JUDGMENT R.L. KHURANA, J.—In the present petition preferred under Section 482, Code of Criminal Procedure, while seeking the quashing of F.I.R. No. 213 dated 9.4.1994 of Police Station, Una, the following the questions have been raised, namely:— (i) that the criminal proceedings pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class (II), Una on the basis of F.I.R. No. 213, of 1994 vide Criminal Case No. 45-1/96 State v. Mohinder Singh and others, are time-barred under Section 468, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; and (ii) The petitioner being in active service of Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force is not amenable to the jurisdiction of ordinary criminal courts. Briefly stated, the facts of the case giving rise to the present petition are these. One Smt. Gurmej Kaur, a teacheress; in the Government Primary School, Chhitra, on 26.5.1994 at about 130 p.m. was returning home from her school on her bicycle. On the way, she was attacked by two persons who were on a scooter with a knife. As a result, she sustained simple injuries on right side of her chest, right arm and left leg. 2. The report about the occurrence was made to the police by Shri Prem Bhatia, Headmaster of the school, on the basis of which a case under Section 324 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code, came to be registered at Police Station, Sadar-Una vide F.I.R. No. 213 of 1994. During the course of investigation, it was revealed that the said Smt. Gurmej Kaur was married to the petitioner in the year 1966. Since the relations between them became strained, their marriage was dissolved by a divorce in the year 1989. However, the petitioner was nursing a grudge against Smt. Gurmej Kaur. The investigation further revealed that the petitioner in connivance and conspiracy with one Nirmal Singh alias Nimma arranged the attack/assault on Smt. Gurmej Kaur by S/Shri Narender Singh and Bhupender Singh alias Bhinda. Thus, on a case having been found against the petitioner and his three abovenamed accomplice, the police submitted the final report under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure, before the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class (II), Una, for the prosecution of the petitioner and his co-accused for the offences under Sections 323, 324 read with Section 34 and under Section 120-B, Indian Penal Code. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on 5.8.1996 and he directed the summoning of the petitioner and his co-accused for 24.12.1996. The case was thereafter being adjourned from time to time for the summoning of the petitioner and his co-accused. The last date for the presence of the petitioner and his co-accused before the learned Magistrate was 26.12.1997, on which date the learned Magistrate was on tour and the case came to be adjourned to 10.6.1998 for proper orders. 3. The present petition came to be filed on 19.9.1997 seeking the quashing of F.I.R. No. 213 of 1994, raising the two questions, detailed above. Be it stated that till date neither the petitioner nor any of his three co-accused has put in appearance before the learned trial Court. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the record of the case. Question No. 1 4. The petitioner and his three co-accused are sought to be prosecuted for the offences under Sections 323 and 324 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code. The offences under Sections 323 and 324, Indian Penal Code, are punishable as under:— Sr No. 1. Offence 323 I.P.C. Punishment prescribed. Imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both 2. 324 I.P.C. Imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, with fine, or with both. Section 468, Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides for period of limitation for taking cognizance of the offence by the Court, reads:— "468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation.— (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be— (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. (2) The period of limitation shall be— (a) six months, if the offence is punishable with fine only; (b) one year, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year; (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years. (3) For the purposes of this section, the period of limitation, in relation to offences which may be tried together, shall be determined with reference to the offence which is punishable with the more severe punishment or, as the case may be, the most severe punishment." 5. In the present case, the period of limitation will have to be determined in relation to the offence under Section 324, Indian Penal Code, which is punishable with more severe punishment as compared to the offence under Section 323, Code of Criminal Procedure. Since the punishment for the offence under Section 324, Indian Penal Code, is imprisonment which may extend to three years, the period of limitation for taking cognizance by the court would be three years within the meaning of clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 468, quoted above. As stated above, the offences in the present case are alleged to have been committed on 26.5.1994. The learned Magistrate, on the final report under Section 173, Code of Criminal Procedure, having been submitted to him, took cognizance of the offences on 5.8.1996, that is, within the prescribed period of three years. Therefore, the criminal proceedings pending before the learned Magistrate vide Criminal Case No. 45-I/96 on the basis of F.I.R. No. 213 of 1994 against the petitioner cannot be held to be barred by time. Question No. 2. 6. it was contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is a member of "armed forces" being a member of the Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force and, as such, he is governed by the provisions of Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force Act, 1992, (for short: I.T.B.P. Act). 7. There is no denying that the petitioner is in active service of Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force. He is thus governed by the provisions of the I.T.B.P. Act. Section 2(r) of the I.T.B.P. Act defines "offence" as meaning an act or omission punishable under the Act and as including a civil offence. 7. There is no denying that the petitioner is in active service of Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force. He is thus governed by the provisions of the I.T.B.P. Act. Section 2(r) of the I.T.B.P. Act defines "offence" as meaning an act or omission punishable under the Act and as including a civil offence. "Civil Offence" has been defined under clause (c) of Section 2 as meaning an offence which is triable by a criminal court. There is no dispute that the offences levelled against the petitioner are civil offences within the meaning of clause (c) of Section 2 of the I.T.B.P. Act and are triable by an ordinary criminal court as well by the "Force Court" under the I.T.B.P. Act. 8. Section 92 of the I.T.B.P. Act provides that when a criminal court and a Force Court have each jurisdiction in respect of an offence, it shall be in the discretion of the Director General, Additional Director General, or the Inspector General or the Deputy inspector General or the Additional Deputy Inspector General within whose command the accused person is serving or such other officer as may be prescribed, to decide before which court the proceedings shall be instituted, and if that officer decides that they shall be instituted before a Force Court, to direct that the accused person shall be detained in Force custody, 9. It has been urged on behalf of the petitioner that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences to begin with, and that the Magistrate could acquire jurisdiction only after a decision in his favour had been by the Central Government in the case of a conflict between the authority under the I.T.B.P. Act and the Magistrate. Reliance in support of the contention has been placed on the provisions contained in Section 93 of the I.T.B.P. Act, which read:— "93. Power of criminal court to require delivery of offender.—(1) When a criminal court having jurisdiction is of opinion that proceedings shall be instituted before itself in respect of any alleged offence, it may, by written notice, require the officer referred to in Section 92 at his option, either to deliver over the offender to the nearest Magistrate to be proceeded against according to law, or to postpone proceedings, pending a reference to the Central Government. (2) In every such case the said officer shall either delivery over the offender in compliance with the requisition, or shall forthwith refer the question as to the court before which the proceedings are to be instituted, for the determination of the Central! Government whose order upon such reference shall be final." 10. The Honble Supreme Court in Major E.G. Barsay v. State of Bombay, AIR 1961 SC 1762, had the occasion of examining the scope of, Sections 125 and 126 of the Army Act, 1950t which provisions are exactly similar to the provisions contained in Sections 92 and 93 of the I.T.8.P. Act. St was observed:— "The scheme of the Act, therefore, is self-evident. It applies to offences committed by army personnel described in Section 2 of the Act; it creates new offences with specified punishments, imposes higher punishments to pre-existing offences, and enables civil offences by a fiction to be treated as offences under the Act; it provides a satisfactory machinery for resolving the conflict of jurisdiction. Further it enables, subject to certain conditions, an accused to be tried successively both by court-martial and by a criminal court. It does not expressly bar the jurisdiction of criminal courts in respect of acts or omissions punishable under the Act, if they are also punishable under any other law in force in India; nor is it possible to infer any prohibition by necessary implication. Sections 125, 126 and 127 exclude any such inference, for they in express terms provide not only for resolving conflict of jurisdiction between a criminal court and a court-martial in respect of the same offence, but also provide for successive trials of an accused in respect of the same offence. Though the offence of conspiracy does not fall under Section 52 of the Act, it being a civil offence, shall be deemed to be an offence against the Act by the force of Section 69 of the Act. With the result that the offences are triable both by an ordinary criminal court having jurisdiction to try the said offences and a court-martial. To such a situation Sections 125 and 126 are clearly intended to apply. But the designated officer in Section 125 has not chosen to exercise his discretion to decide before which court the proceedings shall be instituted. To such a situation Sections 125 and 126 are clearly intended to apply. But the designated officer in Section 125 has not chosen to exercise his discretion to decide before which court the proceedings shall be instituted. As he has not exercised the discretion, there is no occasion for the criminal court to invoke the provisions of Section 126 of the Act, for the second part of Section 126(1), which enables the criminal court to issue a notice to the officer designated in Section 125 of the Act to deliver over the offender to the nearest Magistrate or to postpone the proceedings pending a reference to the Central Government, indicates that the said subsection pre-supposes that the designated officer has decided that the proceedings shall be instituted before a court-martial and directed that the accused person shall be detained in military custody. If no such decision was arrived at, the Army Act could not obviously be in the way of a criminal court exercising its ordinary jurisdiction in the manner provided by law," 11. In Som Datt Datta v. Union of India and others, AIR 1969 SC 414, the above view of the provisions contained in Sections 125 and 126 of the Army Act, 1950, was reiterated in the following words:— "......The legal position therefore is that, when an offence is for the first time created by the Army Act, such as those created by Sections 34, 35, 36, 37, etc., it would be exclusively triable by a court-martial; but where a civil offence is also an offence under the Act or deemed to be an offence under the Act, both an ordinary criminal court as well as a court-martial would have jurisdiction to try the person committing the offence. Such a situation is visualised and provision is made for resolving the conflict under Sections 125 and 126 of the Army Act....." Their Lordships of the Supreme Court further observed:— ".....Section 125 pre-supposes that in respect of an offence both a criminal court as well as a court-martial have each concurrent jurisdiction. Such a situation can arise in a case of an act or omission punishable both under the Army Act as well as under any law in force in India. It may also arise in the case of an offence deemed to be an offence under the Army Act. Such a situation can arise in a case of an act or omission punishable both under the Army Act as well as under any law in force in India. It may also arise in the case of an offence deemed to be an offence under the Army Act. Under the scheme of the two sections, in the first instance, it is left to the discretion of the officer mentioned in Section 125 to decide before which court the proceedings shall be instituted, and, if the officer decides that they should be instituted before a court-martial, the accused person is to be detained in military custody; but if a criminal court is of opinion that the said offence shall be tried before itself, it may issue the requisite notice under Section 126 either to deliver over the offender to the nearest Magistrate or to postpone the proceedings pending a reference to the Central Government. On receipt of the said requisition, the officer may either deliver over the offender to the said court or refer the question of proper court for the determination of the Central Government whose order shall be final. These two sections of the Army Act provide a satisfactory machinery to resolve the conflict of jurisdiction, having regard to the exigencies of the situation in any particular case....." Since the provisions contained in Sections 125 and 126, Army Act, 1950, are exactly similar to those contained in Sections 92 and 93 of the I.T.B.R Act, the observations of the Honble Supreme Court, quoted above, are applicable mutatis mutandis to the present case. 12. The settled legal position, therefore, is that the inherent jurisdiction which a Magistrate has to take cognizance of civil offences under the Code of Criminal Procedure is not taken away by the provisions of the Army Act, 1950 or those contained in the I.T.B.R Act. These provisions envisage a concurrent jurisdiction in the criminal courts and the Force Court and an arrangement for the proper exercise of such jurisdiction including, when necessary, a way of resolving a conflict of jurisdiction. 13. These provisions envisage a concurrent jurisdiction in the criminal courts and the Force Court and an arrangement for the proper exercise of such jurisdiction including, when necessary, a way of resolving a conflict of jurisdiction. 13. Section 475(1), Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, provides:— "(1) The Central Government may make rules consistent with this Code, and the Army Act, 1950 (46 of 1950), the Navy Act, 1957 (62 of 1957), and the Air Force Act, 1950 (45 of 1950), and any other law, relating to the Armed Forces of the Union, for the time being in force, as to cases in which persons subject to military, naval or air force law, or such other law, shall be tried by a court to which this code applies or by a Court-martial; and when any person is brought before a Magistrate and charged with an offence for which he is liable to be tried either by a Court to which this Code applies or by a Court-martial, such Magistrate shall have regard to such rules and shall in proper cases deliver him, together with a statement of the offence of which he is accused, to the commanding officer of the unit to which he belongs, or to the commanding officer of the nearest military, naval or Air Force station, as the case may be, for the purpose of being tried by a Court-martial. Explanation.—In this section— (a) "unit" includes a regiment, crops, ship, detachment, group, battalion or company, (b) "court-martial" includes any tribunal with the powers similar to those of a Court-martial constituted under the relevant law applicable to the Armed Forces of the Union." 14. In pursuance of the provisions contained in Section 475(1), quoted above, the Central Government has framed Rules known as "Criminal Courts and Court-Martial (Adjustment of Jurisdiction) Rules, 1978. Rules 3 and 4 of the said Rules, provide:— "3. In pursuance of the provisions contained in Section 475(1), quoted above, the Central Government has framed Rules known as "Criminal Courts and Court-Martial (Adjustment of Jurisdiction) Rules, 1978. Rules 3 and 4 of the said Rules, provide:— "3. Where a person subject to military, naval or air force law, or any other law relating to the Armed Forces of the Union for the time being in force is brought before a Magistrate and charged with an offence for which he is also liable to be tried by a Court-martial, such Magistrate shall not proceed to try such person or to commit the case to the Court of Sessions, unless— (a) he is moved thereto by a competent military naval or air force authority; or (b) he is of opinion, for reasons to be recorded, that he should so proceed or to commit without being moved thereto by such authority. 4. Before proceeding under clause (b) of Rule 3, the Magistrate shall give a written notice to the commanding officer or the competent military, naval or air force authority, as the case may be, of the accused and until the expiry of a period of fifteen days from the date of service of the notice he shall not— (a) convict or acquit the accused under Section 252, sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 255, sub-section (1) of Section 256 or Section 257 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), or hear him in his defence under Section 254 of the said Code; or (b) frame in writing a charge against the accused under Section 240 or sub-section (1) of Section 246 of the said Code; or (c) make an order committing the accused for trial to the Court of Sessions under Section 209 of the said Code; or (d) make over the case for inquiry or trial under Section 192 of the said Code." 15. On a combined reading of Rules 3 and 4, it is evident that in case the Magistrate is of the opinion that he should proceed with the case without there being any such request from the appropriate authority under the I.T.B.P. Act, the Magistrate concerned is enjoined to give notice to such competent authority in this behalf and till the expiry of fifteen days from the service of such notice on the competent authority, the Magistrate is prohibited from making any order of conviction or acquittal or framing any charges or committing the accused, In the present case, it is significant to note that the case pending against the petitioner before the learned Judicial Magistrate has not proceeded beyond the summoning of the petitioner and his three co-accused. In fact, neither the petitioner nor his co-accused has so far put in appearance before the learned Magistrate. 16. The words "is brought before a Magistrate and charged with an offence" appearing in Section 475, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, are significant. A plain reading of the provisions contained in Section 475, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, shows that the learned Magistrate is not bound to follow the procedure laid down in Rules 3 and 4 of the Criminal Courts and Court-Martial (Adjustment of Jurisdiction) Rules, 1978, and these provisions would not come into play unless and until the accused her either put in appearance or is brought before the Court. 17. A Full Bench of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Ajit Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1970 P&H 351, has held that Section 475., Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (corresponding to Section 549 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898) and the Rules framed thereunder merely regulate the exercise by a Magistrate of the jurisdiction already vested in him and cannot be treated as directions to be followed by the Magistrate before he can acquire1 jurisdiction. The inherent jurisdiction is not taken away by the provisions of the Act governing the Armed Forces and of Section 475, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the Rules framed thereunder. 18. The Honble Supreme Court in Union of India v* Major S.K. Sharma, AIR 1987 SC 1878, had the occasion to examine the scope of Section 475, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 18. The Honble Supreme Court in Union of India v* Major S.K. Sharma, AIR 1987 SC 1878, had the occasion to examine the scope of Section 475, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. It was held:— “.....Now inasmuch as there is always a possibility of the same offence being triable either by a Criminal Court or by a court-marital the law has attempted to resolve the competing claims of the civil authority and the military authority in such cases. Section 475 of the Code of Criminal Procedure empowers the Central Government to make rules as to cases in which persons shall be tried by a Court to which the Code applies or by a court-martial, and the section provides that whenever a person is brought before a Magistrate and charged with an offence for which he is liable to be tried either by a Court to which the Code applies or by a court-martial such Magistrate must have regard to such rules and must, in proper cases, deliver the person together with a statement of the offence of which he is accused to the Commanding Officer of the unit to which he belongs for the purpose of being tried by a court-marital. The language used in Section 475 is significant, It refers to a person who "is brought before a Magistrate and charged with an offence". !n other words, he must be a person respecting whom the Magistrate has taken the proceedings envisaged by Sections 200 to 204 of the Code. He will be a person in respect of whom the Magistrate has found that there is a case for trial. It is for that reason that Section 475 goes on to say that when such person is delivered to the Commanding Officer of the unit to which he belongs it will be "for the purpose of being tried by a court-martial. When he is so delivered, a statement of the offence of which he is accused will also be delivered to the Commanding Officer. The relevance of delivering such statement can be easily understood, for it is to enable the Army authority to appreciate the circumstances in which a court-martial is required by the law." 19. When he is so delivered, a statement of the offence of which he is accused will also be delivered to the Commanding Officer. The relevance of delivering such statement can be easily understood, for it is to enable the Army authority to appreciate the circumstances in which a court-martial is required by the law." 19. Dealing with the scope and ambit of the Criminal Courts and Court-Martial (Adjustment of Jurisdiction) Rules, 1978, it was further held:— "We now turn to the Criminal Courts and Court-Martial (Adjustment of Jurisdiction) Rules, 1978. These Rules have been framed under Section 475 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. When a person subject to military, naval or air force law or any other law relating to the Armed Forces is brought before a Magistrate and charged with an offence for which he is also liable to be tried by a court-martial, the Magistrate will not proceed to try such person or to commit the case to the Court of Session unless (a) he is moved to that effect by a competent military, naval or air force authority or (b) he is of opinion for reasons to be recorded, that he should so proceed or to commit without being moved thereto by such authority. Rule 3, in our opinion, comes into play at the point where the person has been brought before a Magistrate and charged with an offence. That is the stage adverted to earlier where the accused is directed to appear before the Magistrate and is charged with an offence after the Magistrate has determined that there is a case for trial. Before proceeding further with the case and either proceeding to try the accused or to commit the case to the Court of Session the Magistrate must, under Rule 4, give written notice to the Commanding Officer of the accused and refrain for a period of 15 days from doing any of the acts or making any of the orders in relation to the trial of the accused specified in Rule 4. In the event of the Magistrate entering upon the trial of the accused or committing the case to the Court of Session at the instance of the military, naval or air force authority it is open to such authority or the Commanding Officer of the accused to give notice subsequently under Rule 5 to such Magistrate that, in the opinion of such officer or authority the accused should be tried by a court-martial. Upon such notice, the Magistrate, if he has not taken any action or made any order referred to specifically in Rule 4 before receiving such notice must stay the proceedings and deliver the accused together with the statement referred to in Section 475(1) of the Code to the Officer specified in that sub-section. In the other kind of case, where the Magistrate intends to proceed to try the accused or to commit the case to a Court of Session without being moved in that behalf by the military, naval or air force authority, and he has given notice under Rule 4 to the Commanding Officer or the military, naval or air force authority of his intention to do so, Rule 6 empowers the Commanding Officer or the competent authority to give notice to the Magistrate within the aforesaid period of 15 days or in any event before the Magistrate takes any action or makes any order referred to in that Rule, that in the opinion of such officer or authority the accused should be tried by a court-martial. Upon such notice the Magistrate must stay the proceedings and deliver the accused together with the statement referred to in Section 475(1) of the Code to the officer specified in that subsection. It is clear that when the accused is made over by the Magistrate to the Commanding Officer or the competent military, naval or air force authority it is for the purpose of trial by a court-martial or other "effectual proceedings" to be taken or ordered to be taken against him. For, Rule 7(1) provides that when an accused has been delivered by a Magistrate under Rule 5 or 6, the Commanding Officer or the competent military, naval or air force authority must, as soon as may be, inform the Magistrate whether the accused has been tried by a court-martial or other effectual proceedings have been taken or ordered to be taken against him. The communication of such information is mandatory. When the Magistrate is informed that the accused has not been trial or other effectual proceedings have not been taken or ordered to be taken against him, he is obliged to report the circumstance to the State Government and the State Government, in consultation with the Central Government may take appropriate steps to ensure that the accused person is dealt with in accordance with law. The policy of the law is clear. Once the Criminal Court determines that there is a case for trial, and pursuant to the aforesaid rule delivers the accused to the Commanding Officer or the competent military, naval or air force authority, the law intends that the accused must either be tried by a court-martial or some other effectual proceedings must be taken against him. To ensure that proceedings are taken against the accused the Rules require the Commanding Officer or the competent authority to inform the Magistrate of what has been done. Rule 7(2) appears to envisage the possibility that the Commanding Officer or the competent military, naval or air force authority may not try the accused or take effectual proceedings against him even where the Magistrate has found a case for trial. To cover that exigency it provides that the State Government in consultation with the Central Government, on a report from the Magistrate to that effect, may take appropriate steps to ensure that the accused does not escape the attention of the law. The policy of our constitutional policy is that no person should be regarded as being above the law. Military, naval or air force personnel are as much subject to the law as members of the civil population. The policy of our constitutional policy is that no person should be regarded as being above the law. Military, naval or air force personnel are as much subject to the law as members of the civil population. It is significant that Rule 8 empowers the Magistrate, on coming to know that a person subject to the military, naval or air force law or any other law relating to the Armed Forces has committed an offence and proceedings in respect of which ought to be instituted before him and that the presence of such person cannot be procured except through military, naval or air force authorities, to require the Commanding Officer of such person either to deliver such person to a Magistrate for being proceeded against according to law or stay the proceedings against such person before the court-martial if since instituted, and to make a reference to the Central Government for determination as to the Court before which the proceedings should be instituted. Reference may also be made to Section 127 of the Army Act. It is an important provision. It provides that a person convicted or acquitted by a court-martial, may, with the previous sanction of the Central Government, be tried again by a Criminal Court for the same offence or on the same facts. This provision is an exception to Article 20 of the Constitution which provides that no person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. The provision has been made possible by reason of Article 33 of the Constitution which confers power on Parliament to modify any Fundamental Right in its application to the members of the Armed Forces. The provision has been made possible by reason of Article 33 of the Constitution which confers power on Parliament to modify any Fundamental Right in its application to the members of the Armed Forces. It is to enable the operation and application of Section 127 of the Act that Rule 7(1) of the Criminal Courts and court-martial (Adjustment of Jurisdiction) Rules, 1978 requires the Commanding Officer or the competent military, naval and air force authority to inform the Magistrate whether the accused has been tried by a court-martial or other effectual proceedings have been taken against him." Since the pre-requisite condition for application of the provisions of Section 475, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the Rules framed thereunder is missing in the present case inasmuch as the petitioner has neither appeared nor brought before the learned Magistrate in the case pending against him, the stage for following the procedure prescribed under Section 475, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, as well as the Rules framed thereunder has not yet reached. 20. The learned Magistrate, in view of the well settled law, has the inherent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offences charged against the petitioner and as such, no fault can be found with the order of the learned Magistrate taking cognizance of the case and ordering the summoning of the petitioner. 21. The learned Magistrate would be required to follow the procedure laid down in Section 475, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the Rules made thereunder only after the petitioner has put in appearance before him in response to the process issued. 22. At this stage, yet another question arises for determination, that is, whether the ordinary Criminal Court is bound to follow the procedure laid down under Section 475, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and the Rules framed thereunder, if on the date of appearance by the accused, the period of limitation prescribed for the trial of the offence by a "Court-Martial" or a "Force Court" as the case may be, has in the mean-time expired. 23. Section 88 of the I.T.B.P. Act prescribes the period of limitation of three years for the trial of a person subject to this Act. 23. Section 88 of the I.T.B.P. Act prescribes the period of limitation of three years for the trial of a person subject to this Act. It reads :— "(1) Except as provided by sub-section (2), no trial by a Force Court of any person subject to this Act for any offence shall be commenced after the expiration of a period of three years from the date of such offence. (2) The provisions of sub-section (1) shall not apply to a trial for an offence of desertion or any of the offences mentioned in Section 19. (3) In the computation of the period of time mentioned in sub-section (1), any time spent by such person in evading arrest after the commission of the offence, shall be excluded." 24. A plain reading of the provisions contained in Section 88, quoted above, shows that the period of limitation mentioned therein is only with regard to "trial of a person subject to the Act by a Force Court1. These provisions do not bar the trial of the person for an offence by the ordinary Criminal Court. The period of limitation for trial by ordinary Criminal Court would be governed by the provisions contained in "Section 468, Code of Criminal Procedure. 25. Therefore, if the provisions of Sections 88 and 92 of the I.T.B.P. Act are read together, the only conclusion would be that the authorities mentioned in Section 93 would be able to decide as to the Court, that is, ordinary Criminal Court or a Force Court, before which the proceedings against the accused subject to the I.T.B.P. Act shall be instituted, only during the subsistence of the period of limitation prescribed under Section 88. Once the period of limitation prescribed under Section 88 has expired, the Force Court would not be competent to try such accused and as such, there would be no question of exercising the discretion by the authorities under Section 93, I.T.B.P. Act. 26. The learned Counsel for the petitioner by placing reliance on the ratio laid down by the Honble Supreme Court in Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengals v. Usha Ranjan Roy Choudhury and another, AIR 1986 SC 1655, has contended that the trial against the petitioner before the learned Magistrate would stand vitiated on the expiry of period of limitation as prescribed under Section 88, I.T.B.P. Act. 27. 27. The ratio relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner is not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the case before the Honble Supreme Court, the accused therein, who were subject to Army Act, were not only charged and tried by the learned Special Judge, but they were also convicted and sentenced without following the procedure prescribed under Section 549, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (corresponding to Section 475, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973) and the Rules framed thereunder. The period of limitation prescribed under Section 122 of the Army Act, 1950, in that case had not expired when the learned Special Judge after having taken cognizance of the offence proceeded to charge the accused therein and the trial without following the prescribed procedure. it was on these facts that the trial against the accused therein was held to have stood vitiated. 28. As stated above, in the present case, the petitioner has not so far put in appearance before the learned Magistrate and the case has not proceeded beyond the stage of issuing of process against the petitioner. Therefore, the stage for following the procedure laid down in Section 475, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the Rules framed thereunder has net arisen. 29. The Honble Supreme Court in "Common Cause" a Registered Society through its Registrar v. Union of India and others, (1996) 6 SCC 775, has held that in case of trials of warrant cases by Magistrates if the cases are instituted upon police reports, the trials shall be treated to have commenced when charges are framed under Section 240 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 30. Since the trial against the petitioner has not so far commenced, the case pending before the learned Magistrate cannot be quashed for having become vitiated. As regards the trial of offences committed by the persons subject to the provisions of the I.T.B.P. Act, the Act draws a three fold scheme. Certain offences enumerated in the I.T.B.P. Act are exclusively triable by a "Force Court"; some offences have been made exclusively triable by ordinary Criminal Courts; and with regard to certain offences concurrent jurisdiction has been conferred on both ordinary Criminal Courts and the "Force Court". 31. Certain offences enumerated in the I.T.B.P. Act are exclusively triable by a "Force Court"; some offences have been made exclusively triable by ordinary Criminal Courts; and with regard to certain offences concurrent jurisdiction has been conferred on both ordinary Criminal Courts and the "Force Court". 31. There is no dispute that in the cases of first category, which are exclusively triable by "Force Court" under the I.T.B.P. Act, the period of limitation for the trial of such-offences would be governed by Section 88 of the I.T.B.P. Act. Similarly, in the cases falling under second category, which are exclusively triable by ordinary1 Criminal Courts, the period of limitation would be as prescribed under Section 468, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. Section 88, I.T.B.P. Act would have no application to such cases. 32. In respect of third category of cases, which are triable both by ordinary Criminal Courts and the "Force Court", having been vested with concurrent jurisdiction, the period of limitation would be that as prescribed under Section 88, I.T.B.P. Act in case such cases are tried by a "Force Court". However, if such cases are trield by ordinary Criminal Courts, then the period of limitation would be the one prescribed under Section 468, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 33. To illustrate, the offence under Section 325, Indian Penal Code, is a civil offence within the meaning of the I.T.B.R Act and is triable by both ordinary Criminal Court and "Force Court". It is punishable with imprisonment which may extent to seven years. Though under Section 468, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, there is no period of limitation for the trial of accused for such offence by the ordinary Criminal Courts, under Section 88, I.T.B.R Act, in case of trial before a "Force Court" a period of limitation of three years is prescribed. Would prescribing of period of limitation under Section 88, I.T.B.R Act, mean that on the expiry of the period specified therein, the ordinary Criminal Court is also debarred from taking cognizance of the offence and from proceeding with the trial against the accused who is subject to the I.T.B.R Act. The answer to this question has to be in the negative. The answer to this question has to be in the negative. Had the intention of the legislature being that in case of a person subject to the I.T.B.R Act, the ordinary Criminal Court also would not be competent to take cognizance of the offence after the expiry of the period prescribed under Section 88 of the Act, it would not have used the expression".... no trial by a Force Court of any person subject to this Act...." in the said Section. 34. The Legislature was alive to the position that under the scheme of the I.T.B.R Act there are certain civil offences in respect of which concurrent jurisdiction is vested in the "Force Court" as well as the ordinary Criminal Courts, and by confining the period of limitation under Section 88, I.T.B.R Act only for trials by a Force Court, it was intended that even though the trial by a "Force Court" might have become barred by time under Section 88, the accused may be tried by the ordinary Criminal Court for such offence provided however such trial has not become barred by limitation under Section 468, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. 35. Admittedly, in the present case the offence is alleged to have been committed on 26.5.1994. The requisite period of three years as contemplated by Section 88, I.T.B.R Act for trial of the petitioner for the offences charged against him stood expired on 25.5.1997. The learned Magistrate took cognizance of the offences on 5.8.1996, that is, within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 468, Code of Criminal Procedure, and, as such, such trial by the learned Magistrate would not be barred. The proceedings pending before the learned Magistrate in pursuance of F.LR. No. 213/1994 are, therefore, not liable to be quashed. It may be clarified that since the prescribed period of limitation for the trial of the petitioner by a "Force Court" has expired, the authorities mentioned in Section 93 of the I.T.B.R Act cannot exercise the discretion for the trial of the petitioner by a "Force Court". Therefore, in the present case there would be no need to follow the procedure laid down in Section 475, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the Rules framed thereunder by the Central Government. The case shall proceed before the learned Magistrate in accordance with law. Therefore, in the present case there would be no need to follow the procedure laid down in Section 475, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the Rules framed thereunder by the Central Government. The case shall proceed before the learned Magistrate in accordance with law. RESULT In view of the answers to the above two questions, the present petition is dismissed. The record of the Court below be returned forthwith. The petitioner, through his counsel, is directed to put in appearance before the learned Magistrate on 22.6.1998. The learned Magistrate shall proceed to dispose of the case in accordance with law. Petition dismissed.