one or more articled clerks shall be passed without giving him an opportunity of being heard. Explanation- An order passed by the Council under this regulation shall be without prejudice to any action that the Council may take against the principal under Section 21. (4) The President or the Vice-President as the Executive Committee may decide from time to time, may, pending an investigation of the complaint, either terminate or suspend the articles and allow the articled clerk to be accepted as additional articled clerk by a member, notwithstanding anything contained in Regulation 43. Explanation - For the purpose of this Regulation, the articled clerk includes a person who at the relevant time was registered as such. "therefore, as envisaged under Regn. 67 (1) above, the 1st respondent initially caused an inquiry to be held through Sri. B. P. Rao. The subject-matter of the enquiry is stated thus :"sub : Dispute between the articled clerk Ms. Sangeetha Nahar (MM-42332) and her ex-employer Shri Gautam Raj Golla (M. No. 25140) over period of leave shown in Form 109' dated 26-7-91. "annexure-G is the final report after the inquiry. The following paragraph in the inquiry report emphasises the scope of the inquiry :"12. As the Enquiry was limited to find out whether the complainant has worked for just 22 days or more as claimed by the Articled Clerk. "annexure-G is the final report after the inquiry. The following paragraph in the inquiry report emphasises the scope of the inquiry :"12. As the Enquiry was limited to find out whether the complainant has worked for just 22 days or more as claimed by the Articled Clerk. The EO has no hesitation to come to conclusion that the Articled Clerk has worked only for 22 days on the basis of the examination of the witnesses and on the basis of the evidence produced before the EO by the respondent-employer in this respect. "thus the inquiry was confined to that part of the allegations made by the Article Clerk which related to a matter concerning her training. It did not touch upon the other allegations made by the Article Clerk against the principal. ( 3 ) IN this case it is seen that after the report of Sri B. P. Rao, the 1st respondent took up the complaint of the 2nd respondent for consideration. This procedure is permissible under Regn. 67 (3) as well. Thereupon the petitioner responded and invoking proviso to Regn. 12 (1) prayed for dropping the further proceedings being initiated on Annexures-B and D complaints. By the impugned order Annexure-K the said request has been rejected. Aggrieved, the petitioner challenges the whole proceedings initiated on the complaint of the 2nd respondent. ( 4 ) BEFORE we advert to various aspects of the case highlighted by the petitioner, we may usefully refer to the provisions of the statutes relating to this subject. The Regulations are framed by the Council of the Institute by virtue of the powers conferred on the Council under Section 30 of the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' ). Under Section 9 of the Act, it is provided that the Council shall manage the affairs of the Institute of Chartered Accountants and it shall discharge the functions assigned to it under the Act. Section 15 (2) (1) confers powers on the Council to take disciplinary actions against its members. Section 22 of the Act defines professional misconduct and Section 21 deals with procedure to be followed in the case of professional or other misconduct. It may be noted that Sec. 21 covers procedure to be followed while investigating into all classes of misconducts be it professional or otherwise. Section 22 of the Act defines professional misconduct and Section 21 deals with procedure to be followed in the case of professional or other misconduct. It may be noted that Sec. 21 covers procedure to be followed while investigating into all classes of misconducts be it professional or otherwise. Regulation 12 is the subsidiary provision laying down in detail the procedure to be followed while conducting the inquiry under Sec. 21 of the Act. ( 5 ) SECTION 30 (p) of the Act enables the Council to frame Regulations regarding the powers, duties and functions of President and Vice-President of the Councils; Section 30 (s) deals with framing of regulations relating to exercise of disciplinary powers conferred under the Act. It is in exercise of its power conferred under Sec. 30 (p) and (s) of the Act that the Regulations 12 and 67 have been framed by the Council. It means that to discharge the duties assigned to the Council under Sec. 15 (2) (1) and Ss. 21 and 22 of the Act, the Regulations have been framed. The powers of the Council is not exhausted by means of framing of the Regulations. This aspect would be clear if we advert to proviso occurring after Regn. 67 (3), which expressly saves the power vested in the Council under Sec. 21 of the Act. Therefore, any finding entered after ascertaining theprima faciecase while conducting any inquiry under Regn. 67 (1) would not be the decision of the Council on the complaint received by it. It is only the Council who can take a final decision on the complaint received against any member regarding his commission of any misconduct by him. The preliminary inquiries contemplated under Regn. 67 do not abrogate the substantial powers of the Council conferred under Sec. 21 of the Act read with Regn. 12 of the Regulations. ( 6 ) BEFORE embarking on further investigation of the points argued, it has to be borne in mind that the inquiry being held by the 1st respondent is, as a fact-finding body any decision taken by the Council is amenable to the appellate jurisdiction under Sec. 22-A of the Act. A right of appeal is provided to the High Court under Sec. 22-A (1 ). A right of appeal is provided to the High Court under Sec. 22-A (1 ). Besides the High Court has also suo motu powers as well under Sec. 22-A (2) to examine the correctness of the order of the Council vis-a-vis its allegation of misconduct. As such it is not as if the party aggrieved, is left with no remedy to ventilate his grievances. Therefore, while exercising its extraordinary jurisdiction by the High Court, under Art. 226 of the Constitution, it should examine, whether the impugned action is per se illegal or vitiated by errors apparent on the face of record. Unless it is, the Court will be well advised to refrain from interfering with internal administration of a peer statutory body, responsible to keep up the ethics of its members. ( 7 ) NOW, the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. Gandhi, submitted that by virtue of proviso to Regn. 12 (1) since the complaint with respect to which Annexure-K order is made is substantially the same as that was enquired and covered by Annexure-G report, the Secretary of the 1st (respondent) should have filed the complaint without any further action. The proviso in question reads as hereunder :"provided that if the subject-matter of a complaint is, in the opinion of the President, substantially the same as or has been covered by any previous complaint or information received, the Secretary shall file the said complaint without any further action and inform the complainant accordingly. "i am of the view that this argument proceeds on a total misconception of the statutory position. The said proviso could have been invoked only if the Council had earlier exercised its power under Regn. 12 of the Regulations or under Sec. 21 of the Act with respect to a substantially similar complaint. This is not so in this case. In order to attract the proviso, there should have existed a similar complaint which had already been inquired into as contemplated under the Act or Regulations. What is the nature of an inquiry under the Act? The following passage from Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L. K. Ratna, (1986) 4 SCC 537 : ( AIR 1987 SC 71 ) would make the scope and width of the enquiry contemplated under the Act. "11. What is the nature of an inquiry under the Act? The following passage from Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. L. K. Ratna, (1986) 4 SCC 537 : ( AIR 1987 SC 71 ) would make the scope and width of the enquiry contemplated under the Act. "11. It is apparent that in the scheme incorporated in Section 21 of the Act there are separate functionaries, the Disciplinary Committee, the Council and, in certain cases, the High Court. The controlling authority is the Council, which is only logical, for the Council is the governing body of the Institute. When the Council receives information or a complaint alleging that a member of the Institute is guilty of misconduct, and it is prima facie of opinion that there is substance in the allegations it refers the case to the Disciplinary Committee. The Disciplinary Committee plays a subordinate role. It conducts an inquiry into the allegations. Since the inquiry is into allegations of misconduct by the member, it possesses the character of a quasi-judicial proceeding. The Disciplinary Committee thereafter submits a report of the result of the inquiry to the Council. The Disciplinary Committee is merely a Committee of the Institute, with a function specifically limited by the provisions of the Act. As a subordinate body, it reports to the Council, the governing body. The report will contain a statement of the allegations, the defence entered by the member, a record of the evidence and the conclusions upon that material. The conclusions are the conclusions of the Committee. They are tentative only. They cannot be regarded as 'findings'. The Disciplinary Committee is not vested by the Act with power to render any findings. It is the Council which is empowered to find whether the member is guilty of misconduct. Both Section 21 (2) and Section 21 (3) are clear as to that. If on receipt of the report the Council finds that the member is not guilty of misconduct, Section 21 (2) requires it to record its finding accordingly, and to direct that the proceedings shall be filed or the complaint shall be dismissed. If, on the other hand, the Council finds that the member is guilty of misconduct, Section 21 (3) requires it to record a finding accordingly, and thereafter to proceed in the manner laid down in the succeeding sub-sections. If, on the other hand, the Council finds that the member is guilty of misconduct, Section 21 (3) requires it to record a finding accordingly, and thereafter to proceed in the manner laid down in the succeeding sub-sections. So the finding by the Council is the determinative decision as to the guilt of the member, and because it is determinative the Act requires it to be recorded. A responsibility so grave as the determination that a member is guilty of misconduct, and the recording of that finding, has been specifically assigned by the Act to the governing body, the Council. It is also apparent that it is only upon a finding being recorded by the Council that the Act moves forward to the final stage of penalisation. The recording of the finding by the Council is the jurisdictional springboard for the penalty proceeding which follows. "admittedly, no such enquiry was conducted by the 1st respondent in regard to any similar complaint made against the 1st petitioner previously. The gamut of procedure contemplated was not undergone before the submission of Annexure-G report. Therefore, substantially similar complaint was not examined by the Council before the present proceedings. The preliminary inquiry as is contemplated under Regn. 67 (1) and (2) which has produced Annexure-G report is part of the inquiry of the very same complaint which is now being enquired into. The argument built on the proviso to Regn. 12 (1) is misplaced as it proceeds on the assumption that the present inquiry is a second inquiry into the very same set of allegation or complaint. To put it in other words, Annexures-B and D have not been inquired into by the Council so far as contemplated under Sec. 21 of the Act read with Regulation 12. The proviso, would be attracted only if any similar complaint had been dealt with earlier under Regn. 12. It is not so. As such the proviso relied on by the Counsel do not apply to the case. ( 8 ) AS regards the authorities cited at the Bar, they reinforce the resultant statutory position. There are different tiers of Committees to go into the allegations of misconduct. The supreme power, undoubtedly, vests in the Council and the various subordinate Committees cannot denude its power in any manner. Whatever be the finding on the allegations, the ultimate decision has to be taken by the Council. There are different tiers of Committees to go into the allegations of misconduct. The supreme power, undoubtedly, vests in the Council and the various subordinate Committees cannot denude its power in any manner. Whatever be the finding on the allegations, the ultimate decision has to be taken by the Council. The following paragraph from the decision of the Supreme Court in Institute of Chartered Accountants of India v. Price Waterhouse, (1997) 93 Taxman 588 : ( AIR 1998 SC 74 ) indicates the manner in which the inquiry is being held by the 1st respondent. "11. A combined reading of the above statutory provisions would indicate that in case the Council finds that the report of the Disciplinary Committee recording 'no-guilt' is not correct or relevant material was not considered by the Disciplinary Committee, the Council has the power to call further report from the Disciplinary Committee. Though prima facie, the arguments of Shri P. P. Rao is attractive, on deeper probe, it is difficult to give acceptance to the contention that the report of 'no guilt' by the Disciplinary Committee should be given primacy as it would deplete the content of the power to maintain discipline among the members of the Institute. The ultimate control over conduct of the members is by the Council. The Disciplinary Committee is a fact-finding body which is a body subordinate to the Council as a fact-finding authority. If its finding of guilt or non-guilt receives finality, it denudes the Council of the power to direct further appropriate enquiry into the professional or other misconduct not adequately dealt with by the Disciplinary Committee. Similarly, the Council would be disabled to exercise effective vigil and supervision over the professional or other misconduct of the members of the Institute. The Parliament has invested that power with the Council and the construction suggested allows the tail to wag while the controlling body, the Council lamentably look at it. Such a construction would be deleterious to the maintenance of discipline or the professional conduct on the part of the members of the Institute or Associate Members of the Institute, as the case may be. Such a construction would be deleterious to the maintenance of discipline or the professional conduct on the part of the members of the Institute or Associate Members of the Institute, as the case may be. It is true that the discipline sought to be maintained is penal in nature; nonetheless, maintenance of discipline or professional or other conduct of the members or associate members is salutary and paramount to maintain public confidence in the members of the Institute and to inculcate sense of discipline and excellence in the performance of the functions as member of the Institute or associate member of the Institute, as the case may be. "thus it is clear that, the enquiry under Sec. 21 of the Act read with Regn. 12 of the Regulations has commenced and as such proviso to Regn. 12 (1) has no application. Annexure-K order is perfectly justified and does not call for any interference. ( 9 ) BESIDES the petitioner need not have apprehension or misgivings about the enquiry. The following passage from the decision cited above namely (1986) 4 SCC 537 : ( AIR 1987 SC 71 ) charters as to how the inquiry has to be held. "12. Now when it enters upon the task of finding whether the member is guilty of misconduct, the Council considers the report submitted by the Disciplinary Committee. The report constitutes the material to be considered by the Council. The Council will take into regard the allegations against the member, his case in defence, the recorded evidence and the conclusions expressed by the Disciplinary Committee. Although the member has participated in the inquiry, he has had no opportunity to demonstrate the fallibility of the conclusions of the Disciplinary Committee. It is material which falls within the domain of consideration by the Council. It should also be open to the member, we think, to point out to the Council any error in the procedure adopted by the Disciplinary Committee which could have resulted in vitiating the inquiry. Section 21 (8) arms the Council with power to record oral and documentary evidence, and it is precisely to take account of that eventuality and to repair the error that this power seems to have been conferred. Section 21 (8) arms the Council with power to record oral and documentary evidence, and it is precisely to take account of that eventuality and to repair the error that this power seems to have been conferred. It cannot, therefore, be denied that even though the member has participated in the inquiry before the Disciplinary Committee, there is a range of consideration by the Council on which he has not been heard. He is clearly entitled to an opportunity of hearing before the Council finds him guilty of misconduct. "i am sure, that the 1st respondent will bear in mind these observations while conducting the enquiry into Annexures-B and D complaint. ( 10 ) NOW, as I am of the view that the inquiry as contemplated under Sec. 21 of the Act and Regn. 12 is yet to commence, it is premature to decide the propriety or otherwise of the inquiry. As such, I am not referring to the various decisions cited by Sri Gandhi in relation to the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and as regards the formation of 'prima facie' opinion. I am not adverting to various factual details furnished and controverted by respective sides and expressing any opinion thereon as it might prejudice the mind at the inquiry. The whole issues are left open. ( 11 ) THE petitioner is not entitled to any relief in this Writ Petition. As the Writ Petition was moved by the petitioner he is estopped from pleading limitation in defence at any stage of the inquiry. The petitioner belongs to an exalted profession and he should co-operate with the inquiry and establish that Caesers wife is always above suspicion. The Writ Petition is accordingly dismissed. --- *** --- .