ORDER 1. The petitioner has challenged the order dated 13.3.97 (Annexure-P/6) passed by the respondent No.1 as also the order dated 12.1.98, passed in Appeal, by the Board of Directors (respondent No.2) of the Kshetriya Gramin Bank. 2. Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Hoshangabad is constituted under the Regional Rural Bank Act, 1976. In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 30 of the Regional Rural Bank Act, 1976, the Board of Directors of Kshetriya Gramin Bank, Hoshangabad, in consultation with the sponsor Bank, Central Bank of India, and the Reserve Bank of India and with previous sanction of the Central Government, have framed Regulations known as "Kshetriya Gramin Bank Hoshangabad, Staff Service Regulations". It is not disputed that the service of the petitioner, who was posted as Manager in the said Kshetriya Gramin Bank at Hashangabad, is governed by the said Staff Service Regulations. According to the petitioner, the petitioner jointed the said Bank as Branch Manager on 8.9.76 and while he was so posted, he was issued a charge-sheet dated 21.3.96 (Annexure-P/1) pointing out the mis-conduct committed by him by abusing his position as a Branch Manager of the Bank. One of the charges levelled against the petitioner was that he had, contrary to instructions, discounted cheques and had caused a loss to the Bank in the sum of Rs. 32,513/-. According to the petitioner, he had filed his Reply Annexure-P/2 in which he had frankly accepted the ignorance about the provisions made in the various circulars of the Bank and had tendered an apology for the said procedural lapse. The petitioner was, thereafter, directed by a communication Annexure-P/3 to deposit a sum of Rs. 32,513/- towards loss of interest on account of unauthorised discounting of cheques and the petitioner, by Annexure-P/4, placed on record his willingness for the deduction of the said amount from his salary and, accordingly, the respondents started deductions from his salary vide Annexure-P/11 w.e.f. October, 1997. 3. 32,513/- towards loss of interest on account of unauthorised discounting of cheques and the petitioner, by Annexure-P/4, placed on record his willingness for the deduction of the said amount from his salary and, accordingly, the respondents started deductions from his salary vide Annexure-P/11 w.e.f. October, 1997. 3. According to the petitioner, although the deduction of the pecuniary loss caused to the Bank from the salary of the petitioner constituted an implied assurance that no further action would be taken against the petitioner, the petitioner was sent a show cause notice dated 27.2.97 (Annexure-P/5) by which on account of admission of Charge No.1 by the petitioner, penalty of reduction of two increments was proposed and later, by order dated 13.3.97 (Annexure-P/6), the petitioner was visited with the said, penalty and the penalty was implemented vide memo dated 13.3.97 (Annexure-P/7) with the result the basic pay of the petitioner was reduced to Rs. 3780/- from Rs. 4020/-. 4. Regulation 31 of die said Staff Service Regulations provides that an officer or an employee shall have a right of appeal against any order passed by an authority which injuriously affects his interest. Accordingly, the petitioner preferred an appeal against the penalty imposed by the order Annexure-P/6 to the appellate authority, namely the Board as specified by Regulation 32, vide Annexure-P/8. It appears that the said appeal was placed before the Board in its 126th meeting and the Board, instead of acceding to the prayer made by the petitioner in the appeal; proposed to visit the petitioner with the major penalty of removal from service and, accordingly, a notice dated 25.7.97 (Annexure-P/9) was issued to the petitioner requiring him to show cause, if any, against the said proposed punishment. 'The petitioner filed his Reply Annexure-P/10 and vide Annexure-P/12 dated 29.10.97, he was asked to appear for personal hearing on 12.11.97, and the Board of Directors, thereafter, by order dated 12.1.98 (Annexure-P/13) visited the petitioner with the penalty of bringing him down to the lowest stage in the time scale of pay (Officer Scale-I). The petitioner has, therefore, challenged the order of the Disciplinary Authority (Annexure-P/6) as also of the appellate authority (Annexure-P/13) by the present petition. 5. The respondents have filed their Return to which the respondents have appended the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors containing the resolutions in regard to the appeal filed by the petitioner. The petitioner has, therefore, challenged the order of the Disciplinary Authority (Annexure-P/6) as also of the appellate authority (Annexure-P/13) by the present petition. 5. The respondents have filed their Return to which the respondents have appended the minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directors containing the resolutions in regard to the appeal filed by the petitioner. The respondents have referred to the provisions of Regulation 31 (2), as the source empowering the appellate authority to examine the adequacy of the sentence and to pass suitable orders, in justification of the order Annexure- P/13. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to Regulation 31 and has submitted that in an appeal tiled by an Onker, aggrieved by an order of penalty, even on the language used in Clause (2) of Regulation 31, the appellate authority namely the Board of Directors did not have any power to enhance the punishment. Learned counsel has also referred to the decision of the Supreme Court in M.N. Shrivastava v. State of Bihar and others ( AIR 1971 SC 1106 ) and to a decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Ponnamram v. State of Rajasthan (AIR 1960 Rajasthan 56) in support of his contention that the course adoptee by the appellate authority was wholly illegal and arbitrary and not sanctioned by the Regulations which govern the matter of discipline and appeal concerning the employees of the Bank. Learned counsel for the respondents has, in controvertion, contended that the adequacy of the penalty to be examined by the appellate authority in accordance with Regulation 31 (2) would also include examination as to whether or not the penalty imposed on the officer is inadequate. The first question, in the light of the rival contentions aforesaid, that falls for consideration is whether in an appeal filed under Regulation 31 of the Staff Service Regulations, is it open to the appellate authority to enhance the punishment as has been done in the present case ? Regulation 31 reads as follows :-- "R. 31 :-- (1) An officer or employee shall have a right of appeal against any order passed by an authority which injuriously affects his interest. (2) The appeal shall be preferred to the appellate authority mentioned in regulation 32 within 30 days of the date of service of the order appealed against. Regulation 31 reads as follows :-- "R. 31 :-- (1) An officer or employee shall have a right of appeal against any order passed by an authority which injuriously affects his interest. (2) The appeal shall be preferred to the appellate authority mentioned in regulation 32 within 30 days of the date of service of the order appealed against. The appellate authority shall consider whether the findings of the Disciplinary Authority are justified and whether the penalty imposed is adequate and pass suitable order as early as possible." 7. A perusal of Clause (1) of Regulation 31 clearly indicates that the officer or employee alone has been conferred a right of appeal against any order passed by an authority which injuriously affects his interest. The learned counsel for the respondents has not been able to point out any regulation under which a similar right is conferred upon the management to tile an appeal in the event the penalty imposed on a delinquent officer under the said Regulation appears inadequate and not commensurate with the delinquency or mis-conduct proved. It is, thus, clear that the provision of appeal is only as against the penalty inflicted and right has been granted apparently to an officer or servant whose interests have been injuriously affected by an order passed under the said Service Regulations. The real contest between the parties is as to the meaning of the word "adequate" used in regulation 31(2) and while according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the examination of the adequacy of the sentence does not empower the appellate authority to enhance the sentence against which an appeal is filed the learned counsel for the respondents submits that the examination cannot be narrowly construed and grants wider power to the Board, to consider the adequacy of the penalty and to enhance the same to make it adequate to the proved mis-conduct, if the same is found inadequate. 8 Learned counsel has referred to the decision in M.N. Shrivastava v. State of Bihar (supra) and placed reliance on the following observations contained in paragraph 11 of the Judgment which read as follows :-- "..In the absence of any other provision of law or any rule conferring on the State Government the power to pass an order of dismissal in exercise of its revisional power or power of general superintendence, the general principle must prevail, namely, that an appellate authority in an appeal by an aggrieved party may either dismiss his appeal or allow it either wholly or partly and uphold or set aside or modify the order challenged in such appeal. It cannot surely impose on such appellant a higher penalty and condemn him to a position worse than the one he would be in if he had not hazarded to file an appeal. Since under Rule 851 (b) an appeal to the Government has been provided for and the Government had under that rule the appellate authority to dispose of appeals filed before it against the original 'order passed by the Inspector General, it could not resort to any general power of superintendence except in cases where there is a provision conterring such a power in addition to its appellate authority and in the manner envisaged by such a provision." Learned counsel has also relied upon the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Poonamram v. State of Rajasthan (supra) particularly, the following passage contained in paragraph 7 :-- "We should also like to point out that as a matter of principle an appellate authority in an appeal by an aggrieved party may allow the latter's appeal partly or wholly or may dismiss it but it cannot give him higher punishment, and thereby make his position worse than it would be if he had not appealed unless it has been vested with what we may conveniently call revisional jurisdiction by resort whereto the power to award enhanced punishment to the person in default is vouchsafed to it by law." 9. On the basis of the above two decisions, the learned counsel has contended that if right has been granted to a person whose interests have injuriously been affected on account of an order passed by the Disciplinary Authority, the appellate authority can either set aside the penalty, reduce it or dismiss the appeal but by no stretch of imagination, the appellate authority can arrogate the power to enhance the penalty unless that power is specifically granted by the Regulations. Learned counsel for the respondents, however, has proposed to distinguish the case relied upon by the petitioner on the ground that in the decision referred to the relevant service rules had also provided for an appeal by the Department to seek enhancement of the penalty and since such an appeal had not been filed by the Department, the course adopted by the Authority, in enhancing the punishment, was not approved. The question that confronts us is whether the word "adequate" used in Regulation 31 (2) can he construed as granting power to the appellate authority to enhance the penalty in case it is of the view that the penalty is inadequate. If the said provisions were to grant such a power, it would have specifically laid down so. The word used is "adequate" and not "inadequate" and. Therefore, the word "adequate" cannot, on its plain construction, imply that the appellate authority can go into the inadequacy of the penalty in relation to the misconduct for which the officer or employee of the Bank has been found guilty. The absence of a provision granting such a power, to the appellate authority cannot be construed to include the same in Regulation 31 (2), merely because the Regulations are silent on this point and do not provide any remedy to the Department/Management against inadequacy of the penalty. Under these circumstances, I am of the view that the word "adequate" used in Regulation 31 (2) does not imply that the Board has the power to enhance the penalty on an appeal by an officer against the penalty imposed by the Disciplinary Authority in the enquiry under the Regulations. The adequacy would only be whether the penalty is dis-proportionately severe and if so, whether it deserves to be reduced in the facts of the case. Under these circumstances, the order Annexure-P/13 passed by the respondent No.2 enhancing the penalty cannot be sustained. 10. The adequacy would only be whether the penalty is dis-proportionately severe and if so, whether it deserves to be reduced in the facts of the case. Under these circumstances, the order Annexure-P/13 passed by the respondent No.2 enhancing the penalty cannot be sustained. 10. The learned counsel for the petitioner has also pointed out that not only that the respondent No.2 Board did not have the power to enhance the penalty but even the procedure adopted was not in-consonance with the principles of natural justice, as the show cause notice Annexure-P/9 issued by the respondent No. 2 proposing to inflict the penalty of removal did not disclose any reason why it was proposed to enhance the penalty. Learned counsel has invited attention to the minutes of the 126th meeting of the Board of Directors filed by the respondents (Annexure-P/3) and has pointed out that a decision had already been taken to discharge the petitioner from service and it was only by way of a corrigendum that in the subsequent meeting the mistake was rectified and it was proposed to visit the petitioner with the said penalty. While it is true that notice Annexure-P/9 does not communicate any reason why the Board as the appellate authority proposed to enhance the punishment, since on construction of the relevant Regulation 31 (2), it has already been observed that Board was not competent to enhance the penalty in an appeal filed by the officer or the employee against the order of penalty, this aspect does not need any further examination. 11. In so far as the order Annexure-P/6 passed by the Disciplinary Authority is concerned, the petitioner has not been able to point out that it suffers from any procedural or jurisdictional error. It is not disputed that the petitioner had admitted his ignorance about the instructions contained in the circulars issued by the Bank, from time to time, with regard to the discounting of cheques and had further admitted the lapse attributed to him in the charges. It is therefore, clear that the Disciplinary Authority had, in its discretion. Indicted the penalty which is one of the penalties prescribed in Regulation 30. Merely because the petitioner had agreed to deposit the amount of pecuniary loss occuasioned by his mis-conduct to the Bank, it cannot be said that the order of penalty (Annexure-P/6) amounts to double punishment for the same mis-conduct. Indicted the penalty which is one of the penalties prescribed in Regulation 30. Merely because the petitioner had agreed to deposit the amount of pecuniary loss occuasioned by his mis-conduct to the Bank, it cannot be said that the order of penalty (Annexure-P/6) amounts to double punishment for the same mis-conduct. Even in Annexure-P/3, it was made clear that further action shall be taken after the deposit of the said amount. However, the direction to deposit the amount was not by way of infliction of the penalty but only because the petitioner himself proposed to deposit the amount, he was permitted to do so though recovery of the same was also permissible under the rules. Order Annexure-P/6 cannot, therefore, be said to be illegal. 12. In the result, this petition is partly allowed. The order Annexure-P/13 passed by the respondent No.2 is quashed. There shall be no order as to costs.