JUDGMENT : Susanta Chatterji, J. - The present writ petition by Ramesh Kumar Kar and 17 others who are now working in the Safety Engineering in Rourkela Steel Plant being designated as Safety Inspectors have asked for the following reliefs : ".... .to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other suitable writ directing the opposite parties to take immediate steps to comply with the relevant provisions of the Act and the Rules so as to extend all the benefits as provided under Clause (2)(c) of Rule 61-A of the Orissa Factories Rules, 1950 and such compliance be made with retrospective effect i.e. from the date of appointment of each of the petitioners and extend all other service benefits from retrospective effect as permissible under law." 2. The grievance of the petitioners is that they are discharging the duties of Safety Officers as envisaged under Rule 61-A (3)(a) of the Orissa Factories Rules, 1950. It is contended that such duties as enumerated in the said Rules are allotted/entrusted to all the petitioners by specific orders of the authorities of the Rourkela Steel Plant. It is placed on record that, as per Clause (2)(c) of Rule 61-A besides other conditions of service the scale of pay and the allowance to be granted to the Safety Officers shall be the same as those of other officers of corresponding status in the factory. It is highlighted that in spite of repeated reminders and representations from various quarters including the petitioners the authorities of the Rourkela Steel Plant did not extend the status and other service conditions of officers to the petitioners which is contrary to the relevant provisions of the Orissa Factories Rules, 1950. 3. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the acts as alleged, the petitioners have moved the Writ Court seeking the redress as indicated above. 4. The writ petition is opposed by the contesting opposite parties 1 to 3 who have filed a comprehensive counter affidavit, being sworn by the Manager (Personnel), General Services under the Steel Authority of India Ltd., Rourkela Steel Plant, Rourkela. It is submitted on behalf of the opposite parties that the designation mentioned in Rule 61-A of the Rules has been grossly misunderstood. It is submitted on behalf of the opposite parties that the designation mentioned in Rule 61-A of the Rules has been grossly misunderstood. Clause (2)(b) of Rule 61-A contemplates different herearchical positions of the Safety Officers and the scheme of the said Rules envisages that where there are more than one Safety Officer in a factory, one of them is to be designated as the Chief Safety Officer with higher status than that of others. The Chief Safety Officer would be in overall charge of the safety functions and to be assisted by his subordinate officers. Sub- clause (c) of Sub-rule(2) of Rule 61-A clearly postulates that conditions of service of the other officers would be the same and would correspond to other officers in the factory. The designation given to the petitioners as Safety Inspectors, according to the existing promotional policy does not suffer from any infirmity. The Orissa Welfare Officers (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1970 provides for specific grades for the welfare officers and the minimum scale of pay against each grade. The three grades mentioned therein conform to the inbuilt hierarchy of this category of officers. No such grade, pay or scale of pay has been identified under the Factories Act or Rules for Safety Officers. The level of qualification identified for Safety Officers ranges from that of a graduate to a diploma holder. Thus the difference in qualification and experience are definitely linked to difference in the status of these Safety Officers. The other allegations of the petitioners have been controverted and it is submitted that the grievance of the petitioners is misconceived and the writ petition is otherwise liable to be dismissed. 5. Patiently, we have heard Mr. Nayak for the petitioners, and Mr.Das for the Steel Authority of India Ltd. Regard being had to the materials on record, our attention is drawn to Rule 61- A(1)(a). 5. Patiently, we have heard Mr. Nayak for the petitioners, and Mr.Das for the Steel Authority of India Ltd. Regard being had to the materials on record, our attention is drawn to Rule 61- A(1)(a). For better appreciation, we find that a person shall not be eligible for appointment as a Safety Officer, unless he (i) possesses a recognised degree in any branch of engineering or technology and has had practical experience of working in a factory for a period of not less than two years, or a recognised degree in Physics or Chemistry or a recognised diploma in any branch of engineering or technology and has had practical experience of working in a factory in a supervisory capacity for a period of not less than five years; (ii) possesses a degree or diploma in industrial safety recognised by the State Government in this behalf; and (iii) has adequate knowledge of Oriya language. Rule 61-A(2)(b) indicates, inter alia, that the Chief Safety Officer or the Safety Officer in the case of factories where only one Safety Officer is required to be appointed, shall be given the status of a senior executive and he shall work directly under the control of the Chief Executive of the factory. All other Safety Officers shall be given appropriate status to enable them-to discharge their functions effectively. 6. Much emphasis has been laid by Mr. Nayak that Rule 61-A prescribes regarding fulfilment of requisite qualification which came into force in 1986. It is submitted that having acquired the academic qualification and practical experience, the petitioner's designation cannot be in executive rank and their status to be constituted as officers in the Executive Category. 7. Mr.Das has submitted, inter alia, that looking at Rule 61- A(2)(c) the scale of pay and allowances to be granted to the Safety Officers including the Chief Safety Officer and the other conditions of their service shall be the same as those of the other officers of corresponding status in the factory. He has submitted that the point of controversy in the case is very much narrow indeed. He has highlighted that the petitioners themselves are claiming to receive the status of Executive Post of Chief Safety Officer is obviously in the rank of Executive. He has submitted that the point of controversy in the case is very much narrow indeed. He has highlighted that the petitioners themselves are claiming to receive the status of Executive Post of Chief Safety Officer is obviously in the rank of Executive. Although Rule 61-A (2)(b) provides that the Chief Safety Officer or the Safety Officer should be deemed to be a senior Executive, be that as it may, he has drawn attention of this Court to a decision reported in AIR 1972 SC 2284 (S.Narayanaswami v. G.Pannersetvam and Ors.). In particular our attention is drawn to paragraph 19 of the said decision. For better appreciation paragraph 19 is quoted below: "We think that the view contained in the judgment under appeal, necessarily results in writing some words into or adding them to the relevant statutory provisions, to the effect that the candidates from graduates* constituencies of Legislative Councils must also possess the qualification to having graduated. This contravenes the rule of "plain meaning" or "literal" construction which must ordinarily prevail. A logical corollary of that rule is that "a statute may not be extended to meet a case for which provision has clearly and undoubtedly not been made" (See: Craies on Statute Law-6th Edition p.70). An application of the rule necessarily involves that addition to or modification or words used in statutory provisions is not generally permissible". 8. Besides the aforesaid point Mr.Das has also submitted that there is a tripartite settlement covering the Safety Department and in view thereof the Writ Court may not interfere in the matter. 9. We have considered with diligence the submissions made by the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties. We appreciate that the small controversy in this case is whether the petitioners are entitled to the status in the rank of Executive Officers or not. The point about the tripartite settlement has no impact inasmuch as it is well conceded before us by the learned Counsel for both sides that the tripartite settlement does not cover the present dispute as raised in the writ petition. If the pre-sent dispute is not covered by the tripartite settlement it is of no consequence to consider that the writ petition is not maintainable. Such point is not sustained and overruled accordingly. 10. If the pre-sent dispute is not covered by the tripartite settlement it is of no consequence to consider that the writ petition is not maintainable. Such point is not sustained and overruled accordingly. 10. On the score of merit, we find that Rule 61-A(2)(b) and (2)(c) clearly envisages the qualification and experience the safety officer ought to have to become eligible to serve the Department. The appropriate status to be given cannot be construed otherwise as that of Inspector because at the time of entry the petitioners themselves were Inspectors. There is no rank above Inspectors other than that of the officers vis-a-vis executive. Regard being had to the qualification, nature of duties assigned, nature of work within the framework of the Rules, it cannot be construed that the petitioners are not discharging supervisory nature of duties as the dictionary meaning of "officer" envisages. Taking overall view of the matter and interpreting Rule 61-A (2)(b) and (2)(a), we are of the considered view that the relief, the petitioners have asked for has substantive merit. Their status should be construed as officers in the executive rank. The financial benefits would automatically follow if they get the status in the hierarchy as per the Rules prevailing in the Company Service field. 11. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the writ petition and direct issue of an appropriate writ commanding the opposite parties to take ef-> fective steps to re-designate the petitioners as Safety Officers and grant such financial benefits as Executives are entitled within a period of three months from the date of service of writ. No costs. R.K. Dash, J. 12. I agree. Final Result : Allowed