JUDGMENT Radha Mohan Prasad, J. The petitioner in this writ petition has prayed for quashing of the resolution dated 3.7.1996 of the Bihar State Electricity Board (hereinafter referred to as the Board), contained in Annexure 6, whereby and whereunder he has been inflicted with the major punishment of dismissal from service sad, further, he will not be paid any terminal benefits to partly make up the loss caused by him. 2. In short, the relevant facts are that the petitioner was appointed as Assistant Executive Engineer in the Board’s service. A departmental proceeding was initiated against him vide Board’s Resolution No. 691 dated 29.7.1981(Annexure 2) in connection with certain charges while he was posted at Transmission Sub-division, Hatia on account of non-submission of the progress report to his higher officers with respect to process of handling over and taking over charge of the stores by the outgoing Assistant Store Keeper Shri S.B. Bhattacharya to one Anadi Kumar Singh, Junior Stores Keeper. It was also, however, alleged that the petitioner neglected his duties and unduly tried to cover up the irregularities committed in Hatia Store with the result that substantial loss accrued to the Board. The petitioner submitted his show cause/written statement, a copy whereof has been annexed as Annexure 3, and enquiry was conducted by the enquiry officer who submitted his report a copy where of was supplied to the petitioner, vide Annexure 4. The petitioner, vide Annexure 4, was given second show cause notice with the proposed punishment of dismissal and for partly recovery of the loss of Rs.1,11,26,000/- and odd from him. The petitioner submitted his show cause, vide Annexure 5, and the Board vide its impugned resolution awarded the aforementioned punishment. 3. It was contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that bare perusal of the impugned resolution would show that the Board has taken into consideration the extraneous matters and has acted not in consonance with the charges leveled against him and/or finding arrived at by the enquiry officer. It was submitted by Mr. 3. It was contended by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner that bare perusal of the impugned resolution would show that the Board has taken into consideration the extraneous matters and has acted not in consonance with the charges leveled against him and/or finding arrived at by the enquiry officer. It was submitted by Mr. Sinha, learned counsel for the petitioner that the impugned resolution has been passed keeping in view of the magnitude of loss sustained to the Board by the alleged fraudulent act committed by the petitioner when, in fact there is no such finding arrived at by the enquiry officer and the so called above finding recorded by the disciplinary authority is not at all based on any material Learned counsel also placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Nand Kishore v. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1978 SC 1277 and contended that the order removing the delinquent from service should be a self contained speaking order and not a cryptic one like the impugned order. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, for the above finding, no charge was even framed against the petitioner as is evident from Annexure 2. 4. Mr. Jha, learned counsel appearing for the Board while not disputing the aforementioned contention, however, submitted that charge no.1 which has been found proved by the enquiry officer in its magnitude was sufficient to award the punishment of dismissal and that no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the petitioner. It was also submitted by Mr. Jha that in the impugned order it is mentioned that charge no.1 was proved against the proceedee and that due to his lack of proper supervision of Transmission Sub-division, Hatia, the Board suffered the aforementioned loss. 5. I do not find any force in the said submissions of Mr. Jha. It is true that in the impugned order by way of narration of fact, the aforementioned facts have been mentioned but the conclusion is mentioned in the last but one paragraph wherein it is specifically stated that the major punishment was being inflicted keeping in view of the magnitude of loss sustained to the Board by the fraudulent act committed by the petitioner, for which the learned counsel for the Board has failed to point out any finding recorded by the enquiry officer in his report. On the contrary, it has rightly been pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that in the forwarding note of the enquiry report it is mentioned that till date shortage of materials and losses incurred have not been calculated. In the enquiry report the petitioner has only been found responsible and guilty of charge for not informing his superior officers about the progress of handing over and taking over charge of the Stores, upon which, in fact, the order of punishment is not based. In the enquiry report it is mentioned that the petitioner cannot be held responsible for not receiving letters sent by the Electrical Executive Engineer, Transmission Division, Ranchi and that as soon as the letter was received by him through the letter was received by him through Special Messenger he had submitted his reply and so he cannot he held guilty of the charges of not replying to the queries form the Electrical Executive Engineer, Transmission Division, Ranchi. 6. I am quite conscious that the disciplinary is authority is competent to differ with the finding of the enquiry officer but for that he is obliged to record his own reasons considering the evidence on the record and it should be a self contained speaking order and not a cryptic one like the impugned order as has been held by the Apex Court in the case of Nand Kishore v. State of Bihar (supra) 7. Mr. Jha, learned counsel appearing for the Board has placed reliance on a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shirish Kumar Rangrao Patil, reported in (1997) 6 SCC 339 (paragraph 18) and attempted to persuade this Court to hold that charge no. 1 which has been proved was sufficient to award the impugned punishment against the petitioner. In my opinion, the said decision of the Apex Court is of no avail to the learned counsel for the Board. The facts of the said case were different and The Apex Court on consideration of the materials available already on record held that charge no.1 stands established and thus, did not consider the necessity to go into other charges as it was a case where the charges of corruption against the Judicial Officers were under consideration, But in the instant case the Board vide Its resolution. relating to second show cause, contained in Annexure 4, solely decided to accept the finding of the enquiry officer which does not at all contain anything regarding alleged fraudulent act or less sustained by the Board, on the basis of which the impugned punishment has been awarded. 8. Mr. Jha also placed reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India v. G. Oanayutham, reported in (1997) 7 SCC 463 (paragraph 34) and contended that the punishment awarded to the petitioner cannot be quashed is view of the fact that charge no.1 was proved and that was sufficient to impose the major punishment. I fail to appreciate as to how the said decision of the Apex Court helps him. The Apex Court in the said case while considering the scope/principle of judicial review of administrative action held that “……unless the court/tribunal opines is its secondary role, that the administrator was on the material before him irrational according to Wednesbury or CCSU norms, the punishment cannot be quashed. Even then, the matter has to be remitted back to the appropriate authority for reconsideration.” 9. In the instant case, as I have already noticed above, the disciplinary authority has awarded the punishment solely keeping in view the magnitude of loss sustained to the Board by the alleged fraudulent act committed by the petitioner when, in fact, there is no finding either by the enquiry officer or even by the disciplinary authority based on any material before him in that regard. 10. Under such circumstances, is my opinion, the impugned order cannot be sustained and it is, accordingly, quashed. The writ petition is, thus, allowed. However, in the facts and circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.