Judgment B. M. Lal, S. K. Singh, J. 1. The present application under Sec.5 of the limitation Act has been preferred by the State of Bihar for condoning the delay of 193 days in filing the present appeal, 2. The judgment and order of the writ court is dated 24.9.1997 and the appeal has been filed on 5.5.1998. It has been contended by learned counsel for the appellants that though an information regarding the aforesaid judgment had already been sent by the office of the Standing Counsel on 29.9.1997 but the said letter was received in the office of the appellant only 24.11.1997 and thereafter, the appellant applied for certified copy of the judgment on 2.12.1997. The certified copy of the judgment was ready for delivery on 27.1.1998 but for the reasons known to the appellants themselves the same was only received on 26.2.1998. It has also been accepted that the respondents-writ petitioners had already filed a copy of the judgment along with the representation on 3.12.1997 but as certified copy was not available no action has been taken by the appellants. Subsequently, after obtaining certified copy on 26.2.1998 statement of fact for filing the appeal was sent on 7.1.1998. Finally after holding discussions with the offi-cials of the appellants office on 5.3.1998 it materialised as to how the LPA is to be drafted. Thereafter, a draft was prepared and subsequently, approved by the concerned officers. However, again discussions were made on 11.3.1998, 12.3.1998 and 13,3.1998. Thereafter, the memo of appeal was finally drafted and filed on 20,3.1998. However, as the defects were pointed out by the office, the memo of appeal was returned to the appellants for correction. Had the said memo been corrected within seven days date of initial filing, as per the High Court rules, could have been deemed as the date of filing but here again reasons known best to appellants, the defects were finally removed on 5.5.1998 and the memo of appeal re-filed. This is how counsel for the State of Bihar has tried to explain the delay. No explanation whatsoever has been given as to why when the certified copy of the order was ready on 27.1.98 delivery of the same had been taken on 26.2.1998. This period of one month has not at all been explained. This is how counsel for the State of Bihar has tried to explain the delay. No explanation whatsoever has been given as to why when the certified copy of the order was ready on 27.1.98 delivery of the same had been taken on 26.2.1998. This period of one month has not at all been explained. Again when the statement of fact for filing the appeal has been sent on 7.1.1998 why it took so much time and the appeal was finally made ready on 20.3.1998, this period of 2 months has also not been explained. Subsequent thereto once when the memo of appeal had been returned on 20.3.1998 with defects why the defects have been corrected only on 5.5.1998 has also not been explained. 3. The prescribed period to prefer appeal is 30 days. However, if an appeal is made beyond the period of limitation then the appellant is required to explain that sufficient cause or good cause existed for not preferring the appeal within the statutory period. After the expiry of the period of limitation a right accrues to the respondent-writ petitioners. The appellant State cannot be allowed to choose the timing of preferring an appeal. If any appeal is filed beyond the period of 30 days each days delay is required to be explained, if the said period is automatically condoned to create a precarious situation. 4. As we have already stated earlier very flimsy or rather no explanation has been provided for condoning the delay of 193 days in preferring the appeal. 5. Though "sufficient cause" or "good cause" is not defined under Sec.2 of the limitation Act but all the same it means and so far has been construed as a period which is beyond the control of the party seeking indulgence for extension of period of limitation from a bare perusal of the provision of Sec.5 of the Limitation Act and its preamble, it is manifest that the Limitation Act is an exhaustive Code governing the law of limitation in respect of matters specially dealt with by it. That is why the law of limitation is a panacea to prevent the disturbances or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice or what may have been lost by parties own inaction, negligence or laches. In Maqbul ahmad and Ors. V/s. Onkar Narain Singh and ors. That is why the law of limitation is a panacea to prevent the disturbances or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice or what may have been lost by parties own inaction, negligence or laches. In Maqbul ahmad and Ors. V/s. Onkar Narain Singh and ors. , it is held that the Courts are not permitted to travel beyond the provisions of the Act or to supplement them. It is also held that the court cannot grant exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. 6. Thus, the object of the law of limitation is well-known that interest of the State requires that there should be an end of the litigation. In Boota Mal V/s. Union of India, it has been held hat equitable considerations are out of place and the strict grammatical meaning of the words is the only safe guide in interpreting the statute of the limitation. Therefore, the statute of limitation like other statutes ought to receive such construction as the language in plain meaning imports 7. In Union of India and Ors. V/s. Tata yodogawa Ltd, and Ors. , the Apex Court has laid down that delay said to be on account of correspondence, processing and routing through sections of the department is not sufficient cause to condone the delay. In State of haryana V/s. Chandra Mani and Ors. , the Apex court relying upon the decision in the case of ramlal V/s. Rewa Coalfields Ltd, had laid down that each days delay is to be explained satisfactorily. The appellant in the present case has miserably failed to do so. 8. Even on merit the appellant does not have any case as the writ court by its order had only directed the appellants to consider the case of the writ petitioners for appointment by deputation to the post of Senior Lecturer as it was found that the claim of the petitioners for consideration had wrongly been rejected. 9. For the reasons as stated above, as the appellants have miserably failed to explain the delay of 193 days in preferring the appeal, i. A. No.10333/98 is rejected and consequently, the appeal is also dismissed being barred by limitation. Appeal dismissed at time barred.