B. C. PATEL, J. ( 1 ) APPELLANTS, original petitioners before the learned single Judge being aggrieved by the order of dismissal of Spl. C. A. No. 4084 of 1984 passed on 24/09/1984. have preferred this Letters Patent Appeal. ( 2 ) APPELLANT No. 1 is an Industrial Co-operative Service Society (hereinafter referred to as "the Society"), which was formed in the year 1973-74 for the purpose of upliftment of middle class entrepreneurs. The Society-Appellant No. I, the vendee, on one hand and the appellants No. 2 to 5. the vendors, on the other hand on 8-1-1975 entered into an agreement to sell the lands bearing Revenue Survey nos. 162 and 163 situated at village Majura. Tal. Choryasi. Dist. Surat. a copy of which is produced at Annexure a to the Special Civil Application. Another agreement to sell was also entered into between the aforesaid parties on 15-3-1975 for the land bearing Revenue Survey No. 160/1 of village Majura. a copy of which is produced at Annexure b to the petition. Appellant Nos. 2 to 5 executed irrevocable power of attorney on S-1-1975. vide Annexure c to the petition, in favour or the appellant No. I - Society. The Society was put in possession of lands bearing the aforesaid Survey Numbers. The Society, in view of the provisions contained in the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) submitted the form as required under Sec. 6 (i) of the said Act pointing out that the lands were in their possession. Application for exemption under Sec. 20 of the Act was filed before the State Government. It appears that the same came to be rejected on 7-3-1983. vide Annexure L to the petition. On the basis of the order at Annexure l dated 9-3-1983. competent authority passed an order, vide annexure l, on 21-10-1983 holding that Shri Bipinchandra Sundarlal was not holding the land in capacity as an owner. He was merely a promoter of the Society and the form was ordered to be filed. ( 3 ) BEING aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the appellants preferred Special Civil application and the learned single Judge held that the form filed by the appellant no. 1 under Sec. 6 (i) of the Act has been finalised; the exemption has not been granted; the Society was not registered under the relevant scheme prior to 17/02/1976; and. ( 3 ) BEING aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the appellants preferred Special Civil application and the learned single Judge held that the form filed by the appellant no. 1 under Sec. 6 (i) of the Act has been finalised; the exemption has not been granted; the Society was not registered under the relevant scheme prior to 17/02/1976; and. the reasons given by the authority were just and proper. Learned single Judge also held that even assuming that an application under Sec. 20 of the act is pending, the petition is grossly delayed in view of the fact that the final order has been passed in the year 1983. ( 4 ) IT is required to be noted that in the instant case documents, namely, the agreements to sell were executed on two different dates. Appellant No. I was put in possession of the lands in question and an irrevocable power of attorney was also executed in favour of the appellant No. I on 24-2-1975. The Act has defined see. 2 (1} to hold which reads as under :- (1) "to hold" with its grammatical variations, in relation to any vacant land. means.- (i) to own such land; or (ii) to possess such land as owner or as tenant or as mortgagee or under an irrevocable power of Attorney or under a hire-purchase agreement or partly in one of the said capacities and partly in any other of the said capacity or capacities. ( 5 ) RELYING on sub-clause (ii) of clause (1) of Sec. 2 of the Act. it was submitted that the appellant No. 1 was possessing the land in question under an irrevocable power of attorney and. therefore, the application was required to be taken into consideration in the spirit of law in which the Act came to be enacted. ( 6 ) IT is required to be noted that there is no dispute that the lands bearing the aforesaid Survey Numbers are situated in an industrial zone and the appellant- society was seeking exemption for industrial use by middle-class persons. The lands were converted into industrial use by the appellants. From reading Sec. 2 (1) quoted above, it is very clear that the appellant-Society is holding the lands in question. ( 7 ) IT is pointed out before us that under the Act not only the appellant No. 1. but the appellant Nos. The lands were converted into industrial use by the appellants. From reading Sec. 2 (1) quoted above, it is very clear that the appellant-Society is holding the lands in question. ( 7 ) IT is pointed out before us that under the Act not only the appellant No. 1. but the appellant Nos. 2 to 6 also filled in the form under Sec. 6 of the Act. The competent authority declared land admeasuring 69. 945. 49 mtrs. , as excess land by an order dated 26-10-1983 against which appeals were also preferred by appellant nos. 2 to 6 individually and by a common order dated 25-9-1995, the appellate authority directed the competent authority to proceed further after the decision that may be rendered in the present I. . P. A. On this ground, the appeal presented by the society was also disposed of. ( 8 ) IT appears from the decision rendered by the learned single Judge that undue weightage was given to the fact that the Society was not registered under the relevant scheme for the purpose of industries prior to 17/02/1976. As stated earlier. the proposed Society can be said to he a person holding the lands. So far as the registration aspect is concerned. Mr. Sanjanwala. learned Counsel appearing for the appellants drew our attention to the decision of the Division Bench of this High court in L. P. A. No. 273 of 1987 [paramount Industrial Co-op. Society Ltd. and Ors. State of Gujarat and Ors. ] decided on 7/06/1992 wherein similar question was involved. The Society in that ease was not registered prior to 28-1-1976. That was the ground taken by the authority deciding the application. It was pointed out that the appellant No. I was in possession of the said land and that it had paid the price of the same to the, owners and an irrevocable Power of Attorney was executed with regard to the lands in question. The Division Bench held that "a person who is in lawful possession of the land can be regarded as a holder of the land under the act. Thus. the appellant was entitled to make an application under Sec. 20 of the act". The competent authority as well as the learned single Judge have not taken this aspect into consideration. ( 9 ) IT is pointed out in the aforesaid decision relied upon by Mr. Thus. the appellant was entitled to make an application under Sec. 20 of the act". The competent authority as well as the learned single Judge have not taken this aspect into consideration. ( 9 ) IT is pointed out in the aforesaid decision relied upon by Mr. Sanjanwala that in view of the policy statement made by the Chief Minister, as alleged in the application and the granting of permission to another Society, even though it was not registered, the Government could not have rejected that application without affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant No. 1. Appellant No. I could have pointed out to the Government that another Society, to which exemption was granted, was similarly situated and that in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. as pointed out in the application, hardship would be caused to number of persons, who have become the members of the Society. As the impugned order dated 4-4-1986 was passed without affording any opportunity to petitioner No. 1. it deserves to be set aside". As the order dated 4-4-1986 impugned in the said 1. . P. A. was passed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the petitioner No. I. the division Bench set aside the order. ( 10 ) IT is also required to be noted that the appellant-Society was seeking assistance even of gujarat Industrial Development Corporation prior to-1974 which is clear from the letter at Annexure c" to the affidavit dated 21-1 1-1998 sworn by the President of the Society and filed before the Court today. From the letter it transpires that the Society was in need of the land. The Regional Manager of g. I. D. C. . Surat had called upon the Promoter of the Society by letter dated 15-3- 1974 to discuss the matter. The Registrar, Co-op. Society. Surat has issued registration certificate No. 2876 dated 5-9-1979; however, fact remains that the society was organized prior to the Act came into force and the agreements. Annexures a; b and Power of Attorney. Annexure c were executed in the early part of 1975. Section 20 of the Act contemplates that an application of a person who holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit is required to be considered. Therefore, in view of the decision of this Court in L. P. A. No. 273 of 1987. Annexure c were executed in the early part of 1975. Section 20 of the Act contemplates that an application of a person who holds vacant land in excess of the ceiling limit is required to be considered. Therefore, in view of the decision of this Court in L. P. A. No. 273 of 1987. merely because the Society was not registered, the application cannot be rejected. As held by the Full Bench in the case of Avanti Organisation v. Competent Authority, reported in 1989 (1) GLR 586 . if the application is ex facie not maintainable, it can be rejected even without hearing the party. In the instant case. as the Society was holding the land. that is to say that the Society was in possession of the land by virtue of an irrevocable Power of Attorney executed in favour of the Society prior to the Act came into force, the application could not have been rejected merely on the ground that the Society was not registered. ( 11 ) ONE has to also consider the definition of the word person as prescribed in Sec. 2 (i) of the Act. which reads as under :-" (I) "person" includes an individual, a family, a firm. a company, or an association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not:"thus. the section makes it clear that an association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not is required to be considered as a person. In our opinion. even if the argument of the State that the Society was not registered is accepted for the time-being, even then it can he said that in view of sub-clause (i) of Sec. 2 of the Act, the application was by an unincorporated association or body of individuals. The word "incorporate" is to be understood in the sense of process of formation of a legal body with the quality of perpetual existence and succession [law Lexicon]. In the real sense, the Society is. in the first place, a voluntary association of persons formed by members for their mutual rights, protection and benefit. The same is to be regulated by bye-laws. It is a body acting on behalf of all the members of the Society. In the real sense, the Society is. in the first place, a voluntary association of persons formed by members for their mutual rights, protection and benefit. The same is to be regulated by bye-laws. It is a body acting on behalf of all the members of the Society. From the definition, it is very clear that even if the process is pending for incorporation by an association of persons or body of individuals without the action haying been culminated into a corporate body. the same shall be considered as one unit. Incorporation is nothing but an action or process of forming into a community of the corporation. The New Shorter Oxford English dictionary, 1993 edition, page 1342 explains incorporation as under :-"the action or process of forming into a community or corporation; A document which gives legal status to a corporation;. . . . An incorporated society or Company". The Random House Dictionary of English Language, Reprint 1977, explains as "1. to form into a corporation: 2. to form into a society or organisation. ( 12 ) THE Act. considering the object, stipulated that the association of persons as a person - irrespective of the fact whether such association is incorporated or not. for the purposes of the Act. If an Association of body of individuals is in possession of the land, then in that case. it will be considered as one unit. This aspect of the matter has not at all been noticed by the authority deciding the application under Sec. 20 of the Act. Considering the definitions of "to hold" and "person", we are of the view that the State Government ought to have given an opportunity of hearing, and after hearing the appellant No. 1. the State should have decided the application. The decisions which we have referred to hereinabove clearly contemplate that in a case like this. the applicant ought to have been heard. ( 13 ) IT is in this background we are required to decide the appeal and we are of the opinion that the order in the form of letter dated 9-3-1983 at Annexure l is required to be quashed and set aside. ( 14 ) THIS Court had an occasion to consider a case when the application is pending with the Government under Sec. 20 of the Act. ( 14 ) THIS Court had an occasion to consider a case when the application is pending with the Government under Sec. 20 of the Act. what is the nature of directions to be given (L. P. A. No. 85 of 1984 with L. P. A. No. 86 of 1984 decided by this Bench on 5-11-1998) (Savitaben Rumanlal Patel v. State of Gujarat, 1999 (1) GLR 860 ), following the decision of the Full Bench in the case of Avanti organization (supra) and the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Samrathben Manilal Chokshi v. State of Gujarat, in L. P. A. No. 485 of 1984 in special Civil Application No. 1735 of 1984 decided on 8-6-1993 (reported in 1994 (1) GLR 203 ). This Court opined that proceedings initiated in respect of land upto the stage of Sec. 10 (2) of the Act should be left untouched. The prosecution of further process under the Act after the stage of Sec. 10 (2) of the Act being dependent on the decision of the application under Sec. 20 of the Act. could be commenced only after the decision that may be rendered by the Government. In the result, the order passed by the learned single Judge in Spl. C. A. No. 484 of 1984 is quashed and set aside. For the reasons recorded above, the order dated 9-3-1983 passed by the industries Commissioner. Ahmedabad at Annexure l and order dated 21-10-1983 passed by the Competent Authority and Deputy Collector. Surat. Annexure "l" are quashed and set aside, and in view of what we have stated hereinabove, the competent authority will be at liberty to proceed upto the stage of Sec. 10 (2) of the Act; Further process under Act after the stage of Sec. 10 (2) of the Act will depend upon the decision of the application under the Sec. 20 of the Act. It is directed that the Slate shall decide the application under Sec. 20 of the Act submitted by the appellant No. I strictly in accordance with law and the policy in conformity with the provisions of law. Accordingly, the State Government under Sec. 20 of the Act shall dispose of the application under Sec. 20 of the Act submitted by the appellant No. I - Society within a period of three months from the receipt of the writ. Accordingly, the State Government under Sec. 20 of the Act shall dispose of the application under Sec. 20 of the Act submitted by the appellant No. I - Society within a period of three months from the receipt of the writ. The appeal is allowed accordingly. No order as to costs. .