Prakash Chand Saini v. State of Rajasthan — 1998 DIGILAW 682 (RAJ)

Honble MISRA, J.–In all these writ petitions the principal question which has been raised is whether the Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA) and Member of Parliament (MP) representing a constituency can be treated as full fledged Member of the Municipal Council, so as to participate and vote in the proceeding of No Confidence Motion for removing the Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the Municipal Council and hence were required to be given a notice of the meeting for carrying out the motion of No Confidence. (2). The question has cropped up since No Confidence Motions have been passed against all these petitioners, who were either Chairman or Vice Chairman of their respective Municipalities and they are all commonly aggrieved against their removal on account of passing of the No Confidence Motions against them and the ground of challenge is also essentially the same in material particulars as the factual details which have been urged for challenging the No Confidence Motions are clearly disputed questions of facts and hence do not deserve any interference on these counts. Hence, the only question on which arguments were entertained is the one referred to hereinabove. (3). It would be therefore be sufficient to state summarily that the petitioner Prakash Chand in SBCWP No. 5410/97, who having succeeded as a Ward Member of Municipal Council, Karauli was elected subsequently as Chairman by the support of majority of members of the Municipal Council, but thereafter has been removed since No Confidence Motion had been initiated against him which was carried out as 24 out of 25 members voted in support of the motion. Smt. Laxmi Devi in SBCWP No. 5539/97 also had been elected Vice Chairman, after she succeeded in the election of Ward Members of Municipal Board Kotputli but has been voted out of the post of Vice Chairman as the No Confidence Motion which had been initiated against her was supported by 17 out of 25 members. (4). Smt. Laxmi Devi in SBCWP No. 5539/97 also had been elected Vice Chairman, after she succeeded in the election of Ward Members of Municipal Board Kotputli but has been voted out of the post of Vice Chairman as the No Confidence Motion which had been initiated against her was supported by 17 out of 25 members. (4). Similarly, Yogesh Chand Saini, who is the petitioner in SBCWP No. 2510/97 was voted out from the post of Chairman of Alwar Municipal Council, since 35 out of 36 members, who were present in the meeting voted in support of the No Confidence Motion against Shri Saini and last of all Shri Radhey Shyam Sharma in SBCWP No. 2460/97 who was the Chairman of Municipal Board, Bandikui was also removed from the post of Chairman, as the No Confidence Motion has been carried out against him since 10 out of 15 members voted in support of No Confidence Motion in this matter. However, the petitioner in this writ petitioner has disputed about the validity of vote of one of the members on the ground that his resignation from the membership of the Council should not have been treated as effective on 5.11.1996, which was the date of the meeting for carrying out No Confidence Motion. But I do not deem it worthwhile to enter into this dispute as the writ petition had not been entertained due to this grievance. (5). It can thus be noticed that all the petitioners have been removed from their respective posts as the motions for No Confidence has been passed by the votes of 2/3rd members of the Municipal Council, which is the mandatory legal requirement for passing the No Confidence Motion as envisaged in the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 (hereinafter to be referred as the `Act of 1959). (6). Challenging the No Confidence Motions, all the petitioners, however, have narrated detailed facts separately in their writ petitions which in substance is for the purpose of impressing upon this Court that the procedure for passing No Confidence Motion have not been duly followed and the voters were influenced in various ways and also were pressurised to vote in support of the motion adopting devious method. In some of the writ petitions, the petitioners have also challenged about the eligibility of some members participating in the proceeding. In some of the writ petitions, the petitioners have also challenged about the eligibility of some members participating in the proceeding. As already stated, it is difficult to entertain submissions on these counts since all these writ petitions were clearly not entertained to scrutinies the factual details nor the same is the function of this Court while exercising its writ jurisdiction. (7). The counsel for the petitioners therefore, have made a desperate attempt to challenge the No Confidence Motions in order to bring it within the scope of legal parameters and hence, they have all urged that the Parliament vide its 74th Amendment of the Constitution of India, has incorporated in Part IX under Article 243-R incorporating provisions for Composition of Municipalities, which reads as under: ``243-R. Composition of Municipalities: Save as provided in Cl. (2) all the seats in a Municipality shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from the territorial constituencies in the Municipal area and for this purpose each Municipal area shall be divided into territorial constituencies to be known as wards, (2) The Legislature of a State may, by law, provide (a) for the representation in a Municipality of (i) persons having special knowledge or experience in Municipal administration; (ii) the members of the House of the People and the members of the Legislative Assembly of the State representing constituencies which comprise wholly or partly the Municipal area; (iii) the members of the Council of State and the members of the Legislative Council of the State registered as electors within the Municipal area; (iv) the Chairpersons of the Committee constituted under Cl. (5) of Art. 243-S: Provided that the persons referred to in paragraph (i) shall not have the right to vote in the meeting of the Municipality; (b) the manner of election of the Chairperson of a Municipality. (8). In view of the aforesaid amendment to the Constitution, the State of Rajasthan also introduced necessary amendment in the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 vide the Rajasthan Municipalities (2nd Amendment) Act, 1994. (8). In view of the aforesaid amendment to the Constitution, the State of Rajasthan also introduced necessary amendment in the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 vide the Rajasthan Municipalities (2nd Amendment) Act, 1994. The amendment that the introduced in Section 9 of the Municipal Act is as follows: ``(i) Subject to the provisions contained in the succeeding sub section to save as provided in the following provisions of this sub section of the seats in a Municipality shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from the territorial constituencies known as wards, the members of such seats, not being less than 13, being fixed by the State Government from time to time by notification in the Official Gazette; (a) the following viz. (i) three persons or 10% of the number of elected members of a Municipality, which ever is less with special knowledge or experience in Municipal Administration as co-opted by the elected members of the Municipality and; (ii) A member of the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly representing a constituency which comprises wholly or partly the area of a Municipality, shall be represented on the Board, Council or Corporation of such Municipality. Provided that the persons referred to in sub clause (1) shall not have the right to vote in the meetings of the Municipality and (b) A member of the House of the People representing a constituency which comprises wholly or partly the area of a Municipality with a Municipal Council or as the case may be a Municipal Corporation shall be represented on the Council or Corporation of such Municipality. The amendment further incorporated under 1A upon the completion of each census after the establishment of the Board, the number of seats shall be re-determined by the State Government by notification in the official gazette on the basis of the population of the Municipal area within the territorial jurisdiction of the Board as ascertained at the latest census. Provided that the determination of seats as aforesaid shall not affect the then composition of the Board until the expiry of the duration of the Board. (9). Provided that the determination of seats as aforesaid shall not affect the then composition of the Board until the expiry of the duration of the Board. (9). The amendment introduced in Section 9 of the Rajasthan Municipal Act of 1994 has given plank to the petitioners counsel to urge that in view of the provisions with regard to Motion of No Confidence under the Act of 1959 as well as the relevant rules as also the provisions regarding the conduct of business of a meeting of the Municipal Boards as well as its relevant rules, every member has to be called in the meeting by intimation to him through a notice and as such every member has a right to participate in the meetings. All the learned counsels for the petitioners have therefore tried to establish that the Member of Parliament as also the Member of the Legislative Assembly should be treated as a Member of the Municipal Board in view of the amendment introduced and according to them the MLAs and MPs are also the members, who constitute the Municipal Board as a result of which the notice of the meeting for carrying out no confidence motion ought to have been issued to them also and they should have been allowed to exercise also their right to vote in such meetings. To re-inforce this aspect of the matter, they have also urged that the State of Rajasthan itself vide its circular dated 6.3.95 made it clear vide Annx. 6 in SBCWP No. 5410/97 making it clear by issuing instructions to all the Commissioners/Executive Officers/Municipal Corporation/Board/Municipalities of Rajasthan to comply with the provisions of Section 9 of the Act of 1959 in accordance with the 74th Amendment of the Constitution so as to ensure that notice of meeting of the Board be issued to all Members of Parliament and Member of Vidhan Sabha of the area. Since the relevant provision under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act of 1959 provides under Section 72 of the Act that ``Motion expressing No Confidence in the Chairman or the Vice Chairman shall be made and considered in the manner prescribed. Since the relevant provision under the Rajasthan Municipalities Act of 1959 provides under Section 72 of the Act that ``Motion expressing No Confidence in the Chairman or the Vice Chairman shall be made and considered in the manner prescribed. It is in this context that the counsel for the parties in all these matters have stressed on the requirement of issuing notice to the Members of Parliament and the Members of the Legislative Assembly in the meeting of the Board including the meeting for carrying out the No Confidence Motion against the Chairman or the Vice Chairman of Municipal Council. (10). The relevant question, therefore, boils down to one and the only issue as to whether the MLAs and MPs can be construed to be a member of the Municipal Board so as to participate and vote in the meetings for carrying out No Confidence Motion even in absence of an express provision under the Municipal Act of 1959 granting voting rights to the MLA and MPs in the affairs of the Municipality merely by drawing inference that the Rajasthan Legislature intended them to vote by virtue of amendment in Section 9 of the Act of 1959. (11). (11). Learned advocates for the petitioners Shri B.L. Sharma, Shir R.S. Rathore and Shri A.K. Sharma have all endeavoured hard to press the point that the MLAs and MPs in view of the Amendment of 1994 incorporated in Section 9 of the Act of 1959 ought to be construed as members of the Board and infact ought to be held to be having a voting right while considering the No Confidence Motion against Chairman or Vice Chairman since the relevant rule clearly provide that every member has to be called in the meeting by intimation to him through a notice and as such every member has a right to participate in the meetings, but in all these cases there has been a total dis-regard of the relevant provision as even the notice of the meeting has not been sent to the concerned MLAs and MPs, who according to the petitioners contention, are lawful members of the Board under Section 3(5) of the Act of 1959 and since they have been deprived of their right to participate and vote in the meeting for the purpose of carrying out the No Confidence Motion in the cases of all these petitioners, the motion carried against them ought to be struck down as illegal and invalid. (12). Elaborating on this point, it has further been submitted that there are three broad categories of members constituting the Board of the Municipality: (i) Elected (ii) Co-opted (iii) The local MLAs and MPs in view of the amendment introduced in Article 243-R of the Constitution which provides that all seats in the Municipality shall be filled by the members chosen by direct election from the territorial constituency in the Municipal area. Relying on the amendment of 1994 in the Act of 1959, it has been submitted that since all seats in a Municipality which is required to be filled should be by persons, who are chosen by direct election, there is no room for doubt that the Constitution provides each mode of choosing the members of the Municipality apart from the direct election, who are included within the definition of the Municipal Board. (13). (13). It has still been further urged that in view of the proviso to Article 243-R of the Constitution as also the proviso to Section 9 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 since voting right has expressly not been granted only to co-opted members laid down in clause (i) of the said section i.e. those members who have been included with special knowledge or experience in the municipal administration, the necessary inference should be drawn that the remaining category of members have voting rights in the affairs of the administration of a municipality including a proceeding for passing the No Confidence Motion against the Chairman/Vice-Chairman of the Municipality. (14). Contesting the plea raised by the petitioners, the learned Advocate General on behalf of the respondents has urged that the definition of the `Member has been given under Section 3(15) of the Municipal Act as a member meaning any person who is lawfully a member of the Board and under Section 61 it is made clear that every member of the Board has to take oath of office before entering upon his duties and such oath will be administered before the Collector or his nominee in the prescribed form. It has further been made clear in the section that if any member who fails to comply with this provision within a period of 3 months from the date of first meeting of the Board, he shall be deemed to have vacated his seat. It was also submitted that the definition of the `member as given out under Rules 78 of the Rajasthan Municipalities (Election Rules), 1994, the definition of `member means elected member of the Municipality. According to him the intention of the Legislature is very clear and no right to vote has been given to the MPs and MLAs in election of Chairperson and Dy. Chairperson. If a person who is not participating in the election of Chairperson and Dy. Chairperson, cannot have a right to vote in the meeting of No Confidence Motion against the Chairperson and Dy. Chairperson. He has supplemented his argument by contending that there is no provision under the Act even under the amended Act which gives right to vote in the meeting of election or No Confidence Motion against the Chairperson or Dy. Chairperson. Chairperson, cannot have a right to vote in the meeting of No Confidence Motion against the Chairperson and Dy. Chairperson. He has supplemented his argument by contending that there is no provision under the Act even under the amended Act which gives right to vote in the meeting of election or No Confidence Motion against the Chairperson or Dy. Chairperson. He has cited instances where on account of this controversy which arose before the Municipal Board, Beawer and Municipal Board, Bandikui, the Executive Officer sought direction from the Secretary of the Local Self Government whether MPs and MLAs have a right to vote in such matters at the time of passing of No Confidence Motion and the reply was in the negative by the State Government. He has, therefore, submitted that no notice was required to be given to the MPs and MLAs while considering a No Confidence Motion in the Municipalities. (15). It may, however, be noted that a circular dated 6.3.95 was issued by the State Government directing all Commissioners, Executive Officers of the Municipal Board/Councils/Corporations of Rajasthan clarifying that the MPs and MLAs will have only right in the Municipal Board constituted in their constituency and they will not have any right to vote in the meeting. (16). In order to resolve the controversy raised, it is imperative to closely and meticulously scrutinise Section 9 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act after the amendment introduced in 1994 in the light of the 74th Amendment of the Constitution incorporating Article 243-R and on a careful reading of the same (quoted hereinbefore), it cannot be lost sight of the fact that Article 243-R of the Constitution expressly lays down in clause (ii) that The Legislature of a State may be law provide for representation in a Municipality -persons having special knowledge or experience in them as also the Members of the House of the People and the Member of the Legislative Assembly of the State.... and there is a clear bar of those members who have been thus included on the basis of experience from exercising voting right. and there is a clear bar of those members who have been thus included on the basis of experience from exercising voting right. In my considered opinion, this amendment clearly allowed discretion to the Legislature of a State to enact law providing for such representation of other categories of members in the Municipality barring only members of the first category i.e. ``persons having special knowledge or experience from exercising any voting right and further in clause (b) a further discretion was left to the Legislature to provide by law ``the manner of election of the Chairperson of a Municipality. This constitutional amendment thus granted a wide discretion to the State Legislature to make provision in their local laws regarding administration of Municipalities. On the basis of Article 243-R of the Constitution, the Rajasthan Legislature although introduced amendment in Section 9 of the Rajasthan Municipalities Act of 1959, it substantially used and adopted the language of Article 243-R without adding or substracting any thing to it although Article 243-R had left scope and discretion to the Legislature regarding composition of the Municipalities as also the manner of election of the Chairperson of Municipalities, while clearly laying down that ``The Legislature of a State may by law provide for the representation in a Municipality.... When such discretion was left to the State Legislature then in my opinion the Legislature while introducing amendment in Section 9 of the Municipalities Act of 1959 ought to have expressly laid down that Member of the House of People and Member of the Assembly representing constituency, representing the Municipal area as also the member of the Legislative Council of State will also be vested with a voting right. But consciously or unconsciously the State Legislature mechanically introduced amendment in Section 9 of the Act on the basis of Article 243-R of the Constitution which amendment infact had left the onus and discretion to the State Legislature to do so while using the words ``The State Legislature may by law provide... After the introduction of Article 243-R in the Constitution it was the State Legislature which had to further enact laws in this regard but although amendment was introduced, the question regarding the voting rights of MLAs and MPs in the affairs of the administration of Municipality was not expressly mentioned which in my opinion ought not to have been left vague. (17). (17). Now by drawing inferences, the petitioners are attempting to read something between the lines in Section 9 of the Municipal Act by urging that the MLAs and MPs have voting right as they too represent the Board. It is perhaps to obviate this vagueness in the amended Section 9 of the Municipal Act due to which the State Government has to issue circulars and instructions which are sought on the question whether MPs and MLAs can be said to be vested with a voting right also while participating in the meeting of the Board. But some lacunae, gap or omission which was required to be filled by virtue of an amendment as envisaged under Article 243-R of the Constitution cannot be allowed to be done by an administrative instruction of the State Government. (18). In this context, it will be important to recollect and remind ourselves that although the general principles of interpretation as also the general rule of literal construction envisages that the intention of the Legislature primarily is to be gathered from the language used, it also means that attention has to be paid to what has been said as also to what has not been said, and as a consequence a construction which requires addition or substitution of words or which results in rejection of words as meaningless, has to be avoided. As stated by Privy Council in Crawford and N. Spooner (1), which has later been successively followed in a series of decisions by our Apex Court reported in the matter of Nalinakhya Bysack vs. Shyam Sunder Haldar (2), in the matter of P.K. Unni vs. Nirmala Industries (3), State of M.P. vs. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills (4), it was unequivocally held that a Court of law cannot venture to legislate and hence it was observed as follows:- ``We cannot add or mend and, by construction make up deficiencies which are left there. The learned Judges further observed that ``It is contrary to all rules of construction to read words into an Act unless it is absolutely necessary to do so...Similarly it is wrong and dangerous to proceed by substituting some other words for words of the Statutes. Speaking briefly, the Court cannot reframe the Legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. Speaking briefly, the Court cannot reframe the Legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The law reports are full of citations where the Courts have refused even to add words like `also `under `of so as to attribute intention to the Legislature while interpreting the Statutes. It is an application of the same principle that ``a matter which should have been but has not been provided for in a Statute, cannot be supplied by Courts, as to do so will be legislation and not construction. This was the view expressed in the matter of Hansraj Gupta and Others vs. Dehra Dun-Mussoorie Electric Tramway Co. Ltd. (5) which was lateron relied upon in a catena of cases reported in the matter of Dhoom Singh vs. Prakash Chandra Sethi & Others, (6) in the matter of Dr. Baliram Waman Hiray vs. Mr. Justice B. Lentin and others, (7) as also a host of other decisions. (19). It is a corollary to the general rules of literal construction that nothing is to be added to or taken from a Statute unless there are adequate grounds to justify the inference that the Legislature intended something which it omitted to express as the Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reasons for it is to be found within the four-corners of the Act itself. A case not provided for in a Statute is not to be dealt with merely because there seems no good reason why it should have been omitted and the omission appears in consequence to have been unintentional. (20). It would be worthwhile to compare the situation which has arisen in this case to the case of Hira Devi vs. District Board Shahjahanpur (8). In this matter Section 71 of the U.P. District Boards Act, 1922 provided that a Board may dismiss its Secretary by special resolution which in certain cases require sanction of local Government and Section 90 conferred a power to suspend the Secretary `pending enquiry into his conduct or pending the orders of any authority whose sanction is necessary for his dismissal. By U.P. Act of 1933, Section 71 was amended and the amended Section provided that a resolution of dismissal was not to take effect till the expiry of the period of appeal or till the decision of appeal if it was so presented. By U.P. Act of 1933, Section 71 was amended and the amended Section provided that a resolution of dismissal was not to take effect till the expiry of the period of appeal or till the decision of appeal if it was so presented. No corresponding amendment was, however, made in Section 90 and it was held by the Supreme Court that a suspension resolved under Section 90 to be operative till the appeal against dismissal which was decided, was ultra vires the powers of the Board. Bhagwati J. speaking for the Court in the said matter expressed as follows: ``It was unfortunate that when the Legislature came to amend the old Section 71 of the Act it forgot to amend Section 90 in conformity with the amendment of Section 71. But this lacunae cannot be supplied by any such liberal construction as the High Court sought to put it on. No doubt it is the duty of the Court to try and harmonise the various provisions of an Act passed by the Legislature. But it is certainly not the duty of the Court to stretch the word used by the Legislature to fill in gaps or omissions in the provisions of an Act. (21). A somewhat similar situation crops up in the instant matter too, as it is quite apparent that although the 74th Constitutional Amendment to the Constitution envisaged a provision for composition of the Municipalities, it had clearly allowed the State Legislature to frame laws in this regard and only one limitation had been put laying down, that members who are co-opted only on the ground of experience and special knowledge, will not be vested with a voting right. A corresponding amendment in the Rajasthan Municipal Act in my view ought to have been introduced while introducing an amendment in Section 9 of the Rajasthan Municipal Act, 1959 expressly laying down that the MLAs and MPs will also be having the voting right in the affairs of the administration as the constitutional amendment had given full authority to the State Legislature to provide laws even in regard to the election of Chairman and Vice-Chairman. When such a latitude was left to the Legislature to frame laws regarding election of Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Municipalities, nothing prevented the Rajasthan Legislature from expressly laying down that MPs and MLAs will also be vested with a voting right as members of the Board but as already noted and discussed above, there is no express provision in this regard even in the amendment, and if express provision is not laid down therein, it would be difficult for this court to read the same by drawing inference in this regard in absence of any absurdity resulting from such situation. (22). It is no doubt true that by application of the principle of `casus omissus if adequate grounds are available to justify the inference that the Legislature intended something which it omitted to express, such an interpretation can be made of a provision provided clear reasons for it is found within the Act itself as held by the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income-tax vs. National Taj Traders (9), while observing that ``a casus omissus should not be readily inferred. In trying to solve the difficulties courts must not proceed as a mere grammarian of the written law and must search for the true intention of the Legislature. But the intention of the Legislature is not to be judged by what is in its mind but by its expression of that mind in the relevant Statute itself since the only repository of a Legislatures intention is the language it has used and in examining that language, it must be presumed that the Legislature knows the accepted vocabulary of legislative bodies and so knows what words are required and considered apt to a particular result. If it has not made a provision or used words from which a particular result can properly be found, courts will not be justified in finding it, simply because a contrary decision would cause hardship to public. It is true that one must not accept in a statute the complete facts and elaboration of a deed and where the minimum, required to make a particular meaning which is obviously intended is found, effect must be given to such meaning, but courts cannot dispense with even the minimum. Where even such a minimum is absent, courts must declare the deficiency and let it have its effect rather than strain themseleves to make it good. Where even such a minimum is absent, courts must declare the deficiency and let it have its effect rather than strain themseleves to make it good. Thereby, not only the courts prevent themselves from taking up the functions of the Legislature but the Legislature may also provide because it may take care to avoid such deficiencies in future. Such was the view expressed by a Full Bench decision of the Calcutta High Court reported in the matter of Tarak Chand vs. Ratan Lal (10). It was in this context that it was also expressed that the courts cannot add the Legislatures defective phrasing of a Statute by adding, mending and by constructing in order to make up the deficiencies which are left there. If the Legislature did intend that, which does not express clearly, much more, if the Legislature intended something different, if the Legislature intended something pretty nearly the opposite of what is said, it is not for the Judges to invent something which they do not need within the words of the text, it is not for them to supply a meaning for in reality. Time and again it has been held that the courts by supplying an omission in the Act of Legislature would be travelling for a field and it would be open to serious objection when the courts deviate from the real function of construction and enter upon legislation which obviously decide the purview. The courts cannot say to themselves that through oversight the Legislature has failed to provide for a particular situation and, therefore, what has not been done by the Legislature may be done by the courts. This does not lie within the judicial field. If the meaning of the Statute is sensible without the omitting words, courts will not be justified in making interpretations. The general rule in all such cases is that the court may interpret doubtful or obsecure phrases in a Statute so as to give effect to the presumed intention of the Legislature and to carry out what appears to be the general policy of the law. The general rule in all such cases is that the court may interpret doubtful or obsecure phrases in a Statute so as to give effect to the presumed intention of the Legislature and to carry out what appears to be the general policy of the law. But courts cannot by construction cure a `casus omissus, however, just and desirable it may be, to supply the omitted provision and it will make no difference if it appears that the omission on the part of the Legislature was a mere oversight and even if there be no doubt that the Act would have been worded otherwise if the attention of the Legislature had been drawn to the oversight at the time of passing of the Act, it is not possible for the courts to deflect from its course on the specious plea that the interpretation would cause hardship and suffering to those for whose benefit it was enacted. This has been the view in a case of United States vs. Weilzei (11) which has been followed even by the Indian Courts vis. Roshan Lal vs. Govind Raj. (12) and Premnath vs. Premnath (13). (23). Besides the above legal propositions propounded by the celebrated decisions referred to hereinabove, no such pressing reason can be read or found in the instant case, as absence of voting right to MLAs and MPs in the affairs of the Municipality which clearly pertains to Local Self Government cannot lead to absurdity, if MLAs and MPs are denied such voting rights. However, this observation is clearly an obiter dicta as it clearly lies within the domain of Legislature to grant voting rights to MLAs and MPs or divest them of such powers as this Court cannot read something in Section 9 of the Municipal Act merely by drawing inferences when it has not been expressly laid down therein. (24). Having thus considered the plea of the petitioners in the light of the provisions enumerated in the Rajasthan Municipalities Act, 1959 in order to assail the No Confidence Motion, it is not fit to be sustained as in my opinion the Members of Parliament and the Legislative Assembly cannot be held to be having a voting right in a meeting for the purpose of passing No Confidence Motion unless it was expressly incorporated under the Act by appropriate amendment. I may further add that all the petitioners herein have been voted out by the required two-third majority and thus have been removed from the post of Chairman and Vice-Chairman and even if the plea of the petitioners had been accepted, they could not have succeeded in assailing the No Confidence Motions which have been carried through against them. (25). All the writ petitions, under the circumstances, are dismissed without costs. Accordingly, the interim directions given earlier for functioning of the Municipal Corporation will no longer remain in existence and the stay order thus stand vacated.