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1998 DIGILAW 70 (BOM)

Amar Dye Chem Ltd. v. C. M. Kadam

1998-02-06

B.P.SARAF, PRATIBHA UPASANI, R.P.DESAI

body1998
JUDGMENT : B.P. SARAF, J. 1. The controversy in this writ petition pertains to the true meaning of the expression "full wages last drawn" in Section 17-B of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the Act'). Reference of this case to the Full Bench was necessitated because of the Division Bench decisions of this Court in Elpro International Ltd. vs. K.B. Joshi and Others, (1987) 2 Bom CR 1 : (1987) 54 FLR 428 : (1987) 2 LLJ 210 : (1987) Mh. L.J. 376 and Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. vs. Abdul Karim Munafkhan and Others, (1995) 1 LLJ 47 . In Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. (supra) it was held that "full wages last drawn" means the wages which the workman would have drawn if he had been reinstated in the service as per the award. The controversy is whether the expression "full wages last drawn" in Section 17-B means wages drawn by the workman at the time of termination of his employment or wages which he would have drawn on the date of the award. 2. The controversy, however, now stand concluded by the decision of the Supreme Court dated November 19, 1997 in Dena Bank vs. Kirit Kumar T. Patel, 1998 (1) LLJ 1 . In that case, the Supreme Court has held that the words "full wages last drawn" must be given their plain and material meaning and they cannot be given extended meaning as given by this Court in Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. (supra). It is observed in Para 22: "Section 17-B has been enacted by Parliament with a view to give relief to a workman who has been ordered to be reinstated under the award of a Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal during the pendency of proceedings in which the said award is under challenge before the High Court or the Supreme Court. The object underlying the provision is to relieve to a certain extent the hardship that is caused to the workman due to delay in the implementation of the award. The payment which is required to be made by the employer to the workman is in the nature of subsistence allowance which would not be refundable or recoverable from the workman even if the award is set aside by the High Court or this Court. The payment which is required to be made by the employer to the workman is in the nature of subsistence allowance which would not be refundable or recoverable from the workman even if the award is set aside by the High Court or this Court. Since the payment is of such a character Parliament thought it proper to limit it to the extent of the wages which were drawn by the workman when he was in service and when his services were terminated and therefore used the words "full wages last drawn." To read these words to mean wages which would have been drawn by the workman if he had continued in service if the order terminating his services had not been passed since it has been set aside by the award of the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal would result in so enlarging the benefit as to comprehend the relief that has been granted under the award that is under challenge. Since the amount is not refundable or recoverable in the event of the award being set aside it would result in the employer being required to give effect to the award during the pendency of the proceedings challenging the award before the High Court or the Supreme Court without his being able to recover the said amount in the event of the award being set aside. We are unable to construe the provisions contained in Section 17-B to cast such a burden on the employer. In our opinion, therefore, the words "full wages last drawn" must be given their plain and material meaning and they cannot be given the extended meaning as given by the Karnataka High Court in Vishveswarayya Iron and Steel Ltd. (supra) or the Bombay High Court in Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. (supra). 3. It is clear from the above that the expression "full wages last drawn" in section 17-B of the Act means the wages which were drawn by the workman when he was in service and when his services were terminated. It cannot be construed to mean wages which would have been drawn by the workman if he had continued in service if the order terminating his services had not been passed. 4. It cannot be construed to mean wages which would have been drawn by the workman if he had continued in service if the order terminating his services had not been passed. 4. The Supreme Court, in the above case, also held that Section 17-B of the Act does not in any way preclude the High Court or the Supreme Court in exercise of powers under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution to pass order directing the payment of higher amount to workman if such higher amount is considered necessary in the interest of Justice. The conferment of such a right u/s 17-B cannot be regarded as a restriction on the powers of the High Court or the Supreme Court under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court, however, made it clear that such a direction would be de hors the provisions contained in Section 17-B and while giving the direction the Court may also give directions regarding refund or recovery of the excess amount in the event of the award being set aside. The Supreme Court did not agree with the view of this Court in Elpro International Ltd. (supra) that in exercise of powers under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution an order can be passed denying the workman the benefit granted u/s 17-B of the Act. 5. Following the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the above case, we hold that "full wages last drawn" in Section 17-B of the Act means wages drawn by the workman at the time of termination of his employment and not the wages which he would have drawn on the date of the award. The ratio of this Court in Carona Sahu Co. Ltd. (supra) is no more a good law. Similarly, the view of this Court in Elpro International Ltd. (supra) to the effect that in exercise of powers under Articles 226 and 136 of the Constitution an order can be passed denying the workman the benefit granted u/s 17-B of the Act is also not a good law. 6. Ms. N. Mahtre, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, made a grievance before us that in the instant case the employer has not paid the wages due to the workman from May 1997 to September 1997. 6. Ms. N. Mahtre, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1, made a grievance before us that in the instant case the employer has not paid the wages due to the workman from May 1997 to September 1997. She prayed for a direction to the respondents to pay wages due as per this decision forthwith. In reply, the learned counsel for the petitioner stated that the wages due to the workman as per this judgment would be paid to them within one month from today. He further stated that only after making such payment the petitioners, will withdraw the amount deposited by them in this Court. The above statements are accepted. We, accordingly, direct that the amount deposited by the petitioners may be refunded to them on production of evidence to the effect that they have paid the arrears of wages due to the workman. 7. This writ petition is disposed of accordingly with no order as to costs.