OM PARKASH v. DIVISIONAL COMMISSIONER — 1998 DIGILAW 70 (HP)

JUDGMENT SURINDER SARUP, J.—The present petition has been filed under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India praying for the following relief:— To quash and set aside the orders dated 26.8.1993 (Annexure P) passed by respondent No. 1, i.e. Divisional Commissioner, Shimla Division, Himachal Pradesh. By the said order, the respondent No. 1 has decided the appeal under Section 32 of the H.P. Registration of Hotels and Travel Agents Act, 1970, filed by Smt. Prem Seth respondent No. 2. As a result of the said order, the earlier order of the Commissioner (Tourism), Himachal Pradesh dated 14.3.1988 has been set aside and the appeal has been accepted. The operative part of that order has been reproduced in para 2 of the impugned order, which runs as follows: "In exercise of the powers vested in me under Section 7(a) of the H.P Registration of Hotels & Travel Agents Act, 1970,1,V.K. Bhatnagar, Commissioner Tourism, Himachal Pradesh (Prescribed Authority^ hereby order to delete Room No. 8 of Fountain Bleau Hotel, Shimla from the purview of hotel under the aforementioned Act." 2. The facts as given in the writ petition are that the petitioner was inducted as a tenant by respondent No. 2 in the building known as Fountain Bleau (Cottage), Shimla in the year 1979 in respect of accommodation consisting of three rooms, a kitchen and a bathroom known as Set No. 8 in the aforesaid building. The premises were hired by the petitioner for the purpose of running a typing school and for running the business of the repair of the typewriters. According to the petitioner, at the time when the said premises were let out to him, respondent No. 2 had specifically informed him that the premises are not a part of any hotel and the same are not being used as a hotel by the said respondent. After taking over the possession of the premises, the petitioner started paying rent to respondent No. 2 and the same was accepted by respondent No. 2. The copies of some of the receipts in this behalf are Annexures P-1» to P-12. 3. It is further pleaded by the petitioner that respondent No. 2 is running p hotel in the name and style as Hotel Fountain Bleau, Shimla in the same building. The copies of some of the receipts in this behalf are Annexures P-1» to P-12. 3. It is further pleaded by the petitioner that respondent No. 2 is running p hotel in the name and style as Hotel Fountain Bleau, Shimla in the same building. However, Set No. 8, let out to the petitioner is neither a part of the said hotel nor the same falls within the purview of the Himachal Pradesh Registration of Hotel and Travel Agents Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as the Act1). Consequently, Respondent No. 3, i.e. the Commissioner of Tourism, Shimla after holding due inquiry and after giving adequate opportunity of being heard, passed an order dated 14.3.1988 whereby the room in question, i.e. Room No. 8 was specifically ordered to be deleted from the purview of Hotel, as defined under the said Act. Copy of this order of Respondent No. 3 is Annexure P-13 to the petition. 4. The petitioners case is that he was in continuous occupation of the premises in question since the year 1979 and he had been running his business of type-writing repairs and school from that very premises. A telephone bearing No. 4403 was also installed in the premises by him. He was continuing his business in the name and style of M/s. Solan Typewriting Company. The telephone was also installed in the name of that firm of which he is the sole proprietor. The copy of the receipt for registration of the application for grant of telephone connection is annexed as Annexure P-14 while copies of the telephone bills are Annexued as Annexures P-15, P-16 and P-17. 5. According to the petitioner, he had also sent intimation/circular to all Government offices for grant of rate contract with regard to the typewriting work/repair of the typewriters. A copy of the circular/intimation is annexed as Annexure P-18. The rate contract of the petitioner was again renewed by the State Government and a copy of the renewal letter dated 24.8.1983 is annexed as Annexure P-19. The rate contract of the petitioner with PH and HP area of the armed forces was sanctioned vide order dated 1.3.1985 and a copy of the order is annexed as Annexure P-20. 6. In the year 1986, the petitioner also started computer centre in the same premises besides other work referred to above. The rate contract of the petitioner with PH and HP area of the armed forces was sanctioned vide order dated 1.3.1985 and a copy of the order is annexed as Annexure P-20. 6. In the year 1986, the petitioner also started computer centre in the same premises besides other work referred to above. A number of students were admitted in the said centre for imparting training in the computer. Copies of some of the admission forms are annexed as Annexures P-21 to P-25. 7. According to the petitioner, respondent No. 2 had duly informed the Municipal Corporation, Shimla regarding tenancy of the petitioner in respect of the premises in question. The copies of the inspection/assessment list pertaining to the premises in question for the years 1987-88, 1988-89 and 1989-90 are annexed as Annexures P-26 to P-28. Respondent No. 2 had even prayed before the Municipal Corporation, Shimla for rebate in the taxes/assessment pertaining to the premises in question. The relevant orders dated 12.2.1992 and 12.8.1991 passed by the Municipal Corporation, Shimla pertaining to the premises in question are Annexed as Annexures P-29 and P-30 and a copy of the notice issued by the Municipal Corporation, Shimla is annexed as Annexure P-31. The petitioners case is that all the aforesaid documents clearly prove that the petitioner is a tenant qua the premises in question since the year 1979 and the said premises were never used as a hotel by the respondent No. 2 at any stage, whatsoever. 8. The respondent No. 2, in the year 1991, started pressurising the petitioner for increasing the rent of the premises in question and ultimately, filed a Civil Suit before the Senior Sub-Judge, Shimla against him. He also filed an application under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2, C.P.C. for grant of an ad interim injunction. That application was decided by Sub-Judge (IV), Shimla by his order dated 5.10.1991. A copy of the same is annexed as Annexure P-32. Since the ad interim injunction was declined, respondent No. 2 filed an appeal against that order which was-also dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Shimla by his order dated 16.11.1992 Copy of the said order is Annexure P-33. 9. The petitioners case further is that the respondent No. 2 has been harassing and pressurising the petitioner on one pretext or the other. 9. The petitioners case further is that the respondent No. 2 has been harassing and pressurising the petitioner on one pretext or the other. When he did not succeed in getting the petitioner evicted, he filed an appeal before respondent No. 1 against the order dated 14.3.1988 passed by respondent No, 3. That appeal under Section 32 of the Act was filed by respondent No. 3 almost five years after the order, which was impugned therein, i.e. the one passed by respondent No. 3 on 14.3.1998. In other words, the appeal was hopelessly time-barred. Further, respondent No. 2 did not give any cogent reason or explanation for the delay so that the same could be justifiable condoned. The impugned order dated 14.3.1988 was well within her knowledge yet she kept mum for a period of five years. According to the petitioner, this aspect of the case has not been considered in its proper perspective by respondent No. 1 while passing the impugned order Annexure P. 10. The grounds of attack against the impugned order of respondent No. 1 are stated to the effect that he did not appreciate the fact that the respondent No. 2 has deliberately not impleaded the petitioner as party in the appeal, although it was within her knowledge that it is the petitioner who shall suffer and shall be adversely affected by any order passed in the appeal by respondent No. 1. More so, according to the petitioner, the respondent No. 1 has not given him an adequate opportunity of being heard while passing the impugned order, although the fact of the matter is that vide impugned order, the premises in question have been covered under the Act and the petitioner is liable to be evicted at any time and that the petitioner is unable to run has business and retain his possession In the premises in question as a result of the impugned order 11. Another ground of attack against the impugned order, as stated in the petition, is that the respondent has not appreciated the fact that there exists no ground or reason, whatsoever, to condone the delay in filing the appeal under Section 32 of the Act by the second respondent. Another ground of attack against the impugned order, as stated in the petition, is that the respondent has not appreciated the fact that there exists no ground or reason, whatsoever, to condone the delay in filing the appeal under Section 32 of the Act by the second respondent. The petitioner had placed on record, the proceedings before respondent No. 1 end the order passed by the Civil Court of competent jurisdiction in respect of the premises in question and other relevant material has also been placed on record by the petitioner AH this evidence/documents placed on record by the petitioner have been completely brushed aside and ignored by respondent No.1 while passing the impugned order 12. Yet again, the petitioner has challenged the impugned order on the ground that respondent No. 1 has misconstrued the provisions of Saw while passing the impugned order There is no provision under the Act for notification in the gazette for deletion of any part of the premises. Therefore, the respondent No. 1 has wrongly held that the publication in the official Gazette regarding de registration of the premises under the Act was necessary. The petitioners case further is that the respondent No 1 has failed to appreciate the fact that the respondent No. 2 kept silent for five years after passing of the order dated 14.3.1988 by the respondent No. 3 Therefore, the respondent No. 1 has gravely erred while passing the impugned order and has exceeded his jurisdiction. 13. Another illegality in the impugned order according to the petitioner is that the appeal of the respondent No. 2 under Section 32 of the Act was filed against the Himachal Pradesh Tourism Development Corporation which was neither the competent authority nor the order dated 14.3.1988 was ever passed by the aforesaid Corporation, it was thus not even a necessary party in these proceeding in support of this contention, certified copy of the grounds of appeal filed by respondent No. 2 is annexed as Annexure P-34. 14; The last ground on which attack has been raised against the impugned order is that during the pendency of the proceedings before respondent No. 1, the respondent No. 2 had not produced any original record of the hotel, entry of the ledgers and registers, nor the same have been examined by respondent No. 1, yet the impugned order has been passed which would have the effect of getting the petitioner evicted from the premises in question by invoking the penal provisions of the Act which is unjust. 15. The petitioner has summed up his case in para 13 of the writ petition by saying that the impugned order passed by respondent No. 1 is arbitrary, unlawful, unconstitutional being violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India, besides being against the principles of natural justice. Hence the petition. The same is duly supported by an affidavit of the petitioner. 16. A joint reply has been filed by respondents No. 1 to 3 on the affidavit of Shri V.K. Bhatnagar, Director Tourism, Himachal Pradesh. It is stated therein that the Hotel Fountain Bleau in the ownership of Mrs. Prem Seth, was registered as a hotel on 3.1.1976. A copy of the registration certificate Annexure RA is annexed with the reply. At the time of registration, the hotel had six rooms, namely, Rooms No. 1, 1-B, 2, 4, 5 and 8. The tariff of rooms were fixed by the Department vide Order No. 13-33/76-TD dated 21.11.1977 and copies of the same are annexed with the reply as Annexures RB, RC and RD. It was admitted that room No. 8 was deleted from the Hotel vide order dated 14.3.1998, copy annexed as Annexure RE. The rest of the reply consists either of the expression no comments or the deponent has taken the plea of denial for want of knowledge. In other words, the material allegations in the writ petition have not been specifically denied in the joint reply filed by respondents No. 1 and 3. This plea is for the reason that on merits, they are not concerned with the dispute between the petitioner and the respondent No. 2. 17. Respondent No. 2, however, has contested the writ petition by filing a detailed reply. This plea is for the reason that on merits, they are not concerned with the dispute between the petitioner and the respondent No. 2. 17. Respondent No. 2, however, has contested the writ petition by filing a detailed reply. In the same, a preliminary objection has been taken that the petitioner has made deliberate mis-statement of facts and has not come to the Court with clean hands, hence he has dis-entitled himself from any relief by this Court in exercise of its discretionary powers under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. It has been staed that the petitioner is a lodgee in Set No. 8, Fountain Bleau Hotel, Shimla. He was never inducted as a tenant and has obtained orders from the Commissioner Tourism dated 14.3.1988 which was rightly set aside by the Commissioner, Shimla Division in an appeal vide order dated 26.8.1993, Annexure P. The petitioner was duly heard by the Commissioner, before passing the impugned order, as such, no case is made out for interference in the order Annexure P. 18. On merits, it has been pleaded that the petitioner has been running a typewriting repairs centre, typewriting and computer school in Set No. 8 of the Hotel Fountain Bleau without the consent of the respondent No. 2. The respondent No. 3 had wrongly deleted Set No. 8 from the purview of Hotel which was challenged in appeal before the Commissioner, Shimla. It is also stated that an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal was also filed along with the same. The order deleting Set No. 8 of the Hotel Fountain Bleau had not been published in the official Gazette as required under law and the delay was rightly condoned and since the requirement of Section 7 of the Act had not been complied with, the order was rightly set aside. 19. In the reply of respondent No. 2, the grounds of attack have been controverted. It has been stated that the Hotel Fountain Bleau is duly registered. The certificate of registration has been annexed with the reply as Annexure R-2/1. It has been denied that the petitioner has been staying in the Hotel since 1979 as alleged. He checked in the hotel on 15.12.1982. It has been stated that the Hotel Fountain Bleau is duly registered. The certificate of registration has been annexed with the reply as Annexure R-2/1. It has been denied that the petitioner has been staying in the Hotel since 1979 as alleged. He checked in the hotel on 15.12.1982. Copy of the Visitors Register is attached as Annexure R-2/2 in this connection, which had been filled in by the petitioner himself by stating the purpose of his visit as business. The said register is being regularly maintained by respondent No. 2. 20. According to the respondent No. 2, the petitioner was initially a loger in Set No. 9 of the Hotel from 15.12.1982, In July 1983, he shifted to part of Set No. 8 consisting of one room and bath room only and continued to stay as lodger in the said room up to 28.6.1986 and on the same day, he checked out of the hotel. Thereafter, he again checked in from 2.7.1986 to 28.3.1987 and again checked in the Hotel on 1.4.1987 as lodger on day-to-day basis. Entries in this behalf are duly recorded in the visitors register, relevant copies of which are Annexures R-2/3 and R-2/4. These entries have been duly signed by the petitioner. The petitioner used to pay the bills of lodging when presented to him, for which receipts were issued by respondent No. 2. Copies of such bills are attached as Annexures R-2/5 to R-2/9. 21. The impugned order has been supported in the reply of the respondent No. 2. It has been denied that the respondent No. 2 ever informed the Municipal Corporation, Shimla regarding the alleged tenancy of the petitioner. It has been submitted that the petitioner has manipulated the inspection/ assessment lists and the same are not binding on the replying respondent. It has been denied that the respondent No. 2 had ever asked for rebate in tax, as alleged. The reply of respondent is duly supported by her own affidavit. 22. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have examined the record. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, Shri R.K. Bawa, has vehemently argued that the impugned order is illegal and without jurisdiction as it has been passed by condoning the inordinate delay in filing the appeal without sufficient cause having been shown and without any reason having been given in the impugned order for condoning the same. The learned Counsel for the petitioner, Shri R.K. Bawa, has vehemently argued that the impugned order is illegal and without jurisdiction as it has been passed by condoning the inordinate delay in filing the appeal without sufficient cause having been shown and without any reason having been given in the impugned order for condoning the same. 23. In order to appreciate this argument of Shri R.K. Bawa, it would be necessary to refer to para 3 of the impugned order. It has been noted therein that an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act has also been filed and it has been stated therein that representations were made to the Director Tourism from 1987 onwards and subsequently number of reminders too were issued. The applicant had also, applied for gazette notification for deletion of Room No. 8 as per provisions of the Act. Finally, vide letter dated 13.5.1993, the Commissioner Tourism informed the applicant that the deletion of Room No. 8 of Hotel Fountain Bleau has not been published in the official Gazette. Apart from these reasons, it has been stated that the applicant is an old lady who is living out of Shimla due to ill health and there is no mala fide intention on her part for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. 24. In para 9 of the impugned order, after giving the gist of the dispute between the parties and the reasons for adopting the course which he has ultimately done, respondent No. 1 has come to the conclusion that as the impugned order is manifestly erroneous and illegal, he has no hesitation in condoning the extra-ordinary delay in filing the appeal. 25. In order to appreciate the argument of Shri R.K Bawa on the question of limitation, we have noticed that in para 4 of the imugned order, it is clearly mentioned that Shri OP. Verma, i.e. the petitioner through his counsel Shri V.K. Sharma had filed an application before respondent No. 1 stating his interest in the case and requested that he be made a respondent in the said case. Thereafter, it is mentioned in the impugned order that in this connection counsel for both the parties were heard and it was decided that counsel for both the parties would be heard at the time of arguments in the case. 26. Thereafter, it is mentioned in the impugned order that in this connection counsel for both the parties were heard and it was decided that counsel for both the parties would be heard at the time of arguments in the case. 26. In para 7 of the impugned order it has been stated as follows: "Counsel for the interested party stated that he had a dispute which was of a civil nature with the present appellant. He wanted to show that he was tenant of the appellant although there was no written agreement between the parties to this effect. He also informed that the matter was in civil litigation. He strongly opposed the appeal on the grounds of Limitation and asserted that the Commissioner Tourism was competent to issue the impugned orders.” 27. Thereafter, in para 8, it has been categorically mentioned that the respondent No. 1 has heard the counsel for the appellant i.e. respondent No. 2 in the present proceedings, counsel for the department as well for the interested party i.e. the petitioner in the present proceedings. 28. it is manifest from the above facts culled from the impugned order that the grounds for condoning the delay were taken in appeal by respondent No. 2, the same has been noted in the impugned order in para 3 thereof and the objection regarding limitation taken on behalf of the petitioner has also been taken note of in para 7 thereof. In other words, the question regarding condonation of delay was very much present in the mind of respondent No. 1 when he passed the impugned order. He has stated that as the impugned order is manifestly erroneous and illegal, he had no hesitation in condoning the delay in filing the appeal. In other words, the delay has been condoned by giving reasons. 29. Now the question would arise as to whether in the present proceedings in exercise of its extra-ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India, this Court can go into the sufficiency or otherwise of the reason given in the impugned order for condoning the delay, in our considered view, this is not possible. The reason for this is obvious. Respondent No. 1, while deciding the appeal filed by respondent No, 2 before him under Section 32 of the Act, was acting as a quasi-judicial authority. The reason for this is obvious. Respondent No. 1, while deciding the appeal filed by respondent No, 2 before him under Section 32 of the Act, was acting as a quasi-judicial authority. Thus, he had complete jurisdiction in the matter to decide the appeal on merits. Whether it was correctly or wrongly decided is another matter which we shall go into hereinafter. Suffice to say at this stage that he had inherent power to decide the question of limitation and delay in filing the appeal before him by respondent No. 2. That he has done in his wisdom finding that the order, which had been challenged before him, to be manifestly erroneous and illegal and he proceeded to condone the extra ordinary delay in filing the appeal before respondent No. 2. This is a decision/finding on merits and cannot be gone into in writ proceedings by this Court. In other words, sufficiency of cause or otherwise is not a ground on which the High Court can be called upon to decide the same in exercise of its extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 30. The matter can be looked at from another angle also. The writ jurisdiction conferred on this Court by the relevant provisions of the Constitution of India is not only of an extra-ordinary nature, but as per the settled case law on the subject up-to-date, this Court in its discretion can decline to interfere in exercise of its powers therein, even though a ground may have been made out, unless the petitioner can show that manifest injustice has resulted to him. On the facts of the present case, as reproduced in detail here above, we do not find that any manifest injustice has been done to the petitioner in the matter of condoning the delay by respondent No. 1. 31. It has then been urged by Shri R.K. Bawa, learned Counsel for the petitioner that he was not given an adequate opportunity of being heard while passing the impugned order by respondent No. 1. This argument is again untenable in view of the fact that it is clearly mentioned in the impugned order that the counsel for the parties, including the counsel for the interested party, i.e. the petitioner have been heard and the relevant record has been perused. This argument is again untenable in view of the fact that it is clearly mentioned in the impugned order that the counsel for the parties, including the counsel for the interested party, i.e. the petitioner have been heard and the relevant record has been perused. The fact that due hearing and opportunity was given to the petitioner through his learned Counsel is apparent from para 7 of the impugned order which has been reproduced in extenso here above. Therefore, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioner to now turn round and say that adequate opportunity of being heard was not afforded to him. 32. We do not find any illegality in the impugned order which admittedly has been passed by respondent No. 1 within his jurisdiction as he was the appellate authority under Section 32 of the Act. It is clear from para 9 of the impugned order that the order appealed against i.e. dated 14.3.1988 passed by respondent No. 3 is not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. It was so admitted by the counsel for the department. The record shows that the department had been corresponding with respondent No. 2 and had informed her as late as on 13.5.1993 vide their letter that deletion of room No. 8 had not been published in the gazette. This was a mandatory requirement under the law. 33. Another reason, which weighed with respondent No. 1 in allowing the appeal of respondent No. 2 is the fact that under Section 7 of the Act, the prescribed authority may, by an order in writing, remove the name of a hotel from the register and cancel its certificate of registration on any of the grounds mentioned therein. 34. On the facts of the case, respondent No. 1 found that in the case of the premises in question, i.e. Hotel Fountain Bleau, owned by respondent No. 2, none of the disqualifications as contained in clauses (a) to (e) of Section 7 of the Act existed so as to justify deletion of Set No. 8 from the purview of a hotel under the Act. Indeed, as is clear from the record, the petitioner very cleverly made an application before respondent No. 3 for deletion of Set No. 8, occupied by him from the purview of a hotel under the Act and respondent No. 3 without applying his mind whatsoever, passed the order dated 14.3.1988. A bare reading of the said order shows the non-application of mind by respondent No. 3, vide Annexure RE to the written statement of respondents No. 1 and 3. 35. It has then been argued by Shri R.K. Bawa, learned Counsel for the petitioner that the appeal of respondent No. 2 before respondent No. 1 was not competent as it was filed against a respondent, who was neither a necessary nor a proper party in the dispute. He has referred to the heading of the appeal as contained in the impugned order vide Annexure P whereby the respondent has been described as Himachal Pradesh Tourism Department, Shimla through its Commissioner To say the least, this argument of Shri R.K. Bawa is not only hyper-technical but appears to be one of despair. The reason for this is that the order, which was being challenged by respondent No. 2 before respondent No. 1 was that of the Commissioner Tourism. By merely describing the respondent in the appeal as HPTDC through its Commissioner, the form of the appeal does not render it as not maintainable. In substance, the Commissioner, whose order was under challenge before Respondent No. 1 was made a party by respondent No. 2. Therefore, there is no merit in this argument also. 36. It has lastly been argued by Shri R.K. Bawa, learned Counsel for the petitioner that the impugned order has been passed by respondent No. 1 without applying his mind and without going into the original record of the hotel, entry of the ledgers and registers. This argument is untenable on the short ground that a bare perusal of the impugned order shows that the same has been passed after due application of mind and is thus well within the jurisdiction vested in respondent No. 1 as a quasi-judicial authority having a power to decide the appeal under Section 32 of the Act. Moreover, it is manifest from para 8 of the impugned order that respondent No. 1 had not only heard the learned counsel for the parties, including the petitioner, but had also seen the relevant record. Moreover, it is manifest from para 8 of the impugned order that respondent No. 1 had not only heard the learned counsel for the parties, including the petitioner, but had also seen the relevant record. 37. In fairness to Shri R.K. Bawa, learned Counsel for the petitioner, he has cited some rulings in support of his various contentions, referred to above. He has first placed reliance on the case of Sri Murugan Theatre Madhurai v. The Commissioner of Land Revenue, AIR 1972 Mad 3. He has relied on the head note (B) and para 9 of this report which says that an order granting No objection certificate to a cinema on a wrong interpretation of the term Locality occurring in Section 5(1 )(d) of the Tamil Nadu Act 9 of 1955 is liable to be quashed in writ proceedings. On the facts of that case it was found that the order of the Board of Revenue, Madras was vitiated by want of jurisdiction, or, as has been stated in some decisions, by excess of jurisdiction, in that the Board failed to determine a vital question, namely, the adequacy of the existing places for the exhibition of cinematograph films in the locality without equating the word locality to a Panchayat. Without determining the question, the Board had no jurisdiction to grant the no objection certificate. It was in these circumstances that the order of the Board was quashed in the writ proceedings by the Madras High Court. 38. It is manifest that the facts in the present case are entirely different where, by the impugned order, respondent No. 1 has rightly come to the conclusion that the order appealed against before him passed by respondent No. 3 was in contravention of Section 7 of the Act and none of disqualifications occurring therein were existing so as to justify the deletion of room No. 8, admittedly in possession of the petitioner in Hotel Fountain Bleau so as to delete the same from the purview of a Hotel. In other words, the same was within jurisdiction vested in respondent No. 1 and has also resulted in doing justice between the parties. 39. Shri R.K. Bawa has then cited M/s. Hindustan Steels Ltd., Rourkela V. A.K. Roy and others, AIR 1970 SC 1401. That was a case under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and related to the illegal discharge or dismissal of workman. 39. Shri R.K. Bawa has then cited M/s. Hindustan Steels Ltd., Rourkela V. A.K. Roy and others, AIR 1970 SC 1401. That was a case under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and related to the illegal discharge or dismissal of workman. It was held on the facts of that case that the Tribunal, in awarding re-instatement, exercised the discretion mechanically and the refusal by the High Court in writ jurisdiction to interfere with the discretion exercised by the Tribunal was equally mechanical and amounted to refusal to exercise its jurisdiction. 40. Here also, the facts are distinguishable. Indeed, it is the order of respondent No. 3 which was passed in a mechanical manner and the same has been rightly set aside by the impugned order passed by respondent No. 1. So, this ruling of the Apex Court is of no avail to Shri R.K. Bawa. 41. The next authority cited at the Bar before us is in re: K. Anandan Nambiar petitioner, AIR (39) 1952 Mad 117. That was a case relating to preventive detention and it was laid down while interpreting Article 226 of the Constitution that Article 226 confers on the High Court extremely wide powers of interference and a corresponding heavy burden of responsibility. The observations contained in Head Note DJ of the report, which have been culled from para 5 thereof are of a general and sweeping nature, more so in the nature of obiter dicta than being the ratio decidendi. More so, much water has flown under the bridge since the year 1952 and right up to the Apex Court the power and jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 to issue writs or similar direction has been well defined. Manifestly, the Madras High Court judgment rendered in the year 1952 is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. 42. The last authority cited by Shri R.K. Bawa is Basvagowda v. Land Tribunal, Athani and others, AIR 1978 Kant 42. A bare perusal of the facts of that case will make it clear that they have no bearing on the present writ petition. In that case, it was held that under Section 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act prescribes a time limit for making an applications by persons claiming registration of occupancy rights under Section 45 thereof. A bare perusal of the facts of that case will make it clear that they have no bearing on the present writ petition. In that case, it was held that under Section 48-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act prescribes a time limit for making an applications by persons claiming registration of occupancy rights under Section 45 thereof. It was further held that the application filed after 31.12.1974 but before 30.6.1977 can be admitted by Tribunal if sufficient cause was shown. In that case, the landlord must be given an opportunity. The inquiry by the Tribunal into the merits of the claim without admitting the application made beyond the date fixed viz., 31.12.1974 is clearly without jurisdiction. It was further held that this error in the exercise of jurisdiction clearly vitiates the order of the Tribunal which affects the property rights of the landholder, therefore, the case falls under Clause (b) of Article 226(1) of the Constitution as the landholder has suffered injury of substantial nature by reason of the contravention of the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 48-A of the Act. 43. In the present case, the delay has been condoned for valid reasons, after examining the reasons given by respondent No. 2 for not filing the appeal before respondent No. 1 within time, which were very much present in the mind of respondent No. 1 while passing the impugned order. All this was done after affording due opportunity to the petitioner, who was an intervener in the case and was heard through his learned Counsel. Therefore, this authority is also of no assistance to Shri R.K. Bawa. 44. To sum up, none of the grounds of challenge against the impugned order are having any merit. It is clear from the impugned order that Set No. 8 had been illegally and erroneously deleted from purview of a hotel in contravention of Section 7 of the Act by respondent No. 3, who passed the order dated 14.3.1988 without assigning any reason and without any application of mind. It is made clear that it will be open to respondent No. 2 to take appropriate legal steps, if so advised, to establish the status of the petitioner vis-a-vis his occupation of Set No. 8 in Fountain Bleau Hotel, that he is allegedly a mere licensee, who has over-stayed his welcome and is also in arrears of lodging charges, etc. 45. 45. No other point has been urged. 46. For the reasons recorded above, this writ petition fails and is dismissed with costs. Counsels fee is quantified at Rs. 2,000/-. CMP Nos. 272/95, 274/95 and 806/97 In view of the decision of the writ petition, these applications have become infructuous. Petition dismissed.