R. P. SETHI, J. ( 1 ) REGULATION 30. 05 of Karnataka Electricity Supply Regulation of 1988 reads as :"levy of interest 1. In case of any belated payment, simple interest will be levied at the rate of 2% per month or part thereof from the expiry of due date, subject to a minimum of Re. 1/- for L. T. installations and Rs. 100/- for H. T. installations. "the interpretation of words 'part thereof' is the subject of controversy requiring authoritative pronouncement. Such words have been interpreted by the respondent-Board and upheld by the learned single Judge to mean "that not only shall the Board be entitled to the interests at the rate of 2% for every completed month of delay but even for a delay of part of only of a month also the interest chargeable would be 2%. Stated differently the Board is entitled to claim Rs. 2/- per every Rs. 100/- unpaid for each month of delay and delay of only a month also. " ( 2 ) ). The learned counsel appearing for the appellant has, however, submitted that the words 'part thereof' imply that if the delay in the payment of electricity charges was for less than a month then interest at the prescribed rates is recoverable only for the period of actual delay and not for a completed month. It is contended that giving any other meaning to the aforesaid words would result in imposing the penalty which apparently is not authorised either under the law applicable to the case or by the Regulations made therein. ( 3 ) THE facts giving arise to the present controversy are that on account of communal disturbances in the city of Mysore during December 1992 the appellant sought for extension of time to make payment of the electric bills to which the respondent-Board is reported to have agreed vide its letter dated 16-12-1992. The appellant paid 50% of the amount of the bill on 29-12-1992. The time for payment of balance bill was extended by the Board vide its letter dated 31-12-1992 up to 9-1-1993. The appellant paid the balance 50% of the November bill on 8-1-1993. Even though there was a delay of 10 days in making the payment, yet the respondent raised a bill demanding 2% interest for the full month on the ground of the delay in the payment of the bill. The appellant paid the balance 50% of the November bill on 8-1-1993. Even though there was a delay of 10 days in making the payment, yet the respondent raised a bill demanding 2% interest for the full month on the ground of the delay in the payment of the bill. The prayer of the petitioner to restrict the demand of interest to 10 days only was rejected vide letter of the Board 6/13-1-1993. The Board also issued disconnection notice dated 18-1-1993. Aggrieved by the action of the respondent-Board the appellant filed writ petition on the ground that under the Regulation 30. 05 the interest at the rate of 2% can be levied on the actual number of days of delay and not for the full month. The claim of the Board to recover interest at the rate of 2% for the whole month even if the delay was for one day was alleged to be the result of erroneous interpretation of the aforesaid Regulation. Such an interpretation was termed to be highly arbitrary and unconcionable as the object of the Regulation was to compensate the Board for the delay in payment of the bill. Such a compensation was required to be reasonable compensation sufficient to cover financial loss suffered by the Board on the ground of delay in payment. Forcing the consumer to pay the interest on the delayed payment for the full month even if the delay was for a few days was stated to be an unreasonable restriction on the rights of the customers to carry on their business and trade. The Regulation was stated to be ultra vires to Arts. 14, 19 (1) (d) and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India as unguided and unreasonable power was stated to have been conferred on the Board. ( 4 ) THE learned single Judge examined the rival pleas and observed"now it is obvious that the amount due and the period for which it remained unpaid are both add in the sense that the former is not an exact multiple of 100 and the latter not an exact multiple of a month. ( 4 ) THE learned single Judge examined the rival pleas and observed"now it is obvious that the amount due and the period for which it remained unpaid are both add in the sense that the former is not an exact multiple of 100 and the latter not an exact multiple of a month. Calculation of simple interest at the rate of 2% p. m. on the above amount, would be possible not only for the exact amount but also for the exact period for which the delay has occurred, by applying the simple interest calculating formula i. e. , Amount x rate x time _0. When so calculated the interest payable to the Board is 750 x 2 x 61/2 _0 = Rs. 97. 50/ -. It is thus obvious that the expression 2 p. m. is complete in itself to make calculation of interest for any amount for any period exact to the actual number of years, months and days possible. It is not as though it would be impossible or even difficult to calculate interest for any period less than a month so as to make the use of the expression 'or part thereof' necessary. Even in the absence of the said expression, it is possible to calculate interest for the exact period for which the delay has taken place. The learned Judge, however, concluded that "the interpretation suggested by the petitioner that the use of the words 'part thereof' only mean that if the delay is less than a month then the interest amount calculated should be only for the actual delay and not a complete month if accepted would render the said expression a total surplusage. That is so because, even in the absence of the said expression, interest would be chargeable for the exact period of delay and not the whole month. Any such interpretation has therefore to be eschewed for it is an elementary rule of construction that the legislature and even a body exercising subordinate legislative functions does not waste words while enacting the laws. Each word and expression, it is presumed, is meant to serve a purpose and an interpretation which may render any word or expression redundant or superfluous must be avoided. Each word and expression, it is presumed, is meant to serve a purpose and an interpretation which may render any word or expression redundant or superfluous must be avoided. When viewed thus the expression 'or part thereof' used in the Regulation can only mean that not only shall the Board, be entitled to interest at the rate of 2% for every completed month of delay but even for a delay of a part only of a month also the interest chargeable would be 2%. Stated differently the Board is entitled to claim Rs. 2/- for every one hundred rupees unpaid for each month's delay and for a delay of a party only of a month also. That is how the Regulations appear to have been understood not only by the Board but even by the consumers at large for it is not in dispute that till the filing of the present petition none of the consumers has at any stage questioned Board's right to recover interest for a full month even when the delay in making the payment of the charges was only for part only of a month. " ( 5 ) A perusal of the Regulation and the object sought to be achieved by it appears to be to compensate the Board for the delayed payments and not to impose penalty upon the consumer of the electricity for his inaction or default in making the timely payment. The levy of interest has to be distinguished from the imposition of a penalty. Under the law interest is payable by a person who prevents another from having use of money payable to the other by illegally retaining such amount of money with him. It has been held to be the premium paid for the use of money. Interest is, under the expressed terms of the definition in Section 2 (12) of CPC made part of the mesne profits. The character of interest as a part of mesne profits continues to subsist till payment is made. The interest is, thus, the compensation for wrongfully withholding of the money legally payable to the claimant. Even under the Interest Act of 1978 the Court can grant interest as part of damages without infringing the rule of common law where proof is given of special loss or damages sustained by reason of the breach of the contract or an obligation. Even under the Interest Act of 1978 the Court can grant interest as part of damages without infringing the rule of common law where proof is given of special loss or damages sustained by reason of the breach of the contract or an obligation. Interest can be claimed on the basis of an agreement, expressed or implied or under any provision or in the absence of contract and the provision of law by the Court by way of damages for wrongfully withholding amount payable to a person. Penalty, however, means a legal or official punishment which may be in the form of fine of forfeiture for not fulfilling a contractual obligation or a statutory provision. It is a word of wide significance. An exaction which is not of compulsory character can be termed as penalty even though it was not being recovered pursuant to an order finding the person concerned guilty of crime. The interest even though penal in character, cannot be equated with penalty. Allowing the interpretation as put by the respondent-Board or the learned single Judge would amount to hold the imposition of penalty for failure of the defaulter to make the payment of the bill as distinguishable from compensating the Board for in- action of the consumer by making delayed payments. Such does not appear to be either the intention of the law makers or the purpose for making the Regulation. The statutory provisions are required to be given in a harmonious interpretation keeping in view the object sought to be achieved and the same cannot be enlarged for reasons which may apparently appear to be laudable but not sustainable. ( 6 ) WE are of the opinion that where the delay is of a part of the month only, interest can be charged for that period of delay and not for full one month as the Regulation 30. 05 makes the defaulter liable only for the actual days of delay and not for whole month. The words 'part thereof' refer to both the amount and part of the days of a month. 05 makes the defaulter liable only for the actual days of delay and not for whole month. The words 'part thereof' refer to both the amount and part of the days of a month. If the intention of the makers of the Regulation was to make defaulter liable to pay the interest for that full month, they would have used some other words as were noticed to be used by the legislature while enacting S. 8 of the Jammu and Kashmir General Sales Tax Act, where an explanation was added to the Section which read as, "interest shall be charged for full one month and not a part of the month". ( 7 ) WHILE interpreting similar words, the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in case of Brooke Bond India Limited v. Commr. of Sales Tax, reported in (1982) 51 STC 357 held :"in case where the delay is of a part of month only, interest at 2 per cent can be charged for that period of delay and not for full month i. e. , the petitioner is liable to pay interest only for the actual days of default and not for the whole months". To the same effect is the judgment of Madras High Court in Sakthi Sugars Limited v. The Assistant Commr. of Commercial Taxes, Central Assessment Circle I, Coimbatore, reported in (1985) 59 STC 52 wherein it was held :"42. The last contention which is advanced before us and which needs to be considered is that even for delay of one or two days interest of the entire month is sought to be recovered and that such recovery is not justified by S. 24 (3 ). This argument is advanced by Messrs. Subramaniam, Natarajan, Kannan and Bhaskaran, Now on the terms of S. 24 (3 ). it is clear that the taxing authorities are entitled to recover interest only for the actual period of delay in making payment. While specifying the rate of interest of 2 per cent of the amount of the tax assessed, the Legislature has clearly directed that the penalty shall be "for each month or part thereof after the date specified for its payment". While specifying the rate of interest of 2 per cent of the amount of the tax assessed, the Legislature has clearly directed that the penalty shall be "for each month or part thereof after the date specified for its payment". If the Legislature wanted that interest should be payable for the entire month following the default irrespective of the fact that tax is paid at any time before the expiry of the month, then the words "or part thereof" would not have been used by the Legislature. The provision would have been something akin to the provision in S. 8 (2) of the Jammu and Kashmir General Sales Tax Act, where the explanation is added in S. 8 (2) which reads as follows :"interest shall be charged for full month and not for a part of the month. " The use of the words 'part thereof' specifically used in S. 24 (3) would clearly show that the Legislature intended that interest would be payable for the actual period of delay. Thus if the delay is one month and ten days, the interest payable will not be for two months, but it will be only for one month and ten days. Even the instructions issued by the Government in Commercial Taxes Manual (1979 Edition) show that while charging interest only the actual number of days of delay is to be taken into account. The taxing authorities are, therefore, not justified in construing S. 24 (3) as authorising them to recover interest for the entire period of the month during which the payment has been made. "we do not find any reason to take a different view as the learned single Judge has done vide the order impugned in the appeal. Without assigning any valid reason but only finding that as the aforesaid judgment had been pronounced under the Sales Tax Act, the learned single Judge was not justified to say, that he was not inclined to subscribe to the view taken by the Allahabad and Madras High Courts. We are of the opinion that nothing could be read between lines to give a different meaning when the language of the Regulation was clear and unambiguous. We are of the opinion that nothing could be read between lines to give a different meaning when the language of the Regulation was clear and unambiguous. The words 'part thereof' clearly referred to the period confined to a part of month and not the whole month casting an obligation upon defaulter to pay the interest at the rate of 2 per cent only for the period of that part of the month. Accepting the interpretation of the learned single Judge would amount to hold the Board entitled to claim penalty and not interest. 7a. It has been stated at the bar that the consumers including the petitioner over the years accepted the interpretation as put by the Board and made the payment of the interest for the full month even when the delay was for less than one month. It is apprehended that setting aside the judgment of the learned single judge would open the flood gates of further litigation which may result in subjecting respondent-Board to suffer heavy financial burden and losses. Such an apprehension is misplaced and even if it has some substance appropriate directions can be issued for protecting the interests of the Board by declaring this judgment to be in operation prospectively and not retrospectively. We have opted to adopt the latter recourse declaring that this judgment to be prospective in operation and would not confer any right upon any consumer to claim refund of the amount of the interest already paid by him on the assumption of interpretation by the Board of the aforesaid Regulation. All such consumers of electricity would be deemed debarred from preferring any claim on the basis of this judgment on the ground of acquiescence, latches, delay and estoppel. ( 8 ) UNDER the circumstances this appeal is accepted. The order of the learned single Judge impugned therein is set aside. The writ petition of the appellant shall be deemed allowed and the rule issued is made absolute. It is declared that the Regulation 30. 05 of the Supply Regulation authorises the respondent-Board to levy interest at the rate of 2 per cent only on the number of actual days of delay in making the payment of electricity consumption bills and not for the whole month. It is declared that the Regulation 30. 05 of the Supply Regulation authorises the respondent-Board to levy interest at the rate of 2 per cent only on the number of actual days of delay in making the payment of electricity consumption bills and not for the whole month. Such a declaration as already noticed shall however be prospective and would not in any way affect the settled claims of the consumers on the basis of the interpretation earlier put by the Board on the aforesaid Regulation. --- *** --- .