JUDGMENT 1. This is plaintiffs second appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the judgment of affirmance. 2. Original plaintiff Kawarlal (since dead) filed the suit for eviction of the defendants on the ground enumerated under Sections 12(1)(a). 12(1)(c). 12(1)(k) and 12(1)(m) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961. Fourth Civil Judge, Class II, Durg by judgment and decree dated 2.12.1988 passed in Civil Suit No. 96-A of 1988 dismissed the suit. Plaintiff aggrieved by the same preferred appeal and the Fourth Additional District Judge, Durg by judgment and decree dated 21.12.1990 passed in Civil Appeal No.4-A of 1989 dismissed the appeal. Plaintiff aggrieved by the same has preferred this appeal and by order dated 12.7.1991 appeal has been admitted on the following substantial question of law :-- "Whether on facts found, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for eviction under Section 12(1)(c) of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961'?" 3. Facts necessary for the decision of the aforesaid substantial question of law as pleaded by the parties are as under :-- According to the plaintiff, defendants have constructed a Pueea Chabutara tin shed and oven (Bhatti) in the year 1974 for preparation of Halwai goods over the Nali of the Municipal Corporation in front of the plaintiffs house. It is the assertion of the plaintiff that after enquiry by the Nazul Officer, defendants were imposed a fine of Rs. 300/- and the oven was removed in the year 1976. It is the assertion of the plaintiff that thereafter defendants have again reconstructed Chabutara and the oven and again Nazul Officer imposed a fine of Rs. 500/- and the revision filed by the defendants against the said order has also been dismissed. Another act of nuisance according to the plaintiff is that the defendants tried to open window which is situated between the suit accommodation and the plaintiffs adjoining house which led to falling of the brick and the same has caused injury to the plaintiff servant. According to the plaintiff this act of the defendants has infringed upon the privacy of the plaintiff. Another act of nuisance according to the plaintiff is that because of smoke of the oven and smell at the time of the preparation of goods have affected the plaintiffs son who is a lawyer having office adjoining to the suit accommodation. According to the plaintiff this act of the defendants has infringed upon the privacy of the plaintiff. Another act of nuisance according to the plaintiff is that because of smoke of the oven and smell at the time of the preparation of goods have affected the plaintiffs son who is a lawyer having office adjoining to the suit accommodation. Plaintiffs further stand is that customers coming to the hotel of the defendants parks their cycles in front of the office of the plaintiffs advocate son and used leaf plates are also thrown in front of his office, which cause nuisance. 4. Defendants denied the allegations of the plaintiff that they have ever caused nuisance. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, trial Court framed various issues including the issue as to whether the acts complained of by the plaintiff amount to nuisance and on consideration of the materials placed before it held that defendants have not created nuisance. Aforesaid finding has been affirmed by the lower appellate Court in appeal. 5. Shri Ravish Agrawal appears on behalf of the appellant whereas Shri R.R. Thakur has appeared on behalf of the respondents. 6. It is not in dispute that defendants are running the hotel in the suit accommodation for the last 40 to 50 years prior to the date of institution of the suit. Suit has been filed on 27.7.1976. It is relevant here to state that the lower appellate Court has found that the construction of bhatti (oven) over the land belonging to the Municipal Corporation, i.e., over an encroached land by the defendants cannot be taken into consideration for the purpose of deciding the acts of nuisance. Shri Agrawal appearing on behalf of the appellants submits that the construction of oven over encroached land by the defendants itself may not be nuisance, but emission of smoke and kitchen-smell severely affects the plaintiffs son who is having his office in the adjoining accommodation. 7. The expression 'nuisance' has not been defined in the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). In my opinion. no straight jacket formula can be laid to define nuisance. However. 7. The expression 'nuisance' has not been defined in the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). In my opinion. no straight jacket formula can be laid to define nuisance. However. in my opinion, if the tenancy is created for a particular purpose and the acts complained of are inherent in the nature of tenancy, it cannot be said that both inherent acts and activites shall come with in the expression 'nuisance'. As stated earlier, there is no controversy that the defendants are carrying on the hotel business since 40 to 45 years before the institution of the suit on 27.7.1976. It has been further established on fact that the plaintiffs son who is having his office in the adjoining accommodation has joined the profession of law in the year 1978. In my opinion, emission of smoke from oven is inherent and the use of oven is essential for running the hotel business. Hence, I do not find any substance in this submission of Shri Agrawal. 8. Shri Agrawal draws my attention to the evidence of D.W. 2 Dagguram Yadav wherein he has stated that oven bums for 24 hours. Mr. Agrawal with reference to the aforesaid evidence contends that use of oven for 24 hours cannot be said to be inherent in the business of hotel and this creates nuisance. He further submits that the aforesaid act may lead to fire of the adjoining premises and in his submission the same is nothing but an act of nuisance contemplated under Section 12(1)(c) of the Act. True, it is that Dagguram Yadav (D.W.2) in his cross-examination has stated that oven bums for 24 hours but other witnesses have clearly stated that the same is ignited in the morning and the smoke ceases after sometime, particularly when the plaintiffs son comes in his office. In view of other evidence, and the nature of business being run by the defendants, it cannot be said that the oven bums all the 24 hours and the same causes nuisance to the plaintiff. I do not find any substance in this submission of the learned counsel. 9. Shri Agrawal has drawn my attention to the evidence of the plaintiffs witnesses who have stated that customers of the defendant, park their scooters and keep their cycles in front of the accommodation, in which plaintiffs son has his professional office. I do not find any substance in this submission of the learned counsel. 9. Shri Agrawal has drawn my attention to the evidence of the plaintiffs witnesses who have stated that customers of the defendant, park their scooters and keep their cycles in front of the accommodation, in which plaintiffs son has his professional office. Shri Thakur has drawn my attention to other evidence on the point to contend that scooters are not parked in front of the office of the plaintiffs son or cycles are kept there. It is common ground that the suit accommodation is in market place. The accommodation in question was let out for running a hotel and its very nature, customers are expected to come in the hotel by different mode of conveyance. Defendants have no control over the parking of the cycles and scooters by their customers. It is not the plaintiff s case that it is the defendant who encourages or asks the customers to park their scooters and keep the cycles in front of the office of the plaintiff's son. In my opinion, for bringing the act of a tenant within the net of Section 12(1)(c) of the Act, i.e., nuisance, it is required to be established that the act of nuisance is created by the tenant or any person residing with him. It is not the plaintiff's case that the customers who park their scooters and keep their cycles in front of the plaintiff's son's office are residing with the defendants. May be in a given case act done by a person at the instance of the tenant can be construed to be the act of the tenant, but here in the present case, as stated earlier, it is not the plaintiffs case that the defendants customers park their vehicles at the provocation or instance of the defendant. Accordingly I am of the opinion that the aforesaid act cannot be said to be a nuisance within the meaning of Section 12(1) (c) of the act. 10. Mr. Agrawal lastly submits that customers of the defendant throw used leaf plates in front of the plaintiffs son's office. Plaintiff's witnesses do say about the same. Accordingly I am of the opinion that the aforesaid act cannot be said to be a nuisance within the meaning of Section 12(1) (c) of the act. 10. Mr. Agrawal lastly submits that customers of the defendant throw used leaf plates in front of the plaintiffs son's office. Plaintiff's witnesses do say about the same. As stated earlier, the accommodation was let for the business of hotel and as in the case of the parking of the vehicles, so far as throwing of the used leaf-plates by the customers of the defendants, there is no evidence that it is being done at the instance of the defendants. Accordingly I am of the opinion that this act of the customers of the defendant over which defendant has no control cannot be said to be an act of nuisance within the meaning of Section 12(1) (c) of the Act. 11. To put the record straight, it is relevant here to state that Shri Agrawal in support of his submission has placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Narpatchand A. Bhandari v. Shantilal Moolshankar. Jani. AIR 1993 SC 1712 ; and my attention has been drawn to the following paragraph :- "There are no statutory definitions of 'nuisance' or 'annoyance' which under Section 13(1) (c) of the Act constitute a ground for recovery of possession by landlord of a premises in the occupation of a tenant. In the case with which we are concerned, the acts of nuisance or annoyance complained of are committed by the tenant and persons residing with him in the premises which is a tenement (flat) laying amidst other tenements (flats) of the one and same storeyed building. The acts of the defendant or persons residing with him in the tenanted premises which are found as acts causing nuisance or annoyance to adjoining or neighbouring occupires, cannot fall short of being acts of nuisance or annoyance if regard is had to their nature, intensity and duration and the consequential ill-effects which might have been produced by them on the normal living of such occupiers. Further, when the particular acts of the defendant or persons residing with him in the premises (flat) of a storeyed building, said to have caused nuisance or annoyance to the occupiers of adjoining or neighbouring occupiers of tenements (flats) in the very same storeyed building are seen, they cannot make us think that they were not clear acts of nuisance or annoyance envisaged under S. 13(1)(c) of the Act because of the intolerable inconveniences, sufferings, humiliations which must have caused to the adjoining or neighbouring occupiers, due regard being given to the locality of the storeyed building, the class of the people living in the tenements of the storeyed building and the nature of living to which they were accustomed. Even otherwise, the acts, said to have been committed by the defendant and persons residing with him in the premises when are, as stated, found by the fact finding Courts to have amounted to acts of nuisance or annoyance entitling the plaintiff under S. 13(1)(c) of the Act to recover possession of the premises from the defendant and when the High Court has refused to interfere with such finding in exercise of its writ jurisdiction there could be no justification whatever for us to interfere with the same in this appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution". 12. In the aforesaid case the act of the tenant of erecting a Textile Printing Mill, running the same during night, utilising the water stored in the common over-head tanks meant for domestic use for non-domestic purpose removal of radio aerials and T.V. Antenas and preventing the landlords workers in reaching the common terrace were considered to be acts of nuisance. All these acts in the aforesaid case were either done by the tenant or by the person residing with him which is not the situation in the present case and hence the authority relied on is clearly distinguishable. 13. Result of the aforesaid discussion is that the plaintiff has not been able to make out the ground for eviction of the defendants under Section 12(1) (c) of the Act and the substantial question of law framed, is answered against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendants. 14. In the result, I do not find any merit in this appeal and it is dismissed accordingly. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost.