B. N. MALLIKARJUNA, J. ( 1 ) AN unsuccessful defendant who did not succeed in taking possession of the immoveable property situated in prime area of Bangalore City (on mahatma Gandhi Road) admeasuring 4050 sq. ft. , has filed this complaint under Section 15 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 to secure the presence of the plaintiff and one another and to punish them for contempt of Court. ( 2 ) BRIEFLY stated, facts leading to the presentation of this complaint may be stated as under: a-3 Bharat Petroleum Corporation represented by its Senior divisional Manager, instituted the suit O. S. No. 8301 of 1995 in the Court of the City Civil Judge, Bangalore on 9-12-1995 for declaration that under the provisions of the Burma Shell (Acquisitions of Undertakings in india) Act, 1976 is entitled to continue in possession and enjoyment of the above said property for a period of 25 years commencing from 1-10-1995 on payment of quarterly rent of Rs. 1,350/- to the defendant-complainant in this case, on the same terms and conditions as are contained in the registered lease deed dated 26-10-1970 and for granting permanent in-junction restraining the defendants and its agents from disturbing or interfering in any manner with the peaceful possession of the plaintiff. Alternatively, plaintiff sought for directing the defendant by means of mandatory injunction to execute and register a renewed lease in plaintiffs favour on the same terms and conditions as contained in the registered lease deed dated 26-10-1970. Along with the plaint, plaintiff made an application LA. I under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the CPC and sought for temporary injunction. This application was considered and after hearing both the parties by order dated 23-10-1996 came to be allowed and temporary injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiff till the disposal of the suit. Feeling aggrieved, defendant (complainant herein) approached this Court in M. F. A. No. 4122 of 1996 and this appeal came to be dismissed on 7-1-1997. However, direction was issued to the Trial Court to dispose of the suit as expeditiously as possible and at any rate within six months from the date of order viz, 7-1-1997. It is thereafter, defendant approached the Executive Magistrate, civil Station Area, Bangalore with a petition under Section 145 of the cr. P. C. requesting the Magistrate to initiate appropriate action under section 145 of the Cr. It is thereafter, defendant approached the Executive Magistrate, civil Station Area, Bangalore with a petition under Section 145 of the cr. P. C. requesting the Magistrate to initiate appropriate action under section 145 of the Cr. P. C. against Bharat Petroleum Corporation limited and another M/s. Gurukrupa Service Station (A-1 in the complaint ). District Magistrate appears to have forwarded this petition/complaint to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Bangalore North Sub-Division, bangalore for taking appropriate action in the matter. Sub-Divisional magistrate on 11-12-1996 ordered notices on the said complaint to the respondents named therein. Feeling aggrieved, respondents approached this Court in Cr. P. No. 355 of 1997 and sought for quashing the whole proceedings before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate. Learned Single judge, by order dated 3-3-1997 allowed the petition and quashed the said proceedings. Thereafter, complainant filed an appeal purporting to be one under section 4 of the Karnataka High Court Act, 1961 challenging the order of the learned Single Judge in Cr. P. No. 355 of 1997 and that came to be registered as O. S. A. No. 3 of 1997. When this matter came up for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court, notice was ordered only to the state viz, R-3 (not to R-l and R-2) for a limited purpose viz, to hear as to whether an appeal of this nature was maintainable under Section 4 of the High Court Act, 1961. The matter came up for hearing on 31-3-1997. On that day, the Division Bench consisting of Mr. Justice Saldanha and mr. Justice M. B. Vishwanath (as he then was), while holding that the appeal is not maintainable, made certain observations and also directed the Registry to register a suo motu case for contempt against the plaintiff and another person and to post the matter for appropriate orders immediately after service of notice. It would be relevant to quote certain observations made during the course of the order since the learned counsel for the complainant relies on those observations to say that there is a case for contempt notwithstanding the fact that subsequently the suit is disposed of on merits in favour of the plaintiff (accused) and the appeals, against that judgment both before this Court and the supreme Court did not yield any better result. Those are: Webbs Sales and services (Private) Limited, Bangalore v Bharat Petroleum Corporation limited, Bangalore and Others. Those are: Webbs Sales and services (Private) Limited, Bangalore v Bharat Petroleum Corporation limited, Bangalore and Others. "we had issued notice to the State for a limited purpose insofar as the petitioners' learned Advocate had contended that an appeal to the Division Bench is maintainable on the criminal side against an order passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court". . . . . ". . . . We need to hold that the present appeal cannot be entertained as it is not maintainable". . . . . "2. . . . . . TO say the least, the record makes shocking reading. We find that there is a Public Sector Corporation involved in this litigation and that this Corporation through its Chief Regional manager had filed a suit before the City Civil Court which, to say the least, has been very mischievously drafted as far as certain material particulars are concerned". . . . . "3. . . . . IT is condition precedent that the plaintiffs must first make out an unimpeachable case to the satisfaction of the Court that they are in lawful possession of the premises and it is only thereafter that such a prayer can be made. Despite this, unfortunately, an injunction order was passed and subsequently, that order was confirmed in appeal by a learned Single Judge of this court". . . . . "4. What has emerged in the course of the hearing however is that the present case presents a massive fraud played on the Trial court which was carried through again when the matter came in appeal to the High Court and this presents a very serious situation vis-a-vis the justice dispensation system. It has unfortunately become customary in certain circles to make false statements before. a Court, suppress relevant facts and material and obtain injunction orders by misleading the Court and thereafter under the guise of the injunction order to forcibly take possession of the premises in dispute and to then try to hold on to that possession. This is prima facie the modus operandi that has been followed in this case. Even though the appeal filed is not maintainable, these disturbing facts have come to the notice of this court and it is impossible to us to shut our eyes to atrocities of this type. This is prima facie the modus operandi that has been followed in this case. Even though the appeal filed is not maintainable, these disturbing facts have come to the notice of this court and it is impossible to us to shut our eyes to atrocities of this type. Prima facie, there can be little doubt about the fact that this material would indicate that it is imperative for this Court to issue suo motu notice and take action under the Contempt of courts Act insofar as such acts do seriously interfere with and impede the administration of justice". ( 3 ) THIS is not the end but something more is required to be stated in the matter. On 3-7-1997 the case registered as C. C. C. (Cri.) No. 18 of 1997 pursuant to the direction in the above said appeal came up before another Division Bench of this Court for hearing. After hearing, and as the hearing of the civil suit had been fixed for further hearing in the trial Court, Division Bench directed the Trial Court to dispose of the suit finally by recording its finding on the issue referred to in the above terms of agreement by 31-7-1997 and dropped further proceedings. ( 4 ) IN the meantime and perhaps in view of the direction in M. F. A. , o. S. No. 8301 of 1995 came to be disposed of on merits on 26-7-1997. The suit was decreed declaring that the plaintiff is entitled to continue in possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property as a lessee for a period of 25 years from 1-10-1995 on payment of quarterly rent of Rs. 1,350/- to the defendant on the same terms and conditions contained in the lease deed dated 26-10-1970 between the parties and further directed the defendant to execute and register renewed lease deed in favour of the plaintiff. It also directed that if the defendants were to fail to execute the same within a period of one month, plaintiff would be entitled to get it executed through process of Court. In the meantime, complainant made an application LA. III before this Court in C. C. C. (Cri.) no. 18 of 1997 and that application came for consideration before the division Bench on 31-7-1997. In the meantime, complainant made an application LA. III before this Court in C. C. C. (Cri.) no. 18 of 1997 and that application came for consideration before the division Bench on 31-7-1997. Division Bench taking note of the fact that on 26-7-1997 the suit is decreed in favour of the plaintiff (A-2 herein) dropped further proceedings holding that no case of contempt is made out. ( 5 ) DEFENDANT (complainant) who suffered a decree in O. S. No. 8301 of 1995 appealed to this Court in RFA No. 532 of 1997 questioning the legality and correctness of that judgment and decree. On 20-10-1997, after hearing both the parties the appeal came to be dismissed on merits by the learned Single Judge. Aggrieved by the said dismissal, defendant approached the Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) No. 20759 of 1997 and that SLP was dismissed on 19-12-1997. Defendant not being satisfied with the order of the dismissal of SLP made a review petition to the supreme Court and that Review Petition No. 358 of 1998 came to be dismissed on 3-4-1998. ( 6 ) THEREAFTER, defendant-complainant instituted suit in O. S. No. 3632 of 1998, against A-1 in the Court of the City Civil Judge, Bangalore and sought for injunction restraining the defendant-company or its servants from interfering with its possession of the suit properties. Along with the plaint, presented LA. II under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 read with 151 of the CPC an application for grant of temporary injunction. That application after hearing both the parties, is dismissed on 30-6-1998. ( 7 ) IT is thereafter, on 28-7-1998 complainant moved this Court for taking cognizance suo motu as per the direction in the earlier proceedings and to proceed against the accused for contempt of Court. ( 8 ) THE accused appeared and filed their counter and also the documents. Heard the learned Counsel for the complainant and the accused. ( 9 ) WE are now required to determine as to whether there is a prima facie case for framing charge against the accused for committing contempt of Court. ( 10 ) LEARNED Counsel for the complainant very vehemently argued that the accused having disobeyed the directions contained in the order of this Court in O. S. A. No. 3 of 1997 have committed a clear contempt and as such there is prima facie case for framing charge. ( 10 ) LEARNED Counsel for the complainant very vehemently argued that the accused having disobeyed the directions contained in the order of this Court in O. S. A. No. 3 of 1997 have committed a clear contempt and as such there is prima facie case for framing charge. In elaborating the arguments, he contended that there was a particular direction in the earlier proceedings as to how and on what issue the finding had to be recorded, but the Trial Court without keeping in mind those directions has recorded a finding and as such there is a clear contempt and action is required to be taken. Per contra learned Counsel for the accused argued that suit having been finally disposed of, any interim orders made during the pendency of the suit or any direction contained in any one of those interim orders merges with the final decision of the suit and since the suit is decreed in favour of the plaintiff-accused, no case for contempt is made out. Further, he argued that the Court having observed in O. S. A. No. 3 of 1997 that the appeal itself is not maintainable, whatever directions given in that order is no direction or order in the eye of law and as such there is nothing on record to say that there is prima facie case to frame charge. He further contended that the defendant-complainant having failed both in RFA and the SLP, wherein he had questioned the judgment and decree in the suit of the Trial Court cannot now contend that there is a prima facie case for contempt either against 1st or 2nd or 3rd accused. ( 11 ) IN view of the vehemence with which both the Counsels argued the matter and several proceedings, we went through the records carefully. On a careful scrutiny of the papers placed before us, we do not find any substance in the arguments advanced on behalf of the complainant. We are of the definite view that narration of facts by itself make it clear that there is absolutely no material to frame charge against any one of the accused for punishing them for contempt and no further detailed discussion is necessary in the matter. Learned Counsel for the complainant argued that certain directions contained in earlier proceedings are not complied with and as such accused are liable for punishment. Learned Counsel for the complainant argued that certain directions contained in earlier proceedings are not complied with and as such accused are liable for punishment. ( 12 ) ON hearing him patiently, we were at a loss to know as to whether the learned Advocate argued for taking action against the accused-plaintiff or against the Advocate who appeared for the accused or against the Judges who have decided the civil matter. In elaborating the arguments he repeatedly argued that certain directions contained in the order of the Division Bench are not complied by the Trial Judge, he has not recorded the finding on the relevant issue and on the other hand he has recorded the findings on irrelevant issues and thus there is non-compliance of the said direction. We would not like to elaborate on this point except saying that if the complainant had any such grievance he could have agitated and urged those grounds in his appeal against the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. Now that not only RFA is dismissed but also the SLP, it would, not be appropriate to enter into elaborate discussion on this matter. Plaintiff who approached the Court for certain directions has succeeded in the suit. There is a direction to the defendant to execute the renewed lease deed in accordance with the terms and conditions contained in the earlier lease deed of 1970. ( 13 ) LEARNED Counsel for the complainant argued that the Division bench while disposing of the appeal O. S. A. No. 3 of 1997 on 31-3-1997 has considered certain aspect of the matter and it has clearly stated that plaintiff has suppressed certain facts and the plaint is mischievously drafted and that would be sufficient in the circumstances to haul up the accused for contempt. We find absolutely no merit in this contention. At the first place, those observations were made in an appeal which the division Bench itself holds that it is not maintainable. Secondly, there was no notice to the accused on that appeal, notice was ordered only to the State for a limited purpose. Thirdly, whatever observations that were made therein were made before the final disposal of the suit. At the first place, those observations were made in an appeal which the division Bench itself holds that it is not maintainable. Secondly, there was no notice to the accused on that appeal, notice was ordered only to the State for a limited purpose. Thirdly, whatever observations that were made therein were made before the final disposal of the suit. No doubt, certain observations are made, suffice it to say that those obser-vations were made in an appeal which was held to be not maintainable and secondly, the suit at that time was pending disposal. It is only after the disposal of that appeal by this Court, suit has been decreed in favour of the plaintiff, defendant has unsuccessfully challenged the said judgment and decree in first appeal before this Court and in SLP before the supreme Court. Over and above his review petition before the Supreme court against the dismissal order in SLP is also dismissed. ( 14 ) IT was argued on behalf of the complainant that accused have committed criminal contempt and action has to be taken. The expression 'criminal Contempt' is defined in Section 2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts act, 1971. It defines:"criminal contempt means the publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which (i) scandalises or tends to scandalise, or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any Court; or (ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceeding; or (iii) interferes or tends to interfere with, or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner". Now when we examine the material made available on record, keeping in mind the definition of the expression 'criminal Contempt', we hardly find any ground to say that the act of the plaintiff or the act of any one of the accused in the complaint could be brought within the definition of the expression 'criminal Contempt'. We can safely conclude that at any rate it would never fall under sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (c) of section 2 of the Act. We can safely conclude that at any rate it would never fall under sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of clause (c) of section 2 of the Act. We cannot even say that it would fall under clause (iii) of clause (c) of Section 2 for the reason that any action taken by the plaintiff is only pursuant to and in accordance with either the interim order or the final decision in the suit. We cannot also lose sight of the fact that immediately after the disposal of the suit on 26-7-1997 LA. III was moved in CCC (Cri.) No. 18 of 1997 and the Division Bench taking note of the fact that the suit is disposed of on merits, has held on 31-7-1997 that no case for contempt is made out. Circumstances are no better for the defendant-complainant thereafter as he has failed in appeals both before this Court and the Supreme Court. We therefore hold that there is absolutely no prima facie case to proceed to frame charge and the complaint is totally devoid of merits. ( 15 ) THEREFORE, the proceedings against the accused are dropped and they are discharged. Despite the order dated 31-7-1997 in CCC (Cri.) No. 18 of 1997, the complainant is pursuing the matter for punishing the accused for contempt though subsequently there is a decree in the suit against him and that was confirmed in appeals, we are therefore of the considered view that the complainant should be saddled with costs. Hence, we direct the complainant to pay Rs. 2,000/- each to the first and third accused. --- *** --- .