Manmohan Sarin,j. ( 1 ) THE above batch of writ petitions have been preferred by thegovernment of National Capital Territory of Delhi. The challenge in the writ petitions isto the judgment dated 23. 4. 1998 of the Central Administrative Tribunal. By the impugnedjudgment the Central Administrative Tribunal, following its decision in Dr. Sangeetanarang and Others v. Delhi Administration etc. , 1988 (6) ATC 405, directed the petitioner topay to the respondent doctors the same pay-scales and other benefits like Provident Fund,medical Attendance, etc. as payable to the regular Junior Medical Officers, performingsimilar duties. The Tribunal further held that the respondents would be deemed to havecontinued in service till regular appointments are made to the posts in accordance withrules and instructions. Direction was also issued to the petitioner to consider relaxation ofage to the extent of service on ad hoc or contract basis, rendered by the respondents if theyhappen to be the candidates before the Union Public Service Commission for selection. Petitioner s plea that the appointment of the respondent doctors was purely on contractbasis and was to be governed as per the emoluments and terms set out in the appointmentletter was negatived. ( 2 ) PETITIONER s case is that appointment of doctors to various hospitals and dispensaries of the Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi are made through the Unionpublic Service Commission under Central Government Health Scheme Rules. The Ministry of Health and Family Planning is the controlling authority. The selection by the Unionpublic Service Commission is a long drawn out and on-going process. Vacancies resulteither by retirement or creation of new posts. It is submitted that at any given point of timethere are about 150 posts vacant. Petitioner submits that to relieve the pressure and strain on the health care services,a few posts were filled on contract basis in 1996-97. When the appointment of therespondents on contract basis was coming to an end, the respondents chose to move thecentral Administrative Tribunal, resulting in the impugned judgment being passed. ( 3 ) PETITIONER assails the impugned judgment on the ground that the Tribunal hasexceeded its jurisdiction as it had no authority to go beyond the terms of the contract ofappointment. The appointment of the respondents was purely on contract basis for limitedperiods. Parties were to abide by the terms of the contract and the Tribunal had nojurisdiction to carve out fresh terms. The appointment of the respondents was purely on contract basis for limitedperiods. Parties were to abide by the terms of the contract and the Tribunal had nojurisdiction to carve out fresh terms. It was a specific term of the appointment letter that aconsolidated amount was to be paid and no more. Respondents were also not entitled tolay any claim to regularisation by virtue of the contractual appointment. The impugnedjudgment directing payment of wages at par with regular doctors, to respondent doctorsappointed on contractual basis for limited period, has far reaching financial consequences. The Government would not be able to make appointments on contract basis and, consequently, the health care services would suffer as the posts would remain vacant. This, inbrief, is the submission of the petitioner. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also submittedthat implementation of the impugned judgment would tantamount to giving back doorentry to doctors and it would breed inefficiency as rejected candidates would get inductedin services on regular appointment. Lastly, it is contended that reliance on Sangeetanarang s case (supra) was misplaced as it was a case of ad hoc appointment and not purelythat of a contractual appointment. ( 4 ) REGARDING petitioners contention in respect of Sangeeta Narang s case, we may notethat the Special Leave Petition filed by the department against the judgment of the Centraladministrative Tribunal in Sangeeta Narang s case has been dismissed by the Apex Court. The Government, in fact has itself implemented the decision in Sangeeta Narang s case andissue a circular letter/order dated 2. 11. 1988, which appears at page 48 of the paper book. In the said letter the terms, "ad hoc appointment" and "appointment on contract" have beenused interchangeably. Even otherwise, the distinction sought to be made out between thecontractual employment and ad hoc employment would not be of any consequence. Especially when the petitioners have themselves admitted that there are at any point of timeabout 150 vacancies, which remain to be filled. It is the petitioners own case that the saidposts remain vacant as regular appointments are made only by selection through the Unionpublic Service Commission, which is a time-consuming process. We may also note that theappointments though originating in contract, acquire a "status" inasmuch as they aregoverned by applicable rules and regulations and not by original letter/order of appointment alone. It is the petitioners own case that the saidposts remain vacant as regular appointments are made only by selection through the Unionpublic Service Commission, which is a time-consuming process. We may also note that theappointments though originating in contract, acquire a "status" inasmuch as they aregoverned by applicable rules and regulations and not by original letter/order of appointment alone. Reference in this regard may be made to the observations of the Apex Courtin Union of India v. A. K. Roy, AIR 1986 S. C. 737. The decision of the Central Administrativetribunal, as approved by the Apex Court, in Sangeeta Narang s case (supra) clearly holdsthat it is not open to the authorities to terminate the services of the temporary employeeswho may have been appointed for specified periods at any time of their own sweet Will,when there is admittedly need for their services. The attempt to distinguish Sangeetanarang s case on the ground that it is one dealing with ad hoc appointment and not acontractual one, is of no avail. We may note that the petitioner is declining to pay the same emoluments to therespondent doctors as they pay to the regular appointed doctors only because theappointments of respondent doctors are contractual appointments, which according to thepetitioner have to be governed by terms of the contract for all purposes. It is not thepetitioner s case that the respondent doctors are not discharging similar duties andfunctions. ( 5 ) LET us now consider the authorities cited by learned Counsel for the petitioner insupport of her contention that the respondents are not entitled to parity in emoluments withthe doctors appointed on regular basis. Reliance by the petitioner is on certain decisions,where the principle of equal Pay for Equal Work has not been applied. (I) Learned Counsel for the petitioner first relied on Harbans Lal and Others v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 1989 (4) SCC 459 , wherein doctrine of equal Payfor Equal Work was held to be not applicable. Carpenters working in the"wood Work Centre" of Himachal Pradesh State Handicrafts section of thecorporation sought parity in wages with those working in the State Government on regular basis. It was not disputed that there were no regularemployees working in the category of carpenters on the establishment of thecorporation. The Corporation was,however,paying the minimum wagesasapplicable in construction industry to the concerned carpenters. It was not disputed that there were no regularemployees working in the category of carpenters on the establishment of thecorporation. The Corporation was,however,paying the minimum wagesasapplicable in construction industry to the concerned carpenters. The Courtheld that discrimination complained of must be within the same establishment owned by the same management. We do not see how any support canbe drawn by the petitioner from this decision. Admittedly the respondentsand the junior Medical Officers appointed on regular basis, with whom parityis sought, are employed by the Government of National Capital Territory ofdelhi, performing similar duties in the hospitals and dispensaries of thegovernment of National Capital Territory of Delhi. (II) Reliance was next placed on State of Haryana v. Jasmit Singh and Others, AIR1997 SC 1788. Petitioners in this case wereemployed as Mali-cum-Chowkiddar/pump Operators on daily wages. They sought parity with those regularlyemployed by the State Government. The Apex Court noticed the case law inrespect of the doctrine of "equal pay for equal work". It observed that theapplication of the doctrine was not always an easy task and there wereinherent difficulties in comparing and evaluating the work done by differentpersons in different organizations. The daily rate workers were not requiredto possess the qualifications prescribed for regular workers. Restrictions,etc. on age were not there for daily rated workers. The selection process wastotally different. The daily wagers had no liability for transfer. The Courtfound that the daily rates workers could not be equated with regularemployees and, hence, were not entitled to equal pay. In the instant case, it isthe admitted position that qualifications required, viz. , MBBS Degree, is samefor both. The work performed is the same. Same rules and regulations areapplicable to the doctors employed on contract basis so far discharge of theirduties is concerned. The died case is, therefore, distinguishable and is of noavail to the petitioners. (III) Learned Counsel next relied on Ghaziabad Development Authority and Others v. Shri Vikram Choudhury and Ors. , JT 1995 (5) SC 636, to canvass that dailywage employees need not be paid at par with regular employees. The Apexcourt in the said case held that as long as petitioner authority had work andprojects in hand, the services of daily wagers could not be terminated. It wasonly in case if work was not there that principle of last come first go was tobe applied. The Apexcourt in the said case held that as long as petitioner authority had work andprojects in hand, the services of daily wagers could not be terminated. It wasonly in case if work was not there that principle of last come first go was tobe applied. As long as there were no regular posts available, there was noquestion of payment of wages at par with the regular employees-in the instantcase, admittedly, regular posts are available and, hence, the said authority isof no avail to the petitioners. (IV) Reliance was placed by learned Counsel for the petitioner on IIP. Statecement Corporation Ltd. and Others v. B. K. Tiwari, JT 1987 (10) SC 25, to urgethat the terms of the appointment letter ought to be given effect to. In the citedcase respondent was offered appointment as a Manager, by a Public Corporation. The appointment letter specifically gave the pay scales after revision,which had been accepted. Reliance on the cited case is completely misplacedand the petitioners cannot draw any support from it. (V) Reliance was also placed by learned Counsel for the petitioners on Union ofindia and Ors. v. Harish Balkrishna Mahajan, JT 1997 (10) SC 375, whileassailing the direction given in the impugned order regarding consideringrelaxation of age for the respondents if they happen to be candidates beforethe Union Public Service Commission. The reliance on the said case iscompletely misplaced. In the cited case, the direction of the Tribunal wasassailed and quashed since the posts of Directors in Central Governmenthealth Scheme were required to be filled by the Union through the Unionpublic Service Commission. The direction to consider in consultation withthe State Public Service Commission for regularisation was, therefore, foundto be in violation of Article 320 of the Constitution. In the instant case, the onlydirection given is to treat the. service of the petitioners as without break andto consider age relaxation for the period served in case the respondentshappen to be candidates before the Union Public Service Commission. ( 6 ) IT is also not disputed before us that the respondent doctors possess the requirededucational qualifications and the training for discharging duties as Junior Medicalofficers. The nature of their duties are, admittedly, similar to the regularly appointeddoctors. The respondents are also liable to serve in any of the dispensaries or hospitals ofthe Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi and may be moved from one placeto the other. The nature of their duties are, admittedly, similar to the regularly appointeddoctors. The respondents are also liable to serve in any of the dispensaries or hospitals ofthe Government of National Capital Territory of Delhi and may be moved from one placeto the other. In these circumstances, we find no justification for denying them parity inemoluments with the doctors in regular service. The doctrine of "equal pay for equal work"should be applicable. The respondents did not claim or seek from the Central Administrative Tribunal or before us, regularisation of their posts but are only seeking parity ofemoluments and other benefits as applicable to medical officers appointed on regular basis. Learned Counsel for the respondents have taken us through the terms of theappointment letter, the extensions given from time-to-time and the advertisement issuedto demonstrate the transferability of the job and highlighting the other terms as well as theapplicability of the rules and regulations. The advertisements issued inviting applicationsas well as the appointment letters issued and the extensions given clearly establish therequirement for these vacancies and jobs, which is even otherwise not disputed in the writpetitions. As a matter of fact, the learned Government Counsel conceded that posts arealways available and such appointments are always required in order to properly run thepublic health services. The process of regular selection is through the Union Public Servicecommission and is cumbersome and long drawn out. ( 7 ) WE may also, at this stage, notice the contention of the Government Counsel thatthe relief granted by the Central Administrative Tribunal to the respondents amounts toback door en try into the service. The submission is not correct. The relief granted is confinedto parity in salary and emoluments with those payable to the regular doctors. The directionsissued to consider relaxation of age for the years of service rendered by the respondents onad hoc or contract basis, if they happen to be candidates before the Union Public Servicecommission for selection, cannot be considered as directing regularisation or making anyback door entry. In order to somehow justify the unequal treatment to the respondents, the learnedcounsel for the petitioners submitted that the respondent doctors are rejects from theregular selection process and, therefore, they cannot claim equal treatment. This contentionis totally misconceived and untenable. Respondent doctors also possess the same degreeand qualifications as those employed on regular basis. In order to somehow justify the unequal treatment to the respondents, the learnedcounsel for the petitioners submitted that the respondent doctors are rejects from theregular selection process and, therefore, they cannot claim equal treatment. This contentionis totally misconceived and untenable. Respondent doctors also possess the same degreeand qualifications as those employed on regular basis. Besides, the respondent doctorshave also been admittedly employed on the basis of selection and scrutiny, though notthrough the Union Public Service Commission. It is the Government, which invited themto take up job through public advertisement and not vice versa. Lastly, it is not the case ofthe Government that these doctors are not discharging their duties efficiently or meritoriously and, therefore, they have to be paid less than what the doctors appointed on regularbasis are paid. ( 8 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondents, Mr. Mukul Rohtagi, submitted that the writpetitions were completely devoid of merit. Relying on AM. Allison v. B. L. Sen, AIR 1957sc 227, he submitted that there was an additional reason to refuse interference with theimpugned order since there has been no failure of justice. The impugned order only seeksto undo the injustice meted out to the respondents. We find merit in this submission. ( 9 ) THE present writ petition by the petitioner is aimed at depriving the respondentsof their legitimate emoluments and dues. Rather, acting as a model employer, thegovernment is attempting to take unfair advantage of the situation prevalent in the countryon account of large scale unemployment. It is not the case of the petitioner that the servicesrendered by the respondents are in any manner inferior to the services rendered by theregularly employed doctors. The respondent doctors took up employment on contractualbasis for short term on account of force of circumstances and should not be made to sufferon this account. The stand taken by the petitioners apart from being legally untenable, isunfair, unreasonable, arbitrary and unjust. The writ petitions are, accordingly, dismissedwith costs quantified at Rs. 2,000. 00 for each petition.