ORDER J.G. Chitre, J. 1. Heard Shri Prakash Verma Dy. G.A. for appellant-State Shri Umesh Maheshwari Counsel for the respondent in context with the record which has been examined. 2. Mr. Verma contended that the Trial Court committed the error in coming to the conclusion that mere is no case for framing the charge so far as respondent Bhagwantibai is concerned. Mr. Umesh Maheshwari supported the impugned order as correct, proper and legal by submitting that the material which has been collected during the course of investigation does not bring it case under four corners of Section 304B of I.P.C. 3. Learned trial Judge has committed the error in interpreting the words 'dowry' 'in connection with which has been used while defining the word 'dowry'. 4. The Trial Court formed the opinion that there has to be an agreement for giving and taking nuptial gifts which would come under definition of 'dowry'. The word 'dowry' is not restricted only to the articles which are agreed to be given and taken at the time of settling the marriage. The word 'dowry' is having nexus with the articles, gifts given and taken after marriage also. What is important which is to be noted is the nexus of those articles with the marriage and the relations created by the marriage. 5. Such gifts cannot be restricted to 'agreement' connected with settling the marriage. The human greed tempts the in-laws of the brides to go on demanding gifts articles, cash even after the marriage by putting various causes as festivals, birthdays and many other occasions. It is a matter of experience that greedy persons do demand such articles and amount by showing various pretexts and instances including the support to groom for raising the capital, purchasing a flat, purchasing a scooter, car, refrigerator and number of things. Demand in respect of such articles cannot be restricted. It has got the nexus with word harassment which has been used in Section 304B of I.P.C. When the Court is conducting a trial it has to be circumspective of all necessary facets indicated by provisions of Section 304B, I.P.C. and the definition of "dowry" Indicated by Section 2 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 at the time of framing the charge and has to apply the mind for taking a decision whether the charge should be framed or not. The Court should not hasten to conclude that prosecution does not have a case for framing the charge against the accused by giving undue importance to imaginary hypothesis. The Court has to restrict itself to the material which has been collected by the Investigating Agency through statements of witnesses and the documents. It has to form an opinion whether there would be a conviction on the material which has been brought form by the prosecution for framing a charge against the accused, if it is unrebutted. 6. In the present case I find that the learned Trial Court committed the error of law while jumping to conclusion of improper hypothesis that there is no material against the respondent Bhagwantibai for framing the charge of offence punishable under Section 304-3 of I.P.C. Order of discharge passed in favour of the respondent Bhagwantibai will have to be set aside and the Trial Court will have to be directed to frame charge against Bhagwantibai for offence punishable under Section 304-B of I.P.C. by applying its judicial mind towards the material collected against the said respondent by the Investigating Agency during investigation. Thus the petition is hereby allowed. The order of discharge passed by Trial Court in favour of respondent Bhagwantibai stands set aside: The Trial Court is hereby directed to frame charge against her for an offence under Section 304-B of I.P.C. and other allied offences if necessary. Respondent Bhagwantibai to remain present before Trial Court on 3.11.1998. 7. The observations made while deciding this revision petition shall not weigh at the time of trial. Mr. Umesh Maheshwari submitted that the respondent was on bail during proceeding before she was discharged and, therefore, same be continued. This prayer seems to be reasonable as already the power of granting of bail has been exercised by the Trial Court in her favour.