D. C. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision is directed under section 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent Control Act against the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court granting decree for eviction of the revisionists after reversing the judgment and decree of the Trial Court on this point. ( 2 ) THE brief facts giving rise to this revision are as under : the plaintiffs-respondents No. 1 and 2 filed suit for eviction of the revisionists on various grounds. Initially eviction was sought only on the ground of tenant being in arrears of rent for a period exceeding six months and not paying the same after service of notice of demand within a period of one month thereof. Subsequently on 15. 12. 1975 by getting the plaint amended the landlords sought eviction of the revisionists on two more grounds viz. for committing breach of the terms of tenancy and for causing damage to the tenanted accommodation by raising permanent structure. Again on 15. 11. 1976 another amendment was sought by virtue of which the landlord alleged that the defendants No. 4, 5 and 6 were sub let the tenanted accommodation by the defendant No. 2. ( 3 ) THE suit was resisted by the revisionists denying all these allegations. ( 4 ) THE Trial Court framed number of issues and found that though the defendants were in arrears of rent exceeding six months but since section 12 (a) of the Rent Act was not applicable, rather section 12 (b) of the Act was applicable and further since the defendants deposited more than the amount due on the first date of hearing viz. on the date of settlement of issues no decree of eviction would be granted against them. The Trial Court found the notice to be legal and valid. It further found that the pleas of sub-letting, raising permanent structure, causing damage to the tenanted accommodation and committing breach of the terms of the tenancy were not established by the respondents No. 1 and 2 viz. the landlords. Accordingly the suit for possession was dismissed but decree for arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 3,000. 00 was passed. ( 5 ) AN appeal was preferred by the landlords. The Appellate Court agreed with the findings of the Trial Court regarding breach of the terms of tenancy, damage caused to the tenanted accommodation, raising permanent structure and sub-letting. Accordingly the suit for possession was dismissed but decree for arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 3,000. 00 was passed. ( 5 ) AN appeal was preferred by the landlords. The Appellate Court agreed with the findings of the Trial Court regarding breach of the terms of tenancy, damage caused to the tenanted accommodation, raising permanent structure and sub-letting. On the point of arrears of rent also the Appellate Court was in agreement with the findings of the Trial Court. The Appellate Court however, reversed the decree for eviction passed by the Trial Court on the ground that the revisionists did not deposit the rent regularly during the pendency of the appeal. It is, therefore, this revision by the tenants-revisionists. ( 6 ) LEARNED Counsel for the parties have been heard at length. There is concurrent finding of the two Courts below that the tenants did not commit any breach of terms of tenancy, that they did not raise any permanent structure in the suit accommodation nor they caused any damage to the suit accommodation and that the defendant no. 2 did not sub-let the accommodation to the defendants no. 4, 5 and 6. These findings have become concluded. These findings are concurrent findings recorded by the two Courts below on proper appreciation of evidence on record. Hence these findins require no interference in this revision. ( 7 ) THE only point for determination in this revision is whether the lower Appellate Court was justified in holding that the tenants were irregular in depositing the rent during the pendency of appeal. ( 8 ) THERE is also concurrent finding recorded by the two Courts below that the case is governed by Section 12 (3) (b) of the Bombay Rent Act and not by Section 12 (3) (a) of the Bombay Rent Act. This finding has also become final and it does not suffer from any illegality. Thus, the short point for determination is whether the tenants were irregular in depositing the rent during the pendency of appeal. The matter regarding arrears of rent can be divided in two parts. The first is whether the rent was deposited in the Trial Court during the pendency of the suit on the first date of hearing and the second is deposits during pendency of the appeal. ( 9 ) THE admitted facts are that the rent was due from 1. 3. The first is whether the rent was deposited in the Trial Court during the pendency of the suit on the first date of hearing and the second is deposits during pendency of the appeal. ( 9 ) THE admitted facts are that the rent was due from 1. 3. 1971 and the notice of demand and eviction was served on 6. 10. 1973. Notice was not replied by the tenants. There was controversy that within a period of one month rent was remitted by cheque but it was not accepted. This plea raised by the tenants was not accepted by the two Courts below. Thus, it is also now concluded fact that within a month of service of notice of demand entire rent was not paid by the tenants. ( 10 ) THE two Courts below have given cogent reasons for coming to the conclusion that Section 12 (3) (a) is not applicable, rather Section 12 (3) (b) is applicable. The reasons recorded by the two Courts below are that in addition to standard rent of Rs. 351. 00 p. m. , the tenants were obliged to pay education cess, water tax, drainage tax and conservancy tax etc. In view of tenants obligation to pay these taxes the rent did not remain payable monthly within the scope of Section 12 (3) (a) of the Act. Accordingly the lower Appellate Court proceeded to examine whether Section 12 (3) (b) is applicable and if so whether the tenants have deposited the rent regularly as required under the aforesaid section. The lower Appellate Court found that the case was covered by Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act. Both the Courts below found on the first part that more than required amount was deposited by the tenants on the first date of hearing of the suit viz. on the date of settlement of issues. On the date of settlement of issues the tenants were in arrears of rent amounting to Rs. 15,093. 00 only, but a sum of Rs. 15,795. 00 was deposited upto the date of settlement of the issues. The Appellate Court, therefore, rightly observed that more than required amount was deposited by the tenants on the first date of hearing in the Trial Court. Issues were framed on 24. 10. 1974. 15,093. 00 only, but a sum of Rs. 15,795. 00 was deposited upto the date of settlement of the issues. The Appellate Court, therefore, rightly observed that more than required amount was deposited by the tenants on the first date of hearing in the Trial Court. Issues were framed on 24. 10. 1974. Thus, the tenants were regular in depositing the rent and also deposited the entire rent on the first date of hearing. After the settlement of issues the tenants committed only one monthss default in depositing the rent regularly in the Trial Court. Thus, for all purposes there was no default in making regular deposit in the Trial Court. The judgment of the Trial Court was delivered on 12. 4. 1977. ( 11 ) THE landlords filed appeal on 20. 6. 1977. The notice of appeal was served in July,1977. The tenants appeared in the Appellate Court on 27. 7. 1977. The lower Appellate Court found that thereafter in the months of September to December the tenants did not make any deposit in the Appellate Court. On 4. 1. 1978 the tenants deposited six months rent covering the period upto 28. 2. 1978. Thereafter, the next deposit was made on 3. 7. 1978. Thus, there was again default in not making regular deposits in the months of March to June, 1978. Another deposit was made on 3. 7. 1978 covering the rent up to 31. 8. 1978. The next deposit was made on 1. 2. 1979 meaning thereby that the rent for the months of September to December, 1978 and January, 1979 was not deposited regularly. Another default was made in not making regular deposit of rent for the months of June to August, 1979. This finding of fact could not be challenged to be incorrect by the learned Counsel for the revisionists. From these facts it is obvious that during the pendency of appeal, the revisionists committed several defaults and did not deposit the rent regularly within the meaning of Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act. ( 12 ) THE requirement of Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act was considered by the Apex Court in the case of M. B. Shah and Another Vs. B. M. Shah reported in 19 GLR 1090. ( 12 ) THE requirement of Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act was considered by the Apex Court in the case of M. B. Shah and Another Vs. B. M. Shah reported in 19 GLR 1090. The Apex Court observed that the provisions of clause (b) of Section 12 (3) are mandatory and must be strictly complied with by the tenant during the pendency of the suit or appeal if the landlords claim for eviction on the ground of default in payment of rent is to be defeated. The word regularly in clause (b) of Section 12 (3) has a significance of its own. It enjoins a payment or tender characterised by reasonable punctuality, that is to say one made at regular times or intervals. The regularity contemplated may not be a punctuality of clock-like precision ond exactitude but it must reasonably conform with substantial proximity to the sequence of times or intervals at which the rent falls due. Thus, where the rent is payable by the month, the tenant must, if he wants to avail of the benefit of the latter part of clause (b), tender or pay it every month or when it falls due,or at his discretion in advance. If he persistently defaults during the pendency of the suit or appeal in paying the rent such as where he pays it at irregular intervals of 2 or 3 or 4 months the Court has no discretion to treat what were manifestly irregular payments, and substantial compliance with the mandate of this clause irrespective of the fact that by the time the judgment was pronounced all the arrears had been cleared by the tenant. ( 13 ) IT is clear from the above observation of the Apex Court that if the tenant wants to seek protection of Section 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act he must strictly comply with the requirement of this section. ( 14 ) IT is not open to the tenant to contend that since the rent was not payable monthly, and because he had deposited the entire rent before conclusion of appeal he can avail of the protection granted under section 12 (3) (b) of the Act. ( 14 ) IT is not open to the tenant to contend that since the rent was not payable monthly, and because he had deposited the entire rent before conclusion of appeal he can avail of the protection granted under section 12 (3) (b) of the Act. ( 15 ) LEARNED Counsel for the revisionists contended that since the education cess, water tax and other taxes were to be paid by the revisionists the rent no more than remained payable monthly, hence, if the rent was paid after lapse of few months it cannot be said that decree for eviction can be passed against the tenants. I am unable to accept this contention. Under Section 12 (3) (a) the requirement is that the rent must be payable monthly. However, where there is contract between landlord and the tenant that education cess and other taxes are to be paid by the tenant then ofcourse by judicial interpretation in number of cases it has been held that since these taxes are paid annually and not monthly it cannot be said that the rent is payable monthly for the purpose of Section 12 (3) (a) of the Act. This judicial opinion is not to be stretched to the extent that if the landlord agrees with the tenant for charging aforesaid taxes the nature of the tenancy stands altered. If it is accepted that in every such case the rent is not payable monthly then naturally it becomes annual tenancy and annual tenancy cannot be created except by registered document. There is no evidence in this case that tenancy was created by a registered document. Moreover mere payment of rent in a particular manner does not change the nature of tenancy. Even in case of monthly tenancy the landlord may agree to receive rent after an interval of 2 to 3 months and for that reason it cannot be said that the nature of tenancy stands altered. It will still remain a monthly tenancy, no matter the rent was paid after 2 or 3 months and the same was accepted by the landlord. It is only for the limited purpose of Section 12 (3) (a) that it has been held in various cases decided by this Court that if taxes are to be paid by the tenant the rent does not remain payable monthly. It is only for the limited purpose of Section 12 (3) (a) that it has been held in various cases decided by this Court that if taxes are to be paid by the tenant the rent does not remain payable monthly. In none of the cases it has been held that upon such obligation of the tenant the nature of the tenancy is automatically altered to annual tenancy. ( 16 ) THE option given by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgment is that if the tenant wants to avail of the benefit of the latter part of clause (b) he must tender or pay the rent every month or as it falls due or at his discretion in advance. Thus, these three options mean that firstly the tenant has to pay rent every month. Secondly, he can pay on the date when it falls due and thirdly he can pay at his discretion the rent in advance. However, the words "as it falls due " in the aforesaid judgment of the Apex Court do not mean that the tenant can withhold, tender or payment till disposal of appeal nor the tenant can be permitted to say that in such cases the rent will fall due only after completion of one year. In the instant case neither the rent was paid in advance every month nor on the date when it fell due. The deposit during appeal was irregular in as much as there were defaults ranging from 3 to 5 months not only once but on several occasions pointed out in the foregoing portion of this judgment. ( 17 ) FURTHER, according to the above judgment the appeal has also been considered to be continuation of the suit and same requirement is to be observed by the tenant during the pendency of the appeal, if he wants to avail of protection of Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act. ( 18 ) AT present word regularly appearing in Section 12 (3) (b) does not find place in statute book because it was subsequently deleted. However, this deletion according to a Division Bench pronouncement of this Court has prospective effect and has no retrospective effect. ( 18 ) AT present word regularly appearing in Section 12 (3) (b) does not find place in statute book because it was subsequently deleted. However, this deletion according to a Division Bench pronouncement of this Court has prospective effect and has no retrospective effect. When the suit and appeal were decided by the two Courts below the word regularly was already there in Section 12 (3) (b) of the Rent Act and as such the tenants were required to deposit the rent during pendency of appeal regularly. Ofcourse minor defaults could be ignored. The Apex Court made it clear in the aforesaid judgment that if the tenant deposits the rent at intervals of 2, 3 and 4 months it is not regular payment as contemplated under Section 12 (3) (b) of the Act. Thus, according to the Apex Court even two months default could not be condoned by the Appellate Court. The Apex Court further it made clear that if the tenant persistently defaults during the pendency of the suit or appeal in paying rent such as where he pays it at irregular intervals of 2, 3 or 4 months the Court has no discretion to treat what were manifestly irregular payment as substantial compliance with the mandate of this clause irrespective of the fact that by the time the judgment was pronounced all the arrears had been cleared by the tenant. ( 19 ) THEREFORE, from what has been discussed earlier, it transpires that the revisionists persistently defaulted in making deposit of rent during pendency of the appeal and as such they are not entitled to the protection granted under section 12 (3) (b) of the Act. The lower Appellate Court, therefore, committed no illegality in decreeing the suit for eviction. ( 20 ) LEARNED Counsel for the revisionists raised another contention that there was dispute of standard rent and that the findings of the two Courts below on this point are illegal and erroneous. It may be mentioned that the dispute regarding standard rent is not very material now in view of concurrent finding recorded by the two Courts below that Section 12 (3) (a) is not applicable to the facts of the present case. It is only for the purposes of Section 12 (3) (a) that it is seen whether there exists or existed any bonafide dispute regarding standard rent. It is only for the purposes of Section 12 (3) (a) that it is seen whether there exists or existed any bonafide dispute regarding standard rent. Once the two Courts below found that Section 12 (3) (a) is not applicable because the tenant is obliged to pay education cess and other taxes it would not be necessary to discuss the dispute regarding standard rent. However, the tenant had already filed an application for fixation of standard rent vide Application No. 815/80. This application was decided on compromise between the parties and the standard rent was fixed at Rs. 351. 00 p. m. excluding taxes. An attempt was made to challenge this order based on compromise on the ground that this order was obtained by fraud. However, this order of the Trial Court was not challenged in a competent court. It was tried to be challenged for the first time in the appeal from which the instant revision arose. Since the order based on compromise fixing standard rent was not set aside till disposal of the suit, the Trial Court was justified in observing that the tenants were stopped from challenging or raising dispute regarding standard rent. . ( 21 ) THE Appellate Court also did not permit the tenants to raise this plea on the ground that no appeal or cross objection was filed by them against this observation of the Trial Court. Learned Counsel for the revisionists placing reliance upon Order 41 Rule 33 CPC and observations of a Division Bench in the case of Balkrishna Das Agarwal Vs. Smt. Radha Devi and others reported in AIR 1989 Allahabad 133 contended that even without filing appeal or cross objection the finding of the Trial Court on the issue of the standard rent could be challenged in Appeal. I have already pointed out above that this controversy loses its significance once it is held that the case is not covered by Section 12 (3) (a) of the Act. Even if for a moment it is accepted that without appeal or cross objection the lower Appellate Court could have seen this matter still such argument could not have reversed the fate of the appeal. The reason is that simply on this ground the suit could not be dismissed. The order fixing standard rent having attained finality could not be set aside by the lower Appellate Court nor it could ignore. The reason is that simply on this ground the suit could not be dismissed. The order fixing standard rent having attained finality could not be set aside by the lower Appellate Court nor it could ignore. As such it is a futile exercise to enter into this argument raised by the learned Counsel for the revisionists. ( 22 ) FOR the reasons given above I am of the view that the judgment and decree of the lower Appellate Court does not suffer from any illegality. It is perfectly in accordance with law. Hence, the revision has no merit and is bound to fail. The revision is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs. .