Judgment : 1. This revision is preferred by P.W.1 Tmt. Saroja, Wife of the deceased Gnanasundaram, against the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Thanjavur on 13. 1991 in S.C. No. 49 of 1990. 2. The summary of the prosecution case is that on 12. 1988, at about 6 p.m., the accused on account of prior enmity hacked the deceased Gnanasundaram with aruval on his right side of the head, on his left side of the head, and on the other parts of the body, and as a result of the same, Gnanasundaram died on the spot. 3. The case was committed by the learned Judicial Magistrate No. I, Tanjore for trial to the Sessions Judge, Tanjore. The Sessions Judge after framing charges against the accused under Section 302 read with 34, conducted the trial of the case. On behalf of the prosecution 1 1 witnesses were examined. Exs.P1 to P17 and M.Os.1 to 36 were marked. Learned Sessions Judge, Tanjore, ultimately held that the charge against the accused has not been made out and acquitted the accused. Hence this revision. 4. The case of the prosecution as testified to by the witnesses is as follows:- P.W.1 Saroja is the wife of the deceased Gnanasundaram Thevar. P.W.2 Vembayya Thevar is the brother-in-law of the deceased. P.W.3 Ammasi was working as a farm servant under Gnanasundaram Thevar. There has been enmity between the accused and Gnanasundaram Thevar. The 3rd accused was cultivating the lease lands belonging to Perumal Koil on lease. Out of the same, ten cents of the land was cultivated on lease by Gnanasundaram Thevar. The 3rd accused was demanding higher lease amount and as a result there was a dispute between them. Further, the third accused set up some Harijans to file complaint against Gnanasundaram Thevar before the Court. As a counterblast, the deceased also set up some Harijans to file a case against the accused. Chellathurai, the son of the third accused was murdered. A case was filed against Gnanasundaram Thevar and his son-in-law for the murder of Chellathurai. Both of them were acquitted a year before the date of occurrence. On 12. 1988, at about 5 p.m., the deceased Gnanasundaram Thevar along with Ammasi and Tailor Balasubramaniam left his house to fit up the motor for watering the field. A case was filed against Gnanasundaram Thevar and his son-in-law for the murder of Chellathurai. Both of them were acquitted a year before the date of occurrence. On 12. 1988, at about 5 p.m., the deceased Gnanasundaram Thevar along with Ammasi and Tailor Balasubramaniam left his house to fit up the motor for watering the field. Gnanasundaram Thevar promised P.W.2 Vembayya Thevar to provide water for his lands as soon as the motor pump was fixed up. After reaching the field Gnanasundaram Thevar sent the cart back and instructed tailor Balasubramaniam to leave the cart at his house and instruct P.W.1 to get coffee for him from his house. P.W.1 came to the field with coffee at about 6 pm. At that time she saw her husband being chased by the accused with arms (aruval). They chased her husband and cut him with aruval and her husband fell down on the river bridge. When P.W.1 tried to go near and prevent them, the third accused threatened her stating that she will also be killed. When her husband fell down, the 1st accused cut his throat with aruval. Then all the accused ran away with the weapons. 5. P.W.4 was working as Village Administrative Officer in Parakkalaikkottai. P.W.5 Balusamy is his assistant. On 12. 1988, at about 8 pm., P.W.1 accompanied by P.W.2 came to the Office of P.W.4 and reported about the occurrence. As stated by P.W.1, P.W.4 recorded it, and after reading out the same and obtaining her signature in the same. It is P1. Then P.W.2 Vembayya Thevar attested it, and then, he prepared yadasts under Exs.P2 and P3. P.W.5 took the complaint Ex.P1 and the yadasts and went to Adirampattinam Police Station. P.W.6 Kaliaperumal was the Sub-Inspector of Police at Adirampattinam Police Station, and was on duty on 12. 1988 and at about 10 pm, P.W.5 came and handed over Ex.P1 and P2. P.W.6 registered a case in Crime No. 532/88 under Sections 302 and 506 Part II of Indian Penal Code, and prepared Express FIR under Ex.P8. Then he sent the same to the concerned court and superior officers. P.W.10 was the Inspector of Police at Pudukkottai. On 12. 1988 there was agitation and there was law and order problem at Kilakurichi and P.W.10 went to attend the same. On 8. Then he sent the same to the concerned court and superior officers. P.W.10 was the Inspector of Police at Pudukkottai. On 12. 1988 there was agitation and there was law and order problem at Kilakurichi and P.W.10 went to attend the same. On 8. 1988, at about 8.30 am in the morning he received the information and a copy of the Express FIR. Then he took up the investigation and went to the scene of occurrence. He inspected the scene of occurrence, and in the presence of P.W.5 Balusamy and P.W.4 Chinnakkannu he prepared observation mahazar under Ex.P4 and sketch under Ex.P15. Then he instructed PW.7 Arul to take photographs of the body at the scene of occurrence. Accordingly, P.W.7 took the photographs of the scene of occurrence with the dead body from different angles. M.O.32 series are the photographs while M.O.33 series are the negatives of the same. Then he conducted inquest in the presence of panchayatdars and witnesses. At that time he examined P.Ws.1, 2, Pannerselvam and others, and Ex.P16 is the inquest report. Then he handed over the body alongwith his requisition Ex.P9 to P.W.8 constable Ganesan, who took the dead body and the requisition letter to the Government Hospital at Pattukkottai. P.W.9 Doctor Rajagopalan on receipt of the requisition under Ex.P9 and the dead body, conducted the post-mortem and issued the post mortem certificate under Ex.P10. Then the constable P.W.8 handed over the body to the relatives after seizing M.O.34 underwear, M.O.35 waist-cord, and M.O.36 gold ring and handed them over to the Inspector of Police. In the meanwhile, the Inspector of Police, who was continuing investigation, in the presence of P.Ws.4 and 5, seized from the scene of occurrence, M.O.2 kadar dhothi, M.O.3 blood-stained earth, M.O.4 sample earth, M.O.5 pair of green colour cheppals, M.O.6 pair of blue colour cheppals, M.O.7 spade, M.O.8 plastic kudam, M.O.9 screw driver, M.O.10 spanner M.O.11 iron handle, M.O.12 tin with diesel, M.O.13 plastic can black in colour, M.O.14 plastic funnel, M.O.15 plastic funnel red in colour, M.O16 wooden log, M.O.17 torn underwear cloth, M.O18 coconut fibre rope, M.O.19 torch light under Ex.P5 mahazar. Then at about 3 pm., on the same day, about 1/2 furlong away from the scene of occurrence in the presence of same witnesses, he seized M.O.20 oil engine, M.O.21 pipe, M.O.22 brown plastic can, M.O.23 metal kudam, M.O.24 nylon bag M.O.27 series a pair of cutting plier, and one pair of spanner, M.O.28 under Ex.P6. Then he examined witnesses Balasubramaniam, Rajakrishnan, Nagarajan, Shanmugham, Pannerselvam, Ganapathi, Vinayagam, Gunasekaran, Nagarajan, V.A.O. and Thalayari. Then he searched for the accused and they were absconding. Then he received from P.W.8 the seized articles M.Os.34 to 36 under Form No. 95. On 12. 1988. Then he went to the house of the 3rd accused Samithurai and searched and prepared the search list under Ex.P7. At that time, he recovered M.O.1 billhook and kadar thundu M.O.31 in the presence of V.A.O. and Thalayari. Then he examined the other witnesses and continued his search for the accused. Then he received information that the accused Sundaramurthy and his father Samithurai have surrendered before Judicial Magistrate, Perambalur on 112. 1988 and the 2nd accused Tamizharasan has surrendered before the Judicial Magistrate, Thiruthuraippundi on 112. 1988. The Inspector of Police, after sending the seized articles to the Court, he sent requisition under Ex.P11 to the court for sending the same for chemical examination. P.W.10 Ganapathi Subramanian, who was the Head Clerk of Judicial Magistrate 2 Court, Pattukkottai, on receipt of the requisition under Ex.P.11 along with the original letter of the Judicial Magistrate under Ex.P.12, sent the billhook M.O.1, Khadi cloth M.O.31, underwear M.O.34, khadi dhothi M.O.2, M.O.3 blood stained earth, M.O.4 sample earth to forensic laboratory. The chemical analyst report is marked as Ex.P.13 while Ex.P.14 is the Serologists report. Then, after completing the investigation, the Inspector of Police laid the charge sheet against the accused. 6. Now the point for determination is: whether the order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, West Tanjour is liable to be set aside? 7. The Point:- The revisional jurisdiction of this Court while hearing a revision preferred by a private party has certain limitations in the sense the power of the High Court is not as wide as that of the court while hearing appeal. Of course the relevant Section that for the purpose of satisfying itself, as to the correctness, legality of proprieties of any finding, sentence or order, the High Court may exercise its jurisdiction. Of course the relevant Section that for the purpose of satisfying itself, as to the correctness, legality of proprieties of any finding, sentence or order, the High Court may exercise its jurisdiction. In order to prevent abuse of process of court or where the order of inferior court is manifestly illegal and unjust this Court can interfere in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. Thus where there is a glaring departure from the procedure or where there is manifest error of law, consequently there has been flagrant miscarriage of justice, it is open to the High Court to interfere in such matter by exercising its revisional jurisdiction. Normally, a revisional court would not interfere with the finding of fact, but when it is shown that a finding has been arrived without properly considering the evidence, or where it is shown that without applying the principles of law correctly and without considering relevant facts or taking into consideration, irrelevant facts, a finding has been arrived at, even if it be on the question of fact, it is open to the revisional court to interfere with the same. It cannot also be disputed that a revisional court may go into the evidence as to facts where it is necessary to do justice to the parties, because the court below has acted in a manner contrary to well established principles of law; or without any evidence to support the finding; or has arrived at a finding which is perverse; or such as no reasonable man could have arrived at on the evidence produced. In such cases it is open for the revisional court to interfere in such a matter. It is made clear by the Apex Court that such power of interference should be sparingly used especially in case of acquittal passed by the lower court. If it is shown that material evidence has been overlooked, it will also be open to the revisional court to step in. Therefore, in the above context, we have to analyse the case on hand with a view to see whether it is a case where it is not only just and necessary but also imperative to invoke this the proper. 8. The lower court has made very short work of the case in the sense that it has taken into consideration only three aspects which according to it are sufficient to disbelieve the case of the prosecution. 8. The lower court has made very short work of the case in the sense that it has taken into consideration only three aspects which according to it are sufficient to disbelieve the case of the prosecution. The three main reasons given by the lower court for arriving at a finding of acquittal can be set out as follows:- .(1) There is discrepancy in the testimonies of P.Ws.1 to 3. .(2) The flask in which it is stated that P.W.1 took coffee to her husband was not recovered and no explanation is given by P.W. 1 as to what happened to the same. .(3) There is delay in sending the FIR to the Court. According to the lower Court, the FIR was received by the Judicial Magistrate only at 10 am. on 12. 1988, and this delay is not explained. On these three grounds, the Sessions Judge has chosen to disbelieve the prosecution case. This court not being a court of appeal is conscious of the fact that it is not proper to discuss the evidence with a view to show that there is no inconsistency or discrepancy in the case and evidence adduced by the prosecution. 9. The facts of the case are narrated by the learned Sessions Judge in Paragraph Nos.1 to 9 of his order. Paragraph No. 10 begins with discussion. Para Nos.1 1 to 15 only reiterate the arguments of the learned counsel for the accused. But there is no full and proper discussion. The circumstances have not been taken note of by the learned Sessions Judge. 10. The Sessions Judge has not taken note of certain important circumstances and the material evidence. These important circumstance of evidence were ignored by the trial court. The circumstances, which, in my opinion, are of highly significant, are as follows: .11. The enmity between the accused and the deceased is admitted. The son of the third accused Samithurai Thevar viz., Chellathurai was found murdered sometime before the occurrence. The deceased and his son-in-law were suspected of having committed the murder of Chellathurai and were chargesheeted. A year before the said occurrence, the deceased was acquitted in that case. There was admittedly, a dispute between the deceased and the accused relating lease-hold lands. Cases were filed against the deceased at the instance of the accused and similarly cases were filed against the accused at the instance of the deceased. A year before the said occurrence, the deceased was acquitted in that case. There was admittedly, a dispute between the deceased and the accused relating lease-hold lands. Cases were filed against the deceased at the instance of the accused and similarly cases were filed against the accused at the instance of the deceased. No suggestion was made to P.W.1 that the deceased had other enemies beside the accused. Enmity is a subjective factor. It cannot be set into any standard or pattern. It is generally a smouldering one. It may suddenly catch flames like spark of fire on tinder. Just because a years time had gone after the acquittal, it cannot be stated and definitely, to that the accused had completely erased from their mind any retaliatory thought to the deceased. The son of the 3rd accused was murdered and the deceased was arrayed as one of the accused, but he was acquitted by the Court. The Sessions Judge has not taken into account the seriousness of it, the circumstances, the background of the disputes, the case and counter case between the parties. In the course of cross examination, P.W.1 has clearly stated that after the acquittal of her husband, in the village, whenever the deceased passed by the accused, they used to threaten him. It is also brought out in the evidence of P.W.1 that her husband belonged to congress party while the accused all belonged to communist party. All these important circumstances and the material evidence on record, on these aspects, has been completely ignored by the learned Sessions Judge and he has failed to consider the significance of the circumstances and the evidence of PW1. 12. The next important circumstance is the fact that the accused also had lands in the vicinity of the scene of occurrence. It is spoken to by P.W.2 and 3, and the observation mahazar also shows that. P.W.3 also admits that it was an agricultural season at that time. Admittedly, the deceased and the accused are agriculturists depending upon the tillage of the lands for the livelihood. Therefore, the probability of the accused being present at the spot at the time of occurrence can never be ruled out. In other words, it cannot be stated that there was no need at all for the accused to be out there at or near the scene of occurrence. Therefore, the probability of the accused being present at the spot at the time of occurrence can never be ruled out. In other words, it cannot be stated that there was no need at all for the accused to be out there at or near the scene of occurrence. This aspect of the matter is thoroughly ignored by the lower court. .13. The next important circumstance is the flight of the accused from the village of occurrence. Admittedly, the accused are ordinarily the residents of the village. The Inspector of Police has stated that on 12. 1988 and 12. 1988, he made search for the accused and they were absconding. He also stated that he continued his search, and when he went to the house of the third accused, he found it locked. The evidence on record is to the effect that the 1st and 3rd accused surrendered before the Judicial Magistrate, Perambalur on 112. 1988 and the 2nd accused had surrendered before the Judicial Magistrate, Thiruthuraippundi on 112. 1988. Thus from the date of occurrence which was on 12. 1988 to 112. 1988 the 1st and 3rd accused were absconding and the 3rd accused was absconding till 112. 1988. No suggestion was made to the Inspector of Police to say that they were all available at the village or in the usual place of residence. It is also to be pointed out that the Inspector of Police filed an application before the Judicial Magistrate, Pudukkottai requesting the custody of the accused for three days for the purpose of interrogation. In that petition, he has specifically stated that the accused were all absconding, and that he later came to know that the accused Nos.1 and 3 had surrendered before the Judicial Magistrate, Perambalur on 112. 1988 and the 2nd accused had surrendered before the Judicial Magistrate, Thiruthuraippundi on 112. 1988. The only objection made to the said application was that since the accused apprehended that they would be tortured at the hands of the police they oppose the same. Thus, this important aspect of the case had been thoroughly lost sight of by the learned Sessions Judge. 14. There is yet another more important circumstance and material evidence to which the learned Sessions Judge has failed to advert to. This very important aspect of the case which ought to have been referred to by the learned Sessions Judge. Thus, this important aspect of the case had been thoroughly lost sight of by the learned Sessions Judge. 14. There is yet another more important circumstance and material evidence to which the learned Sessions Judge has failed to advert to. This very important aspect of the case which ought to have been referred to by the learned Sessions Judge. There is no discussion of the case on this aspect. Even from the limited discussion, we find that the exercise is only to advance the case of acquittal than to find out the truth of the case. P.W.4 has stated that the Inspector of Police made a search of the house of the third accused Samithurai Thevar and found M.O.1 billhook, M.O.31 kadar towel hidden in the kitchen room of the 3rd accused and seized the same. The Inspector also speaks to the same. The search list has been marked as Ex.P7 in this case. The search list prepared by the Inspector shows that he recovered on search from the house of the 3rd accused a billhook and a three cubits green bordered kadar towel. The billhook and the kadar towel were sent for chemical examination. The report Ex.P13 shows that these two items contained human blood. Though the blood on M.O.1 could not be ascertained as it was not sufficient for analysis, the towel was analysed, and it was found that it contained the blood group of the deceased. The underwear and dhothi belonged to the deceased contained blood of Group B. Thus, it is clear that the deceased had B group blood. The blood of B group was found on the towel seized from the 3rd accuseds house. There is no denial of the ownership of the said towel and billhook. This very important and material evidence and circumstances has been completely ignored by the learned Sessions Judge. 15. The failure on the part of the lower court to advert to important facts and circumstances, and the material evidence on the above aspects available on record, will definitely provide this court with a justification to interfere with the order of the lower court. The lower court rather gave an undue importance to the delay in transmitting the FIR to the Court. The evidence on record would show that the FIR was registered at 10 p.m. on 12. 1988. It has been received by the concerned court on 12. The lower court rather gave an undue importance to the delay in transmitting the FIR to the Court. The evidence on record would show that the FIR was registered at 10 p.m. on 12. 1988. It has been received by the concerned court on 12. 1988 at 10 O clock. Thus there appears to be a delay of 12 hours in the despatch of the FIR. Nodoubt, the delay in despatching the FIR would throw considerable doubt as to the veracity of the prosecution case. But it can never be taken as the most important circumstance in a given case. 16. In Ramarao v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1972 SC 2423 : State of U.P. v. Gokaran, AIR 1985 SC 131 , the Apex Court has held that "every delay in sending the report to the District Magistrate under Section 157 of Cr.P.C. would not necessarily lead to the inference that the FIR has not been lodged at the time stated or has been ante-timed or ante-dated or investigation was not fair and forthright. The relevant provision contained in Section 157 of the Criminal Procedure Code is really designed to keep the Magistrate informed of a congnizable offence so as to enable the investigation, and if necessary to give appropriate direction under Section 159 of Cr.P.C; but, if in a case it is found that the FIR was recorded without delay and the investigation started on that FIR., then however improper or objectionable the delayed receipt of the report by the Magistrate concerned that cannot by itself justify the conclusion that the investigation was tainted and the prosecution insupportable. In the instant case, the material on record clearly shows that steps in investigation by way of drawing inquest report and other panchanamas had been taken in the early hours of the morning of 28th March and these could only follow the handing over of FIR Ex.Ka 1 by Ram Narain Singh to the Station Officer at about 2.15 am. In view of these facts the delayed receipt of the Special Report by the District Magistrate on 29th March would not enable the Court to dub the investigation as tainted one nor could Ex.Ka 1 be regarded as ante-timed or ante-dated. In view of these facts the delayed receipt of the Special Report by the District Magistrate on 29th March would not enable the Court to dub the investigation as tainted one nor could Ex.Ka 1 be regarded as ante-timed or ante-dated. It is no doubt true that the FIR should be despatched and transmitted to the Magistrate expeditiously and with utmost urgency since under Section 157 of Cr.P.C., the Officer in charge of the police station is required to send the report to the Magistrate forthwith. The expression "forthwith and the report" enjoins the officer in charge of the police station to send the report to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence as soon as he has reason to suspect the commission of the cognizable offence from the information or other source. However, mere delay in sending the report to the Magistrate would not in all cases and as a rule vitiate the trial. In cases, where FIR is promptly recorded and on the basis of such FIR the investigation starts, without any infirmity and prejudice to the accused, it cannot be said that because there was delay in sending the report to the Magistrate, the trial is vitiated or that the prosecution case becomes doubtful or suspicious." Delay in despatch or transmission of the FIR to the Magistrate must be looked into from the point of view whether the FIR sought to be projected as FIR was in fact not the FIR that the FIR has been ante dated. On lodging of the FIR if the investigation started immediately and promptly, merely because there was delay in transmission or despatch of such FIR, to the Court, it will not materially affect ordinarily the prosecution case, unless by such delay, prejudice is caused to the accused or improvements made by the prosecution in its case becomes obvious, and the prosecution case becomes doubtful or suspicious and the FIR seems suspicious. This decision is well laid down in Ramarao v. Maharashtra, 1996 Crl. L.J 113. 17. As pointed out by the Apex Court, the lower court has not chosen to find out whether the delay has made any prejudice to the accused or whether on account of the delay any improvement has been brought about or that there is anything suspicious about the FIR. There is no application of mind by the lower court on these aspects. There is no application of mind by the lower court on these aspects. Merely on the ground of delay, the lower court has chosen to make it as a insurmountable obstacle in the way of the prosecution. 18. The Supreme Court had another occasion to consider the fact of delay in the ruling reported in Madru Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1997 SC 3527 . The main contention urged in that case was that copy of the FIR was received by the concerned court Magistrate three days after the incident. The Supreme Court held that no conclusion can be drawn on the ground that the FIR was not lodged on the same day after the incident or that it was ante-dated. Now coming to the question of discrepancies in the testimonies of PW1 to PW3 the Supreme Court has pointed out that when eye witnesses give all necessary details regarding assault, weapons and role played by each accused and when the presence of eye witnesses is corroborated by other witnesses, in such circumstances, the evidence of eye witnesses cannot be simply thrown out or doubted on the basis of some trivial contradictions. In the decision reported in, Boya Ganganna v. State of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1976 SC 1541 the Supreme Court has observed that minor contradictions are bound to appear when ignorant and illiterate women are giving evidence. Even in case of trained and educated persons, memory sometimes plays false and this would be much more so in case of ignorant and rustic women. The evidence given by a witness would very much depend upon his power of observation and it is possible that some aspects of an incident may be observed by one witness while they may not be witnessed by another though both are present at the scene of offence, and therefore, it would not be right to reject the testimony of such witnesses merely on the basis of minor contradictions. 19. 19. The Supreme Court has also further observed in the decision reported in Akalu Ahir v. Ramdeo Ram, AIR 1973 SC 2145 , that the reason why retrial should not be ordered is that the expression of opinion by the High Court on the evidence before it with respect to the commission of alleged offences though not binding on the Court, holding fresh trial, may nevertheless leave an unconscious impression on the court holding such trial. 20. Omission to mention incidental facts cannot be attached any importance, in case of FIR given by a rustic lay woman it is the proposition of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision reported in Gurnam Kaur v. Bakshish Singh, AIR 1981 SC 631 . Their Lordships further opined that the evidence of eye witness who had lodged the FIR and the medical evidence fitting in with the version given in the FIR, the court must place reliance on such evidence.@BT = 21. The lower court has omitted to consider these important decisions. An undue importance has been given to minor contradictions. There is no proper consideration of the medical evidence and the reasons given to ignore it are quite fragile. In other words, the standard of appreciation by the lower court is rustic and lopsided. The matter has been approached with some bias, for we find that the discussion of the learned Sessions Judge proceeds as though to find fault and pitholes in the prosecution case, and there is no focussing of the prosecution case to consider as to why it may not be true and why such an occurrence could not have happened? 22. The lower court has stated that there is considerable discrepancy in the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3. In Paragraph 16 the lower court has observed that as argued by the learned counsel for the accused a number of contradictions are there in the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3. But the reference to numerous contradictions though found by way of observation in Para 16, actually the discussion does not reveal about the numerousness or that the lower court has held the contradictions to be rampant. On the other hand, the learned Sessions Judge has referred to only three important aspects which according to him are discrepant and inconsistent with the truth of the prosecution case. On the other hand, the learned Sessions Judge has referred to only three important aspects which according to him are discrepant and inconsistent with the truth of the prosecution case. He has not referred to any other circumstance, or materials in the evidence of P.Ws.1 to 3 to show that there are numerous contradictions and instances of discrepancy in the prosecution case as testified to by P.Ws.1 to3. 23. The first contradiction pointed out by the learned Sessions Judge is that the case as set out in the complaint and as spoken to by P.W.1 is not the same and much discrepancy is seen in that regard. In the complaint she has stated that her husband left the house at 5 pm on 12. 1988 along with Ammasi, Panneer Selvam with the motor for irrigating the lands. At 6 pm she took coffee to her husband. Near Pathuvanachi bridge, her husband came running, and at that time the accused were chasing him with billhooks in their hands and they cut her husband repeatedly. She appealed to them not to cut her husband to which the 3rd accused Swamithurai Thevar replied that if she intervened she will also meet the same fate. Her husband fell down and at that time, the 1st accused Sundaramurthy slit the neck of her husband and thereafter all of them run away. She seen her husband lying dead with the injuries on his head, right shoulder, face, left flank and the neck was cut off. Ammasi, Vembayya Thevar, Pannerselvam and others, who were there knew about the occurrence. There was enmity between her and the family of Samithuri Thevar. In the evidence she has stated that her husband left the house at 5 pm on 12. 1988 along with Pannerselvam, Ammasi and Tailor Balasubramaniam taking the engine for irrigating the lands. Her husband sent tailor Balasubramaniam back and informed P.W.1 through him to bring him coffee. She took coffee for her husband and near Pathuvanachi Bridge her husband came running and shouting. At that time the accused chased him with billhooks in their hands. They repeatedly cut him with aruval. She appealed to them not to cut her husband, and the 3rd accused threatened her saying if she intervened she will also be cut into pieces. Her husband fell down on the bridge and the 1st accused then cut his neck. At that time the accused chased him with billhooks in their hands. They repeatedly cut him with aruval. She appealed to them not to cut her husband, and the 3rd accused threatened her saying if she intervened she will also be cut into pieces. Her husband fell down on the bridge and the 1st accused then cut his neck. Then all the accused ran away carrying the weapons. At that time Vembayya Thevar, Panner Selvam, and Ammasi were all there. Her husband had injuries on his hand, right shoulder, and injuries on other parts of the body and head. It is not known how the lower court was able to hold that there is discrepancy in the testimony of P.W.1. Of course, she has not referred to the presence of Tailor Balasubramaniam in Ex.P1. But the fact that her husband along with Ammasi left at 5 pm and they took the engine for the purpose of irrigating the lands is mentioned by her. Of course it is not stated by her in Ex.P1 that her husband had instructed tailor Balasubramaniam to go and inform his wife to bring him coffee. Merely because this fact is not mentioned in Ex.P1, I do not know how it can be called a discrepancy. The fact that she took coffee to her husband at about 6 p.m. is specifically mentioned in the complaint . The failure to mention about her husband sending a word through tailor Balasubramaniam to bring coffee in Ex.P1 is not a omission of serious nature so as to dub her evidence as unacceptable. FIR is not an encyclopaedia. Her husband was hacked by the accused to death. It happened in her presence. She is a rustic woman. Definitely it would have caused tremendous shock to her and in such circumstances, one cannot expect a person placed in the position of P.W.1 to recapitulate the sequence of events in a meticulous order and reproduce the same in the complaint to be given by her. If one is to expect such minutest detail to be incorporated in the FIR that will amount to making of a tall order upon a rustic woman. If one is to expect such minutest detail to be incorporated in the FIR that will amount to making of a tall order upon a rustic woman. Not only that, if all the details are given in the FIR it can be challenged how by saying that a person placed in the position of P.W.1 who had just lost her husband to the gruesome attack of the accused could have been in a position to remember and set out every detail of the happenings and therefore it must be concoted. Therefore, the test adopted by the lower court for holding the evidence of P.W.1 as unacceptable is in my opinion not correct. The appreciation is somewhat rusty. The endeavour of the court should be to see if there is enough corroboration on the material particulars and a reasonable hypothesis of the complicity of the accused in the offence committed. The discussion and approach of the court must be with a view to see whether in the circumstances of the case, leaving out the immaterial and insignificant discrepancies, the truth and core of the prosecution case remains unaffected. The complainants husband was hacked to death is not disputed. His death is due to the injuries sustained by him in an attack with weapons. There is some motive suggested and in fact the enmity is not only proved but also admitted by the accused in the statements filed under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. There is no apparent contradictions between the medical evidence and the prosecution case. The conduct of the accused in fleeing from the village. On the anvil of these circumstances the evidence ought to have been considered instead of giving importance to minor contradictions. 24. The other reason found by the lower court for discarding the evidence of P.W.1 to hold that she could not have been present is her failure to account for the flask in which it is stated that she carried coffee to her husband. 24. The other reason found by the lower court for discarding the evidence of P.W.1 to hold that she could not have been present is her failure to account for the flask in which it is stated that she carried coffee to her husband. According to her evidence, she took coffee to her husband at 6 pm and when she was nearing Pathuvanachi Bridge, she found her husband running chased by the accused, with billhooks and repeatedly cut her husband with the billhooks and that her husband fell down and when she requested them not to attack her husband, he was threatened by the 3rd accused and that after sustaining cuts, her husband fell down on the bridge and at the time the 1st accused cut his throat. Then, according to P.W.1, she had to witness a ghastly and diabolical incident and before her very eyes her husband was chased, attacked and hacked to death. According to her, one of the accused had cut the throat of her husband. The natural reaction of a person would be to run to a place where her husband fell down and one will not be conscious of what she carries and how she was carrying? When such a bizarre occurrence had taken place, P.W.1 definitely would have been mentally upset and would not have been in a position to think nor she would have been conscious of what she has been doing and one cannot expect her to control her movements. Her evidence is that the flask fell down somewhere on the way. Of course when the Inspector of Police was investigating, he had recovered very many articles but he had not recovered any flask from the scene of occurrence or near that surrounding. Merely from this circumstance, one rush to the conclusion that she would not have been present at the scene of occurrence. Just because the flask alleged to have been carried by her was not recovered by the police from the scene of occurrence can the entire case be thrown out. Her evidence is that when she went to the house of the V.A.O. to give complaint, she lost the flask on the way, and she did not lose it anywhere near the place of occurrence. Inspite of it, merely on this ground to hold that her evidence cannot be accepted, is, in my opinion, but hallmark of injustice. Her evidence is that when she went to the house of the V.A.O. to give complaint, she lost the flask on the way, and she did not lose it anywhere near the place of occurrence. Inspite of it, merely on this ground to hold that her evidence cannot be accepted, is, in my opinion, but hallmark of injustice. The lower court has observed that one would expect her to drop the flask on seeing the occurrence and kept weeping at that spot. There is no uniformity or pattern of reaction. The reaction differs from person to person and circumstance to circumstance. It cannot be presumed as a rule that P.W.1 ought to have dropped the flask on the spot of the occurrence on seeing the occurrence. Her evidence is that she was hanging it down the shoulder when she went to give coffee to her husband. There is no inflexible rule that immediately on seeing the occurrence she ought to have dropped the flask from her shoulder and should have left it somewhere at the scene of occurrence. Such a reading into the situation would be an unwarranted exercise. It would amount to imposition of ones reaction to the occurrence and it can never be said to reflect the reality. 25. The trial court has also observed that in Ex.P1, the complainant has stated that others were present at the time of occurrence. But in her evidence, she has not stated that besides P.Ws.2 and 3 there were others also present at the time of occurrence. P.Ws.2 and 3 also stated that excepting them, no other person was present there. The occurrence had taken place around 6 pm in December, 1988. December is a month when we have early sunset. Therefore, it cannot be definitely stated that agricultural operations would have been carried on in all the fields even after sunset. Therefore merely because she has stated in the complaint that certain other persons were also present from that it does not follow that there is a discrepancy. The presence of P.Ws.2 and 3 is mentioned in the complaint. The complaint only refers to =>Y. ???? Acpr| III .".WvensriYv JpYvzd. ilf really the complaint was one brought about after deliberation definitely there would have been no necessity to mention that other persons were also present. The presence of P.Ws.2 and 3 is mentioned in the complaint. The complaint only refers to =>Y. ???? Acpr| III .".WvensriYv JpYvzd. ilf really the complaint was one brought about after deliberation definitely there would have been no necessity to mention that other persons were also present. In the circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the lower Court ought to have appreciated her evidence in the background of the numerous circumstances and was not justified in elevating minor contradiction to a pedestal of sacred significance. 26. The testimony of P.W.2 shows that no doubt P.W.2 is related to the deceased. Merely on that ground, the testimony of P.W.2 cannot be thrown out. The reason given by the lower Court is that the complainant has stated that there were other persons also present at the scene of occurrence whereas P.W.2 has stated that P.Ws.1, 2 and 3 and Pannerselvam only knew about the occurrence and therefore the evidence of P.W.2 cannot be accepted. P.W.1 has stated in her evidence that only himself, PWs. 2 and 3 and Pannerselvam were present. Therefore, the circumstance that she had referred to the presence of others in the complaint ought not have been taken as a ground to eschew the evidence of P.W.2. 27. The other circumstance cited by the lower court is that after receiving the cut injuries on his head, the deceased kept running whereas P.W.9C the doctor has stated that after receiving the injuries 1 and 2, the deceased could not have been in a position to run. This is also not a proper reading of the evidence. Injury Nos.1 and 2 are as follows:- .(i) Incised wound 7 cm. x 5 cm. x 2 cm. over the left vertex vertical in direction just above 5 cm. later to midline. .(ii) Incised wound on the right side of vertex longitudinal 5 cm. x 3 cm. x 2 cm. just 5 cm. lateral to midline vertical in direction. The doctor has not found any internal injuries corresponding to injury Nos.1 and 2. In other words he has not found any fracture of the sculp, parietal bones or the dome. He has not noted any subdural haemorrhage. Therefore, the opinion of the doctor that after receiving injuries 1 and 2 he could not have been in a position to run cannot be said to be a conclusive one. In other words he has not found any fracture of the sculp, parietal bones or the dome. He has not noted any subdural haemorrhage. Therefore, the opinion of the doctor that after receiving injuries 1 and 2 he could not have been in a position to run cannot be said to be a conclusive one. Further, when three persons with billhooks were chasing, the instinct to live and flee for life will impel a person to run away from the attack. The casual answer given by the doctor, cannot belittle the value of the evidence of P.W.2. 28. The lower court ought to have taken into consideration the totality of the evidence and its impact and not a stray sentences from here and there to accept or reject the testimony of a witness. It is also observed that the deceased fell on his back after receiving the cuts. The doctor has stated that injury Nos. 14 and 15 could not have been possible if the deceased had fallen down on his back. Injury No. 14 is a lacerated injury with contusion on the right knee while injury No. 15 is laceration and contusion on the left thumb and injury No. 16 is another lacerated injury on the left thumb. P.W.1 has stated that the accused repeatedly cut the deceased with aruval. P.W.2 has also stated that repeatedly the accused cut the deceased with aruval and that the deceased fell on the bridge and there was bleeding on whole of his body. Therefore we cannot say how and when the injuries 14 to 17 were caused. Because he was chased by the accused who were all armed with aruval cut him repeatedly. P.W.2 has not stated that he fell on his back. Therefore, in such circumstances, the reasons given by the lower court do not appear to be sound. .29. The observation mahazar which has been marked as Ex.P4 shows that the body was lying on its back. The photograph which has been marked also shows that the body has been lying on its back. In fact, it is stated by P.W.1 that after the deceased fell down on his back, and the 1st accused cut his neck. Whether the deceased fell on his back or on his chest is not the important thing. The photograph which has been marked also shows that the body has been lying on its back. In fact, it is stated by P.W.1 that after the deceased fell down on his back, and the 1st accused cut his neck. Whether the deceased fell on his back or on his chest is not the important thing. The case of the prosecution is that the deceased was chased by the accused and hacked to death and that he fell down on the bridge and died. The observation mahazar shows that the body of the deceased found on the bridge was lying on its back. The medical evidence is to the effect that on account of the injuries sustained by him, the deceased died. According to the doctor, both the injuries would have been caused with billhooks. Therefore, the question whether he fell down on his back or on his abdomen is not important since the question importance is that after he fell down he received so many cuts. There is no contradiction between the medical evidence and ocular evidence. 30. The lower court has given certain reasons for discarding the evidence of the other eye witness viz., P.W.3. P.W.3 has stated that the accused cut the deceased on the right side of his head with aruval while the 2nd accused cut him on the left side of the head. The reason given by the lower court to discard his evidence is that he has stated before the Inspector of Police under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. that the 2nd accused cut him with aruval on the right side of the head of the deceased. This is definitely a trivial discrepancy or contradiction as the case may be. Even otherwise, the doctor has found injuries both on the right and left side of the head of the deceased. Injury No. 1 is on the left side of the head 3 cm. away from the midline while injury No. 2 is on the right side of the head 3cm away from the midline. P.W.3 had spoken to the cut injury on the right shoulder. The doctor has found injuries on the right shoulder of the deceased. Therefore, the reason given by the lower court for discarding the evidence of P.W.3 is very very feeble. No attempt has been made by the lower court to find out the truth. P.W.3 had spoken to the cut injury on the right shoulder. The doctor has found injuries on the right shoulder of the deceased. Therefore, the reason given by the lower court for discarding the evidence of P.W.3 is very very feeble. No attempt has been made by the lower court to find out the truth. The lower court has not discussed the case from the right angle and in a proper perspective. Unnecessary emphasis is laid on minor and trivial contradictions. There has been no serious and justifiable attempt on the part of the lower court to get at the truth of the matter. .31. As pointed out already, the other reasons given by the lower court for rejecting the prosecution case is that the FIR was received only at 10 am on 12. 1988. I have already referred to the rulings of the Supreme Court on this point. The Inspector has stated clearly that there was a law and order problem at Kilakurichi and he had gone to attend the same, and that the FIR was received by him only at that place and that he took up investigation and went to the scene of occurrence from Kilakurichi. P.W.6 does not say as to when he actually despatched them. But the lower court has observed that according to P.W.6 they were despatched on the same day viz., on 12. 1988 in the night. But P.W.6 has not stated anything about it nor has been cross-examined with reference to the same. Moreover, as pointed out already, the delay of 12 hours cannot be termed as fatal to the prosecution case. Even assuming some mistake has been committed either by the Sub Inspector of Police or the constable (messenger) through whom the FIR was sent, definitely the prosecution cannot suffer on that account. The attempt of the court must be to find out the truth and punish the guilty. The delay in sending the FIR is not going to wipe away the alleged act of the accused. Unless we have materials to show that the delay could have been avoided, or there has been deliberation, and that with a view to implicate other persons, the delay has been caused, and that the delay in the circumstances, may cause prejudice to the accused, then alone the delay can be considered as fatal to the prosecution case. Unless we have materials to show that the delay could have been avoided, or there has been deliberation, and that with a view to implicate other persons, the delay has been caused, and that the delay in the circumstances, may cause prejudice to the accused, then alone the delay can be considered as fatal to the prosecution case. Here P.Ws.1 and 2 had definitely stated that they gave complaint to the Village Administrative Officer at 8 pm. The Village Administrative Officer prepared Yadasts under Exs.P2 and P3 and sent P.Ws.1 and 2 alongwith P.W.5 his menial to the police station. P.W.6 received the complaint at 10 pm., and registered the same. In the above circumstances, the trial court ought not to have treated it as fatal. Therefore on an analysis, I am satisfied that this is a fit case where it is just and necessary, nay, even imperative to disturb the finding of acquittal rendered by the lower court. .32. The lower court has overlooked the material evidence and circumstances. It has magnified the molehill of minor contradictions to a mountain of suspicion. The approach of the lower court has not been fair as it has overlooked the numerous circumstances available in this case which have not been challenged. Inspite of the rulings of the Supreme Court regarding the appreciation of facts, as to how minor and trivial contradictions should be dealt with by the courts, and inspite of the rulings of the Apex Court about the delay in receipt of the FIR, the lower court has concentrated only on these aspects and has ignored the law while passing a decision of acquittal. The situation which P.W.1 was placed, the shock and agony she would have experienced are not taken into account. Her failure to account for the flask has been bloated out of proportion by the lower court. The lower court has just totally ignored the evidence placed by the prosecution. The fact that there is no conflict between the medical and occular evidence will go to show that the court below has erred in its appreciation. The appreciation is lopsided . There is a manifest illegality in the order. The failure to advert to the important materials on record and evidence has caused a miscarriage of justice. The fact that there is no conflict between the medical and occular evidence will go to show that the court below has erred in its appreciation. The appreciation is lopsided . There is a manifest illegality in the order. The failure to advert to the important materials on record and evidence has caused a miscarriage of justice. The material evidence viz., the flight of the accused from the scene of the occurrence and the recovery of billhook and bloodstained cloth from the house of the 3rd accused, and the bloodstain, the materials seized matching with the blood group of the deceased have been totally ignored by the lower court. In my opinion, this is an exceptional case in which the interference is called for. 33. No doubt in a case of acquittal, when the state has not preferred an appeal, and the complainant has preferred a revision, normally, this Court has to be cautious, and interference with an order of acquittal should be sparingly made. In my opinion, the approach of the lower court has not been on proper lines. The approach appears to have been with the thought running in the mind of the court that why should it be true? But a mid way has to be followed but what we find in this case is a lean towards the negative. The reasons given for discarding the testimonies of PWs. 1 to 3 are feeble and fragile. A genuine attempt has not been made to test the testimonies of the witnesses in a sober manner. .34. Therefore, on analysis, I have to hold that the order passed by the lower court acquitting the accused is liable to be interfered with. Before that it is necessary for me to refer to the arguments of the learned counsel for the accused. He referred to the fact that the occurrence had taken place around 6 pm and that there is a delay of nearly 12 hours in giving the reply. I find such an argument was not advanced before the lower court nor was there any cross examination of P.Ws.1 and 2 on that aspect. In fact the parties as well as the lower court have proceeded on the basis that there was no delay. It is not the evidence of P.W.1 that the occurrence had taken place exactly at 6 pm. In fact the parties as well as the lower court have proceeded on the basis that there was no delay. It is not the evidence of P.W.1 that the occurrence had taken place exactly at 6 pm. Further she had seen the occurrence where her husband was killed by certain persons. One cannot expect the complainant in this instant case to shake off her feelings and in a business like fashion rush to the Village Administrative Officer immediately to give the complaint. The other arguments advanced by the learned counsel is that no attempt has been made by the police to immediately reach the scene of occurrence though P.W.1 has stated that the complaint was registered at 10 pm on 12. 1988. Of course no such question was put to him during the course of cross examination. The Sub Inspector after registering the complaint, ought to have proceeded to the scene of occurrence to take up the investigation. We are not able to know why he did not do so. Perhaps there was some omission on the part of the public prosecutor examined in the lower court to bring out these particulars from the witness on record. But such a point was not urged before the lower court. In fact the written argument of the accused does not refer to this aspect. It may be that this court may take into consideration those aspects now put forward by the learned counsel for the respondents. I do not think it necessary to make any emphatic pronouncement on those points. 35. In the result, the revision is allowed. The order of acquittal is hereby set aside. The matter is remanded back to the Principal Sessions Judge, Tanjore for retrial. It is made clear that the observations made in the course of the judgment are meant only for the disposal of the revision and for the purpose of emphasising the point made in the revision. The lower court shall not be influenced by the same. The lower court shall dispose of the case in accordance with the law. It is made clear that the observations made in the course of the judgment are meant only for the disposal of the revision and for the purpose of emphasising the point made in the revision. The lower court shall not be influenced by the same. The lower court shall dispose of the case in accordance with the law. Inasmuch as the occurrence is of the year 1988 and the disposal by the lower court was of the year 1991, the lower court is directed to dispose of the matter after retrial in accordance with the law within three months from the date of receipt of this order or of the records whichever is earlier.