JUDGMENT M.Y. Eqbal, J. This Civil Revision application is directed against the order dated 28.2.1998 passed by Subordinate Judge I, Bhabhua, in Execution Case No 3 of 1986 whereby he passed the order for delivery of possession after partitioning the suit property in the facts and circumstances of the case. 2. Brief facts of the case relevant for the purpose of deciding this case is that Opposite party nos.1 and 2, Hari Narayan Rastogi and Prabhu Narayan Rastogi, who are own brothers filed Title Suit No. 74 of 1965 against Opposite Party nos. 3 and 4 for declaration that various sale deeds dated 5.2.1965 were illegal and not binding on the plaintiffs. Plaintiff-Opposite party nos. 1 and 2 prayed for a decree for recovery of possession of the properties. In the said suit the grand father of Opposite party nos. 1 and 2 was also a co-plaintiff. The suit was decreed in terms of the judgment dated 29.4.1972 by the Additional Subordinate Judge, Sasaram and defendant nos. 1 and 4 were directed to deliver possession of the suit properties in favour of the plaintiffs-Opposite party nos. 1 and 2. The defendants-Opposite party filed First Appeal No. 527 of 1972, but the said appeal was finally dismissed on 7.11.1985. After decree was affirmed in appeal, one of the plaintiffs-decree holders, namely, Hari Narayan Rastogi (Opposite party no. 1) levied execution Case No. 3 of 1986 for recovery of suit property which is a house together with land measuring total area of four decimals. It appears that during the pendency of the execution case, the co-decree holder Prabhu Narayan Rastogi transferred 1½ decimal of suit property to 2 the petitioner and on the basis of the said purchase the petitioner said to have come in possession of the suit property. The petitioner then filed an application in the execution case for impleading him as a party and the court below by order dated 5.12.1992 added him as party in the execution case. After the petitioner was impleaded as party he filed an application in the execution case claiming that he is in possession of the suit house and, therefore, only symbolic possession should be effected in execution of the decree. However, after hearing the parties the court below by order dated 7.1.1993 ordered that the possession of the purchaser-petitioner should not be disturbed in the process of the execution. However, after hearing the parties the court below by order dated 7.1.1993 ordered that the possession of the purchaser-petitioner should not be disturbed in the process of the execution. The decree holder-opposite party then filed a petition in the Executing court praying for delivery of possession over 0.2 decimals of land towards western side out of the 0.4 decimals of land. The court below allowed the prayer and appointed pleader commissioner for delivery of possession to the decree holder over 0.2 decimals of the suit land towards western side. However, the pleader commissioner reported that the petitioner is in possession of major portion of the land and house which he is not entitled to because he has purchased unspecified 1½ decimals of land. So possession of the judgment-debtor has to be disturbed otherwise the decree will not be executed. It was also reported by the pleader commissioner that the judgment debtor was running two shops in two rooms over the suit land. Learned court below after hearing both the parties on the report of the pleader commissioner and with their consent the impugned order was passed in the following terms: "It may be mentioned here that the purchaser (judgment debtor) has purchased only ½ Dec. land including the 2 construction in the Suit land from co-decree holder but no specification of the property has been given in the sale deeds. As per report of the commissioner, Vijay Kumar Gupta is in possession over the major portion of the suit land which he is not entitled to because he has only purchased ½ Dec. of land. So the possession of the judgment debtor has to be disturbed otherwise the decree will not be executed. I am afraid to interfere in the order of the Hon'ble High Court but in my opinion, no option is left to this Court but to disturb the possession of the judgment debtor. After all he is only entitled to the propol1ionate possession over the suit land within the valuation of ½ dec. of land and not beyond that. During the course of argument, a suggestion was given by the court to partition the suit land including the house standing thereon 1/2 and 1/2 because as per decree the decree holder is entitled to 1/2 possession i.e. 2 Dec. of land in question. The learned advocates of both the sides also conceded. of land and not beyond that. During the course of argument, a suggestion was given by the court to partition the suit land including the house standing thereon 1/2 and 1/2 because as per decree the decree holder is entitled to 1/2 possession i.e. 2 Dec. of land in question. The learned advocates of both the sides also conceded. In the circumstance and for the end of justice and to put the litigation to end for ever, let the suit land be partitioned between the decree holder and the judgment debtor. Accordingly the pleader commissioner is directed to assess the valuation of the entire suit land and to make partition 1/2 and 1/2 and to put the decree holder in possession over 2 Dec. of land including the house standing thereon. The commissioner is directed to deliver possession of the suit land and the house over 2 Dec. to the decree holder and submit his report within fortnight. In case of necessity, he can take the help of police." 3. Mr. Ram Balak Mahto, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner assailed the impugned order as being illegal and without jurisdiction. Learned counsel firstly submitted that the petitioner is none else but a purchaser from one of the decree holder and, therefore, the decree cannot be executed against him. Learned counsel further submitted that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, only symbolic possession can be effected in favour of the decree holder-Opp. party. Learned counsel developed his argument by submitting that there is no decree against the petitioner nor there is decree for partition and, therefore, the Executing court cannot go behind the decree by passing the impugned order. Learned counsel lastly submitted that a partition suit has already been filed by the petitioner for partition of the suit properties to the extent of his share purchased by him. According to the learned counsel, therefore, the execution proceeding should remain stayed till the disposal of the partition suit. 4. From the facts stated hereinabove, it is admitted position that a joint decree was obtained by the plaintiff-Opp. party nos. 1 and 2 for recovery of possession of the suit properties from the defendant-opposite party. Thereafter one of the decree holders, namely, Opposite party no. 4. From the facts stated hereinabove, it is admitted position that a joint decree was obtained by the plaintiff-Opp. party nos. 1 and 2 for recovery of possession of the suit properties from the defendant-opposite party. Thereafter one of the decree holders, namely, Opposite party no. 1-Hari Narayan Rastogi levied execution case for recovery of possession of the entire suit properties from the defendants-judgment debtors which is permissible in law. At this stage it is worth to quote Order XXI, rule 15 of the Code of Civil Procedure :- "15. Application for execution by joint decree-holder. - Where a decree has been passed jointly in favour of more persons than one, anyone or more of such persons may, unless the decree imposes any condition to the contrary apply for the execution of the whole decree for the benefit of them all, or where any one from has died, for the benefit of the survivors and legal representatives of the deceased. (2) Where the court sees sufficient cause for allowing the decree to be executed on an application made under this rule, it shall make such order as it deems necessary for protecting the interest of the person who have not joined in the application". 5. However, during the pendency of the execution case the co-decree holder-Opposite party transferred a portion of the suit property measuring 1-1/2 Dec. of the land to the present petitioner. It has come on record that on the basis of such purchase the petitioner occupied major portion of the suit property and have been enjoying the same. So after submission of the report by the pleader commissioner learned advocates appearing on behalf of both the parties have agreed and conceded in the court below that the suit land be partitioned between the decree holders and delivery of possession be effected with the help of the pleader commissioner. The court below, therefore, on the concession of the parties passed the impugned order. 6. Mr. R.B. Mahto, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the advocate appearing for the petitioner in the court below never conceded for partition of the suit property and for delivery of possession and it has been wrongly recorded in the order that the advocates have conceded. On the other hand, Mr. 6. Mr. R.B. Mahto, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the advocate appearing for the petitioner in the court below never conceded for partition of the suit property and for delivery of possession and it has been wrongly recorded in the order that the advocates have conceded. On the other hand, Mr. Chakravarty Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the opposite party refuted the submission and submitted that the impugned order was passed on concession made by both the parties. The learned counsel contended that as a matter of fact the petitioner in order to enjoy the entire suit property has connived with the judgment debtors and has challenged the impugned order by filing this Civil revision. I find much force in the submission of the learned counsel for the opposite party. The submission of Mr. Mahto that the order was not passed on concession cannot be accepted. If the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner would have been correct then the petitioner could have moved the Executing court which passed the order taking stand that no concession was made. Admittedly the petitioner did not file any application in the Executing court raising objection that the petitioner or his advocate has ever conceded for passing the impugned order. In absence of such application the statement recorded in the impugned order has to be accepted as correct. In this connection reference may be made to a decision of the Apex Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Ramdeo Shrinivas Nayak (1982 B.B.C.J. 179) where their Lordships held as under: "When we drew the attention of the learned Attorney General to the concession made before High Court, Shri A.K. Sen who appeared for the State of Maharashtra before the High Court and led the arguments for the respondents there and who appeared for Shri Antulay before us intervened and protested that he never made any such concession and invited us to pursue the written submission made by him in the High Court. We are afraid that we cannot launch into an enquiry as to what transpired in the High Court. It is simply not done. Public policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of judicial records are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena "Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the name of litigation". It is simply not done. Public policy bars us. Judicial decorum restrains us. Matters of judicial records are unquestionable. They are not open to doubt. Judges cannot be dragged into the arena "Judgments cannot be treated as mere counters in the name of litigation". We are bound to accept the statement of the Judges recorded in their judgment, as to what transpires in Court. We cannot allow the statement of the Judges to be contradicted by statements at the bar or by affidavit and other evidence. If the Judges say in their judgment that something was done, said or admitted before them, that has to be the last word on the subject. The principle is well settled that statement of fact as true what transpired at the hearing, recorded in the judgment of the court, are conclusive of the fact so stated and no one can contradict such statement by affidavit or other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been wrongly recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the Judges, to call the attention of the very Judges who have made the record to the fact that the statement made with regard to his conduct was a statement that had been made in error. That is the only way to have the record corrected. If no such step is taken, the matter must necessarily end there. Of course a party may resile and an appellate court may permit him in rare and appropriate cases to resile from a concession on the ground that the concession was made on a wrong appreciation of the law and has led to gross injustice, but, he may not call in question the very fact of making of concession as recorded in the judgment." 7. Be that as it may admittedly the petitioner is not a decree holder but he has purchased unspecified 1.5 Dec. of suit property out of four decimals from one of the decree holders. The petitioner has, therefore, no right to enjoy the entire suit property on the technical plea that a sympolic possession should be delivered and/or the decree cannot be executed against the purchaser of the decree or on the grounds raised by Mr. Mahto, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. The petitioner has, therefore, no right to enjoy the entire suit property on the technical plea that a sympolic possession should be delivered and/or the decree cannot be executed against the purchaser of the decree or on the grounds raised by Mr. Mahto, learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted then a valid decree obtained by the opposite party and affirmed upto the Letters Patent appeal will become inexecutable and a waste paper. This can never be the intention of the framer of the Rules and making provisions of Order XXI, rule 36 of the Code of Civil Procedure. If the impugned order is set aside on the ground that the decree cannot be executed against the purchaser of the decree holder then no decree obtained by joint decree holder could be executed. If one of the decree holders transferred a portion of the property and put the purchaser in possession thereof. 8. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the opinion that the court below had no option but to effect delivery of possession of the properties to the extent of the share of the decree holder with the help of the pleader commissioner. The learned advocates appearing in the court, therefore, very fairly conceded that the decree should be executed in the manner stated above. In exercise of my revisional jurisdiction I am, therefore, not inclined to interfere with the impugned order for the reason that if the impugned order is allowed to stand it would not occasion failure of justice and the petitioner shall not suffer any irreparable loss or injury inasmuch as he is mere a purchaser of the property. 9. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the discussions made above, I do not find any merit in this revision application which is, accordingly, dismissed.