JUDGMENT S.N. Jha, J. - The dispute involved in this writ petition arises out of termination of services of respondent no. 3, Babu Ram (hereinafter referred to as the 'workman') by the management of M/s Kalyanpur Cement Limited. The order led to an industrial dispute and. eventually, reference of the dispute to the Labour Court, Patna, in the following terms. "Whether termination of services of Shri Babu Ram Khalasi (Ticket no. 420), Mechanical Engineering Department, Kalyanpur Lime & Cement Works Ltd. Banjari is proper and justified? If not what relief he is entitled to? 2. The proceedings before the Labour Court were far from smooth. On receipt of the reference on 28.7.77 notice was issued to the parties pursuant to which the management appeared on the very next date but instead of filing written statement started objecting to the maintainability of the reference firstly on the ground that the statement of demand on which the reference was based had not been served on the management and then on the ground that the Government of Bihar was not the appropriate Government for making the reference in view of the fact that cement had• been declared a controlled industry under section 2 of the Industries (Development & Regulation) Act, 1951. It next sought to get the reference disposed of in terms of an alleged compromise petition which was objected to by the workman on the ground that his consent had not been taken. The compromise was rejected on 7.11.81. This led to filing of CWJC No. 37 of 1982 by the management in this Court. The writ petition was dismissed sometime in the year 1993. It was only at that stage that the management filed its written statement. 3. Dispute again arose at the stage of hearing after the workman had closed his case, as to whether the management could take the plea that the termination of services was on account of misconduct. According to the workman, his services having been terminated by an order of termination simpliciter under Standing Order 42(a) of the Standing Orders, it was not open to the management to take the plea that the termination was on the ground of misconduct and prove the same before the Labour Court. The objection of the workman was upheld by order dated 8.4.93 and the relevant paragraphs of the written statement, being paragraphs nos. 5 to 8, were deleted. The objection of the workman was upheld by order dated 8.4.93 and the relevant paragraphs of the written statement, being paragraphs nos. 5 to 8, were deleted. C.W.J.C. No. 3937 of 1993, one of the writ petitions in hand, has been filed challenging the said order dated 8.4.93. 4. After passing the order dated 8.4.93, the Labour Court proceeded to decide the reference in view of the direction of this Court in CWJC No. 37 of 1982 for time bound disposal of the reference case within three months. The management examined its witnesses thereafter and finally closed its case. By judgment and Award dated 10.5.93 the Labour Court held that the impugned order was out and out a simple termination order amounting to 'retrenchment' under section 2(OO) of the Act. The Labour Court further held that in absence of payment of notice pay as required under section 25F of the said Act, the order was bad and illegal for non-compliance of the said provision. On these findings, the workman was directed to be reinstated with full back wages and other consequential benefits which he would have been entitled to had he remained in service. The said judgment and Award has been challenged in the other writ petition in hand Le. CWJC No. 9748 of 1993. 5. Mr. Tara Kishore Prasad, learned counsel for the petitioner-management, submitted that the Labour Court committed error in denying opportunity of hearing to the management to prove its case of miscounduct of the workman. He submitted that where enquiry is held before passing the order of dismissal, discharge or the like, the Labour Court is required to go into the question of fairness of enquiry but where such an order is passed without any domestic enquiry or the enquiry in held to be inadequate or bad for non-compliance of the rules of natural justice, the management is entitled to opportunity to prove its case before the Labour Court. He relied on the case of Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India P. Ltd. v. the Management and ors. (AIR 1973 Supreme Court, 1227). He also submitted that the Labour Court further committed error in holding that the impugned order is one of termination simpliciter. Mr. He relied on the case of Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India P. Ltd. v. the Management and ors. (AIR 1973 Supreme Court, 1227). He also submitted that the Labour Court further committed error in holding that the impugned order is one of termination simpliciter. Mr. Prasad urged that the form of the order is not conclusive of its real character and therefore, in the present case, merely because the order of termination of services was said to have been passed under Standing Order 42(a), it cannot be conclusively said that it was an order of termination simpliciter without going into the attending circumstances. In this regard he placed reliance on Gujarat Mineral Development Corporation v. P. H. Brahmdutt (AIR 1974 Supreme Court, 136). Mr. Prasad invited this Court to lift the veil and find out the real reason and circumstances in which the order has been passed, If after lifting the veil it transpires that the real reason or circumstance was misconduct, it would follow that the management was entitled to an opportunity to prove its case before the Labour Court. 6. Mr. K. N. Gupta, learned counsel for the respondent workman, submitted that opportunity to prove its case can be given to the management only where the order of dismissal/discharge or the like is by way of disciplinary action on the ground of misconduct and not where it is by way of termination simpliciter. He urged that the order at least must whisper that the same was being passed for disciplinary reason or on any ground constituting misconduct on the part of the •workman. Mr. Gupta contended that the veil can be lifted only at the instance of the workman, it cannot be done at the instance of the management. It is the workman alone who can challenge the order on the ground that the same has been passed for a reason different from the one mentioned therein. So far as the management is concerned, it cannot challenge its own order' which will amount to condemning its own order by the management. In support of the contention Mr. Gupta placed reliance on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Baver (India) Ltd. v. Vishan Roy (1985 LIC 509). Mr. So far as the management is concerned, it cannot challenge its own order' which will amount to condemning its own order by the management. In support of the contention Mr. Gupta placed reliance on a decision of the Calcutta High Court in Baver (India) Ltd. v. Vishan Roy (1985 LIC 509). Mr. Gupta alternatively submitted that the acts allegedly committed by the workman, referred to in the relevant paragraphs of the written statement, since deleted, did not constitute misconduct within the meaning of Standing Order 23 of the Certified Standing Orders, for they were allegedly committed outside the factory premises or the place of work. He urged that there should be some nexus between the misconduct and the work or employment of the workman. In this connection he placed reliance on M/s Glaxo Laboratories (I) Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Meerut (AIR 1984 Supreme Court, 505) : (1984) 1 SCC 1 ). On facts, Mr. Gupta submitted that the mandatory provisions of section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act having admittedly not been complied with and observed, the impugned order of termination of services was void and illegal and the Labour Court, therefore, committed no error in directing re-instatement of the workman with full back wages and other consequential benefits. 7. The legal position is now too well established to admit of any doubt that where the order of dismissal/discharge or the like has been passed with respect to any workman without any domestic enqurity or where the domestic enquiry is found to be not in accordance with the rules of natural justice, the management is entitled to an opportunity to prove its case and, in such a case, the Labour Court is obliged to give it such an opportunity. However, the enquiry in the context presupposes that the action of the management - expressed by whatever words such as dismissal, discharge etc. - is based on or the result of some misconduct on the part of the workman. The ratio of the decision in Firestone' case (supra) can be applied in cases related to misconduct. It has no application in cases of termination simpliciter not connected with any misconduct. 8. I find substance in the contention of Mr. - is based on or the result of some misconduct on the part of the workman. The ratio of the decision in Firestone' case (supra) can be applied in cases related to misconduct. It has no application in cases of termination simpliciter not connected with any misconduct. 8. I find substance in the contention of Mr. K. N. Gupta that the veil can be lifted from the order and an adjudication can be made on the point that the reason disclosed in the order is not the real reason and that the same has been passed for some other reason, only at the instance of the workman. The workman can challenge the order on one or the other ground. He can also take alternative pleas. It is open to him to contend that as an order of termination simpliciter, it suffers from legal infirmities, alternatively, he can also contend that the reason shown in the order is camouflage and the real reason was something else, such as misconduct but without holding any domestic enquiry, he has been dismissed or discharged from service. It is, however, not open to the management to take such alternative pleas. The management cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold at the same time. Reliance on Baver (India) Ltd. v. Vishan Roy (1985 LIC 505) appears to be quite well placed. The following observations occurring at page 513 of the Report may usefully be quoted :- "When the services of a workman are dispensed with by an order of termination simpliciter, the workman concerned will be entitled to show that the apparent state is not the real state, and that the termination of his service is really by way of punishment. In such a case, the employer will be precluded from contending that although apparently it is an order of termination simpliciter, it is really by way of punishment. In other words, the employer cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold for the purpose of circumventing (he provision of S. 2(OO) and, consequently, the provisions of S. 25F of the Act. In other words, the employer cannot be allowed to blow hot and cold for the purpose of circumventing (he provision of S. 2(OO) and, consequently, the provisions of S. 25F of the Act. It is true that the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal has the jurisdiction to lift the veil and see for itself whether the termination of the service of the workman concerned is really by way of punishment or not, but that can be done by the Tribunal or the Labour Court only at the instance of and for the purpose of granting relief to the workman concerned. The Labour Court of the Tribunal has no jurisdiction in making that investigation or probe at the instance of the employer." 9. I also find substance in the contention of Mr. Gupta that the alleged act of misbehaviour with the daughter of a colleague in the employees' colony does not amount to 'misconduct' within the meaning of Standing Order 23 of the Certified Standing orders. Firstly, none of the clauses of the said Standing Orders refers to acts committed by the workman outside the factory premises. Secondly, as held by the Supreme Court in Glaxo Laboratories' case (supra), the alleged misconduct which could attract a penalty should have a causal connection with the place of work as well as the time at which it is committed which would ordinarily be within the establishment and during duty hours. Even where the standing order is couched in a language which seeks to extend its operation far beyond the establishment, it would nonetheless be necessary to establish causal connection between the misconduct and the employment. This causal connection must be real and substantial, immediate and proximate and not remote or tenuous. 10. Standing order 42 of the Certified Standing Orders applicable to the workmen of M/s Kalyanpur Lime & Cement Works Limited, in its relevant Part, runs as follows:- "42. Discharge - (a) the company may at any time discharge an employee from service or terminate his service by payment of pay for the period of notice in lieu of such notice - (a) ... The notice of termination of services issued to the workman runs as follows :- "This is to inform you that your services are terminated under the provisions of clause 42(a) of the Standing Orders of the company with immediate effect. A sum of Rs. The notice of termination of services issued to the workman runs as follows :- "This is to inform you that your services are terminated under the provisions of clause 42(a) of the Standing Orders of the company with immediate effect. A sum of Rs. 523.84 (Five hundred twenty three and paise eighty four) only is enclosed herewith in lieu of the notice. Your are hereby advised to collect all final dues on any working day from the Accounts section." The Labour Court has recorded a finding of fact to the effect that the amount (Rs. 324.84 P.) allegedly offered to the workman in lieu of notice-pay, was actually not tendered to him nor the amount of compensation was paid. Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act lays down- "No workman employed in any industry who has been in continuous service for not less than one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer until- (a) the workman has been given one month's notice in writing indicating the reasons for retrenchment and the period of notice has expired, or the workman has been paid in lieu of such notice, wages for the period of the notice. (b) The workman has been paid, at the time of retrenchment, compensation which shall be equivalent to 15 days' average pay, for every completed year of continuous service or any part thereof in excess of six months, and (c) Notice in the prescribed manner is served on the appropriate Government or such authority as may be specified by appropriate Government by notification in the official Gazette." 11. There is no dispute that the termination of service comes within ambit of the term 'retrenchment' under section 2(OO) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The requirements of section 25F, which have been mentioned as "condition precedent" in the section, having not been observed, there is little room for doubt that the termination/retrenchment was violative of the concerned provisions and, therefore, void and illegal. I may mention, in fairness to the workman, precious too little argument was made on behalf of the management to find fault with the findings of the Labour Court in this regard. 12. In these premises, I do not find any scope for interference with the impugned award of the Labour Court. Consequently, I do not find any merit in the writ petitions, which are accordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.