Honble YADAV, J.–In the instant writ petition dominant questions of general importance relating to removal of democratically elected committee to manage the affairs of the Co-operative Societies and term of office of the administrator appointed under Clause (a) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 36 of the Rajasthan Co- operative Societies Act, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as ``the Act of 1965) are involved. (2). The petitioner has filed the present writ petition for quashing promotion order dated 26.9.97 Annx. P/9, promotion order dated 1.10.97 Annx. P/10, reversion order dated 24.1.98 Annx. P/11 and Advertisement dated 17.1.98 Annx. P/12. It is further prayed by the petitioner that he may be declared to be confirmed on the post of Branch Manager/Accountant Gr. D(1) in view of the decision taken by the elected Board of Directors as mentioned at Note No. 2 of Annx. P/6 after completion of three years service on the promoted post of Branch Manager/Accountant as has been done in case of Amar Chand Purohit. The petitioner further prayed that the appointment of Administrator by the Registrar in exercise of his powers under Clause (a) of Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 36 of the Act of 1965 may be declared to be functus officio after expiry of the remainder of the term of the elected commmittee removed under the aforesaid Clause (a) of Sub-sec. (1) of the said Section. It is also prayed that the decision taken by Departmental Promotion Committee (for short the DPC) presided over by the Administrator promoting new incumbents on the post of Branch Manager/Accountant Gr. D(1) Annx. P/9 and P/10 and reverting to the petitioner on the post of clerk vide Annx. P/11 and issuing advertisement Annx. P/12 to the declared to the without jurisdiction and nonest. (3). Material facts which have given rise to the aforesaid question are these :- (4). The petitioner has to his credit the degree of Bachelor of Arts (BA) and as such he possessed the requisite qualification to be appointed on the post of Grade- D(1) under the respondents No. 1 and 2 i.e. on the post of Branch Manager/Deputy Manager/Accountant/Chief Cashier, as per qualification laid down under the Service Rules applicable to him. The petitioner after due recruitment and selection, was appointed on the post of Lower Division Clerk vide order dated 30.1.1970, and latter on confirmed vide Annx. P/2 dated 8.9.70 to the writ petition. (5). The petitioner after due recruitment and selection, was appointed on the post of Lower Division Clerk vide order dated 30.1.1970, and latter on confirmed vide Annx. P/2 dated 8.9.70 to the writ petition. (5). It is to be noticed that under Sec. 29 of the Act of 1965 the powers of the Appointing Authority can be exercised by the Board of Directors. The Managing Director is the Secretary of the Board and he is required to execute and implement the directions issued by the Board of Directors. In the absence of Board of Directors, the Administrator appointed by the Registrar under clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 36 of the Act of 1965 or the Committee nominated by the State Government under clause (c) of sub-sec. (1A) of Sec. 36 of the aforesaid Act can exercise powers of the Board of Directors and Managing Director of the Society. (6). It is averred in paragraph 7 of the writ petition that petitioner was promoted on temporary basis on the post of Branch Manager (D-1) by order dated 31.8.1982, a copy whereof is filed and marked as Annx. P/4 to the writ petition. An another order dated 19.10.1982 was issued whereby petitioners salary was fixed on the post of Branch Manager in Grade (D1), a true copy whereof is filed and marked as Annx. P/5 to the writ petition. In pursuance of Resolution and Decision of the Board of Directors taken on 11.5.1984, the seniority list of the officers was issued on 14.6.1984. In the aforesaid seniority list, the name of the petitioner has been shown, a copy whereof is filed and marked as Annx. P/6 to the writ petition. On perusal of Note No. 2 of the seniority list Annx. P/6 indicates that the officers who had completed three years of service on the post of promotion are liable to be confirmed. It is true that the seniority list dated 14.6.1984 (Annx. P/6) which was prepared in pursuant to the decision and resolution of the Board of Directors of the respondent Bank, had been cancelled but the subsequent event show that the respondent Bank had ignored the order dated 15.9.1984 cancelling the seniority list dated 14.6.1984 and latest seniority list was issued keeping in view of the seniority list dated 14.6.1984 (Annx. P/6). P/6). By order dated 23.7.1997 petitioners fixation was made in the new pay scale i.e. Grade D- 1, copy whereof is filed and marked as Annx. P/7 to the writ petition. (7). It is relevant to mention here that seniority list Annx. P/3 dated 1.4.1980 pertains to the seniority of the Lower Division Clerks whereas seniority list Annx. P/6 dated 14.6.1984 pertains to the seniroity list of the officers. The order dated 26.9.1997 Annx. P/9 to the writ petition was issued whereby 10 persons were promoted on the post of Grade D-1 Branch Manager/Accountant, in the pay scale of Rs. 3800-8000-9540 by a D.P.C. presided by Administrator whose term had already expired within the meaning of Clause (d) of sub-sec. (1A) of Sec. 36 of the Act of 1965. It is alleged that Shri Ramrakh Chaudhary, who is junior to the petitioner, has been granted promotion whereas the petitioner has been reverted to the post of Clerk after working more than 15 years. Besides the aforesaid promotion order, another promotion order dated 1.10.1997 Annx. P/10 to the writ petition was issued where by two persons namely; Lumba Ram Choudhary and Mehra Ram Choudhary were promoted on the posts of Branch Manager/Accountants who are also juniors to the petitioner. (8). Apart from the aforesaid promotion order, another promotion order dated 26.9.1997 was also issued whereby five persons/officers of Grade D-1 were promoted to the post of Grade- C. It is also averred that one Shri Gordhan Mal Mehta, who was promoted vide Annx. P/9, has not joined the promoted post and has fore- gone the promotion. In para 16 of the writ petition, it is averred that as a result of afore-mentioned promotion orders, the petitioner was reverted to the post of Clerk from the post of Branch Manager/Accountant by the impugned order dated 24.1.1998 Annx. P/11 to the writ petition. (9). It is also averred in paragraph 17 of the writ petition that before reverting the petitioner vide impugned order dated 24.1.1998 (Annx. P/11), an advertisement dated 17.1.1998 Annx. P/12 to the writ petition was issued inviting applications, for appointment on the posts of Branch Manager (Grade D 1). (10). Respondents No. 1 and 2 have lodged caveat and they are represented by their counsel Mr. M.R. Singhvi and Mr. P.K. Lohra. P/11), an advertisement dated 17.1.1998 Annx. P/12 to the writ petition was issued inviting applications, for appointment on the posts of Branch Manager (Grade D 1). (10). Respondents No. 1 and 2 have lodged caveat and they are represented by their counsel Mr. M.R. Singhvi and Mr. P.K. Lohra. When the case was taken up for admission, they filed a detailed reply on behalf of the respondent No. 1 and 2 against which learned counsel for the petitioner prayed for and was granted five days time to file rejoinder. The petitioner has filed rejoinder to the reply filed on behalf of respondents No.1 and 2. Notices are duly served upon respondents No.3, 4 and 5 but they did not file any reply in the present writ petition. (11). With the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the case was posted for final disposal at admission stage and now it is being finally disposed of at admission stage. The application for impleading Shri Amar Chand Purohit as a res- pondent is hereby rejected. To my mind, the legality and validity of the orders impugned can be decided without impleading him as a party. I am of the view that where an order is challenged on the ground of inherent lack of authority of an officer affecting large number of employees directly or indirectly by such order are not required to be impleaded as respondents. Such practice in writ jurisdiction will not be practicable. (12). A perusal of the reply, filed on behalf of respondents No.1 and 2, reveals that the respondents are not disputing the facts averred in paragraphs 1 to 6. It is averred in paragraph 7 of the reply that the posts of officers of Grade D/1 are to be filled in by direct recruitment as well as by way of promotion. 60% posts of officers of Grade D-1 are to be filled in by way of promotion and the remaining 40% are to be filled in by direct recruitment. The quota of promotion is further bifurcated into two categories viz. 50% by seniority-cum-merit and 50% by merit. According to Rules for promotion on the post of Officers Grade D-1, the eligibility is that if the incumbent is Matriculate, then he has to gain experience of 15 years whereas in case of Graduate, the requisite experience is 3 years. The quota of promotion is further bifurcated into two categories viz. 50% by seniority-cum-merit and 50% by merit. According to Rules for promotion on the post of Officers Grade D-1, the eligibility is that if the incumbent is Matriculate, then he has to gain experience of 15 years whereas in case of Graduate, the requisite experience is 3 years. It is further averred that meeting of the DPC could not take place, therefore, temporary promotions were made by the Chairman vide Annx.P/4 to the writ petition, though he was not empowered to promote the petitioner on the post of officer Grade D-1. Respondents are also disputing the correctness of the seniority list. (13). It is averred in paragraph 15 of the reply that since the petitioner was Graduate and he was within the zone of consideration, hence, his case was considered treating him to be eligible under the criterion of seniority-cum-merit and merit as well. In the criterion of seniority-cum-merit, only three persons were promoted who were senior to the petitioner, therefore, petitioner cannot have any grievance about promotion of the persons whom are senior to him in thecadre of Clerk. Although Ramrakh Chaudhary is junior to the petitioner but he was promoted under the criterion of merit, hence, the petitioner should have no grievance with regard to promotion of Shri Ram Rakh Chaudhary. It is averred that when the criterion is merit, then even if a person who is junior but more meritorious can be preferred over a senior person. In support of their averments, a copy of the minutes of the meeting dated 25.9.1997 as Annx.R/2 to the reply, presided by Administrator is filed. According to the respondents No.1 and 2, the DPC considered the candidature of all eligible candidates and in that process a reserve list was also prepared. It happened that one Shri Amarchand Purohit was further promoted as Officer Grade-C, which resulted into one vacancy in Officer Grade D-1 and one Shri G.N. Mehta refused promotion, therefore, these two posts are required to be filled in and accordingly Shri Lumba Ram and Shri Mehra Ram Chaudhary were promoted. Nowhere it is stated in the reply that although Lumba Ram Chaudhary and Mehra Ram Chaudhary both were juniors to the petitioner but under what considerations they have been promoted in preference to the petitioner. (14). Nowhere it is stated in the reply that although Lumba Ram Chaudhary and Mehra Ram Chaudhary both were juniors to the petitioner but under what considerations they have been promoted in preference to the petitioner. (14). It is not decipherable from the averments in paragraph 15 of the reply whether Lumba Ram and Mehra Ram Chaudhary, who were admittedly juniors to the petitioner, were promoted in the category of seniority-cum-merit or on merit. It is not understandable from the averments made in paragraph 15 whether the DPC presided by Administrator has considered the suitability of Lumba Ram Chaudhary and Mehra Ram Chaudhary in preference to the petitioner, who has got experience of functioning as Branch Manager for more than 15 years 7 months with unblemi- shed record of his service in the category of seniority-cum-merit or in the category of merit. The evasive reply given by respondents No.1 and 2 lead me to believe that at least Lumba Ram Chaudhary and Mehra Ram Chaudhary, who are admittedly juniors to the petitioners, have been promoted illegally on irrelevant considerations. (15). An identical question came up for consideration before learned the then seven Judges of Supreme Court constituting a Constitutional Bench in case of State of Kerala and others vs. V.M. Thomas and Others, (1) wherein it was observed which reads thus : ``Seniority-cum-merit means that given the minimum necessary merit requisite for efficiency of administration, the senior though less meritorious shall have right. This will not violate Article 14, 16(1) and 16(2) of the Constitution of India. (16). A similar question arose before learned Single Bench of this Court in case of Bal Kishan vs. District and Sessions Judge, Pali and Another, (2), wherein, ano- ther conflicting view of Supreme Court rendered in case of Sr. Jagathigowda C.N. and Others vs. Chairman, Kaweri Gramin Bank and Others (3) was brought to the notice of learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge preferred to rely on seven Judges constitution Bench decision on the basis of statement of law made by Supreme Court in case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Ram Chandra Trivedi (4). I res- pectfully concur with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in case of Bal Krishan (supra). The learned Single Judge preferred to rely on seven Judges constitution Bench decision on the basis of statement of law made by Supreme Court in case of State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Ram Chandra Trivedi (4). I res- pectfully concur with the view taken by the learned Single Judge in case of Bal Krishan (supra). The view taken by me and learned Single Judge of this Court in case of Bal Kishan is buttressed from the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in case of Sadi Lal vs. Dy. Commissioner, Gurgaon and Others (5), wherein, it was ruled by Apex Court that if the promotion is to be made on the basis of seniority- cum-merit, the seniority is the relevant consideration and a senior person is to be selected irrespective of better merit of his juniors. (17). In reply to the averments made in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the writ petition, it is averred in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the reply that when Annx.P/13 was issued, answering respondents have no knowledge about Service Rules as framed by notification dated 2.4.1980 and as such, as per prevailing practice, the Administration of the respondent Bank promoted Shri Amar Chand Purohit as an Officer Grade-C. In the same manner, when it was found by the respondent-Bank that they were promoted in regular manner, they were accordingly confirmed by Annx. P/14. It is also averred in paragraphs 18 and 19 of the reply filed on behalf of respondents No.1 and 2 that no challenge was ever made by the petitioner with regard to promotion of Shri Amar Chand Purohit or two other persons, namely Shri Lumba Ram and Shri Mehra Ram Chaudhary nor any grievance was ever raised with regard to their confirmation. It is also averred -that if by mistake Shri Amar Chand Purohit, Lumba Ram and Mehra Ram Chaudhary have been promoted then mistake cannot be ordered to be perpetuated or repeated in case of the petitioner. Thus, on the aforesaid plea of ignorance of law and mistake, per se illegal promotion orders Annx.P/13 and P/14 are being supported by the respondents, which deserves to be deprecated. (18). As discussed hereinabove, all the Rules and norms for fairness were gi- ven a go by and naked favouritism prevailed in making promotions in the present case by the Departmental Promotion Committee presided by the Administrator (respondent No.2). (18). As discussed hereinabove, all the Rules and norms for fairness were gi- ven a go by and naked favouritism prevailed in making promotions in the present case by the Departmental Promotion Committee presided by the Administrator (respondent No.2). In these circumstances, in my considered opinion, the orders impugned Annx. P/9, P/10, P/11 and P/12 entail nullification under Article 226 of the Constitution of India by issuing a writ of certiorari. (19). I am of the view that the Departmental Promotion Committee presided by Administrator (respondent No.2) has no justification whatsoever to reject the legitimate claim of promotion of the petitioner in the category of seniority-cum- merit in preference to his juniors Shri Lumba Ram Chaudhary and Shri Mehra Ram Chaudhary. (20). It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner Mr. P.P. Chaudhary, that in view of Sub-section (1B) of Sec. 36 of the Act of 1965, the Administrator can continue only for a period of two years and two years tenure expired on 17.12.96 and thereafter the Administrator became functus officio and all orders Annx.P/9, Annx.P/10, Annx.P/11 and Annx.P/12 passed by him after 17.12.1996 are without jurisdiction, honest, void ab initio and entail nullification by this Court by issuing a writ of certiorari. (21). The aforesaid argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner by his learned counsel is strenuously opposed by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the answering-respondents Mr. M.R. Singhvi. According to Mr.Singhvi, in pursuant to Annx.R/3 to the reply, dated 15.12.94 the provisions of sub-section(l-B) of Sec.36 of the Act of 1965 relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner is not attracted to the facts and circumstances of the present case. It is urged by Mr. Singhvi that in view of the specific order passed by the Registrar on 15.12.94 Annx.R/3 to the reply in the present facts and circumstances of the case, the provisions envisaged under Clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec.36 of the said Act are attracted, which specifically provide that after removal of elected committee, the Registrar is empowered to appoint a Government Servant to manage the affairs of the society and shall submit his report justifying the removal of the committee to the State Government within a period of 15 days from the date of removal of the committee. (22). It is also urged by the learned counsel for the answering- respondents Mr. (22). It is also urged by the learned counsel for the answering- respondents Mr. Singhvi that the specific provision is made for a term of the office of the commi- ttee nominated in place of the Administrator by the State Government but nothing is provided under the Act of 1965 or the Rules framed thereunder regarding term of office of the Administrator appointed by the Registrar if allowed to continue by the State Govt. under clause (c) of sub- section (1A) of Section 36 of the Act of 1965, although under clause(d) of sub-section(l-A) of Sec.36 of the said Act, the Admini- strator shall cease to hold office if the State Government nominates a Committee in his place. According to the learned counsel for the respondents, in view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the Administrator appointed by the Registrar under Clause(a) of sub-section(l) of Sec.36 of the said Act can continue for an indefinite period. (23). I have given my anxious and thoughtful consideration to the rival contentions raised at the Bar. The core question involved in the present writ petition would be how long an Administrator appointed under Clause (a) of sub-sec.(1) of Sec.36 of the Act of 1965 by the Registrar will continue if State Government allowed him to continue under clause (c) of sub-section(1A) of the said Section of the said Act. The next important question would be whether term of the office of the Administrator is coterminous with term of the office of the Committee nominated by the State Government as postulated under clause(d) of sub-Section(1A) of Section 36 of the Act of 1965. (24). For better and deeper understanding of the question of law argued at the Bar, it would be expedient to notice certain relevant dates which are not disputed by the learned counsel for the parties before me during the course of their arguments. (25). Indisputably the elected committee of the Board of Directors of the respondent-Bank was elected on 15.9.92 and under its Bye-laws its term was three years i.e. upto 15.9.95. It is evident from perusal of Annx.R/3.to the reply that the elected committee of Board of Directors was superseded on 15.12.94 and on the date when it was superseded its remainder period was 9 months only. It is evident from perusal of Annx.R/3.to the reply that the elected committee of Board of Directors was superseded on 15.12.94 and on the date when it was superseded its remainder period was 9 months only. It is borne out from perusal of the record that against the supersession of Committee of Board of Directors dated 15.12.94, no appeal was filed by any of the aggrieved person before the State Government within 30 days as provided under clause (a) of Sub-section(l-A) of Sec.36 of the Act of 1965. It is apparent from the material on record that the order of supersession passed by the Registrar on 15.12.94 removing the committee of Board of Directors was confirmed by the State Government but it did not nominate another committee in place of the Administrator appointed by the Registrar under Clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of Sec.36 of the said Act and he was allowed to continue to work as Administrator as envisaged under clause (c) of sub-section (1A) of Sec. 36 of the aforesaid Act. (26). In light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case, the mandatory provisions envisaged under clause (d) of sub- section(1A) of Sec.36 is required to be interpreted which provides that the Administrator appointed under Clause (a) of sub-sec.(1) of Sec.36 shall cease to hold-office immediately upon the nomination of another committee or upon the setting aside of the order of removal by the State Government, as the case may be. The nominated committee by State shall cease to hold office upon the expiry of the remainder of the term of the elected committee removed under clause (a) of sub-section(l) of the said Section. A proviso is added to clause (d) of sub-section(1A) of Sec.36 of the Act of 1965, which postulates that the State Government may by order extend-the period of office of so nominated committee for such time not extending one year as may be specified in the order. Under clause (e) of sub-section(1A) of Sec. 36 of the said Act, the State Government is empowered to delegate its power of nomination of a committee under clause (c) to such officer of the State Government and in relation to such co-operative society as may be prescribed. (27). Under clause (e) of sub-section(1A) of Sec. 36 of the said Act, the State Government is empowered to delegate its power of nomination of a committee under clause (c) to such officer of the State Government and in relation to such co-operative society as may be prescribed. (27). It is to be noticed that neither in the writ petition nor in the reply filed on behalf of answering-respondents No.1 and 2, it is averred that the State Government or its delegates as contemplated under clause(e) of sub-section (1A) of Sec. 36 of the said Act has nominated another committee in place of Administrator appointed by the Registrar under clause (a) of section (l) of Section 36 of the Act of 1965. It is nowhere averred in the writ petition or in the reply that the State Government in exercise of its power postulated under Proviso added to clause (d) of sub-section (1A) of Sec.36 of the said Act, has passed any order extending the period of the office of the Administrator for such time not exceeding one year as may be specified in the order. Neither the petitioner nor the answering respondents have brought on record such order passed by the State Government extending the period of office of the Administrator from which it could be inferred that he did not cease to hold office of Administrator upon the expiry of the remainder of the term of elected committee, removed under clause (a) of sub-section (l) of Section 36 of the Act of 1965 by the Registrar. (28). It is contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that it may be presumed that the State Government had extended the period of the office of Administrator for one year, therefore, it would come to an end on 15.9.96. (29). The aforesaid argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner is not acceptable for the reason that if the State legislature has empowered the State Go- vernment to extend term of office not exceeding one year at its discretion under proviso added to clause(d) of sub-section (1A) of Section 36 of the Act of 1965 then such extension cannot be presumed. The reason is not far to seek. The reason is not far to seek. It is well settled principle of law that if the legislature has provided a particular thing to be done in a particular manner then it shall be presumed that it has prohibited to do that thing in any other manner. The extension of period of the office of Administrator which is extendable not exceeding one year at the discretion of the State Government by specific order, cannot be presumed by any stretch of imagination as urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner. Such extension of period not exceeding one year can be proved only by bringing the order of the State Government on record, not otherwise, as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner. (30). Learned counsel for the petitioner strenuously urged before me that under sub-section (1B) of Sec.36 of the Act of 1965, the extension of period cannot be allowed to exceed by more than 2 years. According to his submission, the computation of two years period should be done from 15.9.95 which will come to an end on 15.9.97 whereas according to the learned counsel for the respondents Mr. Singhvi the aforesaid provisions are not attracted in the present case. It is urged by the learned counsel for the respondents Shri Singhvi that period of office of the Administrator appointed by the Registrar under Clause(a) of sub-sec.(1) of Sec.36 of the said Act is indefinite. (31). I am of the view that simply because no specific period is mentioned in Clause (d) of sub-sec.(1-A) of Sec.36 of the Act of 1965 regarding term of office of the Administrator appointed by the Registrar in exercise of his power under Clause (a) of sub- sec.(1) of Sec.36 of the Act, it does not mean that the Administrator will continue for time immemorial. It is specifically provided in sub-sec.(2) of Sec.36 of the said Act that an Administrator so appointed or the committee so nominated by State Government or its deligatee shall have the same powers and shall perform the same functions subject to the control of the Registrar and to such instructions as he may from time to time give to them. Under sub~sec.(4) of Section 36 of the Act of 1965, the Administrator or nominated committee before ceasing to hold office under Clause (d) of sub-sec. Under sub~sec.(4) of Section 36 of the Act of 1965, the Administrator or nominated committee before ceasing to hold office under Clause (d) of sub-sec. (1-A) shall arrange the election of a new committee in accordance with the bye laws of the society and the newly elected committee shall function with effect from the date of Administrator or nominated committee cease to hold office. Thus both Administrator and nominated committee have been charged under sub-sec.(4) of Section 36 of the Act of 1965 to hold elections for constituting a new Committee in its place, before expiry of its term. Therefore, the Administrator appointed by the Registrar under Clause(a) of sub- sec.(1) of Sec.36 of the Act is also bound to hold election for constituting the new Committee, before expiry of the term of the Committee removed. To my mind, the Administrator is appointed in place of the elected Committee, therefore,term of office of such an Administrator cannot be allowed to continue after expiry of term of such removed Committee, unless his term is extended at the discretion of the State Government, by passing a specific order under proviso added to Clause (d) of sub-section (1A) of Section 36 of the Act of 1965. In the present case before expiry of remainder term of elected committee i.e. 15.9.95 steps had been taken either by Administrator or Registrar to hold election of the Board of Directors of the respondent- Bank which is reprehensible in a democratic country like ours. (32). I have no hesitation to hold that in absence of any specific period of office being prescribed for the Administrator, appointed under Clause(a) of sub-sec.(1) of Sec.36,. it will be presumed that he is to continue for the remaining term of the elected Committee because he steps in the shoes of the committee removed by the Registrar although his term can be extended by the order of the State Government as envisaged under the provisions of Clause (d) of sub-sec.(1A) of Sec.36 of the Act by passing a specific order extending his term. It is held that the term of the office of the Administrator appointed by the Registrar under clause(a) of sub-sec.(1) of Sec.36 is conterminous with the term of expiry of the remainder of the term of the elected committee removed under Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of the said Act envisaged under Clause (d) of Sub-sec.(1-A) of the said Section. (33). The aforesaid interpretation of Clause (a) of sub-sec.(1) of Sec.36 of the Act of 1965 came up for consideration before Division Bench of this Court in case of Sunari Gram Seva Sahkari Samiti Ltd. vs. State of Rajasthan, (6), wherein para- graph 17, learned Judges constituting Division Bench ruled, which reads thus : ``......We are of the opinion that the Administrator too ceases to hold the office upon the expiry of the remainder term of the committee removed under sub-sec. (a) but under the proviso, the period of the office of the Administrator can be extended for such time not exceed- ing one year as may be specified in the order because under the proviso the period of nominated committee can only be so extended. We have already referred earlier to the provisions of Sec.33 of the Act and it is the General body of the co-operative society who has to constitute the committee in accordance with the bye-laws and has to entrust the management of the affairs of the society to such committee. We have, in the earlier part of this order, referred to bye-law (31) wherein it has been provided that the period of election of the Board of Directors shall be three years unless an Administrator is appointed or a committee is nominated and in that case the period of nominated committee or Administrator, as the case may be, can only be extended to one year, thus, in no case, the period will exceed four years. The scheme of the Act, therefore, appears to be that the elections to the committee or Board of Directors of the co-operative society must be held in accordance with the bye- laws and it should have been done after three years or at any date after the period of four years, as aforesaid even if an Administrator was appointed but no elections have been held for one reason or the other, inspite of decision having been taken to hold the elections. (34). (34). I have also examined the mandatory amendment made by State Legis- lature under sub-sec.(1B) of Sec.36 of the Act of 1965 which was inserted to cope with the situation arisen after decision rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in case of Sunari Gram Seva (supra). (35). It is urged by learned counsel for the respondents Mr. M.R. Singhvi that sub-section(1B) of Section 36 of the Act of 1965 has no application to the facts and circumstances of the present case whereas according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the aforesaid provision is attracted. 1 am of the opinion that there is substance in the argument of learned counsel for the respondents. To my mind, the aforesaid sub-sec.(1-B) of Section 36 of the Act of 1965 can be pressed into service only in those circumstances if before the expiry of the term of the committee, so removed by the Registrar, a new committee is not constituted as specified in the bye laws, the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, may appoint a government servant as Administrator to manage the affairs of the society for a period not exceeding two years or till a new committee is constituted whichever is earlier. (36). Indisputably, in the present case, the term of the elected committee which was removed by Registrar on 15.12.94 vide Annex. R/3 to the reply expired in accordance with bye laws of the society on 15.9.95 but he did not pass fresh order in exercise of his powers under the aforesaid sub-sec.(1B) of the Act before 15.5.95. (37). In the present case, Administrator (respondent No.2) appointed by the Registrar ceased to hold office of Administrator upon the expiry of the remainder of the term of the elected committee i.e. 15.5.95 and any act done by him thereafter would entail its nullification. In fact, he has no jurisdiction to manage the affairs of the respondent-Bank in the present case after 15.9.95 in absence of any fresh order passed by the Registrar under sub-sec.(1B) of Section 36 of the Act of 1965 before 15.9.95, which was the remainder term of the elected committee removed by him under Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Sec.36 of the said Act. (38). (38). Learned counsel for the respondents Shri Singhvi after apprehending the aforesaid legal situation, he invited my attention towards de facto doctrine and urged that the acts of the Administrator passing the impugned orders in the present case is within the scope of his assumed official authority in the interest of respondent Bank and public at large and not for his own benefit, hence, it is to be treated to be valid and binding as if it was the act of the Administrator de jure. In support of his aforesaid argument, he placed reliance on a decision rendered by the Apex Court in case of Gokaraju Rangaraju vs. State of Andhra Pradesh (7). (39). The facts of the case of Gokaraju Rangaraju (supra) are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present case. Firstly, in that case, it was held that a Judge de facto was one who was not a mere intruder or usurper but one who holds office under colour of lawful authority though his initial appointment was defective and may later be found to be defective. Here in the present case, appointment of the Administrator by the Registrar under Clause (a) of sub-sec.(1) of Sec.36 was valid and was in accordance with law and it remains valid upto remainder term of the democratically elected committee which was superseded by the Registrar but after expiry of the remainder term of democratically elected committee, which was superseded by the Registrar, the Administrator ceased to hold office and he became functus officio. Secondly, it is important to mention that appointment of the Administrator by Registrar under clause(a) of sub-section(l) of Section 36 of the Act of 1965 is not on altruistic mission with an expectation to all that he would render his free services to the respondent Bank but the Registrar is under legal obligation to fix the remuneration payable to the person appointed as Administrator within the meaning of sub-sec.(3) of Sec.36 of the Act of 1965. Thirdly, it is ruled by the Apex Court in Gokaraju Rangarajus case (supra) in paragraph 15 and 16 that the defective appointment of a de facto Judge may be questioned dire- ctly in a proceeding to which he be a party but it cannot be permitted to be questioned in a litigation between two private litigants, a litigation which is of no concern or consequence to the judge except as a judge meaning thereby, in colateral proceedings. Here in the present case, the orders impugned Annx.P/9, Annx.P/10, Annx.P/11 and Annx.P/12, which are passed by the Administrator are directly challenged before this Court on the ground that he has no jurisdiction to pass these orders, after expiry of the remainder term of elected Committee i.e. 15.9.95 whereas these orders are indisputably passed thereafter. (40). Learned counsel for respondents No.1 and 2 had taken additional plea in his reply to the effect that the petitioner has alternative remedy to raise this ques- tion under Sec.75 of the Act of 1965. In support of his aforesaid argument, learned counsel for the respondents placed reliance on a decision rendered by Supreme Court in case of R.C. Tiwari v. M.P. State Co-operative Marketing Federation Limited, (8). (41). Suffice it to say in this regard that law must be taken to be well settled that if the order challenged before this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution is found to be either without jurisdiction or against the principle of natural justice then alternative remedy is no bar to entertain writ petition. Indisputably, it is established in the present case that the orders impugned Annx.P/9, Annx.P/10, Annx.P/11 and Annx.P/12 have been passed by the Administrator, who has no jurisdiction to pass such orders, therefore, these orders entail nullification on this ground alone and alternative remedy is no bar. (42). Indisputably, it is established in the present case that the orders impugned Annx.P/9, Annx.P/10, Annx.P/11 and Annx.P/12 have been passed by the Administrator, who has no jurisdiction to pass such orders, therefore, these orders entail nullification on this ground alone and alternative remedy is no bar. (42). Apart from the aforesaid high handedness remissness and dereliction of duty by Registrar and Administrator in not holding election of the Committee of Board of Directors after expiry of remainder period of the term of the office of the elected committee, removed by Registrar in exercise of his powers under Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 36 of the Act of 1965, failure on their part to seek a specific order from the State Government extending the period of office of the Administrator for such term not exceeding one year under Proviso added to Clause (d) of sub-section (1A) of Section 36 of the said Act is also reprehensible. This Court records its disapproval relating to failure of Registrar to pass a specific order under sub-section (1B) of Section 36 of the said Act before expiry of the term of the Committee as specified under the Bye Laws i.e. before 15.9.95 which was removed by him in exercise of his power under Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 36 of the Act of 1965. (43). In these circumstances, now it is not possible for this Court to direct the Registrar to pass an order under the aforesaid sub-sec.(1B) of Section 36 of the said Act as time to pass such order under the aforesaid Section has already expired on 15.9.1995, yet this Court being bulwark for the protection of rights of the citizen and public at large, it is expected from this Court to check the vagaries, negligence and mistake committed by the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Rajasthan, Jaipur and the Administrator by passing a healthy pragmatic order to facilitate the day to day functioning of the respondent-Bank, otherwise, its functionings will collapse after holding that the Administrator ceased to hold office w.e.f. 15.9.95 and all decisions and acts performed thereafter by him entails nullification. In order to save the management of the respondent-Bank from being collapsed, the following orders are passed by this Court:- (A). In order to save the management of the respondent-Bank from being collapsed, the following orders are passed by this Court:- (A). Operation of the judgment passed in the present writ petition today would be prospective and after extending de facto doctrine in the present case the policy decisions taken by the Administrator and all acts performed by him after 15.9.1995 in his de facto capacity in colour of his assumed office of the Administrator and in his assumed said official authority while maintaining the affairs of the respondentBank shall be binding on all, as if they were taken and were performed by a de jure Administrator except those decisions or acts of the Administrator, which are questioned directly in legal proceedings impleading him as a party and are pending on the date of this judgment. (B) The Administrator appointed by the Registrar in exercise of his power under Clause (a) of sub-sec.(1) of Sec.36 of the Act of 1965 on 15.12.94 vide Annx.R/3 to the reply shall continue to look after day to day affairs of the respondent-Bank by order of this Court for a period of six months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the order passed today or till a newly elected committee is constituted under the Bye Laws of the respondent-Bank whichever is earlier with a direction that he will have no power to take policy decision relating to the management of the respondent Bank, such as appointments, promotions fixation, of salary, preparation of seniority list or any other policy decision of like nature. (C) The Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Rajasthan, Jaipur is hereby directed to constitute a newly democratically elected committee of Board of Directors of the respondent-Bank within six months from the date of receipt of the certified copy of the order of this Court as enshrined under the Act of 1965 by the State Legislature and Rules framed thereunder by the State Government with liberty to approach this Court in case any impediment in constituting the newly elected committee by holding election under the Bye Laws of the respondent-Bank arises before him within the aforesaid period for passing suitable order in this regard. (44). As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the instant writ petition is allowed. (44). As a result of the aforesaid discussion, the instant writ petition is allowed. The decision taken by the Administrator promoting the persons vide Annx.P/9 and P/10 to the writ petition, reversion order of the petitioner vide Annx.P/11 and Advertisement of vacancies vide Annex.P/12 are hereby quashed subject to the observations made in the body of this order.The petitioner shall be reinstated as Branch Manager/ Accountant with full back salary from the date of his reversion to the date of his reinstatement with all consequential benefits. Both parties are hereby directed to bear their own costs. (45). Before parting with the judgment, it is observed that only collective efforts can stem the rot of misgovernance in Co-operative Societies as found in the present writ petition. The need of hours is to make administration in the Co-operative Department in all its facets more responsive to the law enacted by the State Legislature and the Rules framed by the State Government. The concrete measures are to be taken to develop a transparent and accountable governance in Co-operative Department under leadership of the Registrar, Co-operative Societies, who is expected to play a pivotal role in maintaining nature of democratic institution of Co-operative Societies in the State. His power to appoint an Administrator after superseding a democratically elected committee under the Act of 1965 is only in the nature of time gap arrangement for the purposes of holding elections of the elected committee superseded by him. Term of the Administrator can not be claimed to be for an indefinite period as claimed in the present writ petition by the respondents. (46). Office of the Registrar General of this Court is directed to send a copy of this order to the Secretary to the Government, Department of Co-operative Societies, Rajasthan, Jaipur who in turn is directed to apprise political executive to see how the statutory enactment of State Legislature enshrined under the Rajasthan Co- operative Societies Act, 1965 and Rules framed thereunder by the State Government are being obeyed in its breach. (47). (47). This Court being one of the constitutional functionaries records its serious disapproval to the functioning of the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies in converting democratically elected committee to manage the affairs of the respondent-Bank by arrogating a monopoly in himself against the mandate of the State Legislature allowing Administrator to manage the affairs of the respondent-Bank for indefinite period, especially when, the law on the subject was interpreted by Division Bench of this Court in case of Sunari Gram Sewa (supra) long back in the year 1988.