JUDGMENT LOKESHWAR SINGH PANTA, J.—As common question of law and fact arise in both these petitions preferred under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, they were heard together and are being disposed of by this common judgment. The short facts that are necessary for disposal of these writ petitions are as follows : Petitioner in CWP No. 498/97 has alleged that he is a qualified Clerk and he was engaged by the Cement Corporation of India (C.C.I. Rajban)-respondent No. 1 as a Clerk on contract basis on 12th January, 1983 under contractor Shri Albel Singh-respondent No. 2. In CWP No. 136 of 1998 the petitioner was engaged as contract labour on civil side w.e.f. January, 1995 through contractor Shri Om Prakash Yadav-respondent No. 2. They have preferred these petitions alleging inter alia that they have been working as Clerk and daily wage labour since their engagement till date continuously and uninterruptedly in the C.C.I. They were engaged through contractors for doing the work on civil development projects undertaken by the C.C.I, on contract basis entered into between the said contractors and C.C.I. The petitioners have been performing their duties and functions to the satisfaction of the respondents and no complaint whatsoever nature was made against their works. It is then alleged that since they have been working for all these years uninterruptedly and continuously, they are entitled to be absorbed and regularised in the service of principal employer (C.C.I.) in the pay scale attached to its regular employees A dispute took place between the workers of the C.C.I, and Cement Manufactures Association regarding the employment of the contract labour which was referred to the Arbitration under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short I.D. Act) and the award made by the Arbitrators was published in the notification an extract of which was placed on record marked as Annexure P-1. It is then contended that from the perusal of the award the contract labour system has been abolished in the C.C.I, except to the extent that the C.C.I, was permitted to entrust the work to the contractors in the loading and unloading section only. The petitioners have further alleged that after abolition of the contract labour, the C.C.I, is still employing the workman on contract basis which amounts to unfair labour practice. The petitioners have further alleged that after abolition of the contract labour, the C.C.I, is still employing the workman on contract basis which amounts to unfair labour practice. They also alleged that though they discharge their duties and functions through the agency of the contractors but the principal employer namely C.C.I, is now denying the legitimate right to them for being absorbed and regularised in the C.C.I, service and payment of difference of arrears of wages/salary at par with the regular employees in the cadre of the principal employer. They have annexed with their petitions monthly salary statements of the regular employees of the principal employer. The petitioners, therefore, prayed that suitable directions be issued to the C.C.I, to absorb and regularise their services in the pay scale attached to the regular employees of the same category. 2. Both the respondents have filed separate sets of replies. The respondent/C.C.I, has filed its reply denying the claim made by the petitioners. It has raised three preliminary submissions, namely, (a) that the writ petitions are not maintainable as the petitioners have raised highly disputed questions of fact which cannot be adjudicated upon in exercise of extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction and that the petitioners have an alternative efficacious remedy available to them under the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 which they have not exhausted; (b) that the petitioners are the employees of the contractors who were engaged on monthly basis for the execution of works permissible under the exception clause of the Arbitration Award (Annexure P-1) and the role of the C.C.I, is restricted only to the extent of supervisory control over the contractors. The respondent has always ensured that the contractors should make payment to their labour strictly in accordance with the rules and regulations and provisions of the relevant Acts and, therefore, the writ petitions are not maintainable against it; and (c) that the petitions are hopelessly time barred as the petitioners had been engaged by the contractors in January 1983 and January 1995 respectively and that the petitions claiming higher wages/regular wages are being filed after lapse of considerable long time from the publication of the notification issued by the Central Government and being relied upon by them. On merits, according to the respondent the contractors are given work orders on monthly basis and it is for the contractors to employ workmen and other staff for execution of the contract and petitioners are discharging duties for their employer and not for the C.C.I. Photostat copies of the work orders awarded to the contractors are placed on record and marked (Annexures R-1/1, R-1/2, R-1 and R-2 which according to the respondent would show that the respondent has only awarded works to the contractors and has no control over the management of workmen engaged by the contractors or payment of the wages to such workmen. According to the respondent, award was announced by the Arbitrators in the matter of Industrial dispute between the workmen in the cement industry and the employers in the cement industry5 and the same was published vide Ministry of Labour notification dated 18.7.1983 abolishing the contract labour system with an exception that those employees who are being employed in construction work or work of a purely temporary nature not connected with the manufacturing process will not be covered by the award It is denied that the respondent has employed any contract labour contrary to the recommendations/observations made in the award. It is also emphatically denied that the petitioners are performing the same duties as are being performed by the regular clerks or daily wage labour of the Corporation. The petitioners are daily rated workmen employed by the contractors and they work for them in purely casual civil works. The qualification, job experience, responsibility and nature of job performed by the regular Clerk/Mazdoor are not the same as are performed by the casual labour of the contractors and there is absolutely no comparison or similarity between the two. 3. Respondent-contractor in CWP. No. 498/97 in his reply raised two preliminary submissions, namely, that the petition is not maintainable as the petitioner has raised highly disputed questions of facts which cannot be adjudicated upon by the Court in exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction and otherwise also the petitioner has an alternative efficacious remedy, under the relevant provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, which has not been exhausted. However, in preliminary submission No. 2 he supported the case of the petitioner stating that the petitioner was engaged by C.C.l. on contract basis through him and the wages are also being paid by C.C.I, for the work done by the petitioner for it. It is submitted that the petitioner is discharging all the duties for the principal employer i.e. C.C.I, and he only works as an agent on 10% commission of the total payment paid to him on behalf of the principal employer. 4. In CWP No. 136/98 Contractor-respondent No. 2 alleged that the writ petition involves determination of highly disputed questions of facts which have to be adjudicated upon by the relevant statutory Court on production of evidence by the parties concerned. It is specifically submitted that the petitioner is not the employee of the principal employer but has been engaged by him for carrying out various temporary jobs of intermittent nature whenever these occur and the works are handed over to him, therefore, as and when necessity arises, the respondent engages the required number of the workmen for carrying out the various works order. It is also submitted that in the award made by the Arbitrators there are two exceptions where the principal employer can employ contract labour, namely, in the construction work and works of purely temporary nature and not connected with manufacturing process. He was given various work orders by the Civil Engineering Department after evaluation of the monthly needs of various works of temporary nature and the work assigned to him is not of regular nature but as and when the work is anticipated by the C.C.I, the work orders are issued in his favour and other contractors for execution. 5. Rejoinder affidavits were filed by the petitioners reiterating their averments made in the writ petitions and controverting the allegations made in the reply affidavit by the respondents. 6. Mr. Ashwani Kumar Gupta, learned Counsel appearing in support of these petitions urged that the contract labour system stands abolished in the C.C.I, except loading and unloading section by the award made by the Arbitrators and notification was also issued by the Central Government in the official Gazette and that the petitioners could not be employed on contract basis and the principal employer is duty bound to employ them as departmental employees from the date of their initial engagements. He contended that after notification issued by the Central Government abolishing the contract labour system in C.C.I, necessary conclusion is that the whole time workmen are required for carrying on process, operation or other work being done in the industry, trade, business or occupation in the establishment, when the condition of the work which is of perennial nature, is available the continuous of contract labour stands prohibited and abolished and the result would be that the contractors stand removed and direct relationship of employer and employees is created between the principal employer and the workmen. He cited decisions of Madras High Court reported in K. Rama Krishnana v. Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Ltd., 1997 Lab. I.C. 3078 and Supreme Court in Gujarat Electricity Board, Ukai v. Hind Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1995 SC 1893 and Shankar Mukherjee and others v. Union of India and others, 1990(1) All India Services Law Journal 151. 7. Mr. K.D. Shreedhar, learned Counsel for the 1st respondent-C.C.I. in reply to the above arguments of the learned Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that the principal employer has given work orders for various types of civil jobs or casual nature to the contractors and it is for the contractors to employ the workmen and other staff for execution of such work orders. He contended that from the perusal of para 164 of the award it will be clear that contract labour system has not been completely abolished in this industry. Further in paras 50 and 51 of the said award recommendations of the Arbitrators do not cover execution of works by the contractors where such workers are engaged on construction work or work of a purely temporary nature not connected with the manufacturing process and, therefore, the job of temporary/casual nature to be preformed by the contractors is not in violation of the recommendations of the award and, as such, the petitioners are not entitled to any benefit under the award. In support of his submission he also relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Gujarat Electricity Board v. Hind Mazdoor Sabha, AIR 1995 SC 1893 and Air India Statutory Corpn, v. United Labour Union, AIR 1997 SC 645. 8. Before dealing with the rival submissions of the respective parties, certain facts have to be noted for the purpose of understanding the case well. 8. Before dealing with the rival submissions of the respective parties, certain facts have to be noted for the purpose of understanding the case well. In para 225 of the notification (Annexure P-1) the Arbitrators observed as under: "225. In our earlier award dealing with the subject of abolition of contract labour, the CMA took the same stand saying that we have no jurisdiction to direct abolition of contract labour after the Contract Labour Abolition and Regulation Act had come into force. The matter was argued before us at great length and finally we gave our award, which read as under.— "164. The aforesaid unanimous recommendations of the First Wage Board to which labour and management in the Industry are parties have been accepted by the Government and implemented by the industry by and large from 1960. Therefore, contract labour stands . abolished by the unanimous recommendations of the Wage Board as far back as 1960 in all occupations, except unloading, loading and packing. It has also been settled finally by the Wage Board and accepted by the Government and the industry that contract labour wherever employed should get the same rates of wages, allowances and other benefits and amenities as the departmental labour. The only exception is those employed in construction work or work of a purely temporary nature, not connected with the manufacturing process. Thus ail these issues are settled issues." (Emphasis ours) Further in para 166 the observations are thus: "166. We, therefore, direct accordingly that no contract labour shall be employed in the industry by the employer, except in loading (including packing) and unloading operations as stated by the First Wage Board and where an employer employ contract in any other occupations such labour shall be made regular departmental employees under the employers and made eligible to the same wages, DA, bonus and other allowances under our award as other regular employees under the employer, provided they give corresponding workload obtaining for similar occupations in units nearabout, where their emplyees are getting Wage Board Rates. We further direct that all workers employed in the permitted occupations of loading (including packing) and unloading shall be given the same wages be a bonus and other benefits as are given to the regular employees of the Company" Further in paras 50 and 51 of the award while dealing with the issue of coverage the Arbitration extracted the coverage as follows: Coverage "All the following employees......................... 50. It is, therefore, necessary to reproduce the relevant extract from the First Wage Board for Cement Industry in this regard: 13.1.2. Our recommendations should apply to workers employed directly or through contractors at the cement factories. Our recommendations do not cover workers employed by contractors where such workers are engaged on construction work and on purely temporary jobs, not connected with the manufacturing process." (Emphasis ours) After careful reading the aforesaid paragraphs of the notification, the workers employed by the contractors where such workers are engaged on construction work and on purely temporary nature, not connected with the manufacturing process are exempted from the purview of the abolition of the contract labour system in the C.C.I. 9. We have gone through the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel and it appears to us that in the case of K. Ramakrishnan, 1997 Lab. I.C. 3078, the learned Judges of the High Court dealing with the provision of Section 10 of Act 37 of 1970 held that the contract labour was entitled to be absorved by the principal employer only if contract was established as a sham in an industrial dispute, but if contract was found to be genuine, labour would have to get issued a notification for abolition of contract and on issuance of notification they would be straightway entitled to be absorbed as direct employees. The Supreme Court in Gujarat Electricity Boards case, AIR 1995 SC 1893, comprising of a Bench of two Honble Judges went into the question of contract labour and gave their views on three different aspects which are as follows : (i) The existing contract labour can raise an industrial dispute and contend that the contract is a sham or not genuine. In such dispute, if there is a conclusion that the contract is a sham, the Labour Court would have jurisdiction to give relief to the contract labour. In such dispute, if there is a conclusion that the contract is a sham, the Labour Court would have jurisdiction to give relief to the contract labour. (ii) If the Labour Court finds that the contract is genuine, then, the dispute can be kept pending and the parties be asked to approach the Government for abolition of the contract labour by issuance of notification under Section 10 of the Act. But, in a situation of this kind, the direct employees of the-principal employer only can raise a dispute and not the contract labour. (iii) If there is abolition of contract labour in that activity by issuance of a notification under Section 10, then, on a dispute being espoused by the direct employees of the principal employer, it is for the Court to grant relief to the erstwhile contract labour depending upon how many regular workmen are required and the terms for absorption. From the above, it would be seen that three distinct points were considered by the Supreme Court in Gujarat Electricity Board case. 10. The next judgment of the Supreme Court is Air Indias case, AIR 1997 SC 645. It was decided by a Bench of three Honble Judges one of whom was S.B. Majmudar, J. who was in the Bench in Gujarat Electricity Boards case. The question framed by the Supreme Court for its decision in Air Indias case is found in paragraph 58 of the judgment. In paragraph 58, K. Ramaswami, J., who delivered the main judgment, has observed as follows: "Abolition of contract labour system ensures rights to the workmen for regularisation of them as employees in the establishment in which they were hitherto working as contract labour through the contractor. The contractors stand removed from the Regulation under the Act and direct relationship of employer and employee is created between the principal employer and workmen." 11. The Air India case after referring to various case laws on the subject of contract labour, summed up the proposition only in regard to the situation arising out of the abolition of the contract labour under Section 10 of the Act. The said judgment, in our view, is not in support of the proposition that contract labour can straightway claim to be direct employees of the principal employer due to passage of time. The said judgment, in our view, is not in support of the proposition that contract labour can straightway claim to be direct employees of the principal employer due to passage of time. That part of the direction in the Gujarat Electricity Board case with regard to the steps to be taken for absorption upon abolition of contract labour arising out of a notification under Section 10 of the Act, was only found to be bad. In other words, the direction made by the Supreme Court in Gujarat Electricity Board case that contract labour still will have to raise an industrial dispute even after abolition of contract labour under Section 10 of the Act so as to decide how many should be absorbed by the principal employer and on what terms alone was found to be bad in law because, as per the Air India case judgment, the legal effect of abolition of contract labour is that they automatically become employees of the principal employer It is not in dispute that Central Government issued notification in the official Gazette after the award was made by the Arbitrators under Section 10 of the Act prohibiting the employment of contract labour in C.C.I, in any process, operation or other work in any establishment, but with specific exception that those employed on construction work or work of purely temporary nature, not connected with the manufacturing process were not covered under the abolition of the contract labour system. 12. In Shankar Mukherjees case (supra) the Government of West Bengal issued a notification dated February 9, 1980 under Section 10(1) of the Act prohibiting the employment of contract labour in 16 departments covering 65 jobs in the establishments of M/s. Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. in the State of West Bengal. 12. In Shankar Mukherjees case (supra) the Government of West Bengal issued a notification dated February 9, 1980 under Section 10(1) of the Act prohibiting the employment of contract labour in 16 departments covering 65 jobs in the establishments of M/s. Indian Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. in the State of West Bengal. The job of loading and unloading of bricks from wagons and trucks in the Brick Department has been specifically excluded from the beneficial purview of the notification and the said action of the State Government had been challenged in the writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India by the affected workmen on the ground that the petitioners had been subjected to hostile discrimination so much so that the workmen doing the same job in the other departments and allied jobs in the same department had been rescued from the archaic system of contract labour whereas the petitioners had been singled-out and left to be grinded under the pernicious effect of this primitive system. The Honble Judges of the Supreme Court on the facts of the case found that there was no denial nor any averments or material on the record to show that the job of loading and unloading of bricks was not incidental or allied to the stacking of the bricks and even otherwise the Honble Judges failed to understand how the stacking of bricks was a job which was not incidental to loading and unloading. The purchase of bricks, transportation to the factory, unloading, stacking use in the furnace were jobs in one continuing process and it was difficult to accept that these jobs were not incidental or allied to each other Further, it was found that there was no material or basis to show that the job of loading and unloading of bricks was not of perennial nature and the writ petition was allowed striking down the words "except loading and unloading of bricks from the wagons and trucks" in paragraph 9 of the said notification issued by the Government of West Bengal being discriminatory and as such violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India and all the benefits were allowed to the petitioners. 13. There is a distinguishing feature in the cases before us. 13. There is a distinguishing feature in the cases before us. In the present cases admittedly the petitioners were employed by the contractors to whom the principal employer C.C.I, allotted the work under the work orders placed on record and marked Annexures R-1/1, R-1/2, R-1 and R-2. These work orders were issued on month to month basis for executing the work. The contractors employed the petitioners and other employees on casual basis. Therefore, it is in dispute whether works allotted to the contractors for which the petitioners and other employees are being engaged as contract labour of perennial nature connected with manufacturing process and do not fall in exceptions for which evidence is required. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases, it appears to us that the aforesaid decisions are of no assistance to the petitioners in deciding the issue in controversy before us and we are unable to countenance the submissions of the learned Counsel for the petitioners. 14. It is settled position of law that normally disputed question of fact should be gone into in writ jurisdiction for which recording of evidence become necessary, further in order to decide whether the contract between C.C.I, and labour contractor is a camouflage or sham and whether the petitioners are covered under the exceptions clause of the award notified in the gazette or not, evidence may have to be led by both the parties. On the facts of these cases, from the prayers in the writ petitions and of the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel appearing on either side and on a perusal of the averments made by either party, it would be seen that the petitioners were admittedly employed by the contractors. When the contract was subsisting, employment of the contract labour depended upon day-to-day exigencies and requirements of engagement of the petitioners by the contractors would depend upon such exigencies, we leave all these questions open for the Competent Authority for its decision. 15. The learned Counsel for the petitioners has also relied upon the judgments of Supreme Court in Surinder Singh and another v. The Engineer in Chief C.RW.D. and others, AIR 1986 SC 534 and Bhagwati Prasad v. Delhi State Mineral Development Corporation, AIR 1990 SC 371, for the grant of equal pay for equal work in the light of the aforesaid decisions of the apex Court. We do not feel it necessary to decide the question whether the petitioners are entitled for equal pay for equal work at par with the regular employees of the principal employer, namely, C.C.L as we have not recorded our finding on the primary issue whether the petitioners are entitled to be absorbed and regularised by the principal employer after the abolition of the contract labour system. No other point was urged before us by the learned Counsel for the parties. 16. For the aforesaid conclusion, we do not find any merit in these writ petitions. We accordingly dismiss them, however, with liberty to the petitioners to raise all the issues in appropriate proceeding before an appropriate forum, if they so desire or choose and permissible under law. No costs. Petition dismissed.-