N. C. Jain, J.— This writ appeal has been preferred by the appellant against the judgment/order of the learned Single Judge dismissing his writ petition. 2. Shorn of unnecessary details, the factual matrix is that the appellant a Diploma holder having been appointed as Assistant Executive Engineer (Civil) on the recommendation of the Union Public Service Commission was promoted as Executive Engineer. He in inter se seniority list along with the respondent Nos. 4 to 11 who were graduate Engineers was placed at Sl.No.34 whereas the said respondents were placed at Sl.No.35,36,39,41,46,47,48 and 50. The petitioner having not been promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer challenge the promotion of the private respondents by filing civil rule which as observed above has since been dismissed. The learned Single Judge held that the petitioner being not a Graduate Engineer was not entitled to be promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer. Reference was made to the following rule of the rules framed by Central Govt. known as “Border Roads Engineering Service Group 'A' Rules. 1997” (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) reproduced below : “Executive Engineer (Civil) with 5 years regular service in the grade and possessing a degree or equivalent qualification in (Civil) Engineering.” It was further held by the learned Single Judge that the rule was not specifically challenged and. therefore, the Court could not pass an order contrary to the rules. It was further found by the learned Single Judge that even if the vires could be looked into on the basis of paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 of the petition, the rule could not be struck down without giving an opportunity to the other side and that there is a reasonable classification of the two groups of Engineers, one having Diploma and the other Degree in Engineering. The operative part of the finding as recorded by the learned Single Judge is reproduced below : “In the instant case Rule has been framed by the Central Govt. in exercise of the powers under Article 309 of the Constitution and this rule is framed on the basis of Govt. policy regarding appointment and promotion of the officers. Undoubtedly the post of Superintending Engineer is a selection post having much responsibility and, therefore, better academic qualification was necessary. in exercise of the powers under Article 309 of the Constitution and this rule is framed on the basis of Govt. policy regarding appointment and promotion of the officers. Undoubtedly the post of Superintending Engineer is a selection post having much responsibility and, therefore, better academic qualification was necessary. Accordingly it was incorporated in the rule that for promotion from the post of Executive Engineer to the post of Superintending Engineer one person should have not only experience but also must have a degree in Engineering. As I have already stated, the rule has not been specifically challenged and in that view of the matter the rule is still there and the Court cannot pass an order contrary to rules. Mr. Roy submits that rule is ultra vires as there is reference in paragraphs 18,19 and 20 of the writ petition. I am constrained to hold that the rule cannot be struck down without giving opportunity to the other side. Even assuming that this can be looked into at this stage I find that there is reasonable classification of the two groups of Engineers one having Diploma and the other having degree in engineering. Definitely a degree in engineering gives better theoretical idea. The rule making authority decided to make difference between the Engineers having experience and degree in engineering and those having experience an Diploma. In my opinion this classification is reasonable and cannot be said to be arbitrary.” 3. It was not disputed during the course of arguments that the rule reproduced in the earlier part of the judgment is the only rule framed under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India governing the promotion to the post of Superintending Engineers from the Executive Engineers. The factum of the appellant being senior to respondent Nos .4 to 11 also remained undisputed during the course of arguments. 4. The counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that there was a difference between the two methods of recruitment/promotion to the posts of Superintending Engineer (Civil) one that was prevalent at the time of the appellant's entry into the service as back as in the year 1966 and thereafter until before the Border Roads Engineering Services Group 'A' Rules, 1977 came into force and the other as contained in 1977 Rules. The eligibility criteria, according to the counsel, earlier was that an Executive Engineer (Civil) with four years' service in the GREF service on regular basis could be promoted as Superintending Engineer (Civil) whereas in 1977 Rules it has been laid own that 100% appointments are to be made on promotion from, the post of Executive Engineer (Civil) with five years' service in the grade after appointment on regular basis by a person possessing a degree or equivalent qualification in Civil Engineering. The precise argument of the counsel for the appellant is that the Rules could not be changed to the detriment of Diploma holders particularly when earlier rules did provide an opportunity to Diploma holders to be promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer. It has further been argued that the provision in 1977 Rules giving discretion to the authorities concerned, the power of relaxation is without any guidelines and further that the appellant, in view of his past excellent service record could have been sent for consideration by DPC for promotion by relaxing and waiving the requirement of additional educational qualification. The counsel has strenuously challenged the vires of the rule on the basis of averments made in paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 of the writ petition. He has submitted that the learned Single Judge was wrong in not commenting upon the constitutionality of the rules when sufficient grounds were stated by the appellant in paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 of the writ petition and that even if no prayer was made in the prayer clause for striking down the rule as discriminatory, the Court could, while granting relief to the appellant, strike down the rules. The learned counsel has placed reliance upon following judicial pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court: (1) TR Kothandaraman vs. TNWS & DBD, (1994) 6 SCC 282 ; (2) M. KamaJamma & others vs. Hon'ble Chief Justice of the High Court of Kerala & others, (1995) 3 SCC 189 , and (3) Chandran & others vs. Board of Revenue (Excise) & others, 1995 Suppl (1) SCC 159. 5. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the arguments of the counsel for the parties we are of the view that the judgment of the learned Single Judge is correct and deserves to be endorsed. 5. Having given our thoughtful consideration to the arguments of the counsel for the parties we are of the view that the judgment of the learned Single Judge is correct and deserves to be endorsed. The relevant rule clearly envisages that an Executive Engineer possessing a degree or equivalent qualification in (Civil) Engineering having five years' experience would be entitled to be promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer. Rules were framed by the Central Govt. under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. The language of the provision is plain, clear and unambiguous and there is sufficient case law for the proposition that if the language of a particular provision is clear, it should be allowed to prevail. It is none of the function of the Court to add or take away words from any statutory provision and in this case the well settled principle would apply with greater force as the rule has been framed under Article 309 of the Constitution of India. It was held by a Constitution Bench of five Hon'ble Judges of the Apex Court in the State of Jammu & Kashmir vs. Triloki Nath Khosa & others, AIR 1974 SC 1 , that though persons appointed directly and by promotion were integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers, they could, for purposes of promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers, be classified on the basis of educational qualifications. The rule providing that graduates would be eligible for promotion excluding the Diploma holders was held to be not violating Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The Apex Court in the State of Jammu & Kashmir vs. Triloki Nath Khosa & others (supra) upheld the classification on the basis of educational qualifications by observing that it has been done in order to achieve administrative efficiency. The following paragraphs i.e. 7, 22,24.25, 26, 27. 31. 38, 39 and 55 which are reproduced below, in our considered view, completely cover the present case. “7. If persons drawn from different sources are integrated into one class, can they be classified for purposes of promotion on the basis of their educational qualifications? That is the issue for consideration before us. 22. 31. 38, 39 and 55 which are reproduced below, in our considered view, completely cover the present case. “7. If persons drawn from different sources are integrated into one class, can they be classified for purposes of promotion on the basis of their educational qualifications? That is the issue for consideration before us. 22. An argument which found favour with Mufti Bahauddin J, one of the learned Judges of the Letters Patent Bench of the High Court, and which was repeated before us is that the 'retrospective' application of the impugned rules is violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is difficult to appreciate this argument and impossible to accept it. It is wrong to characterise the operation of a service rule as retrospective for the reason that it applies to existing employees. A rule which classifies such employees for promotional purposes, undoubtedly operates on those who entered service before the framing of the rule but it operates in future, in the sense that it governs the future right of promotion of those who are already in service. The impugned rules do not recall a promotion already made or reduce a pay-scale already granted. They provide for a classification by prescribing a qualitative standard, the measure of that standard being educational attainment. Whether a classification founded on such a consideration suffers from a discriminatory vice is another matter which we will presently consider but surely, the rule cannot first be assumed to be retrospective and then be struck down for the reason that it violates the guarantee of equal opportunity by extending its arms over the past. If rules governing conditions of service cannot ever operate to the prejudice of those who are already in service, the age of superannuation should have remained immutable and schemes of compulsory retirement in public interest ought to have foundered on the rock of retroactivity. But such is not the implication of service rules nor is it their true description to say that because they affect existing employees they are retrospective. It is well settled that though employment under the Govt. like that under any other master may have a contractual origin, the Govt. servant acquires a 'status' on appointment to his office. As a result, his rights and obligations are liable to be determined under statutory or constitutional authority which, for its exercise, requires no reciprocal consent. The Govt. It is well settled that though employment under the Govt. like that under any other master may have a contractual origin, the Govt. servant acquires a 'status' on appointment to his office. As a result, his rights and obligations are liable to be determined under statutory or constitutional authority which, for its exercise, requires no reciprocal consent. The Govt. can alter the terms and conditions of its employees unilaterally and though in modern times consensus in matters relating to public services is often attempted to be achieved consent is not a pre-condition of the validity of rules of service, the contractual origin of the service notwithstanding. 24. This submission is erroneous in its formulation of a legal proposition governing onus of proof and it is unjustified in the charge that the record discloses no evidence to show the necessity of the new rule. There is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the constitutional principles. 1956 SCR 279, 297 (b) ( AIR 1958 SC 538 ), Ram Krishan Dalmia vs. Justice SR Tendulkar. A rule cannot be struck down as discriminatory on any a prior reasoning. “That where a party seeks to impeach the validity of a rule made by a competent authority on the ground that the rules offend Article 14 the burden is on him to plead and prove the infirmity is too well established to need elaboration.” The burden thus is on the respondents to set out facts necessary to sustain the plea of discrimination and to adduce 'cogent and convincing evidence' to prove those facts nor ''there is a presumption that every factor which is relevant or material has been taken into account in formulating the classification” State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Kartar Singh, 1964 (6) SCR 679 , 687 ( AIR 1964 SC 1135 ). In GD Kelkar vs. Chief Controller of Imports and Exports, (1967) 2 SCR 29 , 34 ( AIR 1967 SC 839 ), Subba Rao CJ speaking for the Court has cited three other decisions of the Court in support of the proposition that unless the classification is unjust on the face of it, the onus lies upon the party attacking the classification to show by placing the necessary material before the Court that the said classification is unreasonable and violative of Article 16 of the Constitution. 25. Thus, it is no part of the appellant's burden to justify the classification or to establish its constitutionality. Formal education may not always produce excellence but a classification founded on variant educational qualifications is, for purposes of promotion to the post of an Executive Engineer, to say the least, not unjust on the face of it and the onus therefore cannot shift from where it originally lay. 26. Respondents have assailed the classification in the clearest terms but their challenge is purely doctrinaire. Academic or technical qualification can be germane only at the time of initial recruitment; for purposes of promotion efficiency and experience alone must count this is the content of their challenge. The challenge, at best, reflects the respondents, opinion on promotional opportunities in public services and one may assume that if the roles were reversed, respondents would be interested in implementing their point of view. But we cannot sit in appeal over the legislative judgment with a view to finding out whether on a comparative evaluation of rival theories touching the question of promotion, the theory advocated by the respondents is not to be preferred. Classification is primarily for the legislature or for the statutory authority charged with the duty of framing the terms and conditions of service; and if, looked at from the standpoint of the authority making it, the classification is found to rest on a reasonable basis, it has to be upheld. 27. Our reason for saying this is to emphasize that the respondents ought to have furnished particulars as to why, according to them, the classification between Diploma holders and degree holders is not based on a rational consideration having nexus with the object sought to be achieved. 27. Our reason for saying this is to emphasize that the respondents ought to have furnished particulars as to why, according to them, the classification between Diploma holders and degree holders is not based on a rational consideration having nexus with the object sought to be achieved. In order to establish that the protection of the equal opportunity clause has been denied to them, it is not enough for the respondents to say that they have' been treated differently from others, not even enough that a differential treatment has been accorded to them in comparison with others similarly circumstanced. Discrimination is the essence of classification and does violence to the Constitutional guarantee of equality only if it rests on an unreasonable basis. It was therefore incumbent on the respondents to plead and show that the classification of Assistant Engineers into those who hold Diplomas and those who hold degrees is unreasonable and bears no rational nexus with its purported object. Rather than do this, the respondents contended themselves by propounding an abstract theory that educational qualifications are germane at the stage of initial recruitment only. Omission to furnish the necessary particulars was construed by this Court in two cases as indicating that the plea of unlawful discrimination had no basis, Katra Education Society vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1966(3) SCR328, 336 and 337 ( AIR 1966 SC 1307 ); Probhudas MorarjeeRajkotia vs. Union of India. AIR 1966 SC 1044 , 1047. Such an infirmity in pleadings led this Court in State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Bhopal Sugar Industries Ltd, (1964) 6 SCR 846 ( AIR 1964 SC 1179 ) to remand the matter to the High Court in order to enable the petitioner therein to amend its petition. 31. We have observed earlier while dealing with the question of onus that there was no justification for the respondents' plea that the record does not disclose the necessity for the impugned rule of 1970. We will draw attention to the relevant material, which is always admissible to show the reasons and the justification for the classification. Such reasons need not appear on the face of the rule or law which effects the classification. Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Justice SR Tendolkar, 1959 SCR 279 , 307-8 ( AIR 1958 SC 538 ). 38. We will draw attention to the relevant material, which is always admissible to show the reasons and the justification for the classification. Such reasons need not appear on the face of the rule or law which effects the classification. Ram Krishna Dalmia vs. Justice SR Tendolkar, 1959 SCR 279 , 307-8 ( AIR 1958 SC 538 ). 38. Judicial scrutiny can therefore extend only to the consideration whether the classification rests on a reasonable basis and whether it bears nexus with the object in view. It cannot extend to embarking upon a nice or mathematical evaluation of the basis of classification, for were such an enquiry permissible it would be opened to the Courts to substitute their own judgment for that of the legislature or the rule-making authority on the need to classify or the desirability of achieving a particular object. 39. Judged from this point of view, it seems to us impossible to accept the respondents' submission that the classification of Assistant Engineers into Degree holders and Diploma holders rests on any unreal or unreasonable basis. The classifi­cation, according to the appellant, was made with a view to achieving administrative efficiency in the Engineering services. If this be the object, the classification is clearly correlated to it for higher educational qualifications are at least presumptive evidence of a higher mental equipment. This is not to suggest that administrative efficiency can be achieved only through the medium of those possessing compara­tively higher educational qualifications but that is beside the point. What is relevant is that the object to be achieved here is not a mere pretence for an indiscriminate imposition of inequalities and the classification cannot be characterized as arbitrary or absurd. That is the farthest that judicial scrutiny can extend. 55. We are therefore of the opinion that though persons appointed directly and by promotion were integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers, the> could, for purposes of promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers be classified on the basis of educational qualifications. That is the farthest that judicial scrutiny can extend. 55. We are therefore of the opinion that though persons appointed directly and by promotion were integrated into a common class of Assistant Engineers, the> could, for purposes of promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers be classified on the basis of educational qualifications. The rule providing that graduates shall be eligible for such promotion to the exclusion of Diploma holders does not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and must be upheld.” We do not think that the view taken by the Apex Court in the State of Jammu & Kashmir vs. Triloki Nath Khosa & others (supra) as has been elaborately reproduced by us above, has been dissented in any of the judgments at a later stage by the Apex Court. On the other hand, a Division Bench of the Apex Court in Shamkant Narayan Deshpande vs. Maharashtra Industrial Development Corporation & another, AIR 1993 SC 1173 while dealing with a case of Diploma holders and degree holders has dismissed the Special Leave Petition of Diploma holders in Engineering by making the following observations : “3. We find no merit in either of the two contentions. It is now well settled that for the purposes of promotion, a valid classification can be made among the members holing the same post on the basis of their qualifications. In State of Jammu& Kashmir vs. Triloki NathKhosa, (1974) 1 SCR 771 : ( AIR 1974 SC 1 ), a Constitution Bench of this Court has clearly held that such a classificatioin is permissible and does not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Court has observed there that in State of Mysore vs. P. Narasingh Rao, (1968) 1 SCR 407 : ( AIR 1968 SC 349 ) and Union of India vs. Dr. (Mrs) SB Kohli, AIR 1973 SC 811 . it was already held that classification on the basis of educational qualifications was permissible. The Court then referred to Roshan Lai Tandon vs. Union of India, (1968) 1 SCR 185 : AIR1967 SC 1889) and distinguished it on the facts by pointing out that it was a case of the direct recruits and promotees integrated into one cadre. Once they were integrated they lost their birthmarks, viz, the different sources from which they were recruited, (emphasis supplied). Once they were integrated they lost their birthmarks, viz, the different sources from which they were recruited, (emphasis supplied). The Court pointed out that Roshan Lal's case (supra) was thus no authority for the proposition that if direct recruits and promotees are integrated into one class, they cannot be classified for purposes of promotion on a basis other than that they were drawn from different sources. The Court pointed out that in the case before them the classification rested fairly and squarely on the consideration of educational qualifications which was not a discrimination in relation to the source of recruitment. The Court also pointed out that the very bench which decided Roshan Lal's case (supra) held about a fortnight later in Narasingh Rao's case (supra) that higher educational qualifications were a relevant consideration for fixing a higher pay scale and, therefore, matriculate tracers could be given a higher scale than non-matriculate tracers though their duties were identical. The Court, further, on the same reasoning distinguished Mervyn Coutindo vs. Collector of Customs., Bombay, (1966) 3 SCR 600 : ( AIR 1967 SC 52 ) and SM Pandit vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1972 SC 252 by pointing out that both the cases related to the classification made on the basis of the sources of recruitment and not on the basis of educational qualifications. The Court then concluded (para 55 of AIR 1974 SC 1 ): “We are therefore of the opinion that though persons appointed directly and by promotion were integrated into a, common class of Assistant Engineers, they could, for purposes of promotion to the cadre of Executive Engineers, be classified on the basis of educational qualifications. The rule providing that graduates shall be eligible for such promotion to the exclusion of Diploma holders does not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution and must be upheld.” The reliance placed by Shri Shetye appearing for the petitioner on a later decision of a Bench of two learned Judges of this Court in HC Sharma vs. Municipal Corporation of Delhi, (1983) 3 SCR 372 : ( AIR 1983 SC 881 ) is, we are afraid, not justified. It was a case where no separate quota for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer was kept for Degree holder Junior Engineers and Diploma holder Junior Engineers. The Degree holder Junior Engineers had sought a relief that such a quota be kept. It was a case where no separate quota for promotion to the post of Assistant Engineer was kept for Degree holder Junior Engineers and Diploma holder Junior Engineers. The Degree holder Junior Engineers had sought a relief that such a quota be kept. It is while dealing with this relief claimed, that this Court had observed that it could not be done except by carving out two classes in the same category of Junior Engineers. It may be observed that it was not a case where the classification was already made which was challenged before the Court. It was a case where the writ petitioners wanted such a classification to be made. It is for the authorities if they so desire, taking into consideration the nature of work, the requisite qualification for the work and the necessity for making such a classification that quotas could be prescribed on the basis of educational qualifications. It is true that the following observations made in that case while dealing with the relief claimed, do support the petitioner (para 56 of AIR): “Prayer No.4 is to declare the petitioners Graduate Engineers as a separate category amongst Junior Engineers and give them equal quota like the Diploma holder Junior Engineers out of the 50% quota for promotion as Assistant Engineers. This cannot be done except by carving out two classes in the same category of Junior Engineers on the basis merely of their qualification which is not permissible in law though the creation of selection grade in the same category on the basis of merit and or seniority is well known and permissible. The Junior Engineers do the same kind of work and bear the same responsibilities whatever their qualification, whether they are Degree holders of Diploma holders. However, these observations have been made without noticing the decision in Khosa's case ( AIR 1974 SC 1 (supra). Hence, the observations are per incuriam”. As regards the next contention, admittedly neither the practice followed till 1988, nor the resolution passed by the respondent Corporation in 1988 was a regulation passed in accordance with section 64 of the Act. It is well settled that in the absence of a rule or regulation, the authority can prescribe service conditions by executive instructions and this is what was done till the year 1988 and is also sought to be done since 1988 by the impugned resolution. It is well settled that in the absence of a rule or regulation, the authority can prescribe service conditions by executive instructions and this is what was done till the year 1988 and is also sought to be done since 1988 by the impugned resolution. The proposition that in the absence of the rules and regulations, the authority can act by executive instructions finds direct support in Mysore State Road Transport Corporation vs. Gopinath Gundachar Char, (1968) 1 SCR 767 : ( AIR 1968 SC 464 ) and vs. Balsubramaniam vs. Tamil Nadu Housing Board, (1988) 4 SCC 738 : ( AIR 1988 SC 6 ). In view of the above, the petition stands dismissed.” Similar was the view taken by a Division Bench of this Court in AK Raghumani Singh & others vs. State of Manipur& others, (1995) 1 GLR136 (1994 (1) GLJ 71). 6. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the aforementioned judicial pronouncements and the ratio of the judgment of this Court in AK Raghumani Singh's case (supra), we do not find any force in any of the arguments of the counsel for the appellant. At the very outset it deserves to be noted that the counsel for the appellant could not point out any previous rule before 1977 Rules entitling the Diploma-holders to be promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer. No provision in the rules giving Departmental Promotion Committee or any authority to relax rules in view of excellent record of a particular Diploma holder as mentioned in the pleadings, 7. In view of the law laid down by the Apex Court and this Court and the observations made by us in paragraph 5 it can safely be reiterated that the rule debarring the Diploma holders from being promoted to the post of Superintending Engineer cannot be held to be unconstitutional, unjust or arbitrary. The rule is based upon reasonable classification and aims at achieving qualitative standard. We cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the statutory authority. The rule is ratioinal and has got nexus with the object to be achieved by prescribing higher standard of efficiency. 8. Equally untenable is the argument of the counsel that Rule is ultra vires. The rule is based upon reasonable classification and aims at achieving qualitative standard. We cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the statutory authority. The rule is ratioinal and has got nexus with the object to be achieved by prescribing higher standard of efficiency. 8. Equally untenable is the argument of the counsel that Rule is ultra vires. Even if it be assumed that this Court could strike down the rule as ultra vires in view of the basis having been laid by the appellant in paragraphs 18,19 and 20 of the writ petition (may be no prayer for striking down the rule was made in the relief clause), we are of the view that the rule is perfectly constitutional and intra vires simply because the Diploma holders and the graduate Engineers were integrated into one class of service for promotion upto the stage of Executive Engineer, the rule cannot be struck down on the ground that the Diploma holders have wrongly been debarred from promotion to the higher post. The law laid down by the Apex Court as has been noticed above covers this point as well. In addition to this, the latest decision on the subject has been reported in AIR 1997 SC 3385 (Assam State Electricity Board & others vs. Gajendra Nath Pathak & others) wherein their Lordships again reiterated the view repeatedly expressed by the Apex Court in various earlier judgments that classification on the basis of educational qualification between Diploma holders and non-Diploma holders or between Diploma holders and graduate Engineers for the purpose of promotion to the next higher grade is valid. 8A. Before parting with the judgment, the case law cited by the counsel for the appellant must be adverted to. The first judgment which according to the counsel for the appellant is the basic one and heavily relied upon, in our considered view, does not help the appellant in any manner. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case only upheld tile provision dealing with the promotion of Diploma holders in case of 'exceptional merit' in work. The Apex Court dealt with the case of Diploma holders and degree holders where ratio was prescribed between the two. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case only upheld tile provision dealing with the promotion of Diploma holders in case of 'exceptional merit' in work. The Apex Court dealt with the case of Diploma holders and degree holders where ratio was prescribed between the two. We have gone through the entire judgment of the Apex Court and are unable to convince ourselves that the Apex Court laid down such a proposition of law which entitled the Diploma holders to be promoted. On the other hand, in paragraph 16 of the judgment the Apex Court clearly observed that higher educational qualification could be the basis not only for barring promotion but also for restricting the scope of promotion. Higher educational qualification was held to be a permissible basis of classification, the acceptability of which, the Apex Court observed, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The present is not a case where total restriction has been imposed to block the chances of promotion of a Diploma holder. On the other hand, the Diploma holders were integrated ionto one class and were allowed to be promoted in accordance with their seniority up to the stage of becoming Executive Engineer. In view thereof the judgment of the Apex Court in TR Kothandaraman & others (supra) would rather help the graduate Engineers than Diploma holders. 9. The next case i.e. M. Kamalamma & others (supra) also does not help the appellant. In the aforesaid case the leading judgment was dictated by Hon'ble Justice BL Hansaria as he then was, who was the author of the judgment in TR Kothandaraman & others (supra) as well. The facts in M. Kamalamma's case (supra) were that by virtue of a notification issued by Kerala High Court on 14th of June, 1984, Kerala,High Court Service Rules, 1970 were amended and Rule 16 (d) was substituted according to which 8 posts were to be filled by promotion of non-law graduates, subject to the conditions that they had completed 50 years of age or 20 years of total service. Rule 16 (d) which was sought to be substituted reads as follows: “16. Rule 16 (d) which was sought to be substituted reads as follows: “16. (d) Not more than eight posts of Court Officers (Category 6A in Division II) maybe filled by promotion of non-law graduates working in the feeder categories (Categories 1,1A, 1Band3 to 10 in Division II) subject to the following conditions: (i) They must have completed 50 years of age or 20 years of total service, the service being calculated after taking into account the service from the date of appointment as Assistant Grade II, Typist Grade II and Shorthand Writeer Grade II, as the case may be. (ii) They must be willing to be appointed as Court Officers. (iii) Their capacity for Bench work must be certified by a committee consisting of the Registrar, the Joint Registrar and the Deputy Registrar (Judicial) (iv) All the non-law graduates in the feeder categories will together form a separate class. As between the qualified law graduates and the non-law graduates forming the separate class there shall be a ratio of 1:1 for promotion to the post subject to what is stated in clause (v) below : (v) A law graduate who is senior to a non-law graduate coming within the separate class at the time of filling up of the vacancy will not be superseded by the application of the ratio. The seniority as between the law graduate and the non-law graduate will be determined with reference to the total length of service in the manner indicated in clause (i) above. (vi) Promotion from among the non-law graduates shall be on the basis of their total length of service. It shall be calculated in the same manner as total service is calculated under clause (i) above. (vii) Non-law graduates promoted as Court Officers shall not be eligible for any further promotion based only on their promotion following the above provisions.” The law graduates working in Kerala High Court assailed the validity of the amendment which was struck down by the High Court being violative of Article 14 read with Article 16 of the Constitution. The non-law graduates who were conferred the right of promotion under Rule 16 (d) approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The non-law graduates who were conferred the right of promotion under Rule 16 (d) approached the Hon'ble Supreme Court. The Apex Court allowed the appeal of non-law graduates and upheld the validity of Rule 16 (d) by making the following observations: “There can be no dispute with this proposition; but a perusal of the amended rule shows that the same has taken care to see that only such non-law graduates would be considered for promotion who had capacity for Bench work, which is required to be certified by a Committee consisting of Registrar, the Joint Registrar and the Deputy Registrar (Judicial). This shows that the rule making authority had taken full precaution to see that only a person of tested capacity is promoted to the post of Court Officer. It has also been noted by us that out of the 40 posts of Court Officers not more than 8 were made available to the non-law graduates; and that too to those who had completed 20 years of total service. This promotional avenue was opened for those who were at the fag end of their service, as in the alternative, age of fifty five years was required to become eligible. The amendment has shut out further promotion of the non-law graduates promoted as Court Officers.” We are really unable to appreciate as to how the ratio in the aforesaid case helps the appellant in the present case. If the statutory authority had made some provision in the present case for Diploma holders specifying that they would be entitled to be promoted in the ratio of some quota, the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court would have certainly applied to the facts of the instant case. 10. The third case of PA Chandran & others (supra) is equally inapplicable to the facts of the instant case as in that case also the Apex Court dealt with a situation where quota for promotion on the basis of educational qualification was fixed. The Apex Court in the said case upheld the ratio of 1 : 1 between SSLC and non SSLC Excise Guards for promotion to the post of Excise Preventive Officer. In the present case there is no such situation. This judgment was also delivered by BL Hansaria, J & other two Hon'ble Judges agreed with his Lordship. 11. The Apex Court in the said case upheld the ratio of 1 : 1 between SSLC and non SSLC Excise Guards for promotion to the post of Excise Preventive Officer. In the present case there is no such situation. This judgment was also delivered by BL Hansaria, J & other two Hon'ble Judges agreed with his Lordship. 11. In none of the judgments cited by the counsel for the appellant the ratio of law as was laid down in the State of Jammu & Kashmir vs. Triloki Nath Khosa & others' case (supra) judgment delivered by a Constitution Bench of five Judges was diluted. In view thereof no authoriative judicial pronouncements can come to the help of the appellant and we hereby hold that the appellant (who has since retired) was not entitled to be considered for promotion. 12. For the reasons recorded above, the writ appeal is found to be devoid of any merit and it is dismissed with no order as to costs.