M. F. SALDANHA, J. ( 1 ) A very unusual situation has arisen in this litigation in so far as the first respondent who is the elected candidate, through his learned Counsel, has submitted an application to the Court for dismissal of these petitions on the ground of procedural non-compliance. It shall briefly enumerate in the course of this order what the various heads of charge are but I need to prefix the judgment with the observation that Election Law unlike in almost all other fields of litigation presents situation wherein the rule of strict compliance is not only observed but scrupulously insisted upon by the Courts. There are many reasons for this, the main on being that the outcome of these petitions must necessarily be time bound because where an election has been challenged, if the challenge is a valid one the wrongly elected candidate should be dislodged from office at the earliest point of time whereas on the other hand, if the challenge is unfounded then the cloud that hangs over the elected candidate must necessarily be cleared without any undue delay. Experience has shown that one of the main reasons for any form of litigation taking not only years but decades is because of procedural non-compliance and the corrective processes that plod on virtually for years together. I also take cognisance of the fact that the Courts have come across a class of cases where the challenge is far from valid or substantial and the protracted litigation can have its own hazardous effect vis-a-vis the elected candidates. For all these reasons, the Supreme Court and the High Courts have, with a degree of locus standi and consistency insisted upon absolutely strict compliance with the requirements of law. The Representation of the Peoples Act itself by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 86 makes it mandatory for the High Court to dismiss a petition which does not comply with the provisions of Section 81 or 82 or Section 117 of the Act. Undoubtedly, it may appear to be rather harsh because a dismissal on the ground of procedural non-compliance is construed by virtue of Section 86 as a dismissal on merits and in this view of the matter, an argument is sometimes advanced that strict adherence to the requirements may have a very far reaching consequences. Undoubtedly, it may appear to be rather harsh because a dismissal on the ground of procedural non-compliance is construed by virtue of Section 86 as a dismissal on merits and in this view of the matter, an argument is sometimes advanced that strict adherence to the requirements may have a very far reaching consequences. It is for good reason that the Legislature has incorporated special provisions in this Act and I have enumerated the reasons for them and it is for the same reason that the Courts have also interpreted the provisions in keeping with the legislative intent. This Court had occasion to deal with one such situation in Election Petition No. 2 of 1995 and by judgment and order dated 19th July 1996, I had occasion to examine the case law on the Point virtually threadbare and to uphold the view that if procedural non-compliance is demonstrated, that the Court has no option except to dismiss the petition. That view represents the crystallised thinking of the Courts over the years. ( 2 ) ). An Application I. A. I has been presented by the first respondent wherein, dismissal of the petitions has been prayed for on several grounds. The first of them is that Rule 19 (4) requires that the requisite affirming Affidavit in the prescribed form must be appended to the petition. The applicant's learned Counsel pointed out to me from of the petition that the affirming Affidavit is not in keeping with From No. 25. Hesought to elaborate his submission by pointing out that in a petition of the present type particularly where the contention is that the R-1 has indulged in various corrupt practices, that the factual aspect of each of the incidents is of paramount consequence because each of these are virtually in the nature of a separate charge. The corrupt practice is something very serious and Courts would normally not take cognisance of something that is hearsay, something that is generalised or something that is remote but if the incidents have been set out, it is equally necessary for the party making the allegations to very clearly indicate to the Court as to whether each of these is on the basis of one's personal knowledge or on the basis of information which one believes to be true. There is a prescribed requirement in Form No. 25 and the submission is that unless a party swearing the Affidavit makes it very clear with regard to each paragraph or each incident as to whether that party has personal knowledge or whether it is on the basis of information that it would be impossible to either attach credibility to the statement but more importantly to fastened the liability on a particular member individual. I see considerable substance in this argument because it is not a mere formality but it is a requirement of law because these are serious proceedings and they are not to be equated with general roving enquiries. If an election is to be set aside, it has got to be on the basis of specific evidence placed before the Court in the form of a petition and substantiated thereafter and therefore, even for purposes of taking cognizance of the petition and proceeding, the Courts insist that there has go to be sufficiently reliable material before the Court even at that point of time when the petition is presented. Factually, it is true that the affirming Affidavit is not in compliance with Form No. 25 in this case. ( 3 ) I need to however point out that the petitioners' learned Counsel Mr. Phadke was quick to bring it to my notice that Order 6, Rule 15, CPC prescribes the manner in which pleadings are required to be verified and it is generally provided that the affirmation is required to be done before a designated authority and secondly, that it is necessary to generally indicate as to whether the material is on the basis of one's own knowledge or on the basis of information. Mr. Phadke is right when he points out that the general provision of law as enunciated in the CPC governs pleadings but what one needs to take cognisance of is that if there is a special enactment which makes provision for a procedure that is different, that the latter will prevail in proceedings under that enactment. It is in this background, that it becomes necessary for the Court to uphold the view that the form as prescribed in the Representation of Peoples Act will have to have an overriding effect and that one cannot go back to the CPC for this purpose. It is in this background, that it becomes necessary for the Court to uphold the view that the form as prescribed in the Representation of Peoples Act will have to have an overriding effect and that one cannot go back to the CPC for this purpose. This is an Election Petition and the Court cannot ignore that fact and cannot at the same time give a go-by to what is prescribed in the Act and the Rules framed thereunder. ( 4 ) THE second contention raised on behalf of the applicant is that Section 117 of the Act requires certain payments to be made as and by way of security costs and the Act prescribes that the payment is required to be made at the time when the petition is filed. The Applicants learned counsel relied on Rule 22 of the Election Procedure Rules framed by the High Court in support of his contention that the tender of this amount is required to be made at the time when the petition is presented. He reinforces his argument by pointing out that it is the sad experience of the Courts in numerous cases that the requisite payments are not tendered when petitions or appeals are filed and that there are all sorts of protracted proceedings and disputes with regard to the quantum of liability etc. , which keep the cases dragging on for decades and that the aforesaid provisions were enunciated in order to totally eliminate any such possibility. He contended that these cases are not to be time bound and that consequently, special provisions have been incorporated requiring the payments to be made at the time when the Election Petition is filed. What is demonstrated is that the amount was deposited on 6-4-98 and that the petition was filed on 15-4-98. The submission was that in so far as the documents produced by the petitioners themselves indicate that the amount was tendered on 6-4-98, a certificate was issued on 7-4-98 and that these formalities were not complied with on 15-4-98 i. e. the date on which the petition was filed which constitutes breach of the provisions of Section 117. ( 5 ) MR. Phadke has strongly refuted this argument and he submitted that he himself accepts the position that these provisions have been incorporated in order to avoid delay. ( 5 ) MR. Phadke has strongly refuted this argument and he submitted that he himself accepts the position that these provisions have been incorporated in order to avoid delay. He pointed out to me that a party can be said to be in default if the party occasions any delay namely by tendering the requisite payments not at the time when the petition is filed but the next date or at any later point of time but he submitted that it is unthinkable for a party to be penalised if the payments have been tendered before that date. I am in total agreement with the submission canvassed by the learned Counsel because a petitioner can be faulted if the act of the petitioner has occasioned what Section has trying to prohibit but in a case where the payment is tendered earlier to that date, it would be an absurdity to contend that it would constitute any breach of Section 117 or that the party is in default. To my mind, this ground of challenge is totally devoid of any substance. ( 6 ) THESE are unusual petitions because we have before the Court two Election Petitions No. 4 and 5 of 1998 cited in the cause title and two sets of Court fees etc. , have been paid and they are therefore two petitions or rather twin petitions because they are two petitions dependent on one set of pleadings. Petitioners learned Counsel pointed out that the petition had originally been tendered as a joint petition and that the Office raised some procedural objection which was why, out of abundant caution and because of the objection raised by the Office of the High Court, two sets of payments were tendered and the original joint petition has been bifurcated into two separate petitions. ( 7 ) IN the first instance, the applicants learned counsel has made capital out of the fact that the person shown as petitioner-2 G. M. Siddeshwarappa according to him, has to locus standi to present the petition because this person was only the Election Agent of the candidate. Learned Counsel contended that either a candidate or an elector i. e. the voter of that constituency is competent to present a petition and he submitted that Siddeshwarappa is neither of the two and that consequently, his petition will have to be dismissed. In response to this submission, Mr. Learned Counsel contended that either a candidate or an elector i. e. the voter of that constituency is competent to present a petition and he submitted that Siddeshwarappa is neither of the two and that consequently, his petition will have to be dismissed. In response to this submission, Mr. Phadke stated that the learned Counsel is wrongly relying on the concluding statements in paragraph-3 of the petition without taking note of the averments contained earlier and he relies on the following sentence 1. "a true copy of the voters list extract showing both the petitioners as voters/electors of the Davanagere is produced herewith and marked as Annexure-E". The learned Counsel relied on the copy of the extract of the petition which shows the two different names at serial Nos. 65 and 67. His submission is that this completely answers the charge with regard to locus standi and that therefore, there is absolutely no substance in the objection that has been pleaded. Had the matter rested there, I would have left it as it is. Unfortunately, the pleadings themselves contain certain other documents particularly the once whereby the candidate had appointed an agent and these documents indicate the name of the person as G. M. Siddeshwarappa. There is a minor variation in the name and Mr. Phadke was quick to point out that it is one and the same person and his contention was that the prefix of the word "appa" is part and parcel of the same name and that it does not make any difference to the identity. The applicants learned Counsel did not accept this position because he insists that there is a serious discrepancy as far as this aspect of the case goes because he points out to me from the letter written to the Returning Officer by the Agent which is signed as "siddeshwar". The contention raised though technical, proceeds on the footing that there is a discrepancy as far as the identity of this person is concerned and that consequently, in the absence of any cogent reconciliation in the pleadings, this discrepancy is fatal as far as this petition goes. I have carefully scrutinised the petition and I do find that the averments are wanting as far as this aspect of the case is concerned. I have carefully scrutinised the petition and I do find that the averments are wanting as far as this aspect of the case is concerned. I do not dispute that the learned Counsel sought to bridge the gap or reconcile the position in the course of his arguments but the fact of the matter is that the Court is required to go by the pleadings and not by explanations that may come up at a later point of time. There is a crisis of identity in so far as it is not conclusive from the petition that the Agent and the voter are one and the same individual, though the names are some what common, in situations where a discrepancy of this type arises, it is very necessary that the pleadings must be very clear and cogent and that they must, if there are any problematic situations present reconcile the position to the satisfaction of the Court in the pleadings. In the absence of that, there is scope for ambiguity and for disputes but the end result is that it would mean that there is a serious lacuna which the Court cannot overlook. ( 8 ) I have already indicated that as the record stands, the Court is presented with an absolutely exceptional situation in this case because, irrespective of the reasons why it happened, we have two Election Petitions effectively presented by two separate persons bearing separate numbers but both dependent on one set of pleadings which is what I need to take special note of. The inevitable result of the discrepancy that has arisen with regard to the identity of G. M. Siddeshwarappa would leave the Court with no option except to hold that on this ground coupled with the earlier finding, that his petition would have to be dismissed. The question that arises therefore is as to whether the Election Petition No. 4 of 1998 could survive in the light of the dismissal of the joint petition. ( 9 ) THERE is considerable amount of debate with regard to the question of maintainability of joint petitions. Mr. Phadke did draw my attention to Sections 110 and 112 of the Representation of the Peoples Act and to the following decisions 1. ( 9 ) THERE is considerable amount of debate with regard to the question of maintainability of joint petitions. Mr. Phadke did draw my attention to Sections 110 and 112 of the Representation of the Peoples Act and to the following decisions 1. (1) ILR (1978) 2 Kant 1479, (2) AIR 1985 All 118 , (3) AIR 1967 All 150 , (4) AIR 1957 Andh Pra 1007 and (5) (1980) 1 Kant LJ (Short Notes) 22. The last of these decisions deals with the point as to whether individual affirmation is necessary in the case of a joint petition and has virtually answered the question in the negative. In sum and substance, what the learned Counsel submitted was that the law makes provision for joint petitions wherein there can be more than one petitioner and he thereafter submitted that if one looks at the provisions of Sections 110 and 112 of the Representation of the People Act that the law itself contemplates situations wherein a petitioner may die or a petitioner may want to withdraw a petition and the question arises as to what happens vis-a-vis the remaining co-petitioners. I do not dispute the fact that joint petitions are maintainable within the scheme of the law and the learned counsel is equally right when he points out to the Court that there are situations in which a petition would survive even if one of the co-petitioners dies and there is also provision for substitution of any other person in place of such a petitioner. Those were all cases where the term joint petition was construed as being a petition in which the Court had a single proceeding before it with two or more petitioners. This is not such a case because we have in the first instance two separate distinct petitions with two separate distinct petitioners, both the petitions dependent wholly and completely on the same set of pleadings. Even the affirmations have been shown all through jointly. The question that has been posed therefore is as to whether even if one of the petitions is dismissed, the other one could survive on its own strength. In my considered view, where there are two petitioners there is absolutely no difficulty but in the present case, I can only equate the present petitions to a situation that is described in Medical Science as siamese twins. In my considered view, where there are two petitioners there is absolutely no difficulty but in the present case, I can only equate the present petitions to a situation that is described in Medical Science as siamese twins. The reason for this is only because the two petitions are inextricably linked together in so far as both of them depend entirely and totally on the same set of pleadings and if one of the petitions is dismissed under Section 86, it would be impossible for the second one to survive. This is the consequence by operation of law and though I do concede that it may seem unfortunate, despite having given my anxious thought to the modalities I find that the Court is left with virtually no other option. ( 10 ) THE applicants learned Counsel drew my attention to two decisions reported in AIR 1983 SC 558 and (1991) 3 SCC 375 : ( AIR 1991 SC 1557 ). In both of these cases, the Supreme Court had occasion to enumerate the consequences of any form of procedural non-compliance or breach. The Court has, in keeping with the consistent view of that Court held that the breach is fatal. This being the position, the inevitable consequence of the dismissal of the second petition would be that the first one would also not survive. ( 11 ) ONE more objection canvassed by the applicants learned counsel was that the number of copies in the manner in which they are required to be filed had not been tendered and that this constitutes a breach of the provisions of Section 81 (3 ). It is true that on 24th July 1998 a memo was filed taking some corrective action whereby an additional copy in the prescribed form was tendered to the Office. The submission canvassed was that this constitutes a breach of the provision in so far as it is mandatory for the petitioner to provide requisite copies duly affirmed etc. , in the form in which they are required to be tendered and that departure from this requirement would result in inevitable delay and that it is therefore fatal to the petitioner. This is a case in which several copies of the petition were required and Mr. , in the form in which they are required to be tendered and that departure from this requirement would result in inevitable delay and that it is therefore fatal to the petitioner. This is a case in which several copies of the petition were required and Mr. Phadke points out of me that it came to his notice that the copy which had to go to R-1 had gone to R-5 and that for this purpose, he tendered an additional copy. The applicants learned Counsel submitted that since there are two petitions, 22 copies should have been submitted and not 11 and that consequently, this constitutes a substantial breach. As far as this objection is concerned, even though if one were to look at the law it may be construed as breach, I am not inclined to uphold the objection because the Court cannot overlook the fact that the parties were the same and the spirit behind Section 83, (81 (3)) is to ensure that all the opposite parties are served with the copies of the petition. Undoubtedly, there are two petitions on record but having regard to the fact that the respondents were common, in my considered view there is substantial compliance and I therefore overrule this particular objection. ( 12 ) HAVING regard to the aforesaid findings, the I. A. I succeeds to the extent only as indicated in this judgment. Both the Election Petitions stand dismissed. In the circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. --- *** --- .