Judgment S.K.Chattopadhyaya, J. 1. In the present case the judgment/directions of the Apex Court in the cast of Common Cause A Registered Society through its Director V/s. Union of India and Ors. reported in 1996 (2) East Cr. C.129 (SC) : (1996) 2 BLJR 1025 (SC) : 1996 All JIC 601 (SC) and 1997 (1) Eastern Criminal Cases 296 (SC) : (1997) All, JIC 278 (SC), are required to be interpreted in the following facts and circumstances: 2. The petitioner was proceeded for an offence under Sec. 304-A read with Sec. 287 of the Indian Penal Code in Chas P.S. Case No. 114/87 arising out of G.R. Case No. 1210/B/87 and on 5.5.88 after submission of charge sheet cognizance of the offence under the aforesaid Sections was taken and on 25.6.88 summons were issued to him for appearing on 11.10.88. The order sheet of the lower Court shows that on 16.12.89 warrant of arrest was issued and since than the trial could not proceed due to non-service of summons and execution of warrant of arrest. On 20.12.95 fresh non-bailable warrant of arrest with processes under Secs. 82 and 83 Cr. P.G were issued against the accused petitioner through the S.P. concerned and also notices to the bailors, it further reveals that, thereafter, the petitioner was not brought before the Court and on 11.5.96 the case was directed to be put on 23.8.96. In the meantime the aforesaid society approached the Supreme Court for certain general directions with respect to cases pending in the criminal Courts all over the country. Their lordships gave certain directions by judgment dated 1st May, 1996 See (1996) 2 BLJR 1025 (SC) : 1996 All JIC 601 (SC) and on the basis of the said judgment/directions, on 18.6.96 the Magistrate discharged the petitioner. However, pursuant to clarificatory order of the Hon ble Supreme Court dated 20th November, 1996 in the said case See 1997 All JIC 278 (SC) : 1997 (1) East. Cr. C. 296 (SC) by the impugned order dated 15.2.1997 the learned Magistrate recalled the order of discharge dated 18.6.96 and issued non-bailable warrant of arrest and processes under Secs. 82 and 83 Cr. P.C. against the petitioner. 3. Mr. Cr. C. 296 (SC) by the impugned order dated 15.2.1997 the learned Magistrate recalled the order of discharge dated 18.6.96 and issued non-bailable warrant of arrest and processes under Secs. 82 and 83 Cr. P.C. against the petitioner. 3. Mr. Jai Prakash, Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has vehemently urged that the learned Magistrate has committed an apparent error of law in mis-interpreting the clarificatory order of the Supreme Court by issuing the impugned order. According to him, in view of direction No. 1(b) of its earlier judgment (1996) (2) East Cr. C. 129 (SC) : (1996) 2 BLJR 1025 (SC) : 1996 All JIC 601 (SC) the petitioner being proceeded under Sec. 304-A of the Indian Penal Code under which maximum imprisonment is of two years or with fine or with, both, the earlier order of the Magistrate discharging the petitioner on the ground that trial was pending for more than two years, was quite justified and subsequent clarificatory order does not empower the Magistrate to recall has earlier order dated 18.6.96 by the impugned order. 4. Mr. P. D. Agrawal, learned Govt. Advocate on the other hand, contended that the clarificatory order clearly indicates that the earlier decision of the Supreme Court is not applicable to offences under Sec. 304 A of the I.P.C. and the Magistrate was justified in recalling its order dated 18.6.1996 when earlier decision of Supreme Court was not applicable to the case of the petitioner. 5. In these circumstances, different interpretations given by the learned Counsel is to be resolved on going through the aforesaid two judgments of the Supreme Court. In its earlier judgment reported in 1996 (2) East Cr. C. 129 (SC) : (1996) 2 BLJR 1025 (SC) : 1996 All JIC 601 (SC), their lordships noticed with deep concern the pendency of large number of criminal cases throughout the country. Their lordships were of the view that the very pendency of Criminal proceedings for long period by itself operates as an engine of oppression. Considering various circumstances their lordships have given certain directions which shall be valid for all states and the Union Territories. Their lordships were of the view that the very pendency of Criminal proceedings for long period by itself operates as an engine of oppression. Considering various circumstances their lordships have given certain directions which shall be valid for all states and the Union Territories. In the present case we are concerned with some of its directions and direction No. 1(b) which reads as follows: 1(b) where the offences under IPC or any other law for the time being in force for which the accused are charged before any criminal Court are punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five years, with or without fine, and if the trials for such offences are pending for two years or more and the concerned accused have not been released on bail but are in jail for a period of sic months or more, the concerned Criminal Court, shall release the accused on bail or on personal bond to be executed by the accused and subject to the imposing of suitable conditions if any, in the light of Sec. 437 Cr.P.C. Direction No. 2(a) reads thus: 2(a) Where criminal proceedings are pending regarding traffic offender in any Criminal Court for more than two years on account of non-serving summons to the accused or for any other reason whatsoever, the Court may discharge the accused and close the case. 6. In paragraph 5 it is observed that for the purpose of directions contained in Clauses (1) and (2) above the period of pendency of criminal cases shall be calculated from the date the accused was summoned to appear in the Court. However, in paragraph 6 their lordships have given a list of cases in which the directions (1) and (2) are not to be applied. In its clarificatory order, thereafter, in para 1 their lordships have observed as follows: The time limit mentioned regarding the pendency of criminal cases in paragraphs from 2(a) to 2(f) of our judgment shall to apply to cases wherein such pendency of the criminal proceedings wholly or partly attributable to the dilatory tactics adopted by the concerned accused or on account of any other action of the accused which results in prolonging the trial. In other words it should be shown that the criminal proceedings have remained pending for the requisite period mentioned in the aforesaid Clauses of paragraph 2 despite full cooperation by the accused to get these proceedings disposed of and the delay in the disposal of these cases is not at all attributable to the-concerned accused, not such delay is caused on account of such accused getting stay of criminal proceedings from higher Courts. Accused concerned are not entitled to earn any discharge or acquittal as per paragraph 2(a) to 2(f) of our judgment if it is demonstrated that the accused concerned seek to take advantage of their own wrong or any other action of their own resulting protection of trial against them. 7. In para 3 of the order a list of some more offences has been given to which the directions contained in para 1 and 2 of its earlier judgment shall not apply and one of such offences is offence under Sec. 304 A of the Indian Penal Code o. any offence pertaining to rash and negligent act which are made punishable under any other law for the time being in force. In the regard further direction of their Lordships is to the following effect: It is further directed that in Criminal Gases pertaining to offences mentioned under the above additional categories (n) to (r) where in accused are already discharged or acquitted pursuant to our judgment dated 1st May, 1996 and they are liable to be proceeded against for such offences pursuant to the present order and are not entitled to the discharged or acquitted, as aforesaid, the concerned Criminal Court shall suo motu or on application by the concerned aggrieved parties shall issue within three months of the receipt of this clarificatory order at their end. summons or warrants, as the case may be, to such discharged or acquitted accused and shall restore the criminal cases against them for being proceeded further in accordance with law. 8. summons or warrants, as the case may be, to such discharged or acquitted accused and shall restore the criminal cases against them for being proceeded further in accordance with law. 8. From the aforesaid directions of their Lordships it is apparent that in its earlier judgment their Lordships held that where for the offences under I.P.C. or any other law accused are charged and are punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five years with or without fine and the trial for such offences are pending for two years or more, and the accused has not been released on bail but are in jail for a period of six months or more, the concerned criminal Courts shall release the accused on bail or on personal bond subject to certain conditions. Thus, in my view, this direction does not mean that the accused who are facing trial for committing any offence under I.P.C. any other law and such trial is pending for two years or more, the accused is entitled for discharge. In such cases their Lordships have observed that if the accused are in jail for a period of six months or more, they can be bailed out. Much emphasis has been given by Mr. Jai Prakash on direction No. 2(b) which says that where criminal proceedings are pending regarding traffic offences for more than two years on account of non-service of summons to the accused or for any other reason, whatsoever, the Court may discharge the accused and close the cases. In my view, the traffic offences are quite different from the offences as contemplated under Sec. 304-A of the I.P.C. inasmuch as in common parlence traffic offences mean the offences which are punishable under the Motor Vehicles Act and such offences have been enumerated in chapter XIII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. Thus, the argument of Mr. Jai Prakash that the offences alleged against the petitioner in the instant case should be regarded as traffic offence and direction No. 2(b) of the Supreme Court given in its earlier decision should be complied with, in my view, is not sustainable in law. 9. This aspect can be looked into from another angle also. Thus, the argument of Mr. Jai Prakash that the offences alleged against the petitioner in the instant case should be regarded as traffic offence and direction No. 2(b) of the Supreme Court given in its earlier decision should be complied with, in my view, is not sustainable in law. 9. This aspect can be looked into from another angle also. If their Lordships were of the view that the offences punishable under Sec. 304-A of I.P.C should be construed as traffic offences then, in my view, their Lordships would not have, in its clarificatory order subsequently, entitled the offences under Sec. 304-A I.P.C. which would not be covered by the directions contained in paras 1 and 2 of its earlier judgment. Therefore, ii is amply clear that there is a distinction between traffic offences and that of offences under Section 304-A I.P.C. 10. In this context subsequent list of offences as mentioned in para 3 of the subsequent clarificatory order is required to be noticed, in earlier judgment the offences which are not to be covered by the directions, were enumerated as serial Nos. (a) to (m). Thereafter, their Lordships have added certain more offences which are from serial Nos. (n) to (r). Number (q) speaks of offences under Sec. 304-A IPC or any offences pertaining to rash and negligent act which are made punishable in any other law for the time being in force. In this regard specific direction of the Apex Court is that criminal cases pertaining to offences mentioned under additional categories (n) to (r) wherein accused are already discharged or acquitted pursuant to judgment dated 1st May 1996 (1996) (2) East Cr. C. 129 (SC) : 1996 All JIC 601 (SC), and they are liable to be proceeded against for such offences meaning thereby the offences enumerated in categories (n) to (r) pursuant to the present order and are not entitled to be discharged or acquitted, the concerned Criminal Court shall suo motu or on application by the concerned aggrieved party, shall issue summons or warrants to such discharged or acquitted accused and shall restore the criminal cases against them for being proceeded further in accordance with law. This direction clearly indicates that the accused who were discharged or acquitted pursuant to the judgment and directions of the Supreme Court, can be further proceeded with after restoring the criminal cases against them. This direction clearly indicates that the accused who were discharged or acquitted pursuant to the judgment and directions of the Supreme Court, can be further proceeded with after restoring the criminal cases against them. This specific direction, in my view, has been overlooked by Mr. Jai Prakash, Counsel for the petitioner and, as such, he has tried to impress upon the Court that pursuant to third sub-paragraph of para 3 of the clarificatory order, once the petitioner was discharged, cannot be proceeded against by restoring the criminal case against him. This paragraph clearly mandates that in trials regarding other offences which are covered by the time limit specified in its earlier order dated 1st May, 1996 wherein he concerned accused are already discharged or acquitted pursuant to the said order, such acquittal or discharge order shall not be liable to be recalled for facing such trials pursuant to the present clarificatory order meaning thereby this clarificatory order will be treated as prospective in relation to such offences which are covered by the aforesaid specified time limit. 11. In the aforesaid background of authoritative pronouncement of their Lordships, in my view, if is futile for the petitioner to urge that the learned Magistrate has misinterpreted the subsequent directory order of the Supreme Court. On the contrary from the interpretation given aforesaid, I am of the view that the learned Magistrate has not committed any illegality in restoring the criminal case against the petitioner and by issuing non-boilable warrant of arrest and processes under Secs. 82 and 83 Cr.P.C. 12. On a careful consideration I find that no case has been made out for interference with the impugned order. This application is, accordingly, dismissed. As the petitioner is now aware of the issuance of warrant of arrest as well as the processes, he is directed to appear before the concerned Court and to face the trial.