S. P. SRIVASTAVA, J. ( 1 ) HEARD the learned counsel for the tenant/appellant. ( 2 ) SHRI A. M. Naik, learned counsel representing the respondents Nos. 1 and 2/ caveators has also been heard. ( 3 ) PERUSED the record. ( 4 ) THE tenant/appellant, has in this sec ond appeal challenged the judgment and de cree passed by the first appellate Court dismissing his appeal holding the same to have been abated after rejecting the applications filed by the present appellant under Order XXII, Rule 4 and under Order XXII, Rule 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Code ). ( 5 ) THE suit giving rise to this appeal had been filed seeking eviction of the tenant/appellant from the accommodation in dispute by three plaintiffs. On the plaint allegations, out of these three plaintiffs the landlords, so far as the accommodation in dispute was concerned were only the plaintiffs Nos. 2 and 3. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the tenant/ appellant has not disputed the aforesaid fact. ( 7 ) THE trial Court had decreed the suit as prayed for. ( 8 ) FEELING aggrieved by the decree of the trial Court, the tenant had filed a first appeal challenging the decree, of the trial Court dated 8. 5. 1996. ( 9 ) DURING the pendency of the first appeal, vitthaldas, one of the co-landlords died on 6. 1. 1997. An application for substitution of his heirs and legal representatives under order XXII, Rule 4 of the Code, was filed on 30. 6. 1997. Thereafter, another application seeking setting aside of the abatement under order XXII, Rule 9 of the Code, was filed on 30. 4. 1998. ( 10 ) THE appellant moved an application seeking condonation of delay in moving of the aforesaid applications. The tenant/appellant had claimed that he had absolutely no knowledge of the death of the plaintiff/respondent and he had come to know about it on 29. 6. 1997. ( 11 ) THE aforesaid applications field by the tenant/appellant under Order XXII, Rule 4 as well as under Order XXII, Rule 9 of the Code was contested by the respondents. It was asserted that the tenant had full knowledge of the date of the death of the deceased plaintiff on 6-1-1997, itself and had attended the funeral ceremony. 1997. ( 11 ) THE aforesaid applications field by the tenant/appellant under Order XXII, Rule 4 as well as under Order XXII, Rule 9 of the Code was contested by the respondents. It was asserted that the tenant had full knowledge of the date of the death of the deceased plaintiff on 6-1-1997, itself and had attended the funeral ceremony. The daughter of the deceased plaintiff was married on 11-2-1997, and the tenant/appellant had also attended the said marriage and even in the invitation card which had been issued, the fact about Vitthaldas having expired had been clearly mentioned. ( 12 ) IT was further asserted that in the aforesaid circumstances, no sufficient cause could be said to have been made out explaining the delay in the moving the applications referred to hereinabove. ( 13 ) BEFORE the first Appellate Court in support of their respective contentions, the parties had filed affidavits and counter affidavits. The first Appellate court has noticed in the impugned order that both the parties had stated the apart from the affidavits, no other evidence was proposed to be led. ( 14 ) THE first Appellate Court after careful consideration of the materials on record came to the conclusion that the tenant/appellant had full knowledge of the death of the deceased plaintiff on 6-1-1997, itself. It was also noticed that even the contesting respondents had supplied the information about the death of the deceased plaintiff on 6-5-1997. ( 15 ) THE first Appellate Court found the affidavits filed by the contesting respondents to be worthy of credit and believing the case set up by the contesting respondents, held that the tenant/appellant had full knowledge date of death of the deceased plaintiff on 6-1-1997, itself, and no sufficient ground had been made out explaining the delay in moving the applications. ( 16 ) HOLDING that the tenant/appellant had come up with the false case in regard to the absence of knowledge of the death of the plaintiff-respondent, and no sufficient ground had been made out for condonation of delay in moving the applications, the first Appellate court rejected both the applications filed under order XXII, Rule 4 as well as under Order xxii, Rule 9 of the Code. ( 17 ) THE first Appellate Court further found that considering the facts and the circumstances brought on record and the implications arising under the decree passed by the trial Court, the appeal had to be taken as having been abated as a whole. !t was in this view of the matter, that the first Appellate Court dismissed the appeal as having been abated. ( 18 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant has assailed the finding recorded by the first Appellate Court on the question in regard to the insufficiency of the cause explaining the delay in moving the two applications. It has further been urged that in any view of the matter, the entire appeal could not have been held to have been abated. ( 19 ) I have considered the above submission. ( 20 ) THE Apex Court in its decision in the case of State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram, had indicated that in a case where the success of the appeal may lead to the Court's coming to a decision which be in conflict with the decision between the appellant and the deceased respondent and would lead to the court's passing a decree which will be contradictory to the decree which had become final with respect to the same subject matter between the appelant and the deceased-respondent, the appeal could be taken to have abated even against the surviving respondents. It was also indicated that when the appellant could not have brought the action for the necessary relief, against those respondents alone who are still before the court and when the decree against the surviving respondents, if the appeal succeeds, be ineffective, that is to say, it could not be successfully executed, the entire appeal will be rendered incompetent and will be taken to have been abated as a whole. ( 21 ) THE Apex Court in its another decision in the case of Ramagya Prasad Gupta and others v. Murli Prasad and others, clarified that the appeal abates as against the deceased respondent where within the time lim-ited by law no application is made to bring his heirs of legal representatives on record. In such a case under certain circumstances the appeal may not be proceeded with and is liable to be dismissed. In such a case under certain circumstances the appeal may not be proceeded with and is liable to be dismissed. It was reiterated that one or the other of the three tests as indicated by the Apex court in its decision in the case of State of punjab v. Nathu Ram (supra) referred to hereinabove had to be taken into account. The courts will not. proceed with an appeal (a) when the success of the appeal may lead to the court's passing to a decision which may be in conflict with the decision between the appellant and the deceased respondent and, therefore, it would lead to the court's passing a decree which will be contradictory to the decree which had become final with respect to the same subject matter between the appellant and the deceased respondent; (b) when the appellant could not have brought the action for the necessary relief against those respondents alone who are still before the court and (c) when the decree against the surviving respondents, if the appeal succeeds, be ineffective that it is to say it could not be successfully executed. These three tests, as pointed out by the Apex Court in Sri chand v. M/s. Jagdish Pershad Krishna chand, it was emphasised, were not cumulative tests. Even if one of them stood satisfied, the court could dismiss the appeal. ( 22 ) THE Allahabad High Court in its Full bench decision rendered in the case of Ajai verma v. Ram Bharosey Lal and others, had indicated that a valuable right accrues in favour of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent with the abatement of the appeal. In that case, the assertion of the appellant that he had no knowledge of the death of the deceased respondent was found to be false. In the circumstances, it was held that sufficient reason for the condonation of the delay was not made out. The respondent had died on 27-7-1946, and the. application for setting aside the abatement and bringing the names of the legal representatives of the deceased on record was filed on 19-11-1947. It was found that the news of the death of the deceased was published in the daily newspapers and in fact, the appellant had gone on a condolence visit to the residence of the deceased and had met his son. It was found that the news of the death of the deceased was published in the daily newspapers and in fact, the appellant had gone on a condolence visit to the residence of the deceased and had met his son. ( 23 ) IN the present case also the assertion of the appellant that he had no knowledge of the death of the deceased-respondent was found to be false, believing the case of the contesting objectors that the appellant had attended the funeral ceremony of the deceased-respondent. The discretion exercised by the first Appellate Court in refusing to condone the delay in moving the applications does not require any interference by this Court. ( 24 ) IN the present case the decree passed by the trial Court was a joint decree for the ejectment of the tenant/appellant. ( 25 ) IT was held by the Nagpur High Court in its decision in the case of Chhogalal Meghraj maheshri and others v. Fakirji, that failure to bring on record the legal representatives of one of the plaintiff/respondents would result in the abatement of the appeal in its entirety. ( 26 ) TAKING into consideration the facts and circumstances brought on record and the ratio of the decisions indicated hereinabove, I am clearly of the opinion that the finding of the first Appellate Court that the appeal had abated in its entirety is in accordance with law. ( 27 ) THIS appeal does not involve any substantial question of law which requires consideration by this Court while exercising the limited jurisdiction envisaged under section 100 of the Code. ( 28 ) IN the aforesaid view of the matter, this appeal deserves to be and is hereby dismissed in limine under Order XLI, Rule 11 of the Code. Appeal dismissed. .