JUDGMENT N. ARUMUGHAM, J.:---By virtue of Article 226 of the Constitution of India, this writ of Habeaus Corpus has been filed by the petitioner, who is the father of detenu by name Mohammadli @ Jango a resident of Shakur Compound, Gala No. 7 Khairani Road, Sakinaka, Bombay 400 072, detaining him in prison by virtue of section 3(2) of the National Security Act with the order passed by the first respondent Shri R.D. Tyagi, Commissioner of Police, Brihan Mumbai in his order D.O. No. 108/P.C.B./Zone-IX/1995 dated 7th December 1995, which was confirmed by the Government Order, Home Department (Special) No. N.S.A.-2395/1/S.P.-3(B) dated 20th November 1995, to challenge and oppose the same for its various laxity and legal impropriety. Though the above detention order was passed against the detenu above named, the grounds of detention and the execution of the order along with the copy of the documents referred to in Annexure 'A', 'B' and 'C' were served by the respondents to the detenu on 6th December 1997 contemptuously. 2. To clamp the above detention order, the following prejudicial activities were grounded in the detention order above referred. 3. One Mr. Bhavarlal Balaji Mali, running a workshop under the name and style of 'Bharat Metal Casting' at Yadav Nagar, Khairani Road, Sakinaka, Bombay 400 072, by residing along with his family in the same premises. He knew the detenu i.e. the petitioner's son and his associates by name Wasim Shaikh, Bhaiyya, Shahid and others as weapon wielding notorious goondas from the localities of Yadav Nagar, Khairani Road, Sakinaka and that they have always created a reign of fear in the same localities, and that resulted none dares to cross their usual routine. While that being so, at about 23.00 hours on 4-5-1995 while the said Bhavarlal was returning home on his motor-cycle along Khairani Road and reached the place near the Masjid at Yadav Nagar, the detenu and his associates by name Wasim Shaikh, Bhayyaji and Shahid suddenly intercrepted his vehicle and brought him to a halt and when he refused the cigarette demanded by the detenu, his associate Wasim Shaikh manhandled him, while the detenu had tapered the end of his knife against his back and made him to alight from the motor cycle and dragged him to a near by open godown by saying Þcgqr HkkbZ curk gS D;kÞ! Then all of them started twisting and kicking him. Then all of them started twisting and kicking him. Then they kept the said Bhavarlal under their captivity in the said open godown and tortured him physically and mentally and had pleaded with him and promised to pay whatever the amount, which they demanded by him, following which at around 01.30 hours on 5-5-1995, and he was allowed to go. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Bhavarlal suddenly escaped and reached near the house of one Mr. Kanwarprasad by seeking his help. But however they were chased by the detenu and his associates and scared away at the point of knife. Thus the said Bhavarlal and Kanwarprasad ran away, who had become weary and was very anxious to get themselves rescued from their clutches. Then they again sprinted and reached near the house of one Thakur Amirchand and Thakur Khushichand and sought their help. However, on hearing the shouts of Bhavarlal, both Amirchand and Khushichand rushed to his rescue. It was at that time the detenu and his associates pointed their knives upon them and scared them away too, after threatening to kill them. They being dreaded criminals, figuring adversely on the police record, none dared to come to the rescue of Bhavarlal. Then the said Bhavarlal was manhandled. Then his associates including Bhaiyya forcibly removed cash of Rs. 6,000/- from his shirt pocket, while Washim Shaikh removed a cash of Rs. 12,000/- from his pant pocket. Thus after forcibly removing the amount to the tune of Rs. 18,000/- from the pockets of Shri Bhavarlal Balaji Mali, the detenu and his associates manhandled him at the point of knife and threatened to kill him if he reported the matter to the police at around 03.00 hours on 5-5-1995 and then he was let out. 4. Frightened terribly and shocked at the above incident, the said Bhavarlal did not report the matter to the police immediately. As he was in agony, however he went to the J.P. hospital, Sakinaka on 6-5-1995 where he was admitted for treatment and after mustering courage somehow or the other he lodged a complaint with the police following which a case under sections 394, 342, 506(II), 34 I.P.C. was registered against the detenu and his associates by Sakinaka Police Station in C.R. No. 192/95. Consequently, the detenu was arrested in this case on 7-5-95 and in his statement made before the police he has admitted the above overtact. During the investigation of the said case the statements of Amirchand Thakurprasad Agreri and Khushichand Thakurprasad Agreri were also recorded, which happened to be the total corroboration of the complaint given by Bhavarlal. The detenu and his associates were produced for remand before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 22nd Court at Andheri, Bombay on 7-5-1995. But they were remanded to police custody till 15-5-1995 without making any pronouncement of any bail order and that their remand was further extended till 19-5-1995. However, on 10-5-1995 the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, despite the strong objection by the police, granted bail to the detenu in the sum of Rs. 2500/- or cash, each with one surety in the like amount in default remanded to jail custody till 23-5-1995. A further direction was also given to the detenu to attend the police station daily from 09.00 hours to 10.00 hours or 17.00 hours to 18.00 hours for a period of seven days only, and that after having availed of the said bail facilities on 19-5-1995 the detenu had happened to come out. 5. Lallanprasad Ramphal Gupta is running a grocery shop under the name and style of "Sanjay Stores" at Jamaluddin chawl, shop No. 1, Yadavnagar, Khairani Road, Sakinaka, Bombay 400 072 where also he is living in adjoining room along with his wife and children and as assisted by his brother Shivashraya in the business and during the night time used to sleep in the shop premises. At about 22.00 hours on 27-7-1995 while Lallanprasad Gupta and his brother went to bed after closing their business and had their dinner and at around 23.00 hours. On 28-7-1995 at around 01.00 hours, Lallanprasad Gupta heard somebody knocking from outside. When Lallanprasad Gupta raised the shutter slightly and found the detenu and his associate Chandpapa standing close to the shutter. On 28-7-1995 at around 01.00 hours, Lallanprasad Gupta heard somebody knocking from outside. When Lallanprasad Gupta raised the shutter slightly and found the detenu and his associate Chandpapa standing close to the shutter. On seeing both of them Lallanprasad Gupta got frigntened and pulled down the shutter whereupon the detenu and his associate started banging the shutter continuously and Chandpapa shouted loudly and threatened by saying ÞyYyu gjkedksj] njoktk [kksy] ugh rks njoktk rksM nqaxkAÞ Then Lallanprasad Gupta was terribly scared, raised the shutter helplessly and found the detenu and his associate holding two knives, one in each hand and his associate pointed out the knives at Lallanprasad Gupta and demanded in a threatening tone as :i;k 2000@ vÒh ds vÒh nsuk ugh rks tku ls ekj Mkyqaxk! Lallanprasad and his family members, after having seen the associate pointing knives at them got terribly frightened and shocked, as a result, he again tried to pull down the shutter, but could not bring down the same completely as the associate of the detenu had held the shutter by his hand. This followed Lallanprasad and his wife held the shutter firmly and thwarted their efforts to force to open the same. Thereafter the detenu and his associate stood in front of the shutter and started threatening Lallanprasad Gupta and his family members to kill them and to assault them. After having raised hue and cry they could not get the help of any neighbours and that thereafter around 01.30 hours on 28-7-1995 the detenu and his associate demanded money from the neighbouring shop keepers also viz. Trilokprasad Kuber Gupta and Rameshchandra Mataprasad Mourya and also threatened to kill them. As they had created a reign of terror in the localities of Yadav Nagar, Khairani Road, Sakinaka, nobody could dare to go for their rescue. Lallanprasad Gupta was apprenehsive and hesitated to report the matter to the police. However, it was only after having a word with other merchants, he mustered courage and lodged his complaint with the police and accordingly a complaint was registered for the offence under section 385, 506(II) and 34 of I.P.C. against the detenu and their associates at Sakinaka Police Station in C.R. No. 329/95 on 28-7-1995. The statements of the witnesses were recorded including the complaint, which was found in total corroboration of the complaint. 6. The statements of the witnesses were recorded including the complaint, which was found in total corroboration of the complaint. 6. After the commission of the above offences, the detenu remained at large and eluded away from their arrest by police. However he was arrested on 19-9-1995 and in the statement recorded by the police, the detenu admitted that on 28-7-1995 at around 00.30 hours the detenu and his associates were armed with knives and iron road and went to the grocery shop of Lallanprasad Gupta and demanded the money at the point of knife. 7. Then they were produced before the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 22nd Court, Andheri, Bombay on 20-9-1995 and that they were remanded to police custody till 25-9-1995 without any order in the bail application. However, on 25-9-1995 they were released on bail in the sum of Rs. 5000/- or cash with surety in the like amount in default remanded to police custody till 9-10-1995, also with a condition that the detenu to attend the police station daily from 9.00 a.m. to 10.00 a.m. and 17.00 hours to 18.00 hours for a period of seven days and that the said bail order was availed of by the detenu on 25-9-1995. 8. That apart, the confidential enquiry conducted by the police in the localities would reveal that number of persons in the locality of Yadav Nagar, Khairani Road, Sakinaka and the other areas adjoining thereto following in the jurisdiction of Sakinaka Police Station had suffered a lot at the hands of the detenu, who being a weapon wielding, a desperado, a notorious goonda and an extortionist, no one dare to speak openly against the detenu and his associates as they are morally afraid to do so. However, on assurances given to them that they would not be called upon to give evidence against the detenu and his associates openly in the Court or any other open forum and that their names and identity particulars would be kept secret and would not be disclosed, only then the following victims have vividly described the atrocities committed by the detenu before the police. As such their statements have been recorded in camera and accordingly witnesses A, B, C and D have been examined 'in camera' and their detailed statements were recorded and the gist of the say has been given specifically in paras 5(c)(i), 5(c)(ii), 5(c)(iii) and 5(c)(iv) in the grounds of detention. The said statements recorded of the witnesses A, B, C and D respectively in the above paragraphs, goes to substantiate the complaint given by the complainant and rendered already, we are not reproduce the same for the sake of brevity with the consent of the para in this regard. 9. Having placed the above said facts and overtacts and meticulously perused by applying its mind with every detail, the Detaining Authority, the first respondent herein, has arrived at a subjective satisfaction that the detenu was a weapon wielding, a desperado, a notorious goonda and an extortionist and thereby a perpetual danger to the society at large, had created a terror in the minds of the peace loving and law abiding citizens of the localities of Yadav Nagar, Khairani Road, Sakinaka and the areas adjoining thereto falling in the jurisdiction of Sakinaka police station in Brihan Mumbai. Since the people in the said localities are experiencing a sense of insecurity and living and carrying out their daily life or routine under a constant shadow of fear whereby the tempo of life of the society is disturbed by the activities of the detenu and other associates as a dangerous person arrived at a subjective satisfaction to hold that the detenu is a goonda and dangerous person and under the ordinary law of the land is found to be inadequate because of the prejudicial activities of the detenu, passing impugned order of detention by virtue of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the National Securities Act as above referred. While passing the detention order above referred, the Detaining Authority has given all the intimation and warning to the detenu as found in paras 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the detention order. 10. While passing the detention order above referred, the Detaining Authority has given all the intimation and warning to the detenu as found in paras 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the detention order. 10. As the above order of detention was passed on 7-12-1995, it could not be served upon the detenu for a long considerable period inspite of the best efforts taken by the Detaining Authority they were able to execute the same only on 6-12-1997 by serving with the copies of the grounds of detention and the documents of the order as shown in Exh. A, B, C and D appended herewith, simultaneously on the same day. It is this impugned order of detention which is being challenged by the father of the detenu by filing this writ petition. 11. Countering of the averments made in the writ petition and the affidavit, denying each and every one of the same for and on behalf of the first respondent. Mr. Ronald H. Mendonca, the present Commissioner of Police, Bombay, Mr. Bina Prasad, Under Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi on behalf of the Union Government, Mr. S.Y. Sonawane, Under Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department (Special) Mantralaya, Bombay have filed the detailed sworn affidavits, which repudiated all the grounds and contentions made in the writ petition. However, the contents found in the affidavit filed, affirming the writ petition on behalf of the petitioner was also counter acted by the respondents in their counter affidavit filed in the instant case. 12. We have heard the rival submissions from the bar for the respective parties. 13. Mr. However, the contents found in the affidavit filed, affirming the writ petition on behalf of the petitioner was also counter acted by the respondents in their counter affidavit filed in the instant case. 12. We have heard the rival submissions from the bar for the respective parties. 13. Mr. M.R. Kotwal the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner first attacked the impugned order of detention, upon the ground made in ground No. (CC) of the writ petition which in substance says that though the detention order had passed on 7-12-1995 against the detenu, it was served on the detenu only on 6-12-1997 and thus there was a delay of clear two years, and during the intersegnum between the commission of the alleged prejudicial activities and the clamping of the order of detention against the detenu since nothing happened though the petitioner was living in Tarapur, Boisar, District Thane at his regular address and no police officer visited, nor served the detention order the live link existed between the said prejudicial activities and the clamping of the detention order has been virtually snapped and that therefore there was no nexus or proximity existed between the two activities and for this ground alone resulted the vitiation of the order of detention passed against the detenu. In emphasizing the said ground the learned Counsel attempted to persuade us to believe that all through, since 7-12-1995 till 6-12-1995 for a period of two years the detenu was living in Tarapur, Boisar, District Thane at his regular address but no police officer had come to that place nor served anything upon him and that having kept quite for a period of nearly two years and that only on 6-12-1997 they have arrested the accused, would go to show that the very existence and proximity between the alleged prejudicial activities and the clamping of the detention order would become vitiated. 14. With regard to the above contention, the Detaining Authority namely the first respondent in his return at para 25 has specifically pleaded the following. "With reference to Ground (CC) of the writ petition, 1 deny that there is any delay in executing the order of detention. I say that the order of detention was passed on 17-12-1995 and various attempts were made to serve the said order at the known address of the petitioner. I say that the order of detention was passed on 7-12-1995. I say that the order of detention was passed on 17-12-1995 and various attempts were made to serve the said order at the known address of the petitioner. I say that the order of detention was passed on 7-12-1995. I say that since 8-12-1995 till 9-3-1996 the staff of Sakinaka police made continuous efforts to serve the order of detention on the known address of the detenue. I crave leave to refer to and rely upon the Station Diary Entries to that effect. I say that on 12-3-1996, statements of the relatives of the detenu were recorded. They expressed inability to give address of the detenu. I say that on 11-3-1996, the statements of Abdul Shakur Subrati Khan that is the petitioner in this petition was recorded in which he has stated that he is not aware about the whereabouts of his son. I therefore, state that the contention of the petitioner is false which is a statement on oath before this Hon'ble High Court. I say that the mother of the detenu has clearly stated in her statement dated 12-3-1996 that she is not aware of the whereabouts of the detenu and I therefore, respectfully state that the contents of the petitioner that the detenu has been staying at Tarapur, Boisar at his regular address and the police were aware of the said address is false statement on oath. I say that on 13-3-1996, a proposal was forwarded for cancellation of bail as well as proclamation. I say that the Commissioner of Police prepared a report for the purpose of proclamation on 10-4-1996 and submitted the same before the Court of learned Metropolitan Magistrate. I say that by an order dated 24-4-1996 the learned Metropolitan Magistrate, 22nd Court, Andheri, Mumbai issued proclamation which was published and pasted on the house of the detenu on 28-4-1996. I say that in fact, the staff of Sakinaka Police station also went to serve the order of detention at native place of the detenu at village Raghudin Mazare Trilokya, Post, Godra, Tal, Tulshipur, Dist. Gonda, Uttar Pradesh in June 1996. I say that the police had also received a secret information that the detenu was likely to be at Tarapur, Tal. Palghar, Dist. Thane, but the detenu was not found at the said address. Gonda, Uttar Pradesh in June 1996. I say that the police had also received a secret information that the detenu was likely to be at Tarapur, Tal. Palghar, Dist. Thane, but the detenu was not found at the said address. I say that since 25-6-1996 till December 1997, the staff of the Sakinaka police station made continuous efforts to serve the order of detention upon the detenu. I say that ulimately in December 1997 namely 6-12-1997, a secret information was received and the detenu was arrested by Sakinaka police Station, Mumbai. I say that though the order was served in December 1997, still that livelink and nexus between the issuance and the execution of the order of detention was very much alive and I deny that the detenu was available at his known address and there are lapses on the part of the then Detaining Authority to serve the order of detention. I further deny that the livelink is snapped and the order of detention is illegal and unconstitutional and void." 15. Substantiating the said explanatory contentions made in this sworn return of the Detaining Authority, the learned Additional P.P. Shri Rajiv Patil has filed the certified extract of Sakinaka police station diary entry numbering in D.O. No. 108/PCB/95 dated 7-12-1995 which would show that from 8-12-1995 onwards what kind of the efforts and attempts were made by the police, particularly Sakinaka police Station, which is the sponsoring authority in the instant case till about 12-3-1996, which was not at all being controverted nor denied by the opposite side. We have carefully perused the entries made on each of the day mentioned in the said extract of the station diary produced by the learned Addl. P.P. and consequently we are fully constrained to hold that the Sakinaka police were not at any kind of lethargy and laxity nor evasive in tracing the detenu and serving the order of detention upon him as alleged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the instant case. On the other hand we find there was every attempt made by the police to trace him and find out his whereabouts for the purpose of executing the order of detention. However, they could not get the result inspite of their best efforts taken. On the other hand we find there was every attempt made by the police to trace him and find out his whereabouts for the purpose of executing the order of detention. However, they could not get the result inspite of their best efforts taken. It is evident from the grounds of detention itself that the Court of law namely the Metropolitan Magistrate's 22nd Court at Andheri, Bombay had granted bail to the detenu on the condition that the detenu should attend the police station daily from 9.00 a.m. to 10.00 a.m. and 17.00 hours to 18.00 hours for a period of 7 days only and this order was passed by the learned Magistrate on 25-9-1995. After the expiry of the 7 days from the date of availing of the bail from 25-9-1995 onwards it is noticed that the detenu has went on the underground and eluded away right from the beginning till he was arrested on 6-12-1997. It is evident from the fact that apart from the continuous efforts taken by the concerned police to trace the detenu and that they have not able to find any clue of the whereabouts of the detenu, the record shows that the police have cancelled the bail against him followed by proclamation issued by the learned Magistrate on 24-4-1997 and this proclamation was published in the Gazette of the Government of Maharashtra dated 14-8-1997. 16. From the above, it is thus made clear that since the date of expiry of 7 days for the conditional bail, the detenu has been eluded away all through and voluntarily hidden himself somewhere unknown to police or anybody else and that he could not be traced out inspite of the best efforts and all the activities done by the police as provided by the procedure and the law. It is also noticed at this stage the above voluntary activities of the detenu made him elude away for a period of two years and during which period the order of detention clamped against him, could not be executed. It is also noticed at this stage the above voluntary activities of the detenu made him elude away for a period of two years and during which period the order of detention clamped against him, could not be executed. We find on a careful perusal of the entire case records and the extract of the station diary of Sakinaka police station and the rival contentions and the explanatory contentions made in the sworn returns, we constrained to say that it was not the laxity or lapse on the part of the Detaining Authority in executing the order of detention against the detenu but it was only on the voluntary activities while eluding away of the detenu himself such delay has been happened. In other words to say, we are fully satisfied to hold that two years gap existed between the last pending prejudicial activities and the clamping of the detention order, was clearly and totally explained with every aqeduate materials and documents by the Detaining Authority. At the same time on the other hand except the very statement itself on the contention made by the learned Counsel, there appears no iota of evidence or material to show that the detenu was available in Tarapur, Boisar or at any place in Maharashtra or in Bombay so as to shift the burden or rebut the presumption arises in the context of the part of our observation. 17. Pertinent at this stage to refer a case law held in (Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji v. State of Tamil Nadu and another)1, A.I.R. 1979 S.C. page 541, the relevant portion is at page 544 para 6 for the following legal ratio :-- "It is true that the purpose of detention under the COFEPOSA is not punitive but preventive. The purpose to prevent organized smuggling activities and to conserve and augment foreign exchange. It is true that the maximum period for which a person may be detained under the COFEPOSA is one year. It is further true that there must be a live and proximate link between the grounds of detention alleged by the Detaining Authority and the avowed purpose of detention namely the prevention of smuggling activities. We may in appropriate cases assume that the link is 'snapped' if there is a long and unexplained delay between the date of the order of detention and the arrest of the detenu. We may in appropriate cases assume that the link is 'snapped' if there is a long and unexplained delay between the date of the order of detention and the arrest of the detenu. In such a case we may strike down an order of detention unless the grounds indicate a fresh application of the mind of the Detaining Authority to the new situation and the changed circumstances. But where the delay is not only adequately explained but is found to be the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest, there is warrant to consider the link not snapped but strengthened. That precisely is the state of affairs before us. The order of detention was made on 19th December, 1974. The detenu was found to be absconding. Action was taken pursuant to section 7 of the COFEPOSA and he was proclaimed as a person absconding under section 82 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The proclamation was published in several leading English and local language daily newspapers. His photograph was exhibited in cinema halls. A reward of Rs. 5000/- was also announced for his apprehension. Despite all this effort he could not be arrested until he surrendered on 1st February, 1973. We do not have any hesitation in overruling the submission of Shri Jethmalani based on the delay in the execution of the order of detention." 18. In another case held between (Subhash Muljimal Gandhi v. L. Himingliana and another)2, 1994 A.I.R. S.C.W. 4075, and the Supreme Court has observed in para 13 as follows :-- "Mr. Jethmalani lastly submitted that having regard to the fact that the order of detention was passed as far back as in 1990 and the maximum period of detention, which the appellant would have to undergo under the order was two years, was long over, his detention at this distant point of time would be punitive and not preventive. It is undoubtedly true that an unusual delay in execution of an order of detention if not satisfactorily explained, may persuade the Court to draw such an inference. There is, however, no scope for drawing such an inference in this case as the delay here has been occasioned not by any omission or commission on the part of the Detaining Authority. There is, however, no scope for drawing such an inference in this case as the delay here has been occasioned not by any omission or commission on the part of the Detaining Authority. On the contrary, it is the appellant who has delayed the execution by first moving the Bombay High Court and then this Court. That apart, the respondents have asserted that though this Court had not passed any interim order against execution of the order, it could not be served as the appellant was absconding. It is pertinent to point out here that an identical contention raised by Mr. Jethmalani on similar facts was negatived by this Court in Bhawarlal v. State of T.N., 1979(1) S.C.C. 465 : A.I.R. 1979 S.C. 541." 19. A Division Bench of this High Court, while rendering the judgment in Criminal Writ Petition No. 1365/97 held between (Bhavani Shankar B. Paliwal v. Union of India and others)3, dated 8th October 1998 to which one of us (N. Arumugham, J.,) is a party in which in para 10 it has been laid down as follows:- "In the circumstances, it is crystal clear that the delay in executing the detention order was a consequence of the absconding in the past of the detenu and in such a situation, when the detenu himself was to blame for the delay in execution, it hardly lies in his mouth to say that on account of passage of time, the live link between his prejudicial activities and the rationale of clamping the detention order on him was snapped. The Supreme Court in the decisions reported in 1990(2) S.C.C (1 ) (M. Ahmedkutty v. Union of India and another, respondents)4 and A.I.R. 1979 Supreme Court 541 Bhawarlal Ganeshmalji Appellant v. The State of Tamil Nadu and others, respondents, has laid down that if the delay in execution of the detention order has been occasioned on account of the act of absconding on the part of the detenu, the detention order would not be vitiated on the vice of delay in execution. In the former authority in para 13 and in the latter authority in para 6, the Supreme Court has held that where the delay has been adequately explained and it is also found that it is the result of the recalcitrant or refractory conduct of the detenu in evading arrest, there is reason to warrant the inference that the live link has not been snapped but, instead it has been strengthened. In the latter decision, the detenu had been absconding for over three years and therefore, the Supreme Court repelled the contention of his Counsel that the impugned detention order had become vitiated on account of the delay in its execution." 20. In yet another case held between (Mohammed Aslam Musliya v. State of Maharashtra and another)5, 1997 Bom.C.R.(Cri.) 330: 1997 All.M.R.(Cri.) 1782 at para 9, a Division Bench of this Court had occasion to observe as follows (page 337 Bom.C.R.(Cri.)):--- "We would now take up the second ground urged by Mr. Suleman viz. the delay in execution of the detention order. Mr. Suleman contended that although the detention order was formulated on 30th January 1995, it was served on the detenue as late as 15-10-1995 and this delay in execution vitiates the detention order. We regret that we do not find any merit in the said contention. Delay in execution of the detention order on the detenu, has been plausibly explained in the return filed by Mr. R.B. Dange, Police Inspector, attached to P.C.B. C.I.D. Bombay. In paras 2 to 15 of his return he has elaborately spelt out the reasons for the delay in execution of the detention order. In the said paragraphs it has been mentioned that the detenu is a resident of Kasargod in Kerala and his endeavour to execute the detention order on him on various dates there proved futile in the said paragraphs. Inspector Dange stated that since the detenu was not available at his native place, the detention order could not be served on him. In this connection, another return has been filed by Mr. N.P. Sendo, Assistant Commissioner of Customs, COFEPOSA Cell, Sahar Airport, Bombay. In paragraph 3 of the said return, it is stated that the officers of the sponsoring authority visited the detenu's place of residence in Bombay but could not find him. In this connection, another return has been filed by Mr. N.P. Sendo, Assistant Commissioner of Customs, COFEPOSA Cell, Sahar Airport, Bombay. In paragraph 3 of the said return, it is stated that the officers of the sponsoring authority visited the detenu's place of residence in Bombay but could not find him. In the said paragraph it has further been stated that when they could not find the detenu at his Bombay address they made an application for cancellation of his bail on 2-5-1995 and on 8-6-1995, the learned Magistrate issued non-bailable warrants for arrest against the detenu as a sequel to the cancellation of his bail. The said warrant was sent to Kasargod, in Kerala of which place the detenu was a permanent resident. However the warrant returned back on 28-8-1995 as unserved. It is also mentioned in the return of Mr. Sendo that on 15-10-1995 the detenu surrendered and then the order of detention came to be served on him. From a perusal of both the affidavits, we are squarely satisfied that the delay in the execution of the detention order was not on account of any latches on the part of the concerned authorities but on account of the conduct of the detenu who was absconded. It is well settled that the law would not allow a person to take advantage of his own wrongs. If we were to accept Mr. Suleman's contention it would be a bidding good-bye to this norms would almost tantamount to judicial abetment and abscondence and would be giving premium abscondence." 21. Imparting the law clearly laid down by this Court and the Apex Court in the above case laws to the facts of the instant case, which are quite appropriate, we are constrained to hold that the detenu after having eluded away insult by his own activities and avoided his presence to the police to execute the order of detention passed against him and subsequently came and allowed to blame the police or the execution authority that there was a delay in executing the order of detention and that therefore the existing link and nexus between the prejudicial activities and the clamping of the detention order has been snapped, which in our respectful view cannot at all be countenanced and that therefore we reject the first contention offered by Mr. Kotwal the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 22. Kotwal the learned Counsel for the petitioner. 22. Coming to the second contention that the learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon the Ground No. (f), that the representation made by the detenue to the Secretary of Home Department of the Government of India on 21-2-1998 has not at all been considered nor sent any reply to the detenu and this factum would clearly help the detenu as it would violate the fundamental right of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. The learned Counsel for the petitioner contended, in order to substantiate the above ground, that the written representation of the detenue dated 21-2-1998 has been addressed to the Secretary of the Union Government by registered post with acknowledgment as evident from the postal receipt appended to the copy of the representation appended herewith, which would show that the letter has been sent by registered post by the advocate on 21-2-1998 and the photocopy of the served postal acknowledgment was relied upon. On the said copy, though same has been served upon the addressee namely the Secretary of the Home Department of the Union of India and as it has been received as is evident from the seal affixed thereon, it was contended that it was duly registered and that the addressee has received the said representation. But there was neither any reply nor any intimation with regard to the same to the detenu. Therefore the detenue has been deprived of making any valuable and effective representation, which is clearly violative of Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India. 23. In the said ground though tagged in the writ petition and the affirmed affidavit on behalf of the petitioner a supplementary counter affidavit was filed on behalf of the Union of India respondent No. 4 -in the instant case viz. Bina Prasad, Under Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, on 30-10-1998 itself, in which inter alia he has contended specifically that the representation dated 21-2-1998 from the detenu has not been received in the concerned desk of the Ministry of Home Affairs till the date. Hence there is nothing to explain about the consideration of the said representation. Shri Rajiv Patil the learned Addl. Hence there is nothing to explain about the consideration of the said representation. Shri Rajiv Patil the learned Addl. P.P. also substantiated his argument by contending that there was no clue or iota of evidence available in the instant case to say that there was acknowledgment conveyed on the part of the addressee namely the Union Government either by way of Secretary or somebody else for the simple reasoning that copy of the served postal acknowledgment receipt do not at all contain any sign or signature of any person on behalf of the addressee, though find with a border line of the Rubber Stamp also called addressee and that too without the legibility of the exact date on which it was made. In the context of the said position, yet another debate has been projected by the bar for the respective parties. But however on the close perusal of the said served postal acknowledgment receipt, we find that there is no sign or signature or any date in the so called seal affixed thereof on behalf of the addressee, which would indicate no serving date and no one has acknowledged it or with no number at all. However the learned Counsel for the petitioner has pointed out that for the letter sent by the registered post a receipt issued by the postal authorities is affixed herewith and from this alone it cannot be presumed that the letter dated 21-2-1998 has been duly posted and registered. We may at this stage observe that we may not have any quarrel with the learned Counsel's argument with regard to the letter has been sent by registered post as evident from the postal receipt affixed herewith. But we are very doubtful as to whether this representation dated 21-2-1998 has been the letter itself put in the cover of the registered post sent on that day, as there was no iota of evidence in the instant case. It is significant to note at this stage section 16 of the Indian Evidence Act which runs as follows. "16. Existence of course business when relevant---When there is a question whether a particular act was done, the existence of any course of business according to which it naturally would have been done, is a relevant fact. Illustrations. (a) The question is, whether a particular letter was despatched. "16. Existence of course business when relevant---When there is a question whether a particular act was done, the existence of any course of business according to which it naturally would have been done, is a relevant fact. Illustrations. (a) The question is, whether a particular letter was despatched. That facts that it was the ordinary course of business for all letters put in a certain place to be carried to the post, and that particular letter was put in that place, are relevant. (b) The question is, whether a particular letter reached A. The facts that it was posted in due course, and was not returned through the Dead Letter Office, are relevant." 24. In this connection, it became necessary for us to advert section 114, illustration (f) of the Indian Evidence Act, which runs as follows:- "114. Court may presume existence of certain facts---The Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case. As to illustration (f) :---The question is, whether a letter was received, it is shown to have been posted, but the usual course of the post was interrupted by disturbances. 25. Basing the above provisions of law regarding the presumptions which raised in this case, we are able to say that in the factual matrix that the so called representation of the detenu dated 21-2-1998 has been sent to the addressee by a registered post "with served postal acknowledgment due and photocopy of the served postal acknowledgment due is appended herewith and a perusal of the same as we have held already, do not contain either the signature or sign or the date of delivery etc. and that apart the mode of sending the representation i.e. the common and useful course of the business by the detenu by sending the same by registered post the served acknowledgment due produced herein by and on behalf of the writ petitioner, do not contain the sign or signature or the date of delivery or the date of serving, which would mean that the letter has not been served at all. It is the common course, and it is particular, which course has been opted by the detenu through his Advocate to send the letter by registered post with the served postal acknowledgment with proper person indicating or no person indicating or any date, not found in the said photocopy, we are totally not able to accept the contention of the learned Counsel Mr. Kotwal to raise a presumption that the said representation has been served upon the Secretary of the Home Department of the Union of India. In a case held between (L.M.S. Ummu Saleema v. B.B. Gujaral and another)6, A.I.R. 1981 S.C. at page 1191 and at page 1194 in para 6 the Supreme Court had the occasion to consider the identical point in that case which runs as follows:- "The next submission of the learned Counsel for the detenu was that although the detenu had retracted from his alleged original statement dated 7-8-80 long before the order of the detention was made, the fact of such retraction was not considered by the Detaining Authority before making the order of detention. The plain and simple answer of the respondents was that there was no such retraction as claimed by the detenu. According to the detenu as soon as he was released on bail, on 14-8-80, he addressed a letter to the Assistant Collector of Customs, Cuddalore, retracting from his former statement. This communication was sent under Certificate of Posting, a photostat copy of which was produced before us. In support of the claim that he had retracted from his former statement and had communicated: the retraction under certificate of posting, the detenu invited our attention to the reply sent by him to the show cause notice issued by the Collector of Customs under the Customs Act and to the representation made by him to the Detaining Authority, in both of which he made a reference to the alleged retraction. One curious feature which we must notice is that the detenu sent to the Detaining Authority along with his representation a photostat copy of the Certificate of posting but carefully retrained from sending a copy of the letter of retraction itself. This is indeed extraordinary. One curious feature which we must notice is that the detenu sent to the Detaining Authority along with his representation a photostat copy of the Certificate of posting but carefully retrained from sending a copy of the letter of retraction itself. This is indeed extraordinary. If the detenu was serious in his request that his retraction should be considered by the Detaining Authority while considering his representation one would expect him to send a copy of the letter of retraction along with his representation instead of a copy of the Certificate of posting. One cannot help a suspicion that evidence was being brought into existence to support the assertion that a letter of retraction was sent on 14-8-80. The Detaining Authority has stated in the counter that no such letter dt. 14-8-80 was received by the Assistant Collector of Customs. The entire file has been produced before us and on a perusal of the file we find that a thorough search was made, not once but several times, to find out if such a letter was received in the office of the Assistant Collector of Customs, Cuddalore but no such letter could be traced. The learned Counsel urged that the Detaining Authority was not competent to state that the Assistant Collector of Customs had not received such a letter and that it was for the Asstt. Collector to say so. There is no force in this submission. The file produced before us shows that the Asstt. Collector of Customs had informed the Detaining Authority and the Collector of Customs that he had made a thorough search for the letter said to have been written on 14-8-80 and that no such letter had been received in his office. We are satisfied that the alleged letter of retraction was only a myth. The certificate of posting might lead to a presumption that a letter addressed to the Assistant Collector of Customs was posted on 14-8-80 and in due course reached the addressee. But, that is only a permissible and not an inevitable presumption. Neither section 16 nor section 114 of the Evidence Act compel the Court to draw a presumption. The presumption may or may not be drawn. On the facts and circumstances of a case, the Court may refuse to draw the presumption. But, that is only a permissible and not an inevitable presumption. Neither section 16 nor section 114 of the Evidence Act compel the Court to draw a presumption. The presumption may or may not be drawn. On the facts and circumstances of a case, the Court may refuse to draw the presumption. On the other hand the presumption may be drawn initially but on a consideration of the evidence the Court may hold the presumption rebutted and may arrive at the conclusion that no letter was received by the addressee or that no letter was ever despatched as claimed. After all, there have been cases in the past, though rare, where postal certificates and even postal seals have been manufactured. In the circumstances of the present case, circumstances to which we have already referred, we are satisfied that no such letter of retraction was posted as claimed by the detenue." 26. For the reasonings laid down by the Apex Court and emphasized in the context of our finding given above, we are not in any way impressed by the argument advanced by Shri Kotwal, the learned Counsel for the petitioner on the second contention. We may clarify at this stage that if the written representation itself has not been served upon the Central Government, then the question of considering the same without any delay as expeditiously as possible and reply to be sent to the detenu does not arise in any event. 27. As regards the third contention, Mr. Kotwal the learned Counsel for the petitioner, has contended that the Detaining Authority in the instant case has not applied his mind to the grounds of detention independently but however, simply carried out the report of his subordinate officers as evident from the affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents and that therefore on this ground also, according to him, the impugned order of detention has become vitiated. To substantiate the above contention, the learned Counsel has brought our notice to the plea taken by the Detaining Authority namely the first respondent in para 22 of his return, which are extracted hereunder :-- "With reference to ground 8(y) of the writ petition, I say that the petitioner is not entitled to call upon the then Detaining Authority to show the time table for the purpose of proposal. However, for the purpose of demonstrating this Hon'ble Court, I say that Sakinaka police station, Mumbai on 18-10-95 submitted a proposal for detention of the detenu under the provisions of National Security Act which was submitted to the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Sakinaka Division, Mumbai on 19-10-95. I say that after the grant of the Assistant Commissioner of Police, the said proposal was forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone - IX, Mumbai on the same day that is 19-10-95. The Deputy Commissioner of Police after considering the material, forwarded and recommended the proposal to the Additional Commissioner of Police, North West Region. The Additional Commissioner of Police, North West Region carefully considered the proposal and recommended the same by his endorsement dated 4-11-95. The said proposal was submitted in the office of the Prevention of Crime Branch on 9-11-95 and the Senior Inspector of Police P.C.B. C.I.D., by his noting submitted the said proposal for opinion before the Selection Grade Police Prosecutor (P) on 9-11-95. I say that the Selection Grade Police Prosecutor (P) by his recommendation or opinion forwarded the proposal once again to the Senior Inspector of Police, P.C.B. C.I.D. on 14-11-95. The Senior Inspector of Police, P.C.B. C.I.D. after the opinion of the Selection Grade Police Prosecutor prepared a note and submitted the said proposal before the Assistant Commissioner of Police (Hq.), C.B. (P) on 20-11-95. The Assistant Commissioner of Police (HQ) C.B. with his grant submitted the said proposal to the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Prevention) on 20-11-95 and the Deputy Commissioner of Police (Prevention) after considering the recommendations forwarded the said proposal to the Additional Commissioner of Police (Crime) on 21-11-95. The Additional Commissioner of Police (Crime) with his recommondation submitted the said proposal to the joint Commissioner of Police (Crime) on 22-11-95 and the Joint Commissioner of Police (Crime) recommended the said proposal on 22-11-95 to the Commissioner of Police. The Commissioner of Police on 23-11-95 considered the proposal and prepared the grounds of detention and directed his office to type and prepare all the documents with copies and translations. I say that the preparation of the translation was completed and the office of the Prevention of Crime Branch was submitted all the records and checked the documents with translation, through the Additional Commissioner of Police on 5-12-95 for placing the same before the Commissioner of Police. I say that the preparation of the translation was completed and the office of the Prevention of Crime Branch was submitted all the records and checked the documents with translation, through the Additional Commissioner of Police on 5-12-95 for placing the same before the Commissioner of Police. I say that the Commissioner of Police once again considered the documents and formulated the grounds of detention contemporaneously and passed the Order of Detention on 7-12-95. I say that the above mentioned dates clearly show that there is no delay of whatsoever nature in issuing the order of detention. I further say that the live link from the last date of incident till issuance of the order of detention is very much alive with nexus and therefore the order of detention is legal, valid and justified." 28. Pointing out the above graphical description of the event happened since the initiation of the proposal itself as per the procedure laid down by the department itself and thus the proposal has been evolved out and finally the entire proposal with all the documents was placed before the Detaining Authority and the Detaining Authority has thus been seen as considered the whole matter one and the single time and on the same day framed the grounds and passed the detention order with all the documents on 7-12-95. Shri Rajiv Patil the learned Addl. P.P. counteracted the contentions made by Shri Kotwal and urged before us that there was no ground or material available to say that the mind of the Detaining Authority has influenced by the report of the various subordinate officers of his and that only in lieu of which the Detaining Authority has framed the grounds, and that as it is for the above specific plea and because of the said plea the said contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner have lost its sequence and that therefore it is to be rejected. Having seen this specific plea taken by the Detaining Authority in para 22 of his return, we find a very difficult(y) to accept the contention of Mr. Kotwal the learned Counsel for the petitioner for the reasoning that considering all the proposal by all the subordinate officers of the Detaining Authority, before it came for his final consideration, is not a criterion and parameter to hold that the Detaining Authority has not applied its mind independently. Kotwal the learned Counsel for the petitioner for the reasoning that considering all the proposal by all the subordinate officers of the Detaining Authority, before it came for his final consideration, is not a criterion and parameter to hold that the Detaining Authority has not applied its mind independently. In fact it is a sine qua non to be followed by every sponsoring authority by evaluating the matters or the proposals before placing the same before the Detaining Authority and that is what, has been led and followed in the instant case. 29. It is relevant to be noted at this stage to refer a case law in (Prabhakar Menka Shetty v. Ramamurthy, Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay and others)7, 1993(2) Bom.C.R. 3 at page 5 : 1993 Cri.L.J. 1981, a Division Bench of this Court in para 4 has observed as follows :- "As per the affidavit of the Detaining Authority Shri S. Ramamurthy, the Commissioner of Police, paragraphs Nos. 1 to 3 of the grounds were only a preamble and not the grounds of detention. The detention order was not based on those events of distant past. The proposal to detain was prepared by the Sponsoring Authority on 26-12-1991 as per the procedure laid down. The said proposal was processed through the usual channel of Senior Inspector of Police, Mulund Police Station, Assistant Commissioner of Police, Mulund Division, Deputy Commissioner of Police, Zone VI, Additional Commissioner of Police, North Region, Bandra, P.C.B. C.I.D. Bombay, Commissioner of Police, Bombay. It was placed before the Joint Commissioner of Police, Bombay on 23-1-1992. He recommended the detention on the very day. Then it was forwarded to the Commissioner who after going through the same in details and making requisite inquiries formulated the grounds of detention on 5-3-1992. The time taken was reasonable for full and proper consideration of the matter and ensuring that no lacuna remains in the order. The detenu was a gangster who had created panic and insecurity in the minds of law abiding citizens of the locality resulting into disturbance of even tempo. The incidents indicated potentiality of the detenu to repeat such incidents even in future. There was no snapping of the live link between the incidents and the order." 30. The detenu was a gangster who had created panic and insecurity in the minds of law abiding citizens of the locality resulting into disturbance of even tempo. The incidents indicated potentiality of the detenu to repeat such incidents even in future. There was no snapping of the live link between the incidents and the order." 30. It is thus seen that on exactly identical facts, this Court has already held the view that the necessary process to evaluate the proposal in order to enable the Detaining Authority to consider the whole matter by applying its mind and the process specified for the same has to be followed and accordingly it has been done and that the same has been graphically narrated by the Detaining Authority in his own return. The only thing remains to be seen at this stage is whether the Detaining Authority has applied its mind to the formulation of the grounds and passing of the detention order in one and the same time or not ? If this question is seen from the very contents specifically pleaded by the Detaining Authority in para 22 of his own return would clearly demonstrate the fact that the entire proposal sponsored by the sponsoring authority namely the subordinate officers through the proper channel of the police department of Bombay has been forwarded to the Detaining Authority and he considered all the papers by applying his full mind and arrived at a subjective satisfaction with regard to the formulation of the ground and passing of the detention order. In the light of the above, we are at very difficulty to accept the contention of Mr. Kotwal the learned Counsel for the petitioner. On the other hand, we must place on record our endorsement to the contentions raised by Shri Rajiv Patil the learned Addl. P.P. in this regard and that accordingly we hold that the Detaining Authority has applied its mind independently on one and the same day and time and formulated the grounds and passed the impugned order of detention on 7-12-1995. It is for the above specific findings and reasoning and circumstances, the third ground of learned Counsel for the petitioner also must fail. 31. Coming to the 4th and the last contention of the learned Counsel Mr. It is for the above specific findings and reasoning and circumstances, the third ground of learned Counsel for the petitioner also must fail. 31. Coming to the 4th and the last contention of the learned Counsel Mr. Kotwal for the petitioner that the in built of sub-section 4 or sub-section 5 of section 3 of the National Security Act has not been carried out in the instant case and that therefore on this aspect and ground, he argued that the impugned order is to be quashed. Sub-Clause (4) of section 3 reads as under :- "(4) When any order is made under this section by an officer mentioned in sub-section (3), he shall forthwith report the fact to the State Government to which he is subordinate together with the grounds, on which the order has been made and such other particulars as, in his opinion, have a hearing on the matter, and no such order shall remain in force for more than twelve days after the making thereof unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the State Government. Provided that where under section 8 the grounds of detention are communicated by the officer making the order after five days but not later than ten days from the date of detention, this sub-section shall apply subject to the modification that, for the words "twelve days", the words fifteen days shall be substituted. (5) When any order is made or approved by the State Government under this section, the State Government shall, within seven days, report the fact to the Central Government together with the grounds on which the order has been made and such other particular as, in the opinion of the State Government, have a bearing on the necessity for the order." 32. Though the above ground has not been taken in the writ petition, Mr. Kotwal the learned Counsel for the petitioner urged the above ground before us during the course of argument that the said ground comes under the category of a legal ground and that therefore he has submitted his argument as referred to above. By way of reply, Mr. Though the above ground has not been taken in the writ petition, Mr. Kotwal the learned Counsel for the petitioner urged the above ground before us during the course of argument that the said ground comes under the category of a legal ground and that therefore he has submitted his argument as referred to above. By way of reply, Mr. Bina Prasad the Under Secretary, Ministry of Home Affairs Government of India, New Delhi, in his own return particularly in paragraph 5 has respondee to the above contention of the learned Counsel for the petitioner in the following way :-- "That the NSA, 1980, does not cast any statutory obligation on the part of the Central Government to inform the detenu about the result of consideration of the matter received under section 3(5) of the Act from the State Government. That the Central Government therefore, did not consider it necessary to inform the petitioner or anybody about the outcome of the consideration of the report of the detention received under the said section in respect of Shri Mohammedail alias Jango." 33. Mr. S.Y. Sonawane, Under Secretary to the Government of Maharashtra, Home Department (Special), Mantralaya, Mumbai, in his own return at para 3 has responded the following for the above said contention and for the same we have extracted as stated hereunder :-- "With reference to para J of the petition, I say that the Detention Order dated 7-12-95 issued by the Detaining Authority i.e. the Commissioner of Police, Brihan Mumbai was approved by the State Government on 16-12-95 i.e. within the stipulated time limit of 12 days. The report under section 3(5) of the said Act was forwarded to the Government of India on 16-12-95 i.e. within the stipulated time limit of 7 days. The same was received by the Government of India on 16-12-97. Alongwith this report copies of the approval, order, report from the Detaining Authority, report of the Sponsoring Authority, Detention Order, Committal Order, Grounds of Detention formulated by the Detaining Authority and other relevant documents were forwarded. The English translation of the documents in Marathi was also forwarded to the Government of India. Thus the averments made in this para are denied." 34. Considering the very contention raised by Mr. The English translation of the documents in Marathi was also forwarded to the Government of India. Thus the averments made in this para are denied." 34. Considering the very contention raised by Mr. Kotwal the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the reply plea taken in the sworn affidavit as above referred, we feel that the very contention taken by the respondents namely Mr. Sonawane and Bina Prasad would provide an answer to the contention of the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner. Even if, we allow the above said grounds along with the Ground No. 3 referred to above, were not taken as grounds in the writ petition, for a moment to argue and consider for the purpose of adjudication of this writ petition. We straight away observe that these two grounds must together fail for the reason that the State Government has sent the report of the detention order passed by the Detaining Authority after approval within the stipulated time to the Government of India and the Government of India has considered the same and approved. It is at this juncture Mr. Kotwal has contended that principle of natural justice pursuaded or to draw an anology from the decision held under the COFEPOSA Act or the other detention laws to the instant case also to the effect that the Government of India after the receipt of the report of the State Government with regard to the detention order of a detenu must communicate its decision to the detenu so as to make his effective representation under Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India. We are unable to accept the said contention for the simple reason that there was no legal sanction provided elsewhere particularly in the National Security Act to formulate such contention as argued by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. Conceedingly either sub clause 3(4) or sub clause (5) do not provide the State Government that after the receipt of the report from the State Government and approved the same, communicate its decision to the detenue. Conceedingly either sub clause 3(4) or sub clause (5) do not provide the State Government that after the receipt of the report from the State Government and approved the same, communicate its decision to the detenue. Thus for a thing or an activity since has not been maintained or implied by the legislature one cannot argue to require such a mode to be followed in the case of detention of a dreaded goonda whose activities goes to the very root of the tempo of the life of the society in various areas of the Bombay Metropolice by his criminal activities and therefore upon this ground also we are of the firm view that the writ petition must fail. 35. No other substantial points has been projected before us to consider. With the result the writ petition must fail. 36. In the result for all the foregoing reasonings and findings, the writ petition is failed and accordingly it is dismissed. Rule issued already is discharged. Petition dismissed. *****