V.Dutta Gyani, J.- Heard learned counsel for the appellant. 2. This writ appeal arises out of judgment and order dated 17.2.98 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Civil Rule No. 648 of 1998. thereby even while holding that the learned Judge was not inclined to interfere with the order of the appellante authority and dismissing the petition, the authorities were directed to comply with the order of the appellate authority dated 1.1.98 as early as possible. Aggrieved by the same, the writ petitioner has approached this Court in this writ appeal. 3. By order dated 27.2.98 notices were directed to be issued. Accordingly Mr.Talukdar learned senior counsel assisted by Mr. BJ Talukdar and Mr. BP Borah, learned Senior Govt. Advocate appeared for the respondents. They are also heard. 4. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant has raised two points for consideration in this appeal. The first point relates to violation of the rules of audi alteram partem : the appellate authority not having afforded an opportunity of being heard to the present writ petitioner-appellant before passing the appellate order dated 1.1.98. Secondly, the appellate authority had not taken into account the record of the settling authority or committee. These are points relatable to be appellate authority who passed the appellate order, subject matter of challenge in Writ Petition No.648 of 1998 and the learned Single Judge was not inclined to interfere with the appellate order observing that "by invoking the doctrine of natural justice a man cannot be allowed to have wrongful gain." 5. There was some dispute over the specific provisions of rules under which an appeal lies to the appellate authority whether it is section 105 or section 137 of the Assam Panchayat Act, 1994. While section 137 covers the area of appeal, section 105 deals with appeals in matters relating to settlement of bazaar. But we are not primarily concern with the applicability of either of these provisions of law. The crucial question that falls for consideration is whether the writ petitioner-appellant was denied opportunity of hearing as urged by him and secondly, the scope of inter­ference of this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters essentially relating to contracts and offering of State largesses. 6. The crucial question that falls for consideration is whether the writ petitioner-appellant was denied opportunity of hearing as urged by him and secondly, the scope of inter­ference of this Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution in matters essentially relating to contracts and offering of State largesses. 6. So far as the natural justice is concerned, it is not a capsule formale of universal application, it varies in its application from case to case depending on facts of each case. Ever since the decision of the House of Lords in Ridge vs. 632 WLR 935, adopting a liberal view on natural justice and expanding and extending it to administrative bodies and authorities as well and the same having been upheld by the Supreme Court in AK Kraipak vs. Union oflndia, AIR 1970 SC 150 and some other subsequent landmark judgments, as reported in Menaka Gandhi vs. Union of lndia, AIR 1978 SC 597 , Mahendra Singh Gill vs. Chief Election Commissioner, AIR 1978 SC 851 , SL Kapoor vs. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136 upholding the rule of natural justice in matters relating to public contracts, the Supreme Court in Tata Cellular vs Union oflndia, (1994) 6 SCC 651 has set forth the guidelines for the Courts to bear in mind while dealing with matters relating to public contracts: "(I) The modern trent points to judicial restraint in administrative action. (2) The Court does not sit as a Court of appeal but merely reviews the manner in which the decision was made. (3) The Court does not have the expertise to correct the administrative decision. If a review of the administrative decision is permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without the necessary expertise which itself may be fallible. (4) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burden on the administration and lead to increased and unbudgeted expenditure." 7. Now coming to the present-case, more recently the Supreme Court in Sibsagar Tiwari vs. Union of India, popularly as the case relate to Captain Satish Sharma. has again upheld the principle of natural justice and the same has also been reiterated in Dharambir Singh vs. Union of lndia, (1996) 6 SCC 702 . With all these case law. Now coming to the present-case, more recently the Supreme Court in Sibsagar Tiwari vs. Union of India, popularly as the case relate to Captain Satish Sharma. has again upheld the principle of natural justice and the same has also been reiterated in Dharambir Singh vs. Union of lndia, (1996) 6 SCC 702 . With all these case law. the scope of interference, dealing with a case of mining lease in Dharambir Singh vs. Union of lndia, (1996) 6 SCC 702 , the Supreme Court has categorically held that while granting a prospective licence or mining lease, any doubt about the area of discretion is circumscribed by rules, recognizing the right of the State Govt. to grant or refusing to grant a prospective licence or lease, the Apex Court has categorically held that no applicant has a right, much less a vested right to the grant of mining lease for mining operations in any place within the State. It is within this narrow area as laid down by the Supreme Court that this grant of marketing rights for a specific period, needs to be considered. It is not in dispute that the respondent No .2 had offered higher bid than the bid of the petitioner-appellant and no reason for discarding his higher bid was assigned by the Sub Divisional Settlement Committee for discarding the bid offered by the respondent No.2. Learned counsel appearing for the appellant referring to the appellate order pointed out that the security offered by the respondent No.2 was not adequate and therefore the necessity for going through the record of the Sub Divisional Settlement Committee. Mr. Borah, learned Senior Govt. Advocate appearing for the respondent State, on the other hand, maintained that the security as noted by the appellate authority also cover the settlement value and both the factors, the bid as well as the security were in favour of the respondent No.2. 8. The scope of interference with administrative actions of a quasi judicial nature, is rather narrow as propounded by the Supreme Court in Tata Cellular. Certain amount of discretion has to be given to the authorities. In the instant case as rightly urged by the learned Govt. Advocate, the appellate authority order was not based on any extraneous consideration. 9. 8. The scope of interference with administrative actions of a quasi judicial nature, is rather narrow as propounded by the Supreme Court in Tata Cellular. Certain amount of discretion has to be given to the authorities. In the instant case as rightly urged by the learned Govt. Advocate, the appellate authority order was not based on any extraneous consideration. 9. It is really surprising that the appellate authority should have stayed its own order dated 1.1.98 filed as Annexure D by the appellate by subsequent order passed on appeal on 3.1.98, Annexure E. The WT message as placed on record by the appellant reads as follows : "Annexure D : WT Message 01.01.98 BDO Lakhowa Anchalik Panchayat C/o Officer Incharge, Rupahi PS, Dist Nagaon Infer : Dep Com Nagaon, Assam from DEVSEC Assam No.PDA.436/97 dated 01.01.98; Govt.. after careful consideration of the Appeal Petition submitted by Shri Ram Chandra Roy a tenderer of Ambagan Half Weekly Market and after perusal certified copy of the C.S. has decided that Ambagan Half Weekly Market should be settled in favour of Shri Ram Chandra Roy appellant who have offered Rs 3,01,522.00 for the whole year as a bid money which is higher annual bid value of 2,80,452.00 offered by Shri Anil Das. It appears that Sub Divisional Settlement Committee has not recorded the reasons for not giving settlement of the appellant. His security also covers the settlement value of the year offered by him. Hence Govt.. directs that you should immediately cancel the earlier settlement order issued in favour of Shri Anil Das and you should settlement order to Shri Ram Chandra Roy for the remaining period of the Panchayat year with immediate effect. The monthly settled value should be fixed calculating on the basis of the annual bid of Rs 3,01,572.00 offered by Shri Ram Chandra Roy. Security money etc. may be obtained from him and he should be asked to sign the agreement and deposit the first kist for January, February and March 98 immediately. Please confirm action taken within seven days. 10. It is evident from the above order that it was not the discretion of the appellate authority but the desire of the Hon'ble Minister that the stay order was passed. Please confirm action taken within seven days. 10. It is evident from the above order that it was not the discretion of the appellate authority but the desire of the Hon'ble Minister that the stay order was passed. There is yet another order dated 21.01.98 as passed in Civil Rule No. 237 of 1996 which has also been placed on record by the appellant as Annexure F. By this order the same learned Single Judge who has passed the impugned order under appeal directed the respondents to give effect to the appellate order. One can envisage the gross interference in giving effect to the order passed by the appellate authority. If there is interference, as is evident from the record. Annexure E and El, it is to the detriment of the respondent No.2. 11. It is an admitted position that respondent No.2 was higher in his bid than the bid offered by the writ petitioner-appellant. Fairness demands that the Committee entrusted with the task of acceptance with the bid should have assigned some reasons for discarding the bid. If in this context the provision of section 105 are taken into account it is well within the purview of the appellate authority to interfere with such orders as appears to have been done in the instant case. 12. In Dutta Associates (P) Ltd vs. Indo Marchantiles Pvt Ltd, (1997) I SCC 53, a case relating to supply of rectified spirit, a matter arising from the judgment of this Court as reported in (1997) 1 SCC 53 had occasion to deal with the question of offering low or high bid. A Division Bench of this Court had observed: "In the matter of supply of spirit to the warehouse offering of low or high rate does not affect Government revenue. The more the profit earned by the supplier the more sales tax can be levied by the agreement." Disagreeing with the view even while upholding the judgment on merits, the Supreme Court observed that we find it difficult to understand how the acceptance of tender of a high rate does not affect the Govt. revenue. In the instant case, the present case is a case of accepting the tender of lower revenue as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the revenue. The source of revenue of the Panchayat is primarily hat, bazaar, ghats etc. revenue. In the instant case, the present case is a case of accepting the tender of lower revenue as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the revenue. The source of revenue of the Panchayat is primarily hat, bazaar, ghats etc. It is all the more incumbent on the part of the authorities to have assigned some reasons for giving preferential treatment to the writ appellant discarding the highest bid offered by the respondent. But learned Single Judge was therefore right in not going by a rigid formula of natural justice, so as to adversely affect the substantial justice which in the instant case by invoking the principles of natural justice was sought to be defeated. The interference at the desire of the Minister speaks volume for itself. 13. Learned counsel referring to the interim order dated 27.2.98. pointed out that he has deposited the amount of difference between the two bid one offered by the appellant and the other respondent. As the legal maxim goes- actus curiae neminem gravabit (the act of the Court shall prejudice none), these two deposits does not confer any added right on be appellant. 14. Learned counsel has relied on two judgments as reported in 1995 (2) GLT 356, Md Abdul Rahim vs. State of Assam (1995 (1) GLJ 520). The facts of the present case are quite distinguishable. What weighed with the learned Single Judge is the fact that almost 8 months have rolled by since the bid was accepted and bazaar settled, yet the respondent could not get any benefit out of it. The other judgment relied upon is Kanak Chandra Saikia vs. State of Assam, (1985) 1 GLR 51. This case deals with the principles of audi alteram partem. The subsequent Supreme Court decision commencing right from A.K.Kraipak, have already been discussed above and there is no need to deal at length on this judgment, as rightly pointed out by learned Govt. Advocate these decisions are based on old Act and Rules. 15. The law governing contracts, auction and confirmants of largeesses is well settled by series of decisions of the Supreme Court. Advocate these decisions are based on old Act and Rules. 15. The law governing contracts, auction and confirmants of largeesses is well settled by series of decisions of the Supreme Court. Even in case of the highest bidder, the Supreme Court in State of UP vs. Vijay Bahadur Singh, AIR 1982 SC 1234 has categorically held: "The Government was under no obligation to accept the highest bid and that no rights accrued to the bidder merely because his bid happened to be the highest. Therefore, the Government had the right for good and sufficient reason not to accept the highest bid but even to prefer a tenderer other than the highest bidder. The power vested in the Government to refuse to accept the highest bid cannot be confined to inadequacy of bid only. There may be variety of other good and sufficient reasons e.g. the very enormity of a bid may it suspect. Moreover, the Government is entitled to change its policy from time to time according to the demands of the time and situation and in public interest and such a change, subsequent to the auction but before its confirmation, may be sufficient justification for the refusal to accept the highest bid." 16 For the foregoing reasons, this appeal fails, it is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed without any order as to costs.