Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff in O.S. No. 110/76 on the file of the Subordinate Judges Court, Vellore, is the appellant in the second appeal. The suit was for a declaration that Sri Lakshminarayanaswami temple situate in Panapakkam village, North Arcot District, was a denominational one intended and maintained for the benefit of Vadapuram Sengunthar Samudhayam and for injunction restraining the H.R. & C.E. Department from interfering with its possession of the properties. The suit was originally filed by one Palaniyandi Mudaliar and later it was amended mentioning the name of A.V.A. Subramania Mudaliar in the trial court and after the filing of the appeal by the department, the plaint was amended as Vadapuram Sengunthar Samudhayam of Panapakkam village by its Sri Lakshminarayanaswami Perumal Temple Trustee A.V.A. Subramania Mudaliar. 2. The contention of the appellant was that the suit temple was a denominational one, that the trustees for the temple were being appointed by the Vadapuram Sengunthar Samudhayam periodically, that they were alone managing and maintaining the temple without any hindrance, that some time prior to the suit an order had been passed on 19.1.1975 appointing the first defendant in the suit one Samidoss, Executive Officer, Sri Agastheeswarar Temple, Vanni Vedu Village, Wallajah Taluk (who was exonerated as per order dated 3.7.1976) as the fit person and trustee and that, that order was illegal. 3. The defence of the department was that the suit temple was not a denominational one, that it was under the management of the department, that trustees were being appointed by the department alone and so the appellant/plaintiff was not entitled to the reliefs asked for or question the appointment of the first defendant in the suit as the trustee. 4. The trial court, viz. the Subordinate Judges Court, Vellore, framed the necessary issues on the basis of the pleadings and found that the suit temple was a denominational temple as alleged, that A.V.A. Subramania Mudaliar was the trustee of the temple, that the department had no right to appoint the trustee for the suit temple, that the suit was maintainable, that Subramania Mudaliar was not estopped from questioning the right of the department to appoint trustees, that the Collector of North Arcot, who had been impleaded as the fourth respondent in the suit was an unnecessary party to the suit and that Subramania Mudaliar was entitled to the declaration and injunction prayed for. 5. 5. The department filed appeal A.S. No. 184/82 along with an application in I.A. No. 227/84 before the Principal District Court, North Arcot at Vellore. In the appeal as already stated, amendments were sought and the same was granted. The learned District Judge by his judgment and decree dated 20.9.1984 reversed the decision of the trial court, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit. Aggrieved, the present Second Appeal has been filed. 6. At the time of admission the following substantial question of law was framed for decision in the Second Appeal. “whether at the instance of a Saivite, a declaration that the Vaishnavite temple is a denominational, temple could be granted irrespective of the faith be practices?” 7. Mr. T.R. Mani, learned Senior Counsel appearing for Mr. M. Chinnachamy, attacked the findings given by the lower Appellate Court in the following manner: The lower Appellate Court had stated that Sengunthars were Saivites and the suit temple, Lakshminarayana Temple being a Vaishnavite temple, it was inconceivable that there could be management of a Vaishnavite Temple by Saivites. The learned Senior Counsel submitted that the names of the trustees Varadharaja and Abhimanyu who were both Senguntha Mudaliars were Vaishnavite names and not Saivites names. The learned Senior Counsel also referred to instances wherein Vaishnava temples, Saiva form of worship or pooja was performed. The learned Senior Counsel cited the case of Sri Ananthapadmanaba Swami Temple in Adyar and Sri Krishnan Temple in Gopalapuram. It may be of interest to note that in Kadhirgamam in Sri Lanka the person doing pooja to Lord Muruga is a Buddhist. There was a news item recently where a Christian was the priest in a Durgai Amman Temple. According to the learned Senior Counsel these things transcend other mundane considerations and this ought not to have been put against the appellant by the lower Appellate Court. The learned Senior Counsel referred to Abidhana Chinthamani page 726 for the purpose of showing who the Senguntha leaders and Kaikolargal were. The learned Senior Counsel also referred to the book on Castes and Tribes of Southern India by Edgar Thurston at page 361 and also as to who Kaikolars were. In Tamil Lexicon published by the University of Madras, Sengunthars were shown as persons of Kaikolars caste who were able warriors serving as personal body guards of ancient Chola Kings. The learned Senior Counsel also referred to the book on Castes and Tribes of Southern India by Edgar Thurston at page 361 and also as to who Kaikolars were. In Tamil Lexicon published by the University of Madras, Sengunthars were shown as persons of Kaikolars caste who were able warriors serving as personal body guards of ancient Chola Kings. These warriors, in course of time, did not find use for their pugnacity and ceased to have utility, and they had to settle down for lesser things like weaving. As rightly contended by the learned Senior Counsel, Sengunthars need not necessarily be Saivites and even conceding that they are Saivites it would not be a taboo for Vaishnavites to have poojas done by Saivites in Vishnu temples. The learned Senior Counsel is well-founded, in his contention that the syllogism by the lower Appellate Court is erroneous and the conclusion flowing therefrom is naturally wrong. 8. But, the conclusion reached by the lower Appellate Court is not based on this solitary reason alone. The lower Appellate court has adverted to several other circumstances to non-suit the appellant. The question for consideration is whether the suit temple is a denominational temple. It is the submission of the learned Senior Counsel that a denominational temple is equally a public temple. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the further reasoning by the lower Appellate court, viz. that the appellants had not substantiated their stand with regard to the denominational character of the temple, was clearly erroneous. He submitted that if the temple belonged to a religious denomination of a particular community and if that particular community was entitled to manage the temple it would be a denominational religious institution notwithstanding that persons belonging to other communities were permitted to participate in the festivals and allowed to worship in the temple. He submitted that if the temple belonged to a religious denomination of a particular community and if that particular community was entitled to manage the temple it would be a denominational religious institution notwithstanding that persons belonging to other communities were permitted to participate in the festivals and allowed to worship in the temple. According to the learned Senior Counsel, the temple - subject matter of the present proceedings - is an ancient one, the origin of the temple is not known and there were no stone inscriptions to prove the origin of the temple and just because of this it could not be held that the suit temple was not a denominational temple provided there were other materials to show that the suit temple was maintained and managed by the Vedapuram Sengunthar Samudhayam of Panapakkam Village for a considerable time without any interference by any other community then it could be inferred that the suit temple was of denominational character. 9. The learned Senior Counsel referred to a number of decisions, apart from referring to the oral and documentary evidence. The first of the decisions is the one in The State of Tamil Nadu and another v. P.S.R. Senbagamurthy Nadar and others (AIR 1997 Madras 96). In that case there was material to show that the temple was originally founded and constructed by Hindu Nadars and Grocery Merchants belonging to Hindu Nadars Community. There were also documents produced, viz. Sivakasi Thala Puranam and an ancient text book “The Nadars of Tamil Nadu” showing that the temple was a denominational temple of Hindu Nadars. This documentary evidence was accepted and in the absence of any independent witness of any other community having been examined, it was held by the subordinate courts that the temple was a denominational temple and the learned Judge accepted the finding by the courts below and held that the temple had not lost its denominational character. This decision will not help the case of the appellant. 10. The next case relied on by the learned Senior Counsel is the judgment of the Supreme Court in BiharState Board Religious Trust, Patna v. Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das ( AIR 1971 SC 2057 = 1971 3 SCR 680 ). This decision will not help the case of the appellant. 10. The next case relied on by the learned Senior Counsel is the judgment of the Supreme Court in BiharState Board Religious Trust, Patna v. Mahant Sri Biseshwar Das ( AIR 1971 SC 2057 = 1971 3 SCR 680 ). It was held in that case that, “The court had to see whether the grant was for the benefit of the public or a section of it, i.e. an unascertained class or for the benefit of the grantee himself or for a class of ascertained individuals, that an inference could also be drawn from the usage and custom of the institution or from the mode in which its properties had been dealt with as also other established circumstances.” The Supreme Court also held that dedication to public would not be readily inferred from the mere fact that members of public were freely admitted to the temple for worship or for attending festivals celebrated by merchants. The evidence that sadhus and other persons visiting the temple were given food and shelter was not by itself indicative of the temple being a public temple or its properties being subject to a public trust. It was further held by the Supreme Court that the value of such public user as evidence of dedication depended on the circumstances which gave strength to the inference that the user was as of right. Having regard to the facts of that case it was held that the dedication was not public in character. 11. In my view, materials are wanting in the present case to infer that the suit temple was a denominational temple. No doubt, it has to be borne in mind that the mere fact that the general public was allowed to worship and partake in the festivals would not by itself prove the public character of the temple. At the same time, we should bear in mind that in South India all the temples are considered to be public temples and if any person claimed a particular temple as a private temple or denominational temple, it was for that person to prove the same. We have therefore to see whether the denominational character of the suit temple stands established by the appellant. 12. We have therefore to see whether the denominational character of the suit temple stands established by the appellant. 12. The next decision relied on by the learned Senior Counsel is the one in Sri Venkataraman Devaru and others v. State of Mysore and others ( AIR 1958 SC 255 ). The Supreme Court held as follows, as regards the tests of denominational temple: “When there is a question as to the nature and extent of a dedication of a temple, it has to be determined on the terms of the deed of endowment if that is available and where it is not, on other materials legally admissible; and proof of long and uninterrupted user would be cogent evidence of the terms thereof. Where, therefore, the original deed of endowment is not available and it is found that all persons are freely worshipping in the temple without let or hindrance, it would be a proper inference t o make that they do so as a matter of right and that the original foundation was for their benefit as well. But, where it is proved by production of the deed of endowment or otherwise that the original dedication was for the benefit of a particular community, the fact that members of other communities were allowed freely to worship cannot lead to the inference that the dedication was for their benefit as well. For, it would not in general be consonant with Hindu sentiments or practice that worshipers should be turned away. Where the foundation was originally for the benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmin community, the fact that other classes of Hindus were admitted freely into the temple would not have the effect of enlarging the scope of the dedication into one for the public generally” On the facts of that case the Supreme Court held that the temple at Moolkypetha in village Mannampady in South Canara District was a denominational temple founded for the benefit of the Gowda Saraswath Brahmins. 13. The next case relied on by the learned Senior Counsel is A.N. Ramaswami Iyer and others v. The Commissioner. H.R. & C.E. (1975 11 MLJ 178 = 88 L.W. 631). 13. The next case relied on by the learned Senior Counsel is A.N. Ramaswami Iyer and others v. The Commissioner. H.R. & C.E. (1975 11 MLJ 178 = 88 L.W. 631). In that case, it was held by a Bench of this Court that, “there was nothing in the definition of the word ‘trustee’ which, would deprive a body of persons of their right of trusteeship merely because that body was likely to fluctuate from time to timer” 14. In V. Balakrishnan and others v. The Assistant Commissioner. H.R. & C.E , (1978 TLNJ 359) V. Sethuraman, J. referred to the earlier decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court held as follows: “The circumstance of the worshippers of communities other than those belonging to the denomination having access to the temple and offering worship therein is not conclusive of the question whether it is a denominational temple or not. Whether it is a denomination or not has to be determined by a reference either to the original deed of endowment or any other evidence bearing on it.” In that case, exhibits of the years 1901 and 1903 were filed and in those deeds it was recited that the temple belonged to the Yadhavas of Mahalingapuram and in the body of the documents it was mentioned that the consideration for the sale had been received from the temple which belonged to the Yadhavas and that it was for their common benefit. The learned Judge observed that, “if the temple was not a denominational temple belonging to the Yadhava community of the particular village, then there was no reason why the documents should have recited that the temple belonged to that particular community.” 15. In Tamarakulam Vellala Samudhayam etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu represented by the Deputy Commissioner. Nagercoil and mother (1980 11 MLJ 358 - 93 L.W. 643) the same learned Judge on the facts of that case held that, the Vellala Community of Tamarakulam in Kanyakumari District would be a sect entitled to maintain the Arvo Kulasekhara Nangai Amman Temple as it had been doing so for a long time previously as evidenced from the exhibits marked in that case and therefore the plaintiff would be entitled to a declaration that the temple was a denominational temple.” 16. In Sri Panduranganathaswami Devasthanam etc. v. Deputy Commissioner. In Sri Panduranganathaswami Devasthanam etc. v. Deputy Commissioner. H.R. & C.E. (1988 11 MLJ 53) Swamikkannu, J. dealing with Article 26 of the Constitution observed as follows: “Article 26 of the Constitution of Indian guarantees certain rights to every religious denomination subject to public order, morality and health and the rights are capable of being enforced by or on behalf of a denomination. Religion in this context is not confined to religious belief but includes the practices which are regarded by the community as part of its religion and may extend even to matters of food and dress. Each religious denomination or organization enjoys complete autonomy in the matter of deciding as to what rites and ceremonies are essential according to the tenets of the religion they hold. But the court has the right to determine whether a particular rite or observance is regarded as essential by virtue of a particular religion.” In that case it was held on the basis of the previous declaration that, “the temple belonged to the members of the Viswakarma Brahmin Community in Salem District as a whole and that corporate body would have the right to manage the temple and to administer the endowments and the rights of that body would be entitled to protection under Article 26 of the Constitution.” 17. The next decision cited by the learned Senior Counsel is Chinta Venkata Sundara Venugopalaswamy v. President of Board of Commissioners for Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras (AIR 1938 Madras 214). In that case, a Division, Bench of this Court held that, “the mere fact of admission of the public to the temple would not by itself necessarily affect the private character of the trust if originally the temple was dedicated for the use of the founders family and was a private trust.” 18. In Mundacheri Roman v. Thachangat Puthan Vittil Achuthan Nair and others (AIR 1934 P.C.230) it was held that there was no presumption as regards temples in Malabar that they were public temples. The Privy Council observed as follows: “In the greater part of the Madras Presidency where private temples are practically unknown, the presumtion is that temples and their endowments form public charitable trusts. But, no such presumption exists in case of temples situated in Malabar.” 19. In Rajagopalier v. Commissioner. The Privy Council observed as follows: “In the greater part of the Madras Presidency where private temples are practically unknown, the presumtion is that temples and their endowments form public charitable trusts. But, no such presumption exists in case of temples situated in Malabar.” 19. In Rajagopalier v. Commissioner. H.R. & C.E. (84 L.W. 86) it was held by a Bench of this Court that, “the Sourashtra Brahmin Community of Madurai, which was admittedly a part of the Hindu Community, was a religious denomination and the temple of Sri Prasanna Venkateswaraswami situated in Sourashtra Krishnan Koil Street, Madurai Town was a denominational temple governed by Article 26 (A) and (B) of the Constitution of India and that the fact that the suit temple might fall within the definition of a temple in Section 6(2) of the Madras Hindu Religious and Charitable endowments Act of 1959 could make no difference.” The Bench further observed that, “injudicious and frequent interference in the management of the affairs of long established institutions by the authorities are not likely to promote the interests of the institution.” 20. The learned Senior Counsel next relied on the judgment of this Court in Chinna Royan and others v. The Commissioner. H.R. & C.E. (1975 11 MLJ 294 = 88 L.W. 825 = ILR 1975 Madras 504). In that case, V. Ramaswami, J. as he then was, held as follows: “What Article 26(d) provides is that the administration of the property shall be in accordance with law. This could only mean that the administration and management could be regulated by law and there is no absolute right vested in the religious denomination in the matter of administration of the temple and its properties. But this in my opinion, would not include a right to take away the entire right of the denomination or to substantially take away the right to management leaving a mere husk. Though ‘regulation’ within the meaning of Article 19 might include a total deprivation of the right, in the context of Article 26 it would be difficult to hold that the law could take away the entire right or deprive the religious denomination of any right in the management of its properties.” 21. In Sri Vedantha Sthapana Sabha, Nanganallur v. The Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. (1997 2 L.W. 151) a Bench of this Court held as follows. In Sri Vedantha Sthapana Sabha, Nanganallur v. The Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. (1997 2 L.W. 151) a Bench of this Court held as follows. “There is nothing in the definition of the word ‘trustee’, which would deprive a body of persons of their right of trusteeship merely because that body is likely to fluctuate from time to time. There can be no doubt that the law of the country recognised fluctuating communities as legal persons capable of owning property, as for instance, the caste and the village. The above statement represents the correct position of law. If a whole village is capable of owning property, notwithstanding the fact that the collectively called village is necessarily a fluctuating body, we see little reason why such a fluctuating body cannot hold the right of administering and managing the temple and being the trustee thereof. If the right of superintendence or administration of the suit temple validly vests in a body, there can be little doubt that this community is the body, which will be regarded as a trustee of the temple within the meaning of Section 6, Clause (22) of the Tamil Nadu Act XXII of 1959.” On the facts of that case, it was held that, “The temple in question was founded by the members of the Sabha which is a body of persons and that the Sabha had constructed the temple, and that was the founder and that it was managed by the Sabha only.” 22. Having cited the above decisions the learned Senior Counsel referred to the following decisions and submitted that they required reconsideration: (1) The Assistant Commissioner, H.R. & C.E., Salem v. Nattamai K.S. Ellappa Mudaliar & others (100 L.W. 240); (2) The Assistant Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. v. Swminatha Iyer and others (1988 11 MLJ 344 = 1988 2 L.W. 484); and (3) Appusamy v. A.V. Sundararajan and others ( 1997 1 MLJ 218 ). 23. The above decisions have set down certain norms for qualifying as a denominational community. According to those decisions for a community to be dubbed as a religious denomination the following criteria are necessary: 1. The persons claiming to be a religious denomination must have a common faith based on religion. 2. They must have a spiritual organization. 3. They must have a distinctive name. 4. They must have belief in a particular religious teacher or guru. 5. The persons claiming to be a religious denomination must have a common faith based on religion. 2. They must have a spiritual organization. 3. They must have a distinctive name. 4. They must have belief in a particular religious teacher or guru. 5. They must have been common religious tenets and preachings prescribed by the said guru. (The basic cord that connects them should be religion and nothing else.) The temple which is claimed to be a denominational temple should have been founded by a religious leader of the community for the spiritual benefit of the said community. Special poojas or ceremonies should be conducted exclusively for the particular community without admitting members belonging to other communities. 24. Mr. T.R. Mani, learned Senior Counsel, submitted that the concept of guru is unknown to Hindu religion. The Hindu religion had no beginning; no end. It had no single book. “Kittabya” concept is alien to Hindu religion. 25. As against the above contentions Mr. B. Mani, learned Government Advocate for the Department, submitted as follows: The suit has been filed for declaration as a denomination. The temple can file the suit only after the community is declared to be a denomination and a declaration could be got that the temple was a denominational temple. The learned Counsel, besides relying on the three decisions just now referred to as requiring reconsideration by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, referred to some more decisions. They are: 1. The Commissioner, H.R. & C.E. v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt ( AIR 1954 SC 282 = 67 L.W. 1220) — popularly known as the Shirur Mutt case . 2. S.P. Mittal v. Union of India and others ( AIR 1983 SC 1 ) 3. T.T. Kuppuswamy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu (100 L.W. 1031) and 4. State of Tamil Nadu and another v. Vilampatti Nadar Uravinmuraikku Pathiayapatta A.V.M. Marimuthu Nadar Melnilaipalliy in Managing Committee, Vilampatti and others (AIR 1991 Madras 233 = 1991 1 L.W. 382) 26. In the Shirur Mutt case the Supreme Court in paragraph 15 dealing with Article 26 observed as follows: “As regards Art. 26, the first question is, what is the precise meaning or connotation of the expression “religious denomination” and whether a Math could come within this expression. In the Shirur Mutt case the Supreme Court in paragraph 15 dealing with Article 26 observed as follows: “As regards Art. 26, the first question is, what is the precise meaning or connotation of the expression “religious denomination” and whether a Math could come within this expression. The word “denomination” has been defined in the Oxford Dictionary to mean “a collection of individuals classed together under the same name: a religious sect or body having a common faith and organization and designated by a distinctive name”. It is well known that the practice of setting up Maths as centres of theological teaching was started by Shri Sankaracharya and was followed by various teachers since then. After Sankara, came a galaxy of religious teachers and philosophers who founded the different sects and sub-sects of the Hindu religion that we find in India as at present. Each one of such sects or sub-sects can certainly be called a religious denomination, as it is designated by a distinctive name, - in many cases it is the name of the founder. - and has a common faith and common spiritual organisation. The followers of Ramanuja, who are known by the name of Shri Vaishnavas, undoubtedly constitute a religious denomination’ and so do the followers of Madhwacharya and other religious teacher. It is a fact well established by tradition that the Udipi Maths were founded by Madhwacharya himself and the trustees and the beneficiaries of these Maths profess to be followers of that teacher. The High Court has found that the Math in quest ion is in charge of the Sivalli Brahmins who constitute a section of the follower of Madhwacharya. As Art. 26 contemplates not merely a religious denomination but also a section thereof, the Math or the spiritual fraternity represented by it can legitimately come within the purview of this Article.” 27. In S.P. Mittal v. Union of India and others the Supreme Court in paragraph 20 in its own words attempted to define the word “religion” with some difficulty. “In the background of the provisions of the Constitution and the light shed by judicial precedent, we may say religion is a matter of faith. It is a matter of belief and doctrine. It concerns the conscience, i.e. the spirit of man. It must be capable of overt expression in word and deed, such as worship or ritual. “In the background of the provisions of the Constitution and the light shed by judicial precedent, we may say religion is a matter of faith. It is a matter of belief and doctrine. It concerns the conscience, i.e. the spirit of man. It must be capable of overt expression in word and deed, such as worship or ritual. So, religion is a mater of belief and doctrine, concerning the human spirit, expressed overtly in the form of ritual and worship Primarily, it is a question of the consciousness of the community, how does the fraternity or sodality (if it is permissible to use the word without confining it to Roman Catholic groups) regard itself, how do others regard the fraternity or sodality. A host of other circumstances may have to be considered, such as, the origin and the history of the community, the beliefs and the doctrines professed by the community, the rituals observed by the community, what the founder, if any, taught, what the founder was understood by his followers to have taught etc. In origin, the founder may not have intended to found any religion at all. He may have merely protested against some rituals and observances, he may have disagreed with the interpretation of some earlier religious tenets. What he said, what he preached and what he taught, his protest, his dissent his disagreement might have developed into a religion in the course of time, even during his lifetime. He may be against religion itself, yet, history and the perception of the community may make a religion out of what was not intended to be a religion and he may be hailed as the founder of a new religion. There are obvious examples of Buddhism and Jainism and for that matter Christianity itself. Neither Buddha nor Mahavira nor Chirst ever thought of founding a new religion, yet three great religions bear their names.” In paragraph 21 the Supreme Court dealt with religious denomination in the following terms. “If the word ‘religion is once explained though with some difficulty, the expression ‘religious denomination’ may be defined with less difficulty. Neither Buddha nor Mahavira nor Chirst ever thought of founding a new religion, yet three great religions bear their names.” In paragraph 21 the Supreme Court dealt with religious denomination in the following terms. “If the word ‘religion is once explained though with some difficulty, the expression ‘religious denomination’ may be defined with less difficulty. As we mentioned earlier Mukherjee, J. borrowed the meaning of the word denomination from the Oxford Dictionary and adopted it to define religious denomination as a “collection of individuals classed together under the same name, a religious sect or body having a common faith and organization and designated by a distinctive name’. The followers of Ramanuja, th e followers of Madhwacharya, the followers of Vallabha, the Chisten soofies have been found or assumed by the Court to be religious denominations. It will be noticed that these sects possessed no distinctive name except that of their founder-teacher and had no special organization except a vague, loose-unknit one. The really distinctive feature about each one of these sects was a shared belief in the tenets taught by the teacher-founder. We take care to mention here that whatever the ordinary features of a religious denomination may be considered to be, all are not of equal importance and surely the common faith of the religious body is more important than the other features. It is, perhaps, necessary to say that judicial definitions are not statutory definitions; they are more explanations, every word of which is not to be weighed in golden scale. Law has a tendency to harden with the passage of time and judicial pronouncements are made to assume the form of statutory pronouncements. So soon as a word or expression occur in the statute is judicially defined, the tendency is to try to interpret the language employed by the Judges in the judicial definition as if it has been transformed into a statutory definition. That is wrong. Always, words and expressions to be interpreted are those employed in the statute and not those used by judges for felicitous explanation. Judicial definition, we repeat, is explanatory and not definitive. One remark requires to be added here. Religious denomination has not to owe allegiance to any parent religion. The entire following of a religion may be no more than the religious denomination. Judicial definition, we repeat, is explanatory and not definitive. One remark requires to be added here. Religious denomination has not to owe allegiance to any parent religion. The entire following of a religion may be no more than the religious denomination. This may particularly be so in the case of small religious groups or ‘developing religions, that is, religions in the formative stage.’ 28. In T.T. Kuppuswamy Chettiar and 4 others v. State of Tamil Nadu (100 L.W. 1031) S.T. Ramalingam, J. held that, “The Beri Chetty community of Madras, as followers of Sri Dharmasivacharya Mutt was not a religious denomination and Kandhakottam Temple was not a denominational temple within the meaning of that term in Article 26 of the Constitution of India (sic) denomination without a guru was not comprehensible.” 29. In The Assistant Commissioner. H.R. & C.E. v. Swaminatha Iyer and others (1988 II MLJ 344 = 1988 2 L.W. 484) Kader, J. held that the Brahmin community of Naranammalpuram was not a religious denomination within the meaning of Article 26 of the Constitution of India. The learned Judge observed in paragraph 8 after referring to the Supreme Court cases, Shirur Mutt case and S.P. Mittal case and the decision of Srinivasan, J. as he then was, in The Assistant Commissioner. H.R. & C.E. v. Nattamai K.S. Ellappa Mudaliar and others (100 L.W. 240) and concurred with the view expressed by Srinivasan, J. as he then was, “As seen from the decision of the Supreme Court the words” religious denomination’ must take their colour from the word religion. It is therefore clear that the common faith of the community should be based on religion. It is essential that they should have common religious tenets. The basic chord which connects them should be religion and not anything else.” 30. In State of Tamil Nadu and another v. Vilampatti Nadar Uravinmurai (AIR 1991 Madras 233 = 1991 1 L.W. 382), Somasundaram, J. as he then was, held that, “The Hindu Nadar community of Vilampatti did not constitute a religious denomination; they did not have a common faith peculiar to themselves and the educational institution managed by the said community was not entitled to the benefits under Article 26 and under Article 30 of the Constitution.” 31. In Appuswamy v. A.V. Sundararajan and others ( 1997 1 MLJ 218 ) S.S. Subramani, J. set down the several criteria for calling a community ‘a religious denomination’ and a temple ‘a denominational temple’. 32. I had occasion to consider a similar position in S.A. No. 632/84.1 followed the decisions of the Supreme Court in Shirur Mutt case, S.P Mittal case, Nattamai K.S. Ellappa Mudaliar case and T.T. Kupppuswamys case and held that having regard to the facts of that case, the criteria for calling a particular community as religious denomination were not satisfied. 33. Though the learned Senior Counsel submitted that there was no such thing as a guru concept that there was no beginning, no end, still the established legal position appears to be otherwise. The criteria laid down for claiming to be a religious denomination, in my view, have not been satisfied in the present case. In paragraph 17 of its judgment the lower Appellate Court has adverted to the various documents marked on the side of the appellant. Exs. A-24 to A-33 do not prove that the Rajagopuram and the 16 Pillar Mandapam had been constructed by the Vadapuram Sengunthar Samudhayam. Only the names of the individual Sengunthars were mentioned. It has also been found from Exs.B-2 to B-15 that people belonging to other communities had gifted articles to the temple. Exs.B-6 and B-13 showed that a Bell had been presented by Rajeswari Transport while Exs.B-7 and B-14 showed that a Plate had been presented to the temple. The choultry had been constructed by one Appaji Iyengar. The learned Judge has also referred to the evidence of P.W.1 wherein he had stated that he did not know as to how much properties of the temple were with other communities thereby showing that other communities also might have given properties to the temple. 34. As regards the public worship it had been admitted that besides Senguntha Mudaliars there were Vaishnavite Mudaliars, Naickers and Brahmins, besides Harijans residing in the village. The Chithrai Festival in the temple was performed by the Sengunthars while the Krishna Jayanthi was celebrated by Yadhavas in the month of Avani and in the month of Puratasi during Navaratri Festival each community celebrated ons day the nine day festival. The Chithrai Festival in the temple was performed by the Sengunthars while the Krishna Jayanthi was celebrated by Yadhavas in the month of Avani and in the month of Puratasi during Navaratri Festival each community celebrated ons day the nine day festival. Vaikunta Ekadesi was being celebrated in the temple every year and that was arranged by all the shopowners at Panapakkam irrespective of their caste or community. The festival on the first of Thai used to be celebrated by the Thenpuram Vellalars. Thus, as rightly found by the lower Appellate Court, other community people were not mere worshipers but they were arranging the festivals and taking active part in the conduct of the festivals. In my view, the lower Appellate Court had correctly found that the plaintiff Samudhayam people had not established that they were managing the temple and the properties or that they were entitled to manage it as of right and the other community people just came as worshippers. 35. Adverting to the appointment of trustees for the temple by the community, it is on record that the Department had on earlier occasions appointed trustees to the temple. As early as 1949, one Senguntha Mudaliar was appointed as the trustee, that he continued to act till 1954 and that Adimoola Mudaliar was appointed as trustee by the department. Adimoola Mudaliar applied as per Ex.B-24 for appointing him on 30.12.1969. This was done pursuant to the notice Ex.B-26 issued by the department calling for applications. He was appointed as trustee on 2.6.1971. After the expiry of the period of Adimoola Mudaliar, one M.C. Palaniyandi, the original plaintiff, filed application Ex.B-1 on 21.9.1974 for appointing him as trustee. After Palaniyandi Mudaliars claim for appointing him as trustee was rejected as he was over-aged, the present suit had been filed claiming the temple to be a denominational temple and the community to be a religious denomination. May be the applications made by the people belonging to the community to the department for appointing as trustees could not be an estoppel, still the fact emerges that they had not at any earlier point of time claimed the temple to be a denominational temple and only because of this they had come forward with the suit. May be the applications made by the people belonging to the community to the department for appointing as trustees could not be an estoppel, still the fact emerges that they had not at any earlier point of time claimed the temple to be a denominational temple and only because of this they had come forward with the suit. Thus, it has to be held that the appellant had not established that it was a religious denomination and that the suit temple was a denominational temple. The conclusion reached by the lower Appellate Court is unexceptionable. The decision of the lower Appellate Court has therefore to be confirmed. 36. One other point raised by the learned Senior Counsel was that the property shown as item 2 in the Schedule to the plaint was being used for communal purposes also, that it did not have a denominational character and that it should be segregated if ultimately it was found that the temple was not denominational in character. The appellant had claimed that item 2 belonged to the temple. In the prior suit O.S. No. 145/31 it was claimed that the property belonged to the 172 sharers, that the produce from it was divided between the sharers previously and later on, the practice of auctioning the produce and the amount being utilised for the temple was in vogue. The lower Appellate Court has referred to several documents, Ex.A-13 being the copy of the plaint in O.S. No. 145//31, Ex.A-14 being the judgment in O.S. No. 11/36, Ex.A-15 a copy of the judgment in O.S. No. 364/50 and Ex.A-16 certified copy of the compromise decree in O.S. No. 14/66. In the last of the exhibits which is the compromise decree it is mentioned that the properties, which included the second item also belonged to the Vadapuram Sengunthar sharers. It was not stated that the property was given to the temple or endowed to it. In none of the earlier proceedings, as observed by the learned District Judge, there was any reference to the fact that the Perumal Temple belonged to the Sengunthar Samudhayam or that any property was endowed to it. It is also found by the lower Appellate Court that the allegations in the prior claims would indicate that only in the recent post the sharers had decided to spend the surplus amount realised from the lands for the temple. It is also found by the lower Appellate Court that the allegations in the prior claims would indicate that only in the recent post the sharers had decided to spend the surplus amount realised from the lands for the temple. That would not show that there was an endowment to the temple or indicate their right to manage the temple. 37. The plaintiff has come forward with a specific case that the property had been endowed to the temple and the prior proceedings clearly showed that there was no such endowment of the suit second item to the temple. The clear finding by the lower Appellate Court is that there was no endowment of the second item to the suit temple. The segregation prayed for therefore need not be specifically granted. 38. Consequently, the substantial question is answered against the appellant and the Second Appeal is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs. The injunction petition in C.M.P. No. 14140/84 is also dismissed.