STATE OF GUJARAT v. MAMUBHA PREMSANGJI JADEJA — 1998 DIGILAW 758 (GUJ)

J. N. BHATT, J. ( 1 ) ). IN this appeal under Sec. 378 of the Code of Criminal procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "the Code"), the appellant-State of gujarat has challenged the judgment and order of acquittal recorded by the learned Sessions Judge, Kutch-Bhuj in Sessions Case No. 46 of 1989 passed on 26-3-1991 whereby all the 9 respondents-original accused persons came to be acquitted of all the charges against them. ( 2 ) IN order to appreciate the merits of the acquittal appeal and the challenge against it, let us first have a conspectus of material and the relevant facts of the prosecution case. The incident in question occurred on 20-2-1989. On that date about 2-30 p. m. one Balubha Bhimji-complainant came back home from his field. He found his wife Lilaba and mother Pamuba quarrelling about vacating the house. The complainant and his family was residing in the residential house situated at village Mota Kandagara of Bajpur Taluka in District Kutch-Bhuj. Complainant-Balubha was asked to vacate the house by his mother. Therefore, there was family discord and a quarrel. At that time, one person, who was a neighbour, Ladhubha Amarsing and his son Jilubha came to the house of the complainant. Likewise, Khengarji Hathisinh and Surubha Hathisinh also came to the house of the complainant. They tried to pacify the mother of the complainant. The brother of complainant Dadhubha was present and he was overhearing. After the mother of the complainant was pacified, the neighbours went away. ( 3 ) THE respondents are the original accused person Nos. 1 to 9. Therefore, for the sake of convenience and brevity, they are referred to hereinafter as accused nos. 1 to 9. The complainant has three brothers and he is the eldest amongst four brothers. Younger to him is Nana and the youngest one is one Batukbha. A-3 dadhubha and A-4 Batukbha are the brothers of the complainant. They were residing separately. ( 4 ) ON the date of incident, i. e. , on 20-2-1989 at about 4. 15 p. m. the complainant came to the Panchayat Office and set on the otla portion (sitting place near the tree ). A-1 Mamubha, A-2 Madhubha, A-3 Dadhubha, A-4 Batukbha, A- 5 Kehngarji, A-6 Bhagwanji and A-7 Bachubha came there where the complainant was sitting. 15 p. m. the complainant came to the Panchayat Office and set on the otla portion (sitting place near the tree ). A-1 Mamubha, A-2 Madhubha, A-3 Dadhubha, A-4 Batukbha, A- 5 Kehngarji, A-6 Bhagwanji and A-7 Bachubha came there where the complainant was sitting. Along with the complainant deceased Ladhubha Amarsing, Jilubha ladhubha, Khengarji Hathisinh, Surubha Hathisinh and Keshubha Hamirsang were also sitting in and around the complainant on the otla portion. A-1 was armed with a weapon called adaa. A-7 was armed with iron pipe, whereas, remaining accused A-2, A-6, A-8 and A-9 were armed with sticks. They attacked on the persons sitting there. Deceased Ladhubha and his son Jilubha had sustained injuries on their head and they were profusely bleeding. On scream being raised, accused persons fled away. Thereafter, one Amarsing Hathising and Prabhubha ladhubha came there who took him to Mundra Hospital for treatment. Thereafter, the complainant Balubha went to the Police Station and lodged the complaint. ( 5 ) ON the basis of the complaint, offence came to be registered with C. R. No. 8 of 1989 against the accused persons and thus commenced the investigation. The Investigation Officer (I. O.) recorded the statement of the prosecution witnesses and collected the muddamal articles and forwarded the same to the forensic Science Laboratory for examination and report. Injured Ladhubha had sustained serious injuries. Therefore, he was shifted to the Civil Hospital at Bhuj from Mundra Hospital who succumbed to the injuries on 25-2-1989 in the hospital. The dying declarations of the deceased were also recorded. Upon completion of the investigation, charge-sheet followed and the accused persons on being committed to the Sessions Court were charged in Sessions Case No. 46 of 1989 for having committed offences punishable under Secs. 143, 147, 148, 149 of i. P. C. and also under Secs. 307, 325, 323 read with Sec. 149 of I. P. C. They were also charged under Sec. 120-B of I. P. C. ( 6 ) THE accused persons denied charges against them and they claimed to be tried. In order to fortify and substantiate the charges against the accused persons, the prosecution placed reliance on the evidence of 34 prosecution witnesses. The prosecution also placed reliance on the documentary evidence to which reference would be made by us, as and when necessary, at an appropriate stage. ( 7 ) THE prosecution also alleged motive. In order to fortify and substantiate the charges against the accused persons, the prosecution placed reliance on the evidence of 34 prosecution witnesses. The prosecution also placed reliance on the documentary evidence to which reference would be made by us, as and when necessary, at an appropriate stage. ( 7 ) THE prosecution also alleged motive. One was about the dispute about handing over of the property and the other one was a political vendetta. ( 8 ) UPON the assessment and evolution (sic.) of the evidence of the prosecution, the trial Court held the accused persons not guilty and acquitted them of all the charges against them by passing the impugned judgment and order recorded on 26-3-1991. Hence, this appeal at the instance of the State. ( 9 ) THE learned A. P. P. has raised the following contentions before us :- (i) The approach of the trial Court in rejecting the evidence of six injured witnesses and five eye-witnesses is attached. (ii) That the prosecution has, successfully, proved that there was an unlawful assembly. The common object of which was to finish deceased Ladhubha amarsing and to cause injuries to injured witnesses and to attempt, assault and commit manslaughter. (iii) That the contradictions highlighted by the trial Court are not material contradictions. (iv) That the prosecution has, successfully, proved the guilt of the accused persons beyond reasonable doubt. (v) That the trial Court had no reason to discard the evidence of eye-witnesses and particularly the injured witnesses. It was, therefore, submitted that the impugned acquittal judgment and order is quite perverse and has resulted in manifest injustice. ( 10 ) THE aforesaid submissions are countered by the learned Advocate for the accused persons in defence. He has also raised the following contentions before us :- (i) That the prosecution has suppressed the gist and genesis of the incident. (ii) That the evidence of eye-witnesses and the injured persons is not only contradictory in terms, but is highly prejudicial. (iii) That the dying declarations of the deceased have not been proved to be genuine and the truthful version of the deceased. (iv) That the recording of joint and composite panchnama in respect of recovery of the muddamal articles is impermissible and illegal. (v) That the prosecution has not successfully established the guilt of the accused persons beyond doubt. (iii) That the dying declarations of the deceased have not been proved to be genuine and the truthful version of the deceased. (iv) That the recording of joint and composite panchnama in respect of recovery of the muddamal articles is impermissible and illegal. (v) That the prosecution has not successfully established the guilt of the accused persons beyond doubt. ( 11 ) WE have been taken through the entire evidence at a marathon length on different dates. We have also extensively heard the rival versions before us. ( 12 ) THERE is no dispute about the fact that deceased Ladhubha died a homicidal death. He had sustained serious injuries in the evening of about 4-15 on 20-2-1989. Therefore, he was shifted to initially Mundra Hospital and thereafter to civil Hospital, at Bhuj, where his one oral dying declaration and two written dying declarations were recorded. ( 13 ) ). Since the homicidal death of deceased Ladhubha Amarsing is not disputed, it would not be necessary to divulge on that aspect. However, it may be noted that initially injured Ladhubha was shifted to Mundra Hospital. Since he had sustained serious injuries, he was shifted to the Civil Hospital, Bhuj. He succumbed to the said injuries during the course of treatment on 25-2-1989. xxx xxx xxx ( 14 ) THE important question which appeals for consideration, at this juncture, is as to whether the prosecution has, successfully, established that - (1) there was an unlawful assembly. The common object of which was to kill deceased ladhubha and cause injuries and (2) Prosecution witnesses, Khengarji, Jugarsinh, bhikhubha, Jilubha, Keshubha and Surubha were injured and they had sustained injuries of varying gravity. If the first point is held in favour of the prosecution, then the question would arise as to whether (sic.) what was the common object of the unlawful assembly and whether the accused persons were guilty for the offences punishable under Secs. 302, 323 and 307 of I. P. C. ( 15 ) WE have, extensively, examined the oral and documentary evidence. Prima facie, the acquittal granted by the trial Court even in a case of six injured and four eye-witnesses would require serious consideration. 302, 323 and 307 of I. P. C. ( 15 ) WE have, extensively, examined the oral and documentary evidence. Prima facie, the acquittal granted by the trial Court even in a case of six injured and four eye-witnesses would require serious consideration. However, in our opinion, the view taken by the trial Court and the ultimate conclusion recorded in acquitting all the accused persons of all the charges against them in the facts and circumstances of this case could not be said to be not possible. ( 16 ) IT is a settled proposition of law that when two views are possible, the appellate Court, while examining the merits of an acquittal appeal with the aid of sec. 378 of the Criminal Procedure Code, would not substitute its own view in place of the view taken by the trial Court if it is probable and plausible. Merely because a better view can be perceived or a higher and better perception could be obtained upon analysis and evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution, had the appellate Court been the trial Court is not the ground for setting aside the acquittal recorded by that trial Court. ( 17 ) IN order to succeed in an acquittal appeal under Sec. 378 of the Cr. P. C. , the prosecution has to successfully establish one or the more grounds enumerated hereinbelow :- (i) That the view taken by the trial Court is not only unjust, unreasonable, but is impermissible in the light of the evidence on record. (ii) That the impugned acquittal order is trained with vices, which has resulted into miscarriage of justice. (iii) That the view taken by the Court at the end of the trial could never have been taken by any reasonable man of prudence. (iv) That the impugned acquittal is totally perverse and palpably wrong and manifestly unjust. ( 18 ) THE trial Court in the impugned judgment has elaborately assigned reasons for not accepting the evidence of the prosecution. The trial Court has also held that though the death of Ladhubha Amarsing on account of the homicidal death, the injuries sustained by six prosecution injured witnesses are also not relied on. The trial Court has given clear and cogent reasons for discarding the evidence of the complainant and other witnesses. The trial Court has also held that though the death of Ladhubha Amarsing on account of the homicidal death, the injuries sustained by six prosecution injured witnesses are also not relied on. The trial Court has given clear and cogent reasons for discarding the evidence of the complainant and other witnesses. The contradictions which are, successfully, pointed out are not only substantial in nature, but they are at macro level. The gist and genesis is not brought successfully or placed on record by the prosecution for the reasons not known to us. There are material and serious contradictions in the evidence of doctors and the eye-witnesses. The trial Court has, threadbare, examined in minute assessment and has found the prosecution witnesses not reliable. ( 19 ) OUT of the 34 witnesses, the prosecution examined, in support of the charges against the accused, 9 witnesses have turned hostile to the prosecution case. Six injured witnesses and the four eye-witnesses who have given the narration and account of the incident in question, is neither consistent nor compatible or supporting the prosecution version beyond doubt. It will be surprising to note that even the complainant has not remained consistent in his testimony. He is an eye-witness. His evidence is vacillating. Therefore, rejection of evidence of the complainant by the trial Court cannot be complained of. There are serious contradictions on the main theme of the prosecution. It is true that the contradictions at the micro level, which do not affect the authenticity of the heart of the prosecution case, would be inconsequential and insignificant. However, when serious discrepancies and material contradictions are found in the evidence of the complainant, no reliance can be placed on the evidence of such person and the trial Court has, rightly, rejected his testimony. xxx xxx xxx ( 20 ) ORDINARILY, the dying declarations are accepted, if they are found to be true, correct, unprompted and voluntary statements of the deceased. The dying declaration does not require corroboration as such. The conviction can also be founded upon such dying declaration. While rejecting the three dying declarations and the refusal to rely on any of them, the trial Court described detailed reasons and has discussed the material contradictions and deficiencies in respect of the use of the incriminating weapons, the number of blows, the change in the names of the accused persons, etc. While rejecting the three dying declarations and the refusal to rely on any of them, the trial Court described detailed reasons and has discussed the material contradictions and deficiencies in respect of the use of the incriminating weapons, the number of blows, the change in the names of the accused persons, etc. After having, carefully, examined the aforesaid three dying declarations, we have also not been able to convince ourselves to disagree with the reasons assigned by the trial Court in rejecting them. . ( 21 ) THE first dying declaration Exh. 70 clearly goes to show that the deceased sustained 3 dharia blows. This version of the deceased how he has entered into his statement has remained unexplained for the simple reason that there is no case of the prosecution that A-1 or one or more accused persons had used dharias. The deceased has stated that A-1 Mamu, A-2 Madhu and A-4 Batukbha gave 3 dharia blows on his person, whereas, in his dying declaration before the I. O. at Exh. 101, he has given total go-bye to this version and has stated that accused Nos. 1 to 9 had given blows with the help of sticks. It is not the case that there is some doubt or manner of deficiency in narrating by the accused or the weapon used. What is stated in the dying declaration Exh. 70 is, diametrically, opposite to the version stated in the dying declaration Exh. 102. Again in the dying declaration before the executive Magistrate, the deceased has not disclosed the names of all the accused persons. Apart from that the medical evidence relied on by the prosecution militates against the statement made in the dying declaration Exh. 70 as well as dying declaration Exh. 102. No injury with the aid of dharia is noticed by any of the medical officers. Dharia is also not seized by the police. It also does not form part of the muddamal articles. ( 22 ) AGAIN, it is interesting to note that, even according to the prosecution case, A-7 Bachubha Tapubha was armed with iron pipe whereas in the dying declaration Exh. 102, it is stated that all the accused persons were armed with pipes and sticks. A-1 Mamu was holding a wooden log which is, totally, and conspicuously absent in two dying declarations. 102, it is stated that all the accused persons were armed with pipes and sticks. A-1 Mamu was holding a wooden log which is, totally, and conspicuously absent in two dying declarations. Moreover, the material deficiencies and discrepancies are, successfully, spelt out in respect of nature and number of injuries sustained on the abdominal part of the deceased in the view of three medical officers. The evidence of the eye-witnesses is also found full of material contradictions. Not only that, even the injured witnesses have stated certain types of injuries which are absent in the medical certificate. ( 23 ) WE have, carefully, and with full of circumspection examined testimonial collections and the documentary evidence relied on by the prosecution and we are satisfied that with the view taken by the trial Court in passing an acquittal against the accused persons of all the charges against them cant be said impossible. It is a settled proposition of law that when the appellate Court merely agrees with the reasons and the ultimate conclusions recorded by the trial Court, it would not be necessary for the appellate Court to reiterate all the reasons and grounds upon the acquittal is founded. This position is made extensively clear by the decision of the Honble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, AIR 1981 SC 1417 , wherein the decision in Girija Nandini Devi v. Bijendra Nandini choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124 , is relied on. It became, therefore, very clear that there is no necessity to repeat and reiterate all the reasons by the appellate Court when it particularly is in agreement with the reasons and the ultimate conclusions recorded by the trial Court. Since we have broadly agreed with the ultimate conclusions and the reasons of the trial Court, we do not deem it expedient to repeat and reiterate them. xxx xxx xxx ( 24 ) BEFORE concluding our verdict, we are also impelled and compelled to place on record atleast in a nutshell, since we are confirming the acquittal recorded by the trial Court, while rejecting the appeal of the State under Sec. 378, which we have found in exercise of the further statements under Sec. 313 of the cr. P. C. Needless to say that the statutory mandate enshrined in Sec. 313 has a purpose and also object behind it. It is distinctly provided by the Parliament in its wisdom. P. C. Needless to say that the statutory mandate enshrined in Sec. 313 has a purpose and also object behind it. It is distinctly provided by the Parliament in its wisdom. The further statement of the accused persons to be recorded under Sec. 313 cannot be taken as an empty formality. One of the most important objects of providing this statutory provision is to safegaurd the interests of the accused and afford him with an opportunity to explain the incriminating material and circumstances appearing against him in the course of the prosecution witnesses. Therefore, it is obligatory for the Court to formulate the questions after giving serious thought to the evidence which are incriminating against the accused, so that he could appreciate and if he so desires, can answer. It is, equally, important to note that the accused while explaining the incriminating circumstances and evidence appearing against him in the prosecution evidence has, also, an opportunity to evolve and formulate his defence strategy. The statements or the answers given pursuant to the questions put by the trial Court in support of the exercise of power under Sec. 313 can be also used against accused persons like any other circumstances to corroborate the case of the prosecution. It, therefore, becomes explicit that the exercise of mandate under Sec. 313 of the Cr. P. C. at the end of the trial is required to be scrupulously followed and observed with due spirit and letter. ( 25 ) IT is true that the accused cannot be compelled to answer. It is his choice. It is an enabling clause. Therefore, it cannot be used to disable the accused. If he chooses to answer, he can answer the question put to him and suggest his defence. It must also be remembered that the questions formulated under Sec. 313 for giving an opportunity to the accused against the incriminating material and the evidence propounded in the course of the prosecution case should be straight, thorough and simple, non-complex or couched in a simple compact phraseology so that even an ordinary person can properly understand and appreciate it while giving reply. It should, equally, be remembered that it is not an exercise of crossexamination. It should not be formulated in such a way that the accused could be compelled to answer against his interest. It should, equally, be remembered that it is not an exercise of crossexamination. It should not be formulated in such a way that the accused could be compelled to answer against his interest. ( 26 ) UNFORTUNATELY of late, with the respect, we have noticed that the trial courts even in case of serious matter or a capital charge, have not come up to the expectation of the statutory requirement of Sec. 313 of the Code. It can, never, be treated or characterised as a mere ritual or a formality. Non-performance or nonobservance of the provisions of Sec. 313 of the Code may be because of defective compliance, ineffective compliance or mere irregularity. If the incriminating material emerging from the record against the accused is not properly placed to the accused answering the eligibility criteria or material requirement of Sec. 313 of the Code, it can never be used against the accused. It is, equally, important that even in case of incomplete or defective failure to adhere to the principle of Sec. 313 of the Code, it must be shown that no prejudice is caused to the accused. If prejudice is shown to have been caused, such a material cannot be used. ( 27 ) THE practice of raising questions for the purpose of Sec. 313 in omnibus style is also not expedient and proper as it is likely to create confusion or to give rise to prejudice in the defence. We have, unfortunately, noticed a very uncommon, unusual, unsatisfactory and improper modus operandi and methodology of putting or raising omnibus question, collecting the names of all the witnesses together with the documentary evidence propounded and led by the prosecution and that too identical question to all the accused persons. It has not only stumbled and pained us but it has very much shocked us seeing the highly unsatisfactory manner of performing the mandatory statutory obligation which is penultimate process before the conclusion of the trial. ( 28 ) IT is not the case of prosecution or also it is not noticed from the record, virtually, common incriminating evidence or material highlighted by the witnesses, so that the same can be put to all the accused persons in the same way and fashion, in a omnibus manner. ( 28 ) IT is not the case of prosecution or also it is not noticed from the record, virtually, common incriminating evidence or material highlighted by the witnesses, so that the same can be put to all the accused persons in the same way and fashion, in a omnibus manner. ( 29 ) AS could be seen from the aforesaid information that different material, different weapons, different blows are thoroughly recollected and narrated by the witnesses in those testimonies in their evidence. Therefore, it is improper and unsatisfactory to put or raise the one and common question out of the entire evidence and that too regardless of the nature of incriminating material against particular accused, to all the accused persons in purported performance of duty cast upon the provision of Sec. 313 of Cr. P. C. ( 30 ) IT is not, really, a proper compliance to read out a long string of or a long list of all witnesses and to put same question to one and all not only in a complicated or composite form, but also in a omnibus methodology "ipso facto", could not be said to be satisfactory, expedient and proper compliance of the provisions of Sec. 313. We are very sorry to say that the manner and mode in which the mandatory statutory obligation emerging out of the provisions of Sec. 313, which has rationale legitimacy and philosophy. In the present case, where no less than 9 accused persons are involved are put and asked with not only a common but an omnibus question to one and all. We, therefore, are constrained to observe, with respect to the trial Court approach that such a practice is highly unsatisfactory, inexpedient and running counter to the legislative design and device of Sec. 313. We, therefore, are left with no alternative but to record our serious disapproval and strong displeasure to which we also will not like to be a silent spectator and that it shall not be repeated by the Courts concerned in future as true and fair trial in a criminal case is a sine qua non. With these observations, we would conclude this aspect by extinguishing our burning feeling by our disquiet fire. With these observations, we would conclude this aspect by extinguishing our burning feeling by our disquiet fire. ( 31 ) OBVIOUSLY, the reliance on the discovery panchnama prepared under Sec. 27 of the Evidence Act is also unfortunately stealing our heart as it is also not satisfactorily performed and prepared. When material contradictions (i) on the main theme of the prosecution, (ii) the nature and number of injuries and (iii) the type of weapon used arise out of evidence, the Court can accept some sort of corroboration from different circumstances like discovery panchnama. ( 32 ) DISCOVERY panchnama as such is very important piece of evidence which can be taken into consideration for transfixing the criminality of the accused provided the requisite material conditions are ensured in terms of Sec. 27 of the evidence Act making a departure from the provisions of Secs. 25 and 26 of the evidence Act. In Sec. 27, information received from the accused is prescribed to be proved provided the discovery by a person in the custody in consequence of the information received and it must relate distinctly to the fact thereby discovered. In other words, Sec. 27 provides that a discovery of fact at the instance of the person in custody which is relevant, if proved, could be used against the accused, though it may be in the nature of confession irrespective of the provisions of Secs. 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. In order to avail the benefit of the provisions of Sec. 27, following conditions ought to be established by the prosecution it being an important incriminating circumstances against the accused persons. It should be ensured by the Court that the requisite conditions or material requirements of Sec. 27 are fully adhered to or followed while collecting more evidence with the aid of Sec. 27 of the Evidence Act. The first condition necessary for bringing Sec. 27 into operation is the discovery of the fact, which means a relevant fact, in consequence of information received from a person accused of an offence. Secondly, the discovery of such fact must be deposed. Thirdly, at the time of receipt of the information, the accused must be in a police custody and fourth and very important condition is that only that much of information which relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible. Secondly, the discovery of such fact must be deposed. Thirdly, at the time of receipt of the information, the accused must be in a police custody and fourth and very important condition is that only that much of information which relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible. Thus, the rise and source of the information has been proved. Unfortunately, in the present case "en-bloc" composite discovery is embarked upon, Exh. 88 is the panchnama of the joint discovery of incriminating weapons of all the accused persons. It is not evident from the panchnama as to what was precisely deposed, by whom, which it led to the discovery of incriminating weapons. The practice of joint exercise of discovery and preparing a joint panchnama of discovery in respect of incriminating material admissible under Sec. 27 where more than one accused is involved, is not only inexpedient, unhealthy, but at time confusing and prejudicing the interest of both the parties. Time and again, this Court and in many cases the Honble Apex Court has strongly disapproved the practice of making or taking or preparing discovery and resultant composite panchnama when more than one accused is concerned. ( 33 ) SECTION 27 of the Evidence Act reads as under :-"27. How much of information received from accused may be proved :- Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a Police Officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. "it could very well be visualised from the aforesaid provisions that though technically it may be possible for two persons or more to give joint information which may lead to discovery of a fact which is, distinctly, related, but it is always expedient and safer to record separate discovery panchnama. In a given case, in case of a joint discovery, the Court will be further burdened and obliged to consider and examine as to whether mere making of joint discovery panchnama has as such be able to prove the material ingredients of Sec. 27 as it is very important to note that discovery of fact is reliable only for the information given by the accused. Therefore, the Court will be obliged to consider the circumstances in each such case solely on the ground of being joint discovery panchnama with the result in each case where more than one accused made a joint and simultaneous discovery of the same fact and from the same place the exercise of discovery does not operate for the reason that it becomes difficult to ascertain which of the other accused persons could be connected with discovery of the fact in question. Therefore, in order to obviate such a factual situation and resultant correct examination and adjudication by the Court, it is very much expedient and desirable to make or prepare separate discovery panchnama when more than one accused is involved. We hope and trust that such our feeling will be attended to by the concerned authority and will not be a cry in wilderness. ( 34 ) IT shall be appropriate to project a celebrated pronouncement of the Honble Apex Court in this connection in Mohd. Abdul Hafeez v. State of A. P. , AIR 1983 SC 367 . It is, clearly, propounded in this decision that if evidence otherwise confessional in character is admissible under Sec. 27, it is obligatory upon the Investigation Officer to state and record who gave the information when he is dealing with more than one accused, what words were used by him so that a recovery pursuant to the information received may be connected to the person giving the information so as to provide incriminating evidence against that person. It was also further held in the said case that the evidence that one accused along with all others gave information leading to recovery of robbed article and the evidence of receiver of robbed property that accused Nos. 1 to 3 sold him the ring and that accused Nos. 1 to 3 asked him to produce the ring when they came with the police party do not present any incriminating material against the accused. Such mode of recording evidence was deprecated. ( 35 ) AFTER taking into consideration the entire evidence of the prosecution and the rival submissions in the light of the relevant proposition of law and more so on account of failure to scrupulously adhere to the material ingredients of the provisions of Sec. 313 of the Cr. Such mode of recording evidence was deprecated. ( 35 ) AFTER taking into consideration the entire evidence of the prosecution and the rival submissions in the light of the relevant proposition of law and more so on account of failure to scrupulously adhere to the material ingredients of the provisions of Sec. 313 of the Cr. P. C. while preparing and indicating the incriminatory material and questions to the accused persons and also the failure to appreciate and follow the underlying design of the provisions of Sec. 27 of the Evidence Act, and the material contradictions on the material aspects of the prosecution case, we have to raise our hands in helplessness painfully, but dutifully in rejecting this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal is rejected and the impugned judgment and order shall stand affirmed on the grounds stated by the trial Court and in addition to what we have stated hereinbefore in our judgment. Since respondent No. 1 - original accused No. 1 has expired during the pendency of the appeal and since respondent Nos. 2 to 9 - original accused Nos. 2 to 9 are on bail, their bail-bonds shall, obviously, stand cancelled. .