JUDGMENT Ujjain Textile Mills, a Private Company was taken over by the Government and its management handed over to State Textile Corporation. It was closed down by Govt. Order dt. 14.8.1997. Appellants first filed review petition against this order before the Government and then filed M.P. No. 1368/97. They prayed for quashing of the order and for consideration of this Review application by the Government or to require it to refer the matter to the Tribunal for adjudication in terms of S. 25-O(5) of Industrial Disputes Act. This Writ Petition was disposed of by order dt. 30.9.97 providing as under: "The Counsel for the petitioner only prays for a direction that the review application may be considered and decided within reasonable time in accordance with law." , The aforesaid limited prayer is not seriously opposed by the counsel for respondents. In the circumstances, we dispose of this Writ Petition with a direction to respondent No.3 to consider and decide the application for review, pending before it within reasonable time in accordance with law." It so happened that appellants' review petition was rejected by order dt. 29.9.1997, a day earlier. Upon this, they filed yet another W.P.No. 1592/97 and in repeat exercise again asked for quashing of the order dt. 14.8.1997 and also for a direction to the Government to make a reference to the Tribunal. This Petition was dismissed by order dt. 16.3.98 on the ground that since they had pressed into service only one relief for disposal of their review petition in their First W.P. No. 1368/97, they should be deemed to have abandoned other reliefs thus they could not be allowed to re-open the matter. It was also noticed by the Writ Court that all other employees except 7 or 8 persons had accepted retrenchment, compensation and gratuity etc. Appellants have filed this appeal to assail this order now. It is submitted by their counsel Shri P. Mathur that Writ Court could not have denied the other reliefs on the ground that they had impliedly given up those in their first Writ Petition. He explains that their review petition was dismissed by the Govt. on 29.9.97, not pursuant to this Court Order dt. 30.9.97. Besides, once they have asked for an alternate relief of reference to the Tribunal in the review application, the Govt. was bound to grant it. He explains that their review petition was dismissed by the Govt. on 29.9.97, not pursuant to this Court Order dt. 30.9.97. Besides, once they have asked for an alternate relief of reference to the Tribunal in the review application, the Govt. was bound to grant it. He relied upon the DB Judgment of Rajasthan High Court in support. It transpires from record of appellants' W.P. No. 1368/97, and the order dt. 30.9.97. passed therein that appellants had limited their prayer, and had asked only for a direction for disposal of their pending review petition. No other relief including that of reference to the Tribunal was pressed into service by them. They could not be therefore allowed to re-agitate the abandoned reliefs in an un-ending exercise. The Writ Court had, therefore, rightly rejected their second petition, on this ground. It is inconsequential whether the Govt. had rejected their review petition pursuant to Court order in their first W.P. No. 1368/97, so long as they had chosen to abandon other reliefs. To top it all, it is not obligatory for the Govt. to make a reference to the Tribunal in all events and circumstances. The relevant provision extracted hereunder leaves no room for doubt about this. "The appropriate Government may either on its own motion or on the application made by the employer or any workman, review its order for granting or refusing to grant permission under S. 2 of refer the matter to the Tribunal for adjudication." A perusal of the provision shows that word "may" occuring therein makes it optional for the Government to either review the order or granting or refusing permission for closure or to refer the matter to the Tribunal for adjudication. It is not mandatory for the Government to resort to both options simultaneousely or one after the other. The word "or" assumes significance in this context. It mayor may not resort to either option or may take one option. When it elects to take review option that ends the matter. It cannot be then asked to taken recourse to make reference to the Tribunal. There could be cases where word 'may' used in the provision could be treated directory as done by the Rajasthan High Court but that would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. When it elects to take review option that ends the matter. It cannot be then asked to taken recourse to make reference to the Tribunal. There could be cases where word 'may' used in the provision could be treated directory as done by the Rajasthan High Court but that would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In any case, the employee cannot ask for either option as a matter of fact fight more so when one option of review stands exhausted. In the present case because appellants appear to be on as good as valid goose chase, taking one remedy after the other and filing one writ petition over the other on same set of facts and claiming same reliefs, limiting their prayer in one, and re-opening in the other such a situation, provisions of S. 25-O (5) could not be interpreted in a manner to cast an obligation on the Government to necessarily refer the matter to the Tribunal for adjudication. For the reasons given, we affirm the Writ Court order to dismiss this appeal.