JUDGMENT This appeal is filed under section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act') against the impugned order dated 23.12.1994 passed in M.J.C. No. 2 of 1991 by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Rajnandgaon. The appellant/petitioner filed a petition for claim under section 166 of the Act on 15.9.1991 claiming compensation on account of the injuries sustained by him in a motor accident dated 1.9.1990. An application under section 166(4) of the Act was also filed for condonation of delay in filing the petition for claim. However, the petition for condonation of delay and consequently the petition claiming compensation have been dismissed by the impugned order as barred by limitation. Learned counsel for the appellant has submitted that section 166(3) of the Act been omitted by section 53 of the Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 1994 which came into force w.e.f. 14.11.1994. It has been submitted that in view of the amendment now there is no limitation for preferring petition for claim for compensation on account of the motor accident. Since the appellant's petition for compensation was pending before the Claims Tribunal after the above amendment was made effection i.e. on 14.11.1994, the same should not have been dismissed as barred by limitation. Reliance in this connection has been placed on Dhannalal v. D.P. Vijayvargiya, (1996) 4 SCC 652 . It appears that the petition for claim was accompanied by an application for condonation of delay filed under section 166(4) of the Act. The appellant petitioner alleged that the delay was caused on account of the treatment of injuries sustained by him in motor accident for which he was hospitalised and was receiving treatment. The Tribunal appears to have granted several opportunities to the petitioner appellant to prove his assertions regarding the delay. The petitioner appellant failed to do so. The Tribunal, therefore, held that the petitioner has failed to prove any justifiable cause for the delay, hence the application for condonation of delay and consequently the petition claiming compensation were dismissed as time barred. However, as laid down in Dhannalal's case by the Apex Court, the benefit ensuing on the deletion of Sub-section (3) of section 166 should be extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation has been raised. However, as laid down in Dhannalal's case by the Apex Court, the benefit ensuing on the deletion of Sub-section (3) of section 166 should be extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation has been raised. It has further been laid down that since section 166(3) of the Act has been omitted, the Tribunal has to entertain a claim petition without taking note of the date on which such accident had taken place and the claim petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground that such claim petitions were barred by time when sub-section (3) of section 166 was in force. In view of the observations as above since the petition for claim by the appellant was pending on and after 14.11.1994, it could not have been dismissed as time barred. In view of the above, the impugned, order holding the claim petition of the appellant as time barred, is set aside and the Claims Tribunal is directed to consider the petition for compensation on merits and proceed to hear it, in accordance with law. In the result, the appeal is allowed as above.