KERALA TRANSPORT COMPANY v. VASU DALJITH KAUR AMARJEETH SINGH
1998-11-06
M.P.CHINNAPPA
body1998
DigiLaw.ai
M. P. CHINNAPPA, J. ( 1 ) THE plaintiff-petitioner herein filed a suit in S. C. No. 4792 of 1995 on the file of the X Additional Judge, Court of Small Causes, Bangalore (SCCH 14) to recover a sum of Rs. 8,990/- from the respondent on the allegation that the petitioner had entrusted certain quantity of materials to be transported and delivered to its customer viz. , M/s. Asian paints at Bombay. While the goods were delivered to the consignee at bombay, some of the items were found to be damaged during transit as a result of which the materials had become useless. The consignee rejected the goods and claimed Rs. 13,990/- being the value of the damaged goods and the same was paid to the Asian Paints by the petitioner. After adjusting the freight charges, the petitioner brought a suit for a sum of rs. 8,990/- being the difference amount payable by the respondent towards the loss or damage caused to the petitioner. ( 2 ) THE respondent filed written statement contending among other things that the Small Causes Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit on the ground that under Section 8 (2) of the Small Causes Court Act (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act'), the claim made by the petitioner was excepted from the purview of the Code. Therefore, this suit is not maintainable as the Small Cause Court has no jurisdiction. This question was treated as a preliminary question and the Court has passed the order on 25-1-1997 holding that the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. It further directed the plaint to be returned to the plaintiff for presentation to the City Civil Court, Bangalore, on or before 6-2-1997. Being aggrieved by this order, the plaintiff has preferred this petition under Section 115 of the CPC. ( 3 ) HEARD the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondent. ( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the petitioner submitted that Section 8 (2) of the Act confers jurisdiction on the Court of Small Causes, all suits of a civil nature and the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Courts are excluded only in respect of such suits which are stated in the Schedule. He also further stated that S. 8 specifically bars any other Court from trying a suit which is cognizable by a Court of Small Causes.
He also further stated that S. 8 specifically bars any other Court from trying a suit which is cognizable by a Court of Small Causes. According to him, it is a simple suit for recovery of money from the respondent to the extent of Rs. 8,990/- on the cause of action alleged by the petitioner to the effect that the respondent has caused damage to the materials of the petitioner at the time of transit and the said claim is not at all exempted under Article 29 of the Schedule. ( 5 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent however submitted that it is a suit in the nature of claiming damages from the respondent for the loss he sustained due to the damage caused to the materials which were entrusted to the respondent to be transported. Therefore, it clearly comes under Article 29 of Section 8 (1) of the Act. Therefore, he submitted that the impugned order does not call for interference. Section 8 of the Act reads as follows:" (1) A Court of Small Causes shall not take cognizance of the suits specified in the Schedule as suits excepted from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes. (2) Subject to the exception specified in the Schedule and to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, all suits of a civil nature of which the value does not exceed five hundred rupees shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes: provided that the State Government, in consultation with the high Court, may by notification, direct that all suits of which the value does not exceed "ten Thousand Rupees" shall be cognizable by a Court of Small Causes mentioned in the notification". ( 6 ) AS far as pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court is concerned, there is absolutely no quarrel between the parties. The only question that arises for consideration is as to whether this claim comes under Article 29 of the Schedule which refers to suits excepted from the cognizance of a court of Small Causes. Article 29 reads as follows: "a suit for a general average loss or for salvage".
The only question that arises for consideration is as to whether this claim comes under Article 29 of the Schedule which refers to suits excepted from the cognizance of a court of Small Causes. Article 29 reads as follows: "a suit for a general average loss or for salvage". The learned Small Causes Court has come to the conclusion that this is exempted from the purview of the Small Causes Court as the word ''general average loss" is used in item No. 29 has to be interpreted with reference to the object of this Act. The object of this Act is a speedy disposal of some small matters which do not involve complicated questions of law and facts. So a simple suit for recovery of money has been within the competence of the Small Causes Court but a suit for recovery of damages for the loss sustained or damage done by the carrier of the goods, such a suit cannot be called as a simple suit for recovery of money. According to him, it is a complicated suit where tortious liability of the carrier is to be determined with reference to the compensation claimed. Therefore, he has given the ordinary meaning of the words 'average' and 'loss' found in Chambers 20th Century Dictionary, New edition 1983 which means that: "it is the assessment of damages done to the cargo". According to the Court below, in the present context that meaning appears to be probable. ( 7 ) REPELLING this finding of the Court below, the learned Counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to the Law Lexicon of 1992 Edition by Sri P. Ramanatha Iyer at page 1149 where "salvage" is defined which reads: salvage. A compensation allowed to persons who have saved or aided in saving ships or cargo from actual loss after wreck, or from impending danger, whether from fire, pirates, enemies or the ordinary perils of the sea;"salvage, in its simple character, is the service which those who recover property from loss or danger at sea, render to the owners, with the responsibility of making restitution, and with a hen for their reward. It is personal, in its primary character at least".
It is personal, in its primary character at least". "salvage consists: (1) of an adequate compensation for the actual outlay of labour and expense made in the enterprise; and (2) of the reward as bounty allowed from motives of public policy, as a means of encouraging such exertions. In determining the amount of an award the leading considerations are the degree of danger from which the rescue is made; value of the property saved; risk to the salvors; the value of property risked by salvors and the dangers to which it was exposed; the skill shown and the time and labour spent". "a salvage loss is that kind of loss which it is presumed would, but for certain services rendered, have become a total loss. The charges incurred are called "salvage charges", the property saved is the "salvage", and the difference between the amount of salvage after deducting the charges and the original value of the property is called the "salvage loss". In general, a salvage loss of goods is one in consequence of shipwreck or where by the perils of the sea, the vessel is prevented from proceeding on her voyage, and the cargo or the part that is saved is obliged to be sold at a place short of the port of destination". He has also drawn my attention to Judicial Dictionary by Iyer at page 1012 wherein Salvage means: "allowance or compensation made by maritime law to those by whose exertions ships or goods have been laved from the dangers of the seas, fire, pirates or enemies". From this meaning it is clear that it is not pertaining to the loss or damage caused to the materials which were transported in a carrier. Therefore, the word appearing in Article 29 "for general average loss or for salvage" cannot be construed as the exemption granted in respect of the loss claimed by the plaintiff in this suit. The finding of the Court that the Court cannot go into the question of tortious liability and it is excepted to decide a suit simple in nature cannot also be accepted. In deciding the question whether the suit is of a small cause nature or not, attention has to be paid to the nature of the suit.
The finding of the Court that the Court cannot go into the question of tortious liability and it is excepted to decide a suit simple in nature cannot also be accepted. In deciding the question whether the suit is of a small cause nature or not, attention has to be paid to the nature of the suit. ( 8 ) IN a decision rendered by this Court in Muddanna Shetty and another v Maire alias Laxmi Heggadthi, this Court has held that unauthorised cutting of trees by tenant-suit for damages is maintainable before the Small Causes Court. This decision also was referred to by the learned Court below and it has held that this decision came to be rendered by this Court prior to the Act coming into force. Therefore, the decision is not applicable. ( 9 ) IN Govinda Krishna Kulkarni v Venkatesha Krishna Kulkarni, this Court had occasion to deal with the jurisdiction of Small Causes courts in a case filed by the plaintiff against the defendant alleging wrongful removal of crops and this Court has held that the said act was wrongful or illegal but not necessarily a penal one. This Court has held that the Small Causes Court has jurisdiction to try the suit. ( 10 ) THE Court below has not followed the above said decisions on the ground that they are not pertaining to Karnataka Small Causes Courts act, 1964, whereas they pertain to the Provincial Small Causes Courts act and therefore, it is held that it is not applicable to the present case. From a perusal of the decisions and also the meaning attached to the words referred to above, it is abundantly clear that the suit is not based on penal actions but only to claim damages that were caused to the consignment during transit. Therefore, the principles enunciated in the aforesaid decisions are not contrary to the provisions of the present Act. On the other hand, they are in consonance with the provisions of the act. From these decisions it is clear that there is no total bar to try the case in respect of damages arising out of tortious act. Prohibition is only in respect of maintaining the suit in regard to penal actions.
On the other hand, they are in consonance with the provisions of the act. From these decisions it is clear that there is no total bar to try the case in respect of damages arising out of tortious act. Prohibition is only in respect of maintaining the suit in regard to penal actions. In this particular case it is clear that the plaintiff has sought for recovering the amount from the defendant which the plaintiff had paid to the consignor. Though the suit appears to be in the form of tortious act, it is in fact regarding recovering the amount which the plaintiff had paid to the consignor for the damages caused to the materials. It is not a case wherein, complicated question of law or facts is involved. Even if it is involved, the Court of Small Causes is competent to try the case as the presiding Officer has sufficient experience to deal with the matter. Therefore, the finding of the Court below that the Court of Small Causes is only meant to try a non-complicated case and the subject-matter in this suit is very complicated which cannot be tried by the Court of Small causes and it is against the object of the Act, etc. , cannot be accepted. Article 29 is excepted only in regard to general average loss or for salvage and it is not pertaining to the claim made in the suit which is clear from the meaning and explanation assigned by the Law Lexicon mentioned above. Therefore, the first reasoning of the learned Trial Court is liable to be rejected. ( 11 ) THE Court below also has come to the conclusion that it also comes under Article 14 of the Schedule to Section 8 of the Act. Article 14 reads:"a suit for the specific performance or rescission of contract". This suit is neither for specific performance of contract nor for recission of the contract. This case has no application to suits for damages for breach of contract which are not cognizable by Small Causes Courts. The contract was completed by delivering the goods. The only claim of the plaintiff is that while delivering the goods some of the goods were damaged and the respondent is liable to pay the said amount. Therefore, this item does not come under Article 14 in Schedule to Section 8.
The contract was completed by delivering the goods. The only claim of the plaintiff is that while delivering the goods some of the goods were damaged and the respondent is liable to pay the said amount. Therefore, this item does not come under Article 14 in Schedule to Section 8. For the foregoing reasons, I hold that the order passed by the Court below which is impugned in this petition regarding jurisdiction is unsustainable. ( 12 ) IN the result therefore, I proceed to pass the following: order the petition is allowed. The order dated 25-1-1997 passed by the court of Small Causes, Bangalore, holding that that Court had no jurisdiction to try the suit and directing the office to return the plaint to the plaintiff to present it before the City Civil Court is set aside. The Court of Small Causes is directed to proceed with the case, in accordance with law. --- *** --- .