Judgment :- 1. The above revision is directed against the Order dated 20.7.1993 made in C.M.A No. 34 of 1992 on the file of the learned District Judge, Tanjore, reversing the order of the learned subordinate Judge, Tanjore, dated 30.12.1991 made in O.P. No. 62 of 1988. 2. The brief facts of the case are stated as follows: The petitioner was working as an Executive Officer in Kondeeswarar Temple at Puthur village, Valangaiman Taluk. At the time of inspection on 5.3.1987, the respondent found certain irregularities relating to the administration of the temple and consequently, the respondent initiated surcharge proceedings against the revision petitioner, which ultimately culminated in issuing a surcharge certificate dated 28.3.1988, for a sum of Rs. 2,960/- against the petitioner herein. 3. Under the said surcharge certificate dated 28.3.1988, the petitioner was required to pay a sum of Rs. 560/- towards improper expenditure incurred by the temple for the alleged excessive payment of salary to the watchman appointed on 1.7.1986, as the said appointment was made without prior permission of the Commissioner as required under the circular dated 23.12.1986 and a further sum of Rs. 2,400/- was asked to be paid by the petitioner towards the alleged expenses for the purchase of firewood for the preparation of the prasadam. 4. The said surcharge certificate dated 28.3.1988 was challenged by the revision petitioner in O.P. No. 62 of 1988before the learned Subordinate Judge, Tanjore, who after a detailed enquiry, relying upon the evidence of the respondents themselves, held that the surcharge proceedings was totally illegal on the ground that: i) the circular dated 23.12.1986 contemplating the prior permission from the Commissioner for the payment of salary of the watchman itself came into force from 23.12.1986, whereas the appointment of the watchman was made on 1.7.1986, considering the interest and safety of the deity and the temple properties and ii) as there is no firewood shop in the village where the said temple was located, there is every justification for the revision petitioner to purchase the head-load of firewood for Rs. 3/- every day for the preparation of the prasadam. Otherwise, it would not be possible for the revision petitioner to discharge his duly itself In any event, in so discharging his duty, the revision petitioner has exercised his discretion consciously, as there would not be any gainful purpose in inviting tenders for the purchase of firewood for Rs. 3/- every day for the preparation of the prasadam. Otherwise, it would not be possible for the revision petitioner to discharge his duly itself In any event, in so discharging his duty, the revision petitioner has exercised his discretion consciously, as there would not be any gainful purpose in inviting tenders for the purchase of firewood for Rs. 3/- every day. 5. The learned Subordinate Judge, Tanjore, therefore, set aside the surcharge certificate dated 28.3.1988 by exercising the power under Section 90(4)(a), by his order dated 30.12.1991, aggrieved by which, the respondent preferred C.M.A. No. 34 of 1992 before the learned District Judge, Tanjorc, who, by order dated 20.7.1993, allowed the appeal and confirmed the surcharge certificate dated 28.3.1988 on the ground that at the lime of inspection, the gurukkal has stated that the petitioner had not purchased the firewood for the preparation of prasadam. 6. Mr. V.K. Vijayaraghavan, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that when the circular dated 23.12.1986 requiring that no appointment should be made without prior permission of the Commissioner, came into force much later to the appointment made on 1.7.1986, there is no justification to rely upon the circular dated 23.12.1986. Mr. V.K. Vijayaraghavan also contends that the appointment of the watchman issued by the revision petitioner was made only in the best interest of the temple and its properties, and therefore, such an act of the respondent cannot be construed as loss to the temple. 7. Mr. V.K. Vijayaraghavan further contends that since there is no firewood shop in the village, the only possibility for the revision petitioner is to purchase a head-load of firewood locally for a sum of Rs. 3/- for the preparation of prasadam to perform his duty without break, as admitted by the respondent themselves in their cross-examination and therefore, such an act of the revision petitioner cannot, again be construed as causing loss to the temple, but has been done only in the best interest of the temple. 8. In this connection, Mr. Vijayaraghavan relies upon the decision of this Court in R. Sethumadhavan v. The Deputy Commissioner, H.R.&C.E., Admn. Department, Coimbatore, reported in 1987 TNLJ 244. 9. Per contra, Mr. B. Mani, learned Government Advocate (C.S.) appearing on behalf of the respondent, reiterated the reasons given by the learned District Judge, Tanjorc, reversing the order of the learned Subordinate Judge, Tanjore. 10. Vijayaraghavan relies upon the decision of this Court in R. Sethumadhavan v. The Deputy Commissioner, H.R.&C.E., Admn. Department, Coimbatore, reported in 1987 TNLJ 244. 9. Per contra, Mr. B. Mani, learned Government Advocate (C.S.) appearing on behalf of the respondent, reiterated the reasons given by the learned District Judge, Tanjorc, reversing the order of the learned Subordinate Judge, Tanjore. 10. I have given a careful consideration to the submissions of both sides. 11. There is no doubt as to the fact that the appointment of the watchman was made on 1.7.1986. whereas the circular relied upon by the respondent contemplating the prior permission of the Commissioner for appointing any person, came into force only on 23.12.1986, i.e. only after the appointment of the watchman on 1.7.1986. Therefore. I am satisfied that there is no justification in complaining that the temple has incurred loss on account of the alleged excessive payment of salary as the same is contran to the circular dated 23.12.1986. In any event, I am in agreement with the reason of the learned Subordinate Judge that the revision petitioner appointed the watchman only in the interest of the temple properties and therefore, such an act of the petitioner should not be considered as causing loss to the temple. Similarly, the award of Rs. 2,400/- towards the alleged loss for having purchased the firewood is also not acceptable in the eye of law, as admittedly, the revision petitioner was preparing the prasadam daily without any break in discharge of his duties by spending Rs. 3/- per day for the head-load of firewood. Since there is no firewood shop in the village, there is no meaning in inviting tenders for the purchase of firewood for Rs. 3/- daily. Therefore, I am satisfied that the revision petitioner has not caused any loss to the temple by his act. 12. In this connection the decision re ferred to by the learned counsel for the peti tioner, namely, R. Sethumadhavan v. The Deputy Commissioner, H.R.&C.E. Admn. De partment, Coimbatore, reported in 1987 TLNJ 244 is relevant to be referred. In the said deci sion, it is held as follows: “The order of surcharge could be passed only if loss is made out. De partment, Coimbatore, reported in 1987 TLNJ 244 is relevant to be referred. In the said deci sion, it is held as follows: “The order of surcharge could be passed only if loss is made out. But if the delinquent is able to show that there were justifiable circumstances, as found in this case, then there could be no liability to surcharge him.” In the instant case, as discussed above, no loss was caused to the temple by the act of the revision petitioner, and therefore, initiating surcharge proceedings on such untenable grounds is, in my opinion, totally without jurisdiction, and therefore, I am obliged to set aside the surcharge certificate dated 28.3.1988 and accordingly, the same is set aside. 13. At this juncture, Mr. Vijayaraghavan, brought to my notice that on account of the pendency of the above revision, for almost a decade, the terminal benefits of the petitioner have been withheld. Therefore, while allowing the revision, I also direct the respondent to settle all the terminal benefits to the revision petitioner within three months from the date of receipt of this order. In the result, the revision is allowed with the above observations. However, there will be no order as to costs.