ORDER Deepak Verma, J. 1. In this petition, filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution, Petitioner is praying for quashment of the order of termination of her services; for declaration, that her services have never been legally terminated; she still continues in service, without break; to restore her in service with all consequential and incidental benefits; to give effect to the order dt. 22.9.1997, passed by this Court in W.P. No. 857/1997 and for quashment of the charge-sheet, issued to her. 2. The petition had come-up for admission before this Court, after issuance of show-cause notice to the Respondents on 17.3.1998. It appears, on the said date, objection was raised with regard to maintainability of a writ petition, filed against the Respondents. The Court considered the objection, but, placing reliance on judgments, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1607 ; AIR 1998 SC 295 and 1994 MP LLR 174; prima facie, came to the conclusion that Daly College/Respondent No. 1, would be amenable to writ jurisdiction and will be "State" under the definition of Art. 12 of the Constitution. Thus, the petition, on the said date, was admitted for final hearing. It has now come-up before me for final hearing. 3. Since, this petition has already been admitted for final hearing, it cannot be thrown at the threshold, on the ground, that Respondent No. 1 would not be a State, covered under Art. 12; consequently, would not be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 4. It has been felt by this Court, to resolve this dispute, as number of petitions against Daly College and other such Educational Institutes are coming up. So far question, whether Respondent No. 1/Daly College, would be a State, covered under the definition of Art. 12; consequently, would be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution, has not been examined critically, specifically and the question has not yet been set at rest. 5. I, therefore, deem it fit and proper, on account of aforesaid facts and circumstances, to examine the said question, even, if, it is of academic interest in this petition, as this petition stands admitted. In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court, it has remanded a matter to the High Court, to examine certain question, even, if, it is only of academic interest. In a recent judgment of the Supreme Court, it has remanded a matter to the High Court, to examine certain question, even, if, it is only of academic interest. The said judgment has been pronounced on 12.8.1998 in the matter of Civil Appeal No. 2245 of 1996 (Gujrat Ambuja Cement Ltd. and another V. Union of India and Ors.), relevant operative portion of the said judgment on this point is reproduced hereinbelow - We would also request the High Court to decide all these questions including the main controversy on merits, even, if, after hearing the parties concerned, the High Court is once again inclined to take the view that the grievance of the petitioners was of academic nature. In that case the High Court may examine the said main grievance in the alternative. This request is made to the High Court in order to avoid any future possibility of further remand to the High Court, in case its decision on the academic nature of writ petitioner's grievance gets upset in the hierarchy of proceedings. 6. In view of aforesaid recent judgment of the Supreme Court, I am fortified in my views, even, to examine academic nature, involved in a petition. 7. The counsel, appearing for rival parties, were requested to address this Court on the aforesaid question first and then on the merits of the matter. They have argued it accordingly and I shall also deal with it correspondingly. 8. Smt. Ritu Bhargava, learned counsel, appearing for Petitioner, has placed reliance on number of judgments. First in the series, is, reported in AIR 1998 SC 295 (K. Krishnamacharyaulu and Ors. V. Shri Venkateshwara Hindu College of Engineering and another). In this case, it has been held that writ jurisdiction, is available to teachers in private Educational Institution as State has obligation to provide facilities and opportunities to people to avail right of education and private institutes cater to need of educational opportunities, which has element of public interest. It has, thus, been held, that teachers can, therefore, avail remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 9. In the aforesaid case of the Supreme Court, parity was claimed on the principle of "Equal pay for equal work" on the basis of entitlement to seek enforcement of the orders issued by Government. 10. It has, thus, been held, that teachers can, therefore, avail remedy under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 9. In the aforesaid case of the Supreme Court, parity was claimed on the principle of "Equal pay for equal work" on the basis of entitlement to seek enforcement of the orders issued by Government. 10. Supreme Court has further, held that on account of the fact that an element of public interest is created and the institution is catering to that element, the arm of institution is also entitled to avail of the remedy provided under Art. 226. As mentioned above, in the aforesaid case, Petitioners were claiming parity, on account of the circular issued by Government with those who were working in Government Institution, thus, an element of public interest was created. Interest of en masse teachers was involved, but, in the instant case, Petitioner is claiming her individual right, which has no element of public interest. Thus, the aforesaid case of Supreme Court is clearly distinguishable to the facts of the present case, its ratio cannot be made applicable to this case. 11. Petitioner, then, placed reliance on a judgment of the Supreme Court, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1607 (Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Shri Muktajee V.S.J.M.S. Trust V. V.R. Rudani). In the said case, Apex Court has held that issue of writ of mandamus is not confined to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of State only, but, it can be issued to any other person or authority, performing public duty, even, if, duty is not imposed by statute. 12. Facts of Shri Anadi Mukta's case (supra) reveals that on the basis of revision of pay scale of teaching staff of the University; the Teachers of Science College, which is being run by Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru Trust, were claiming parity with that of University Teachers. Thus, the element of public interest was very much involved, as all the teaching staff of said Science College, were claiming the said relief. In the case in hand, Petitioner is assailing infringement of her individual right, questioning the termination of her services, where, element of public interest cannot be said to be involved. Consequently, I find the said judgment of Supreme Court has no application to the Petitioner's case. 13. Petitioner, then, alluded to 1994 M.P. SLR 174 (Ratan Prasad Kushwaha & Ors. In the case in hand, Petitioner is assailing infringement of her individual right, questioning the termination of her services, where, element of public interest cannot be said to be involved. Consequently, I find the said judgment of Supreme Court has no application to the Petitioner's case. 13. Petitioner, then, alluded to 1994 M.P. SLR 174 (Ratan Prasad Kushwaha & Ors. V. North Coal Fields Ltd. & Ors.), wherein, Division Bench of this Court has been pleaded to hold that even private unaided Schools run by Societies, registered under Societies Registration Act, would be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution. It is further held that imparting education is the function of the State, which, may be discharged either through the State owned or recognized Education Institutions. In the aforesaid case, Petitioner Ratan Prasad Kushwaha, alongwith others, had approached the Court, complaining of mass termination of their employment by the Respondents. 14. Thus, salient and basic distinguishing feature is, that in Ratan Prasad Kushwaha's case (supra), challenge was to mass termination of services, whereas, in this case, an order, passed against an individual employee is under challenge. Thus, for this reason, the aforesaid judgment would not apply to the case in hand. 15. The Petitioner referred, yet, another Single Bench Judgment of this Court, passed in W.P. No. 1251/1996 - Smt. Urmila Sodhi V. Bregadier/ Chairman, Army School, Sagar Cantt., decided on 14.11.1996. 16. In the said judgment, learned Single Judge, placing reliance on the two judgments, namely; Shri Anadi Mukta Sadguru (supra) and Ratanprasad Kushwaha (supra), has held, that writ petition would be maintainable, even, against Private Educational Institution. But with great respect, case of an individual employee of an Educational Institute has not been considered. 17. In the aforesaid case, Army School, in which, Petitioner Smt. Urmila Sodhi, was working as Teacher, is said to be a registered Society, under the Central Act and is not receiving any aid either from Central or State Government, but, was still receiving grant from Welfare fund of the Army, which is regemental fund and not public fund. As mentioned above, learned Single Judge has, on the basis of two judgments, which have been dealt with, above, held that against Private Educational Institutions, writ petition would be maintainable. I have already distinguished the aforesaid two judgments on which, learned Single Judge has placed reliance. As mentioned above, learned Single Judge has, on the basis of two judgments, which have been dealt with, above, held that against Private Educational Institutions, writ petition would be maintainable. I have already distinguished the aforesaid two judgments on which, learned Single Judge has placed reliance. Thus, with utmost humility and with great respect, I differ with the view, as expressed by learned Single Judge. 18. Even, otherwise, facts of the said petition are different than the one mentioned in this petition. Here Respondent No. 1/Daly College is not receiving any grant, aid and support, either from the Central or the State Government. It is being run by creating of its own fund. Thus, view expressed by learned Single Judge in Urmila Sodhi's case (supra), also does not apply to the case in hand. 19. This Court had the occasion to consider the ambit and scope of Art. 12, consequently, amenability to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226 of the Constitution in W.P. No. 493 of 1997 -Madhusudan Agrawal and Ors. V. M.P. Stock Exchange and Ors., decided on 10.11.1997. In this case, specific objection was raised by the Respondents of the said and connected petitions that M.P. Stock Exchange would not be covered as State, under Art. 12 of the Constitution. Consequently, would not be amenable to writ jurisdiction. Though, the question was confined with regard to M.P. Stock Exchange only, but, all recent cases of High Courts and of Apex Court, on Art. 12 have been considered. 20. After consideration of the matter, this Court has held that no writ can be issued against Private Body, unless, fundamental rights or legal rights are being infringed, which, should be sufficient to warrant invocation of writ jurisdiction. 21. If any personal right is being claimed by a petitioner against any Private Body, then, the same cannot be entertained in a petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. Useful reference can also be made to a judgment of the Supreme Court, reported in AIR 1981 SC 487 -Ajay Hasia V. Khalid Mujib Saharvardi & Ors. In the said judgment, yet, another judgment of the Supreme Court has been referred to, which is reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628 . 22. Useful reference can also be made to a judgment of the Supreme Court, reported in AIR 1981 SC 487 -Ajay Hasia V. Khalid Mujib Saharvardi & Ors. In the said judgment, yet, another judgment of the Supreme Court has been referred to, which is reported in AIR 1979 SC 1628 . 22. After consideration of the matter, Supreme Court has held, that it would be paramount importance that existence of deep and pervasive State Control may offer an indication that such Body is a State Agency or instrumentality. 23. Here, it is no doubt, true, that Daly College, a Public School, is engaged in imparting education. The Daly College, was established more than 100 years back, basically with an intention, not only to impart formal education, but, more emphasis is, on giving lessons on extra curricular activities. The main object of Respondent No. 1, is to cut and polish a student like diamond and to grant him full exposure in all respect. The function of Daly College, even, though, engaged for imparting education, cannot be closely related to Governmental functions. This institute is, infact, exclusively for upper strata of Society, who can afford to pay exorbitant fees and expenses. This type of education cannot be afforded by a common man of this Country. It was founded by Sir Henry Daly to educate the sons of the Chiefs of Central India in education and other extra curricular activities. Thus, formal education is not the primary and basic object of this. It gives more of practical training for being a good human being and conscientious citizen of the Country. 24. In AIR 1976 SC 888 -Executive Committee of Vaish Degree College V. Lakshmi Narain, it has been held, that an Institution can be said to be a statutory body, if it is created by or under the statute and owe its existence to a statute. This must be the primary thing which was got to be established. A distinction must be drawn between an institution which is not created by or under a stuatute, but is governed by certain statutory provisions, for the proper maintenance and administration of the institution. Apex Court has held that if it is not the creation of a statute, but, is governed by certain statutory provisions, then, the same would not be amenable to writ jurisdiction. Apex Court has held that if it is not the creation of a statute, but, is governed by certain statutory provisions, then, the same would not be amenable to writ jurisdiction. 24-b. Useful reference may be made to a full Bench judgment of this Court reported in 1993 MPLJ 786 - Dinesh Kumar Shamra V. M.P. Dugdha Mahasangh Sahkari Maryadit and another. Full Bench has held in the said judgment, that co-operative society registered under S. 9 of the M.P. Co-operative Societies Act is not State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India and not amenable to writ jurisdiction of High Court. It has further been held that writ would be maintainable, if, society or its officer act in violation of statutory provisions and/or fail to discharge statutory public duty. Here in the case in hand, there are no statutory Rules applicable to the Petitioner's service conditions, which can be said to have been violated by the Respondents. 25. It is not dispute, that Respondent No. 1 is a Society, said to be registered under the deeming provisions of Madhya Pradesh Registrikaran Adhiniyam, 1973. Except for the fact, that it is affiliated and recognized by C.B.S.C. Board, there is nothing on record to show that it is a creation of Statute. 26. Thus, in the considered opinion of this Court, it would not be amenable to writ jurisdiction, as Respondent No. 1 cannot be said to be a 'State' covered under Art. 12 of the Constitution. This is clearly culled out from the judgment of the Supreme Court and High Courts, after critical and microscopic examination of the same. 27. However, as I have already mentioned above, this question being purely academic for this petition, is not going to affect the petitioner's case, as it has to be decided on merit, as petition stands admitted. The aforesaid ratio would be applicable in future, for other employees of Daly College and other such Institutes, as time and again, such type of controversy has arisen before this Court. 28. Now, I shall deal with the facts of the instant case. Petitioner was appointed as Asstt. Mistress, Jr. School, Daly College, Indore on 30.6.1979. After completion of probation period, she was duly confirmed on the said post and continued to perform her duties as such, till her services were terminated by Respondent No. 1 vide order dt. 13.5.1995. 28. Now, I shall deal with the facts of the instant case. Petitioner was appointed as Asstt. Mistress, Jr. School, Daly College, Indore on 30.6.1979. After completion of probation period, she was duly confirmed on the said post and continued to perform her duties as such, till her services were terminated by Respondent No. 1 vide order dt. 13.5.1995. The impugned order of termination shows that her services have been terminated on account of "Disorderly behaviour and indiscipline". 29. Grievance of the Petitioner is, that the order of termination is bad in law and cannot be sustained. It has also been attacked that an employee cannot be removed on the basis of notice simplicitor on payment of salary for the requisite period in lieu of notice period. It has, then, been submitted, that the wordings of the termination order are such, which casts a stigma on the Petitioner's record, therefore, it cannot be termed as termination order simplicitor. By amendment, Petitioner has claimed other reliefs, including quasment of charge-sheet. 30. On being served with the order of termination, Petitioner approached this Court by filing W.P. No. 857 of 1996, which has since been decided on 22.9.1997. The learned Single Judge, without expressing any opinion on the merits of the matter, disposed of the same, by giving following directions; 12. In the circumstances, I do not express any opinion on the merits of the matter, but, dispose of these petitions in terms indicated below - (a) Annexure-P1, concerning Mrs. Promilla Bais (Petitioner of W.P. No. 857 of 1996) and Annexure P.3, concerning Mrs. Lila Bhan (Petitioner of W.P. No. 1624 of 1996) shall now be considered by Respondent No. 2 in the meeting scheduled to take place in the first week of October, 1997 and appropriate decision on the same may be taken under intimation to the respective Petitioners; (b) In case of delay or unfavourable decision by Respondent No. 2, Petitioners shall have the freedom to resort to appropriate remedy as may be available to them under the law. Respondent No. 2, may however, ensure justice to avoid this. 31. Pursuant to the said order, a Meeting of Board of Governors, was held on 24.10.1997, result of which was conveyed to the Petitioner on 15.11.1997. It has been resolved as under by Board of Governors : After discussion, it was resolved that though the aforesaid termination orders dt. Respondent No. 2, may however, ensure justice to avoid this. 31. Pursuant to the said order, a Meeting of Board of Governors, was held on 24.10.1997, result of which was conveyed to the Petitioner on 15.11.1997. It has been resolved as under by Board of Governors : After discussion, it was resolved that though the aforesaid termination orders dt. 13.5.1995 are termination simplicitor and causes no stigma on employee concerned. However, in view of the direction issued by the Hon'ble High Court of M.P. Indore, Bench Indore in W.P. No. 857/1996 and W.P. No. 1624/96 and reconsidering the matter, the Board took the decision to keep the termination order dt. 13.5.1995 in abeyance and the aforesaid employees would be proceeded with a Departmental Enquiry by issuing charge-sheet etc. and after completion of the Departmental Enquiry, the matter would again be placed before the Board of Governors. It is further resolved that the point of reinstatement and backwages will depend upon the result of Departmental Enquiry. It is further resolved that before proceeding departmentally, against the above employees, they be given prior hearing in the matter before the Board or the person appointed by the Board. For this purpose the Board appointed Mr. P.S. Dixit, Sr. Vice Principal for hearing in the matter. 32. Petitioner's grievance now is, that this resolution passed by Board of Governors is, in violation to the dicta of High Court, in Petitioner's earlier petition. According to the Petitioner, she has first to be restored to her earlier position and reinstated, only, thereafter Departmental Enquiry can be held. 33. Petitioner has further contended that unless relationship of master and servant is restored, the question of Respondent No. 1, taking any action against Petitioner does not arise. In other words, submission is, that she has to be restored back in service and, only, thereafter, any action could be taken against the petitioner. The appointment of Shri P.S. Dixit, as Enquiry Officer is also being attacked. 34. Initially a show-cause notice against admission was issued to Respondents. Respondents have raised preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the petition on the ground, that Respondent No. 1 is not a State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution, thus, it would not be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226. 34. Initially a show-cause notice against admission was issued to Respondents. Respondents have raised preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of the petition on the ground, that Respondent No. 1 is not a State within the meaning of Art. 12 of the Constitution, thus, it would not be amenable to writ jurisdiction under Art. 226. The petition is premature, in as much as, pursuant to the order of High Court, the Petitioner's initial termination order has been treated as 'termination order simplicitor' and the same has been kept in abeyance, subject to final result of the Departmental Enquiry. It is further contended that even Petitioner's salary and other benefits and intact, should there be an order in favour of the Petitioner finally by Board of Governors. It is further submitted, that reinstatement in service or payment of backwages cannot be said to be condition precedent for giving an opportunity of hearing and holding an enquiry, moreso, when the termination order has been kept in abeyance. 35. As has been mentioned above, the petition was, thereafter, admitted for final hearing on 17.3.1998 and it was further directed that Petitioner would be paid salary or wages as the case may be w.e.f. 24.10.1997 till the said date. 36. It is not in dispute that pursuant to the said order, Petitioner has actually been paid salary w.e.f. 24.10.1997 till March, 1998. 37. It appears that Petitioner agitated the matter for further payment after March, 1998 on account of which, Respondents filed their Reply and also filed an application for modification of the said order dt. 17.3.1998. Respondents also brought it to the notice of the Court by filing subsequent Application that Petitioner is gainfully employed in Progressive Education School since July, 1996, which is manifest from the Prospectus of the said School, in which, she has been shown as one of the Faculty Members. This fact has not been denied by the Petitioner. Thus, it is clearly made out that Petitioner is gainfully employed in Progressive School, since July, 1996. 38. However, on Petitioner's insistence for payment of further salary from April, 1998 and for continuance of the same until disposal of the petition, this Court thought it fit to hear the matter expeditiously, that is how, it has been taken up for hearing, out of turn. 39. 38. However, on Petitioner's insistence for payment of further salary from April, 1998 and for continuance of the same until disposal of the petition, this Court thought it fit to hear the matter expeditiously, that is how, it has been taken up for hearing, out of turn. 39. In the Additional Return, filed by Respondents, they have submitted, on account of the objection raised by Petitioner, with regard to appointment of Shri P.S. Dixit as Enquiry Officer, Board of Governors has appointed Shri S.K. Chansoriya as Enquiry Officer. This intimation has been given to the Petitioner on 18.7.1998. Further date was also informed by the Respondents to the Petitioner on 21.7.1998 to participate in the proceedings before the newly appointed Enquiry Officer, as he is required to complete the enquiry within a period of three months. But Petitioner has not co-operated in the said enquiry, and is not participating in the same. Respondents have, therefore, submitted, that on the one hand Petitioner is not participating in the enquiry and on the other, is, claiming wages/salary from April, 1998. Thus, behaviour of the Petitioner speaks volume on her conduct. 40. In the light of rival contentions, as advanced by the learned counsel for parties, I have heard them at length and perused the record. 41. Earlier, the Petitioner had approached this Court that her order of termination was bad, as the same could not have been passed, without holding any proper enquiry or without there being any proof of misconduct by the petitioner, which could be done only by issuance of charge-sheet against her. Thus, keeping this objection in view, the Board of Governors, passed necessary orders, which in the considered opinion of this Court, have been complied with fully by the Respondent No. 1. Petitioner's initial termination order has been directed to be kept in abeyance and enquiry is to be held for the misconduct as per charge-sheet, issued to her on 24.3.1998 (Annexure P.12) 42. In one of the Reply, filed by Petitioner, she has submitted that enquiry, if, at all, is to be conducted, then, some Retired High Court Judge be appointed as Enquiry Officer. Infact, looking to her objection, it was thought fit by the Board of Governors to change the Enquiry Officer and to appoint a new officer in his place. Now, Mr. S.K. Chansoirya is the new Enquiry Officer. Infact, looking to her objection, it was thought fit by the Board of Governors to change the Enquiry Officer and to appoint a new officer in his place. Now, Mr. S.K. Chansoirya is the new Enquiry Officer. On the basis of Petitioner's surmises and conjectures, the Enquiry Officer cannot be changed every now and then, unless petitioner is able to establish a serious bias or prejudicial mind of the Enquiry Officer. In the said case, Petitioner has not leveled any such charges. 43. Thus, the Petitioner had no choice, but, to appear before the Enquiry Officer, submit reply to the statement of charges and participate in the Departmental Enquiry. Since, the Petitioner's order of termination has already been directed to be kept in abeyance, I am of the considered opinion, that unless, final orders are passed after conduction of the enquiry, this petition has to be treated as premature. 44. Before the matter could be concluded, after hearing counsel for parties, Shri A.K. Sethi, learned counsel appearing for Respondents, informed the Court that Shri S.K. Chansoriya, the New Enquiry Officer, has already submitted his Report to the Board of Governors of Respondent No. 1 for taking action in the matter. In view of this development, he prayed that hearing be deferred for a day so as to enable him to produce the Enquiry Report. Accordingly, hearing was adjourned for a day. 45. Respondents have, then, submitted the Enquiry Report dt. 17.9.1998 before this Court. Petitioner was given time to file documents in rebuttal, if she so desired. Petitioner has submitted an affidavit and several documents alongwith it to show the numerous objection taken by her with regard to holding of the enquiry. 46. It is pertinent to mention here that on 24.7.1998, Petitioner's prayer for staying the enquiry was specifically refused by this Court. Petitioner's main thrust of argument is, that in view of pendency of the petition, where, issuance of charge-sheet itself is under challenge, even, if, prayer for stay was refused, judicial proprietary and discipline required that Respondents should have stayed their hands from proceedings further with enquiry. 47. I am afraid, such an argument would be preposterous and against well settled cannons of law. 47. I am afraid, such an argument would be preposterous and against well settled cannons of law. Since, Petitioner's prayer for stay of the enquiry was refused by this Court, after hearing both sides, on Petitioner's interlocutory application, filed in this regard, I find there was no illegality or error in continuing with the enquiry against her. 48. It is a matter of record, that Petitioner was issued notices/letters to appear before the Enquiry Officer and to put up her case. Infact, Enquiry Officer had tried to make her understand, in so many clear and specific words, of the repurcussion of her not participating in the Enquiry but still good sense did not prevail on her. Admittedly, she indulged in unnecessary correspondence with the Enquiry Officer and on her own showing did not appear before him on 6.8.1998 and again on 27.8.1998. She is to be blamed herself for this indifferent and callous attitude. 49. In Service Law Jurisprudence, an employee is to be afforded an opportunity of hearing in the enquiry and principles of natural justice are to be followed. Unless serious bias or prejudice is projected against the Enquiry Officer, he could not have been changed every now and then, at the whim and fancy of the Petitioner. Now it is an admitted position that despite knowledge of dates of hearings, Petitioner did not appear before the Enquiry Officer, thus, leaving him with no choice but to proceed with the enquiry. Infact, short of begging, Enquiry Officer made all efforts to cajole her to appear before him, but, all his efforts failed. 50. On account of change of scenario, the complexion of the case has totally changed with rendering of Report against her. Now it is for the Board of Governors to take appropriate action, or drop proceedings against her, what in their wisdom, Board of Governors are going to do is not known to this Court. Thus, in a way, this petition has been rendered in fructuous. 51. Now it is for the Board of Governors to take appropriate action, or drop proceedings against her, what in their wisdom, Board of Governors are going to do is not known to this Court. Thus, in a way, this petition has been rendered in fructuous. 51. A useful reference can also be made to AIR 1970 SC 1244 -Executive Committee of U.P. State Warehousing Corpn., Lucknow V. C.K. Tyagi, where, Supreme Court was considering the import of dismissal of an employee, even, though, it was in violation of Regulation framed under Agricultural Produce (Development and Warehousing) Corporation Act and has held that the same cannot be said to in breach of mandatory obligation under the Act. Consequently, the employee cannot claim reinstatement. 52. It has been held elegantly in para-31 as under - Having due regard to the principles discussed above, we are of opinion that the High Court was not justified in granting the declaration that the order dated March 10, 1964 dismissing the respondent from service is null and void and that he is entitled to be reinstated in service with full pay and other emoluments. As pointed out by us, the regulations are made under the power reserved to the Corporation under Section 54 of the Act. No doubt they lay down the terms and conditions of relationship between the Corporation and its employees. An order made in breach of the regulations would be contrary to such terms and conditions, but would not be in breach of any statutory obligation, as was the position which this Court had to deal with in the Life Insurance Corporation case, 1964 5 SCR 528 : ( AIR 1964 SC 847 ). In the instant case, a breach has been committed by the appellant of regulation 16 (3) when passing the said order of dismissal, inasmuch as the procedure indicated therein has not been followed. The Act does not guarantee any statutory status to the respondent, nor does it impose any obligation on the appellant in such matters. As to whether the rules framed under Section 52 deal with any such matters, does not arise for consideration in this case as the respondent has not placed any reliance on the rules and he has rested his case only on regulation 16 (3). As to whether the rules framed under Section 52 deal with any such matters, does not arise for consideration in this case as the respondent has not placed any reliance on the rules and he has rested his case only on regulation 16 (3). It is not in dispute that, in this case, the authority who can pass an order of dismissal has passed the same. Under those circumstances, a violation of regulation 16 (3), as alleged and established in this case, can only result in the order of dismissal being held to be wrongful and, in consequence, making the appellant liable for damages. But the said order cannot be held to be one which has not terminated the service, albeit wrongfully or which entitles the respondent to ignore it and ask for being treated as still in service. We are not concerned with the question of damages, because no such claim has been made by the respondent in these proceedings. 53. While on the subject in Vaish Degree College (supra), it has been held by majority view as under - When the Executive Committee of a College registered under Registration of Co-operative Societies Act and affiliated to a University is not a statutory body and without the approval of the Vice-Chancellor as required by Section 25-C (2) of the Agra University Act the services of the plaintiff as Principal of the College are terminated on ground of his habitually and perpetually remaining absent from his duties without permission, such a case does not fall within any of the aforesaid exceptions to the rule of non-enforceability of contract of service and hence, prima facie, the plaintiff is not entitled to any declaration or injunction. In view of special and peculiar circumstances of the case, it was held not to be a proper exercise of discretion to grant a decree for declaration and injunction in favour of the plaintiff. 54. Shri A.K. Sethi, learned counsel for Respondents has made a statement at bar that in any case final orders with regard to punishment or dropping of the proceedings after consideration of Departmental Enquiry, would be made by the Principal only, who is the Disciplinary Authority. According to him, should there be an adverse order by the Disciplinary Authority, then, Petitioner would have a right to prefer an appeal as per bye-laws and such right is not being taken away. 55. According to him, should there be an adverse order by the Disciplinary Authority, then, Petitioner would have a right to prefer an appeal as per bye-laws and such right is not being taken away. 55. Thus, the ratio of the case, reported in AIR 1995 SC 1053 -Surjit Ghosh V. Chairman and Managing Director, United Commercial Bank and Ors. has been completely met, by this statement made by learned counsel for Respondents, at bar. Thus, in any case, Petitioner's right to file an appeal being intact, I find that there is no error of jurisdiction in the impugned orders. 56. Thus, on consideration of the aforesaid judgments, it is clear that petitioner cannot knock the doors of this Court. 57. On careful consideration of the reliefs claimed in this petition, I am of the opinion that this has now been virtually rendered infructuous. Petitioner's main grievance for quashment of the chargesheet has lost its sanctity, as the Enquiry Officer has already submitted his Report. Surprisingly, even, after, coming to know about the submission of the Enquiry Report, the Petitioner has neither sought to challenge it nor has prayed for stay of further action to be taken by the Board of Governors on the said Report, even, though, she had ample time to do so. There is also no dispute that the Petitioners order of termination has been kept in abeyance by the Resolution of Board of Governors. Thus, Petitioner cannot have any legitimate grievance in this regard, moreso, when, all her monetary benefits have been kept intact, should there be an order in her favour by the Board of Governors. 58. The order of Respondents to keep the Petitioner's order of termination in abeyance, until the conclusion of the Departmental Enquiry, conducted against the petitioner, appears to be just, proper, legal and within the jurisdiction of Respondents. The same could not be subject matter of challenge or subject to judicial review by this Court. In my considered opinion, I find no illegality, perversity or impropriator in the impugned actions of the Respondents. The petition is, hare by, dismissed, but with no order as to costs. Petition dismissed