JUDGMENT - KAPADIA S.H., J.:---In the above matter reference has been made to this Court under section 113 read with section 151 of the Civil Procedure Code by the Taxing Officer. 2. The facts giving rise to the above reference, briefly, are as follows: 3. The above First Appeal Stamp No. 5284 of 1997 has been preferred by the appellant under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act seeking to challenge the Award and judgment of the Civil Court in Land Reference No. 154 of 1988. The Award of Civil Court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was declared on 10-10-1996. Being aggrieved, the above first appeal has been filed on 25-2-1997. The office while examining the matter, raised an objection regarding deficiency in Court Fees as per the Maharashtra Ordinance No. VIII of 1997, amending the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1950. The said Ordinance came into force from 21-2-1997. Subsequently, the said Ordinance has been substituted by the Amending Act entitled Bombay Court Fees Amendment Act, 1997. According to the said Amendment Act the Court Fees payable by the Appellant is Rs. 30,950/-. According to the Appellant, the said Amendment Act, 1997 did not operate retrospectively and hence the appellant objected to the Court Fees being charged in the sum of Rs. 30,950/-. Accordingly, the matter was put up by the office before the Taxing Officer who heard the Counsel for the appellant on 9-10-1997. During the course of the argument before the Taxing Officer, the appellant showed his willingness to pay the remaining half of the Court Fees of Rs. 7,500/- for the Claim of Rs. 24,62,400/- as per the old unamended schedule under the Bombay Court Fees Act. Accordingly, the appellant has paid the remaining half of the Court Fees of Rs. 7,500/- on the claim. After hearing the Counsel for the appellant, the Taxing Officer has referred the matter to this Court to decide the question as to whether the said Bombay Court Fees Amending Ordinance, 1997 operated retrospectively or whether the said Ordinance operated only prospectively. 4. The short point which arises for determination for which reference is made is as under. Whether the Bombay Court Fees (Amendment) Act, 1997 is having retrospective effect? 5. For the purposes of deciding the above question, it would be necessary to quote the Act in its entirety. 4. The short point which arises for determination for which reference is made is as under. Whether the Bombay Court Fees (Amendment) Act, 1997 is having retrospective effect? 5. For the purposes of deciding the above question, it would be necessary to quote the Act in its entirety. "1(1) This Act may be called the Bombay Court Fees (Amendment) Act, 1997. (2) It shall be deemed to have come into force on the 21st February, 1997. 2. In Schedule I to the Bombay Court Fees Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as "the principal Act") (a) in the proviso to Article 1 for the words "thirty thousand rupees" the words "seventy five thousand rupees" shall be substitute. (b) after Article 17, for the Table of rates of ad valorem fees leviable on the institution of suits, etc. the following shall be substituted, namely: "Table of rates of ad valorem fees leviable on the institution of suits etc.". 6. Mr. Apte, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant invited our attention to the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of (State of Bombay v. M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd.)1, reported in A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 980. Mr. Apte contended that in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court, it is now well settled that an impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only, it impairs or imperils a substantive right and an enactment which does so is not restrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment. Mr. Apte has also relied upon the decision of this Court in the case reported in (A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 287)2. Mr. Apte contended that an appeal is a continuation of the suit. He pointed out that by putting a new restriction on the right of appeal or by imposing a more onerous conditions, the appellant's substantive rights are affected. He further contended that such new restriction or condition being imposed is not a matter of procedure but it is a matter where a substantive right of the appellant is impaired. Mr. Apte further contended that, in the present case, there is nothing to indicate that the Amending Act operated retrospectively. 7. He further contended that such new restriction or condition being imposed is not a matter of procedure but it is a matter where a substantive right of the appellant is impaired. Mr. Apte further contended that, in the present case, there is nothing to indicate that the Amending Act operated retrospectively. 7. Learned Advocate General who appeared on behalf of the State, however, contended that the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay v. M/s. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. (supra) did not apply to the present case. Learned Advocate General further contended that there is a difference between the appeal filed by the appellant in case of a decree arising from a suit and an appeal filed against the judgment of the Reference Court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Learned Advocate General conceded that the judgment of the Supreme Court referred to above would squarely apply to the appeals arising from suits. However, he contended that the said judgment of the Supreme Court would not apply to the appeals filed under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. Learned Advocate General further contended that under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, the Land Acquisition Officer is required to make an Award after holding proper inquiry. Learned Advocate General further pointed out that under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, the claimant, who is aggrieved by the Award, can seek a Reference to Civil Court if the claimant does not accept the Award. Learned Advocate General further pointed out that the application for Reference to the Court cannot be compared to a suit being instituted on the filing of the plaint in a Civil Court. Learned Advocate General further pointed out that every Award delivered under Part-III of the Land Acquisition Act is deemed to be a decree by way of legal fiction introduced under section 26(2) of the Act. Learned Advocate General further pointed out that every Award delivered under Part-III of the Land Acquisition Act is deemed to be a decree by way of legal fiction introduced under section 26(2) of the Act. Learned Advocate General further pointed out that under Item 1 of Schedule 1 to the Court Fees Act, there is a specific reference to plaint or memorandum of appeal or cross objection presented to any Civil or Revenue Court which Entry No. 1 is quite distinct and separate from Entry No. 15 of Schedule-I to the Bombay Court Fees Act which deals with the application of the claimants to the Collector for Reference to Civil Court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Learned Advocate General pointed out that in Item 15 there is no reference to the word "Memorandum of Appeal" unlike Item 1 of Schedule 1 to the Bombay Court Fees Act. In other words, learned Advocate General contended that the appeal arising from the Award delivered by Reference Court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is not a continuation of the proceedings as in the case of Appeal arising against decree passed by the Civil Court in suits and in the circumstances learned Advocate General contended that the appeal arising from the Award delivered by Reference Court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is not a continuation of the proceedings as in the case of appeals arising against decrees passed by the Civil Court in suits and in the circumstances learned Advocate General contended that the judgment of the Supreme Court reported in A.I.R. 1960 S.C. page 980 (supra) has no application to the facts of the present case. In his connection, learned Advocate General further submitted that even under section 7 of the Bombay Court Fees Act, it is expressly provided that the amount of fees payable under the Act on a Memorandum of Appeal against an order or relating to compensation under any Act for the acquisition of land for public purposes shall be computed according to the difference between the amount awarded and the amount claimed by the appellant. Learned Advocate General further contended that under section 18, the Reference Court is only required to decide the disputes of limited nature, namely, enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act. Learned Advocate General further contended that under section 18, the Reference Court is only required to decide the disputes of limited nature, namely, enhancement of the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer under section 11 of the Land Acquisition Act. He further submitted that a statutory appeal has been expressly provided under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act. He contended that in case of a suit filed in the Civil Court the proceedings commence with the filing of the plaint which provisions cannot be compared to filing of reference application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. He further contended that even section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act makes it very clear that it is an appeal subject to the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code as applicable to the appeals from the original decree. In the circumstances, learned Advocate General contended that the Land Acquisition Act is a complete Code by itself and the appeal filed to this Court against the Award of the Reference Court cannot be compared to appeal filed against the decree of a Civil Court in a suit instituted in the Civil Court. Accordingly, learned Advocate General contended that the above two decisions do not apply to the facts of the present case. Learned Advocate General also placed reliance on the judgment in the case of (Laxmanrao Desmukh v. Collector of the Nagpur District)3, reported in I.L.R. 1945 Nag. 399. 8. The short point which arises for determination in the present reference is whether the Bombay Court Fees (Amendment) Act, 1997 is retrospective or whether the same is prospective in nature? In the present mater, it is not in dispute that the reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act came to be disposed of on 16-10-1996 by an Award passed by Extra Joint District Judge, Pune in Land Reference No. 154 of 1988. The Act came into force thereafter from 21-2-1997. The appeal has been filed on 25-2-1997. The basic controversy in the present matter is whether an appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act is continuation of the reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Act came into force thereafter from 21-2-1997. The appeal has been filed on 25-2-1997. The basic controversy in the present matter is whether an appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act is continuation of the reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. If it is so, then the next question which arises for determination is whether the Amending Act, 1997 constitutes an impairment to the right of appeal and if so, the Amendment Act cannot be read as retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment. In the conjoint matter, we have taken the view that the said Act is not retrospective. However, that matter arose in an appeal filed against the decree of the Civil Court in a suit which is not the case herein. It is for this reason that the learned Advocate General submitted that reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act cannot be compared to a suit filed in Civil Court. In the case of the State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Ltd. (supra), the fact were as follows. On 16-4-1953, Messrs Sawaldas Madhavdas brought a suit against Arati Cotton Mills for a decree for Rs. 2 lacs. The suit was decreed on 22-7-1954. Arati Cotton Mills filed memorandum of appeal on 04-09-1954 against the said decree. Arati Cotton Mills paid Court Fees of Rs. 3,913/-. On 5-10-1954, a settlement was arrived at between the parties. On 9-10-1954, an application was made for refund of excess Court Fees paid on memorandum of appeal. The application was allowed by the order of the High Court dated 24-11-1954. In the above circumstances, the Apex Court held that impairment of the right of appeal by putting a new restriction thereon or imposing a more onerous condition is not a matter of procedure only, it impairs or imperils a substantive right of appeal and, therefore, an enactment which does so is not retrospective unless it says so expressly or by necessary intendment. This is on the footing that the appellant had a vested right of appeal when the proceedings were initiated and his right of appeal was governed by the law as it then stood. It is further observed that if by an amendment the substantive right is whittled down then the amendment had no retrospective effect unless the Amending Act states so expressly or by necessary intendment. It is further observed that if by an amendment the substantive right is whittled down then the amendment had no retrospective effect unless the Amending Act states so expressly or by necessary intendment. Similarly in the case reported in A.I.R. 1955 Bombay page 287 (supra), the question arose as to whether certain provision of the Court Fees Act was retrospective. In the said judgment it has been laid down that a right of appeal is not a procedural right. That it is a substantive right. That it is a right vested in the litigant who files a suit. That appeal is a continuation of the suit and when litigant files a suit he has the right to continue the suit up to the final Court of Appeal, and that a substantive right cannot be taken away unless the legislature expressly or by implication intends that it should be so taken away. In the said judgment, it has also been laid down that when the Court Fees are increased the legislature makes it more difficult for the litigant to appeal to the High Court. In this connection, the High Court has further laid down that under the amendment to the Court Fees Act, the right which the litigant enjoys after the amendment is that he can only come to the High Court provided he takes upon himself heavier burden of payment of higher Court Fees. This Court in the said judgment agreed with the ratio of the judgment of the Madras High Court in the case of (R.M. Seshadri v. Province of Madras)4, reported in A.I.R. 1954 Mad. 543 in which it has been laid down after considering the various judgments of the Supreme Court that where the Court Fees are increased, they impose an additional burden upon the litigant. In the case reported in A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 287 (supra), this Court has held that if the Court Fees impose heavier burden upon the appellant than before the legislation which imposes this heavier burden is not a legislation that regulates the proceedings of the Court, but interferes with the substantive right of the party with regard to his appeal. In the case reported in A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 287 (supra), this Court has held that if the Court Fees impose heavier burden upon the appellant than before the legislation which imposes this heavier burden is not a legislation that regulates the proceedings of the Court, but interferes with the substantive right of the party with regard to his appeal. In the light of the above two judgments which squarely apply to the facts of the present case, the only question which remains to be decided is whether the appeal under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act stands on a different footing from the appeal under section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code for the purposes of deciding the retrospective nature of the amendment to the Court Fees Act? In the case of (State of Maharashtra another v. Chandrakant @ Pomaji Vasudev Somshetti (since deceased by L.Rs.) and others)5, reported in A.I.R. 1991 Bom. 245, one of the questions which arose for determination before the Division Bench was : whether an Award of the District Judge under section 34(1) of M.I.D.C. Act which is mutatis mutandis to section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act would be appealable under section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code? The Division Bench held firstly, that section 34(1) of M.I.D.C. Act, 1961 was pari materia to section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Secondly, the Division Bench further held that the decision of the District Judge under section 34(2) of M.I.D.C. Act is a decree under Civil Procedure Code. In this connection, the Division Bench, after taking into account provisions of the Land Acquisition Act and M.I.D.C. Act, came to the conclusion that the State Legislature was fully aware that the decision of the Court under section 34 of M.I.D.C. Act would be a decree and the grounds for the Award would be a judgment under the Civil Procedure Code and therefore, once an Award becomes a decree and the grounds thereof becomes a judgment then such an Award or judgment would be appealable under section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, if delivered by a District Court. The Division Bench further held that under the above circumstances the appeal against the decree or judgment of the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction is nothing, but a continuation of proceedings commenced by reference to the Civil Court. The Division Bench further held that under the above circumstances the appeal against the decree or judgment of the principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction is nothing, but a continuation of proceedings commenced by reference to the Civil Court. This judgment of the Division Bench in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Chandrakant (supra) squarely applies to the present case. In view of the above judgment of this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra v. Chandrakant (supra), the position is very clear that appeal against an Award of the Reference Court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is a continuation of proceedings arising out of a reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. Merely because the proceedings stand initiated by a reference and not by a suit will not make any difference to the decision on the point in question. In matters falling under the Land Acquisition Act the rate for charging Court Fees, undoubtedly, is different. Similarly, the points to be decided by the Reference Court under section 18 are also limited. However, when the Reference Court passes an Award which is deemed to be a decree from which an appeal lies under section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, we do not see any reason to hold that such an appeal is not a continuation of the original proceedings for the purposes of deciding the retroactivity of the amendment to the Court Fees Act. In the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, we decide the reference in favour of the Appellant/Assessee and we hold that the said ordiance/Amending Act, 1997 is not retrospective in nature. This is particularly in view of the fact that it amendment to the Court Fees Act impairs a substantive right of appeal of litigant and in the absence of any express provision making the Amending Act retrospective and in the absence of any such clear intendment of retrospectivity the said Amending Act, 1997 cannot be read as retrospective. In the case of Laxmanrao Deshmukh v. Collector of the Nagpur District, reported in 1945 I.L.R. Nag. In the case of Laxmanrao Deshmukh v. Collector of the Nagpur District, reported in 1945 I.L.R. Nag. 399, the question which arose for determination by the High Court was whether a reference can be made by the Tribunal constituted under the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act under Order XLVI, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code for opinion of the High Court on a law point arising out of the Land Acquisition Proceedings? It was held that in order to attract the provisions of Order XLVI, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code the question must arise at the hearing of the suit or appeal. That the legislature has made a distinction between the suit and an application. That the suit is instituted by the presentation of a plaint and it ends in a decree whereas reference made by the Collector to the Court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is neither a suit nor an appeal. In the light of the above controversy, it was held that a reference made by the said Tribunal was not maintainable as the Tribunal was not a Court and, therefore, the Tribunal was not competent to refer the case to the High Court for decision under Order XLVI, Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Code. The said judgment has no application to the facts of the present case. In the present case, as stated hereinabove, the question which arises for consideration is whether an appeal against the decision of the District Court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act is a continuation of proceedings commenced by reference to Civil Court for the rupees of applicability of the Court Fees Act as amended by the Amending Act, 1997? This question was not before the Court in the case of Laxmanrao Deshmukh (supra). Hence, the said case has no application to the question in hand in this reference. We, however, once again repeat that under the above circumstances the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of State of Bombay v. Supreme General Films Exchange Limited (supra) the judgment of the Bombay High Court reported A.I.R. 1955 Bom. 287 (supra) and the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of State of Maharashtra another v. Chandrakant (supra) would squarely apply to the controversy in hand. 9. 287 (supra) and the judgment of the Bombay High Court in the case of State of Maharashtra another v. Chandrakant (supra) would squarely apply to the controversy in hand. 9. Before concluding we may mention that one of the arguments advanced on behalf of the Government was that the Government would stand to loose its revenue if the Amending Act, 1997 is read only as prospective in nature. We do not find any merit in the said contention. If two views are possible the Amending Act to the Court Fees Act required to be read in favour of the litigant Assossqo. However, we may mention that our experience indicates that appeals are being filed by the State Government in large number of matters against the Award given by the Reference Court and under the above circumstances the State being a largest litigant who files appeals against the Award of the Reference Court, there is no merit in the last contention advanced on behalf of the State. 10. Reference is answered as follows. Whether the Bombay Court Fees (Amendment) Act, 1997 is having retrospective effect? And : In the negative. 11. Reference is answered accordingly. Court Fees to be charged accordingly. Reference answered accordingly. -----