Honble KHAN, J.–This petition u/S. 482 Cr.P.C. seeks the recalling of the order dated 9.9.97 whereby this court, in exercise of its powers u/S. 482 Cr.P.C. quashed the investigation being made on the basis of F.I.R. No. 365/96 u/Ss. 420, 467, 471 IPC lodged by the applicant against Pramod Kumar with Police Station Kotwali Dholpur. (2). Vinod Kumar applicant, who holds the office of an Additional District and Sessions Judge in the States Higher Judicial Service, had filed a Civil suit No. 7/91 in the Court of the District Judge, Dholpur against inter-alia, his brother Pramod Kumar, who is non-applicant No. 2 in this petition. When the applicant examined himself as a witness in that suit a letter, alleged to have been written by the appli- cant to his father and throwing light upon the subject matter of the suit was put to him and he was asked to explain the statement made therein. The applicant stated that the said letter was not written by him and that the same was a false and forged document. The letter in question had already been produced in court and formed part of the record of the suit. It was under such circumstances that the applicant lodged FIR No. 365/96 aforementioned, against his brother Pramod Kumar. (3). Pramod Kumar approached this Court u/s. 482 Cr.P.C. with the prayer that since the document, in respect of which the applicant had lodged the F.I.R. had already been ``produced and ``given in evidence in the judicial proceedings of the Civil Suit being heard by the Distt. Judge, Dholpur there was no sense in permi- tting the investigation to continue on the basis of the F.I.R. lodged by the applicant as no court would be competent to take cognizance of the offences u/s. 467/471 IPC against him in view of the specific bar created in that respect by Sec. 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. This Court accepted the contention of Pramod Kumar and by order dated 9.9.97 quashed the F.I.R. and the investigation being made on the basis thereof. The Court further ordered that the applicant be called upon to show cause as to why he should not be proceeded against for committing contempt of the Court of the Distt. Judge Dholpur. The applicant seeks the recalling of that order. (4). Mr. The Court further ordered that the applicant be called upon to show cause as to why he should not be proceeded against for committing contempt of the Court of the Distt. Judge Dholpur. The applicant seeks the recalling of that order. (4). Mr. Suresh Goel, the learned counsel for the applicant, urged that in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of State of Punjab vs. Raj Singh & Anr. (1) and Sachidanand Singh & Anr. vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (2) the order dated 9.9.97 quashing the F.I.R. was required to be recalled as the same lays down a different proposition of law. (5). In State of Punjab vs. Raj Singh (Supra) the Apex Court held that `the statutory power of the police to investigate under the Code is not in any way contro- lled or circumscribed by S. 195. But in the very next sentence their Lordships observed that `it is of course true that upon the charge-sheet (challan), if any, filed on completion of the investigation into such an offence the Court would not be competent to take cognizance thereof in view of the embargo of Sec. 195(1)(b) Cr.P.C. In this case the judgment in Gopal Krishna Menon & Anr. vs. V.D. Raja Reddy (3) was not followed on the ground that case was distinguishable on facts. (6). In Gopal Krishnas case cognizance had been taken on a private complaint even though the offence of forgery was committed in respect of a money receipt produced in the civil court. On such facts the Apex Court had held that the Court could not take cognizance on such a complaint in view of Sec. 195 Cr.P.C. (7). Facts in Raj Singhs case are not available from the report. (8). In Sachidanands case the complainant Lal Narain Singh had filed a complaint in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate alleging commission of offences. Inter-alia, u/Ss. 468, 469 and 471 IPC on facts that the accused persons had forged a Jama- bandi-Rent Roll and produced the same in the court of the Exe- cutive Magistrate which court was hearing a case u/S. 145 Cr.P.C. between the parties. The Chief Judicial Magistrate forwarded the complaint u/S. 156(3) Cr.P.C. to the police for investigation. On a police report having been submitted before him u/S. 173 Cr.P.C. the Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of, inter-alia the afore-mentioned offences. The Chief Judicial Magistrate forwarded the complaint u/S. 156(3) Cr.P.C. to the police for investigation. On a police report having been submitted before him u/S. 173 Cr.P.C. the Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of, inter-alia the afore-mentioned offences. The accused-persons moved a petition u/S. 482 Cr.P.C. before the Patna High Court for getting the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance of offences against them quashed. In support of their submission they relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Gopala Krishna Menons case (supra). However, relying upon another decision of the Apex Court in Mahadeva Bapuji Mahajan & Anr. vs. State of Maharashtra (4) the High Court dismissed the petition. The accused person then approached the Apex Court in appeal. (9). Before the Apex Court the accused-persons (appellants before the Supreme Court) placed reliance on Gopal Krishna Menons case. Reference to the three Judge Bench decision in the case of Patel Lalji Bhai Somabhai vs. State of Gujarat (5) was also made by the learned counsel for the parties. (10). In Patel Laljibhais case a forged document had been produced in a suit by a party thereto and subsequently a prosecution was launched against him for offences u/Ss. 467, 471 IPC through a private complaint. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed that : ``The offence about which the court alone, to the exclusion of the aggrieved private parties, is clothed with the right to complaint may, therefore, be appropriately considered to be only those offences committed by a party to a proceedings in that court, the commission of which has a reasonable close nexus with the proceedings in that court so that it can without embarking upon a completely indepen- dently and fresh inquiry, satisfactorily consider by reference principally to its records the expediency of prosecuting the delinquent party. It, therefore, appears to us to be more appropriate to adopt the strict construction of confing the prohibition contained in Sec. 195(1)(c) only to those cases in which the offences specified therein were committed by a party to the proceedings in the character as such party. (11). It, therefore, appears to us to be more appropriate to adopt the strict construction of confing the prohibition contained in Sec. 195(1)(c) only to those cases in which the offences specified therein were committed by a party to the proceedings in the character as such party. (11). Their Lordships (in Sachidanands case) noted that though the decisions in Patel Lal Ji Bhais case and in another case of Goswami vs. High Court of M.P. (6) were referred to in Gopal Krishan Menon yet a view different from that expres- sed in Patel Laljibhais case was taken mainly for the reason that the main issues involved in the two cases for the decision of the Court were materially different. Their Lordships took particular note of the deletion of the words ``by a party to any proceedings in any court from the language of Sec. 195(1)(b)(ii) at the time of the enactment of the New Code. After referring to paragraph 15.93 of the 41st Report of the Law Commission, a Full Bench decision in the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Harbans Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab (7), Karnataka High Court decision in Govinda Raju vs. State of Karnataka (8) and Bombay High Court decision in Alka Bhagwant Jadhava vs. State of Maharashtra (9) their Lordships finally held that ``the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code is not applicable to a case where forgery of the document was committed before the document was produced in a Court. In other words, their Lordships were of the opinion that ``the offence should have been committed during the time when the document was in custodia legis. (12). A close study of the two decisions relied upon by Mr. Goel discloses that in the case of State of Punjab vs. Raj Singh (Supra) their Lordships expressed the view that even in the case wherein the police has investigated into the offences u/Ss. 467/471 IPC and proposed a report u/s. 173(2) Cr.P.C. the Court would not be competent to take cognizance of such offences in view of the embargo of Sec. 195 Cr.P.C. In the other case of Sachanand Singh & Anr. vs. State of Bihar & Anr. 467/471 IPC and proposed a report u/s. 173(2) Cr.P.C. the Court would not be competent to take cognizance of such offences in view of the embargo of Sec. 195 Cr.P.C. In the other case of Sachanand Singh & Anr. vs. State of Bihar & Anr. (Supra) their Lordships following their earlier three Judges confining the prohibition contained in Sec. 195(1)(c) only to those cases in which the offences specified therein were committed by a party to the proceedings in the character as such party was stressed, held that the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code is not applicable to a case where forgery of the document was committed before the do- cument was produced in a Court. (13). It may be noted that in paragraph 15.93 of its 41st Report the Law Commission had observed that : ``The purpose of the section is to bar private prosecutions where the course of justice is sought to be perverted leaving to the court itself to uphold its dignity and prestige. On principle there is no reason why the safeguard in Clause (c) should not apply to offences committed by witnesses also. Witnesses need as much protection against vexatious prosecutions as parties and the court should have as much control over the acts of the witnesses that enter as a component of a judicial proceedings as over the acts of the parties. If, therefore, the provisions of Clause (c) are extended to witnesses the extention would be in confirmity with the broad principle which forms the basis of Section 195. (14). It may be recalled that in Patel Laljibhais case it had also been observed by their Lordships that it appears to be more appropriate to adopt the strict construction of confirming the prohibition contained in Section 195(1)(c) only to those cases in which the offences specified therein were committed by a party to the proceedings in the character as such party. Taking note of such observations of their Lordships in Patel Laljibhais case and looking to the recommendation of the Law Commission in its 41st Report, as reproduced above the words ``by a party to any proceedings in any court occurring in the language of Section 195 of the Old Code were omitted or deleted while enacting the New Code. Taking note of such observations of their Lordships in Patel Laljibhais case and looking to the recommendation of the Law Commission in its 41st Report, as reproduced above the words ``by a party to any proceedings in any court occurring in the language of Section 195 of the Old Code were omitted or deleted while enacting the New Code. As observed in Sachidanands case ``the deletion was intended to stretch the advantage to the non-parties to the proceedings as well. It may be appreciated that except the abo- ve position of the deletion of the words ``by a party to any proceedings in any court from the language of Section 195 Cr.P.C. of the Old Code the statutory position as well as the judicially interpreted position (as was indicated in Patel Laljibhais case) of Section 195(1) remained the same. (15). In the order dated September 9, 1997 this court had relied upon the deci- sion of the Apex Court in Surjit Singh & Ors. vs. Balbir Singh (10) and held that since the letter put to the applicant (who was plaintiff in the Civil Suit) in cross-examination already formed part of the record of the judicial proceedings before the District Judge, therefore, the court of the Distt. Judge only was competent person u/S. 195 Cr.P.C. to file a complaint for an offence falling u/S. 463 IPC in relation to the said document. It was further observed that since the document in question had already been ``produced in judicial proceedings and the Distt. Judge concerned had been called upon to consider its correctness and genuineness the investigating Agency, at the request of the applicant, could not examine the genuineness of that document. Finally it was held that there was no sense in permitting the police to inves- tigate the present matter, as even a positive police report would not entitle a court to get over the bar created by Sec.195 Cr.P.C. The views so expressed were in confirmity not only with the decision of the Apex Court in Surjit Singhs case (Supra) which was relied upon by me, but also with the ratio of the decisions of the three Judges Bench of the Apex Court in Patel Laljibhais case (Supra), as discussed above. (16). (16). It is evident that the order, sought to be recalled was made on merits and the issue involved in the petition was thoroughly examined and then a decision on such issue was taken. Ordinarily, when a matter has been decided on merits after giving opportunity to the parties such order is not required to be recalled in exercise of the exceptional and very limited powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. unless it is shown that if allowed to remain in force such order would perpetuate injustice to a party or such order runs contrary to the statutory position or the position of law as declared by the Apex Court. Though the decisions now relied upon by Mr. Goel were rendered much after the order was made by this Court and their benefit was not available to me at the time of making the order on 9.9.97 yet it is well settled position of judicial discipline that whenever the order of the Apex Court on a point of law is brought to the notice of this Court it becomes its duty to give utmost respect and regard to the decision of the Apex Court and to bring its order in confirmity with the decision of the Apex Court, if that can be legally done after giving opportunity to the parties. I had, therefore, to closely examine the cited case. Incidentally it is noticed that the decision in Patel Laljibhais case, (which was also a decision by three Judge Bench) was earlier in point of time to the decision in the case of Sachidanands case and supports the view taken by me. That apart, since the Distt. Judge, in the event of his feeling satisfied with the nece- ssity of doing so, is competent to file a complaint for the offences of forgery and use of false document in judicial proceedings after conducting necessary inquiry as per Section 340 Cr.P.C. against the person, who ``produced or ``gave in evidence such document, no injustice is likely to be caused to the applicant if the order dated 9.9.97 is allowed to remain in force. Viewed thus there is no merit in this petition and it is minconceived. No case for recalling the order dt. 9.9.97 is thus made-out. (17). In the result the petition is dismissed.