JUDGMENT : Y.B. Bhatt, J. This is an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1 CPC, at the instance of the original defendant, challenging the order passed by the trial court on an application filed by the plaintiff at exh. 31. 2. Firstly, a short background of the controversy between the parties requires to be noted. It appears that the plaintiff has in a number of litigation's continued to assert and insist firstly that he is entitled to function as Head Master/Principal of the institutions in question, and that his date of birth as recorded in various official records is incorrect, and that he is entitled to function as Head Master/Principal until he is retired on the basis of only his correct date of birth which is 22nd December, 1939. 3.1 It appears that the DEO at one point of time had passed an order directing the plaintiff's retirement on 31st December, 1991, on the basis of the date of birth of the plaintiff as found in the official records of the institution. This order of the DEO was challenged by the plaintiff by filing Special Civil Application No. 3219/93, and again the basis of the challenge was on his correct date of birth as 22nd December, 1939. Since this writ petition was admitted, and interim relief in favour the plaintiff was granted, he was not retired at that point of time. However, what is required to be noted is that even if the date of birth as asserted by the plaintiff is accepted, his date of superannuation could not be any date later than 31st December, 1997. It appears that this fact was brought to the attention of the High Court in the aforesaid writ petition, and therefore, by order dated 15th July, 1998 (Coram: Kundan Singh, J.), the petitioner withdrew the said petition. 3.2 There cannot be any controversy that the plaintiff's own case is that his correct date of birth is 22nd December, 1939. This is also obvious from the plaintiff's own affidavit filed in the suit at exh. 25/3, which contains this assertion. It is therefore obvious that at the best and at the highest, the plaintiff cannot claim the date of birth later than 22nd December, 1939, and therefore, cannot claim any date of superannuation later than 31st December, 1997. This is also obvious from the plaintiff's own affidavit filed in the suit at exh. 25/3, which contains this assertion. It is therefore obvious that at the best and at the highest, the plaintiff cannot claim the date of birth later than 22nd December, 1939, and therefore, cannot claim any date of superannuation later than 31st December, 1997. Under the circumstances, I am of the opinion that since even according to the plaintiff's own case, he has reached and passed the date of superannuation, the injunction operating against the defendant is no longer justified. 3.3 It is only pertinent to note that the plaintiff's application exh. 31 contained a two-fold prayer, firstly to hold the defendant guilty of Contempt of Court and to impose adequate punishment, and secondly to restrain the defendant from advertising for the post of Head Master/Principal and/or making any appointment to the said post. Looking to the nature of the controversy between the parties and also looking to the case sought to be made by the plaintiff in the plaint as also the injunction application, there cannot be any controversy that the entire root of the plaintiff's case is that he cannot be dealt with on the basis of his date of birth other than the one claimed by him namely 22nd December, 1939. The trial court after considering the facts and circumstances of the case, firstly found against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant so far as the prayer of contempt of court was concerned. This aspect therefore does not require to be examined in the present appeal at the instance of the defendant. 3.4 In the present appeal, the Court is only concerned with the justification of the injunction order restraining the defendant from issuing any advertisement and/or making an appointment to the said post. It is further required to be noted that while dealing with the aspect of contempt alleged to have been committed by the defendant, the trial court has taken note of the fact that the advertisement had already been issued prior to the injunction order, and even otherwise mere issuance of an advertisement does not amount to making an appointment to the said post. The relevance of this finding in the limited context is only that the defendant was only restrained from making any fresh appointment to the said post by giving effect to the specific advertisement issued on 11th August, 1996. 3.5 As discussed herein above, since the plaintiff has reached the age of superannuation, on his own showing, i.e. 31st December, 1997, there is no justification for continuation of the injunction against the defendant, at least to day. 4. In view of my aforesaid findings, I do not consider it necessary to go into the detailed examination of the impugned order as to whether the same could or could not have been legitimately passed on the date when it was passed. Suffice it to say that the impugned order is not justified at least today. 5. Accordingly, the impugned order is quashed and set aside, to the extent that it restrained the defendant from making an appointment to the said post, and the appeal is accordingly allowed with no order as to costs.