JUDGMENT S.N. Jha, J. The petitioner is the owner and ‘landlord’ within the meaning of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1982 ('the Act in short) of a house bearing holding No. 30A within Ward No. 8 at Forbesganj. Respondent No. 3 Gopal Prasad Sah has been a tenant in portion of the house where he used to carryon his business. The premises in occupation of the said respondent sustained extensive damage as a result of the rains and storm on 11.5.96. He filed an application before the Sub-Divisional Officer-cum-Controller, Araria, seeking direction to the petitioner to make repairs in terms of Section 9 of the Act. The Sub-Divisional Officer, it may be mentioned, is vested with the powers of Controller under the said Act. The application was registered as Misc. Case No. 217M/96. By order dated 11.9.96 the Controller held that the premises in question was completely destroyed as a result of the storm to the extent that it could not be repaired; the structure would in fact require reconstruction. Observing that under the Act, the Controller can pass orders for repairs and not reconstruction, he further held that the application filed by respondent no.3 was beyond his competence. On these findings the application was disposed of. Respondent No.3 did not prefer any appeal against the said order; instead, on 30.6.97 he filed a fresh application seeking similar relief which was registered as Misc. Case No. 127M/97. The petitioner pursuant to notice, appeared before the Controller and pointed out that similar application had been rejected earlier by his predecessor. The objection of the petitioner, however, was overruled. The Controller held that his predecessor had ignored the report of the Officer-in-charge and under an erroneous impression that the prayer of the respondent lays outside his jurisdiction, did not pass any positive order. The Controller further held that what the respondent sought in the application was 'repairs' and not 'reconstruction', which come within the ambit of Section 9 of the Act. On these findings he directed the petitioner to make the repairs, the cost of which would be borne by the respondent. 2. Mr. Y.V. Giri, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the Controller committed error in reviewing the order passed by his predecessor. On these findings he directed the petitioner to make the repairs, the cost of which would be borne by the respondent. 2. Mr. Y.V. Giri, learned counsel for the petitioner, contended that the Controller committed error in reviewing the order passed by his predecessor. He submitted that as no appeal against the previous order dated 11.9.96 was preferred by respondent no.3, the same became final and could not be reopened. Reference was made to provisions of Sections 24(3) and 30 of the Act in this regard. Mr. Giri also contended that the impugned order has been passed under a totally wrong notion that it was a case of repairs as distinct from reconstruction. He pointed out that as the premises in question had been completely destroyed, it required 'reconstruction' which does not come within the ambit of the powers of the Controller under Section 9 of the Act. 3. Mr. Ajay Kumar Thakur, learned counsel for respondent no.3, did not controvert the submission of Mr. Giri that there is no provision for review under the Act. He however contended that this Court may not interfere with the impugned order merely on technical ground if it transpires that the impugned order has been correctly passed on facts. He urged that the balance of convenience lies in favour of respondent no. 3 since he has been carrying his business in the premises in question. 4. Section 9 of the Act runs as follows :- "9. Directions for repair to the building. - (1) Every landlord shall carry out the repairs which he is bound, under any law, contract or custom, to make to a building in the possession of tenant. Explanation. - In this sub-section "repairs" include annual white-washing, re-colouring and periodical repairs. (2) If the landlord fails to carry out annual white-washing, re-colouring and periodical repairs, which he is bound to make, the tenant may by notice require him to carry out the same within one month from the date of service of the notice and, on the landlord's failure to do so within the said period, the tenant may himself carry out the same at a cost not exceeding one month's rent for the building and deduct such cost from the rent. (3) If the landlord neglects to carry out repair, other than those referred to in sub-section (2), which he is bound to make, the Controller shall, on application by the tenant, which shall specify the approximate cost of such repairs, cause a notice to be served on the landlord to appear and show cause, within such time as may be fixed against the application. (4) If the landlord does not appear in obedience to the notice or if he appears but fails to satisfy the Controller as to why he should not be directed to carry out the repairs or such of them as he finds the landlord is bound to make, the Controller shall after making such inquiry as may be necessary direct him to carry out the same within time to be fixed, and on the landlord's failure to comply with such direction, the Controller may permit the tenant to carry out such repairs at a cost not exceeding such amount as may be specified in the order and to recover such cost from the landlord. It shall, therefore, be lawful for the tenant to make such repairs and to deduct the cost thereof from the rent or to recover it otherwise from the landlord if it were a debt due to him by the landlord : Provided that if, the Controller is satisfied that the repairs involved were due to the negligence of the tenant, he will order the tenant to make such repairs and the cost of repair shall be borne by the tenant and the same shall not be recoverable from the landlord by deduction from the rent." From a plain reading of the above provisions it would appear that the landlord is required to carry out only such repairs which "he is bound under any law, contract or custom to make in a building. If the landlord fails to carry out annual white-washing, recolouring and periodical repairs, which he is bound to make, the tenant may by notice require him to carry Jut the same and if he neglects to do so, le may get the same done upto the limit of one month's rent and adjust the amount against the house-rent. If the landlord fails to carry out annual white-washing, recolouring and periodical repairs, which he is bound to make, the tenant may by notice require him to carry Jut the same and if he neglects to do so, le may get the same done upto the limit of one month's rent and adjust the amount against the house-rent. For repairs other than annual white washing, re-colouring or periodical repairs which also the landlord is bound to make, the tenant may apply before the Controller for direction to the landlord to carry out the repairs. After show cause and opportunity of hearing the Controller may direct him to carry out the "repairs or such of them as he finds the landlord is bound to make", and where the landlord fails to comply with such direction, the Controller may permit the tenant to carry out such repairs at his own cost and deduct the same from the rent or recover it otherwise from the landlord as if it were a debt due to him by the landlord. 5. The key words of Section 9(4) for the purpose of disposal of this writ petition are "as he (Controller) finds the landlord is bound to make". Read alongwith section 9(1) under section 9(4) the Controller can direct the landlord to carry out only such-repairs which he is bound to make under any law, contract or custom. 6. Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act provides for the rights and liabilities of the lessor and the lessee. Read alongwith section 9(1) under section 9(4) the Controller can direct the landlord to carry out only such-repairs which he is bound to make under any law, contract or custom. 6. Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act provides for the rights and liabilities of the lessor and the lessee. Clauses (f) and (m) of the section which appear to be relevant for the purpose of this case, may be noticed as hereunder: “(f) If the lessor neglects to make within a reasonable time after notice any repairs which he is bound to make to the property, the lessee may make the same himself, and deduct the expenses of such repairs with interest from the rent or otherwise recover it from the lessor." "(m) The lessee is bound to keep, and on the termination of the lease, to restore the property in as good condition as it was at the time when he was put in possession, subject only to the changes caused by reasonable wear and tear or irresistible force, and ...," It would appear that, primarily, it is the liability of the lessee to keep the property in good condition in which it was given to him by the lessor, and the lessor is liable to make only such repair which he is bound to make under the terms of the contract. Unless there is an express contract to that effect, the lessor is not necessarily bound to make any repair. See the cases of Steuart and Co. Ltd. vs. V.G. Mackertich, AIR 1963 Calcutta 198, and Mirza Afzal Beg vs. Prabhu Dayal, AIR 1973 Allahabad 26. 7. However, Building control statutes are special statutes and the rights and liabilities of the landlords and tenants governed by such statutes are to be determined with reference to the relevant provisions contained therein. In V. Dhanpal Chettiar vs. Yesodai Ammal, AIR 1979 Supreme Court 1745, the Apex Court held that for getting decree of eviction of the tenant under the Building Contract Act, it is not necessary to serve notice terminating the tenancy and the provisions of section 106 of the Transfer of Property was a mere surplusage. I have nonetheless referred to the provisions of section 108 of the said Act in order to show that even under that Act there is no special liability on the landlord lessor to make repairs. I have nonetheless referred to the provisions of section 108 of the said Act in order to show that even under that Act there is no special liability on the landlord lessor to make repairs. It depends on the terms of the contract between the parties. Even if the provisions of Section 9 of the Act are liberally interpreted in favour of the lessee tenant keeping in view the objects of the Act enshrined in its preamble which is to regulate the letting of building and the rent of such building and to prevent unreasonable eviction of the tenant therefrom, it would appear that provisions of section 9 are intended to provide protection to tenants from harassment by the landlord. It has been found that the landlords often allow the building to fall in disrepair in order to get the rent increased or to pressurise the tenant to vacate the building. It is to pre-empt such an eventuality that the provisions of Section 9 have been enacted to ensure that the premises are kept in good condition so that, the tenants are not unnecessarily harassed. 8. The present case stands on an entirely different footing. The house was damaged not by any act of omission or commission on the part of the landlord-petitioner but on account of act of God or nature. In my view, it is not necessary to go into the controversy as to whether the fact and circumstances of the case require repair or reconstruction of the house as, according to me Section 9 intends to ensure that the landlord discharges his obligation cast on him under any law, contract or custom, where the repair or reconstruction becomes necessary not as a result of any act, omission or commission on the part of the landlord but as a result of some act of God, he can not be compelled to make such repairs. The position of course would be different if there had been a provision in the contract or some law or custom. No such stipulation in the contract or prevalence of custom or any law was pointed out to me by reason of which even where the house in question undergoes extensive damage as a result of some natural calamity, the landlord can be required to make repairs in terms of Section 9 of the Act 9. No such stipulation in the contract or prevalence of custom or any law was pointed out to me by reason of which even where the house in question undergoes extensive damage as a result of some natural calamity, the landlord can be required to make repairs in terms of Section 9 of the Act 9. It may be that in the present case the rains and storm provided a God- sent opportunity to the petitioner to get the respondent evicted from the house, for it transpired that prior to .the incident in question he had filed Eviction Suit No. 13/95 before the Munsif, Araria for eviction of the respondent It is however obvious that no motive can be attributed to the petitioner in this regard. It is admitted position that the house fell down as a result of act of God. Any direction to the petitioner to make repair which would virtually amount to reconstructing the house would be beyond the provision of Section 9 and the powers of the Controller thereunder. 10. Even if any other view of the matter could be taken, the impugned order is fit to be quashed as being without jurisdiction on the ground that the Controller had no power to review the order of his predecessor. It is obvious from bare perusal of the impugned order that the Controller tried to find fault with the findings and the ultimate conclusion of the predecessor as if he were sitting in appeal over the same. There is no dispute that order dated 11.9.96 could be appealed against by respondent no.3 under Section 24(1) of the Act which he did not prefer. Section 24(3) lays down that subject to provision of Section 25 (regarding award of cost) the decision of the appellate authority and subject only to such decision, where the appeal lies, an order of tile Controller shall be final, and shall not be liable to be questioned in any court of law whether in suit or other proceeding by way of appeal or revision. 11. 11. The second application filed by respondent no.3 was also clearly barred by the provisions of Section 30 of the Act which lays down in no uncertain terms that the Controller shall summarily reject any application which raises substantially the same issues as have been heard and finally decided in former proceeding under this Act between the same parties under whom they or any of them claim". As pointed hereinabove, the finality of the previous order dated 11.9.98 was not questioned by the counsel for the respondent. 12. In these premises, I have no hesitation in holding that the impugned order was illegal and without jurisdiction and is, therefore fit to be quashed. The order dated 6.12.97 contained in An1exure 5 is accordingly quashed and the writ petition is allowed There will be no order as to cost.