O. P. GARG, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision petition is directed against order dated 4. 8. 1992 passed by Civil Judge. Agra in misc. Case No. 197 of 1984 arising out of Original Suit No. 76 of 1949 whereby an application. 4c. filed by M/s. Gambhir Mal Pandya Pvt. Ltd. Co. , was allowed and it was directed that the present two revisionists, who are real brothers and sons of late Hari Kishan Gupta shall hand over vacant possession of the premises in dispute. ( 2 ) HEARD Sri S. K. Mehrotra, learned counsel for the revisionists and Sri Swami Dayal, learned counsel for the respondent, at considerable length. ( 3 ) THE dispute relates to John Mills bungalow No. 1. bearing municipal number 21/5. Jeoni mandi. Agra, which was given in occupation and possession of late Hari Kishan Gupta, father of the present revisionists with the permission of the Court by the receiver appointed in Suit No. 76 of 1949. The licence was granted in favour of late Hari Kishan Gupta on 17. 7. 1967 for a specific period of two years. A document was executed incorporating the terms and conditions of licence. In clause 4 of the indenture dated 17. 7. 1967. It was expressly provided that licence was merely for a period of two years and that it shall come to an end fpso facto Immediately upon the expiry of the said period and further that the receiver upon the expiry of the said term would be entitled to take possession over the bungalow, aforesaid, without having recourse to any legal proceedings. In clause 6, it was further provided that the licensee would not be entitled to take recourse to any Court of law in case he was aggrieved by any act of the receiver in connection with the licence and would always abide by the decision of the Court of Civil Judge, Agra. Again in clause 8. It was provided that the provision of Transfer of Property Act regarding lease or for termination of tenancy was not to apply to the licence granted to late Hari Kishan Gupta and he will be evictable at any time if the licence was revoked under the orders of the Civil judge. Agra. After the expiry of the period of licence and before action for eviction of the licensee could be taken. Sri Hari Kishan Gupta died on 27. Agra. After the expiry of the period of licence and before action for eviction of the licensee could be taken. Sri Hari Kishan Gupta died on 27. 9. 1969. The present two revisionists girish Chandra Gupta and Jagdish Prasad Gupta, who are sons of the late licensee late Hari kishan Gupta, have continued to remain in possession of the said bungalow. The respondent m/s. Gambhir Mal Pandya Pvt. Ltd. Co. moved a number of applications for Its physical possession over the bungalow in question after eviction of the revisionists in the following circumstances. ( 4 ) UNDOUBTEDLY, the case has a chequered career and a detailed history of the case is to be found in the decision of the Supreme Court in Loonkaran Sethia v. Evan E. John, AIR 1977 SC 336 . Nevertheless, for better understanding and appreciation of facts, it is necessary to advert to, in brief, the facts of the case. ( 5 ) THERE was a group of mills comprising, of three spinning mills, a flour mill, several bungalows and other properties, all of which were compendiously known as john Mills, located in Jeoni mandi. In the city of Agra. All these properties belonged to the family of A. John and at one point of time, they came to be Jointly owned by S/srl I. E. John. M. L. John and Doris Marzano and others. In course of time, certain strangers came to be introduced. Seth Munnilal Mehra and hira Lal Patni purchased 19/40 share in the John Mill and its properties. Suit No, 31 of 1940 was instituted in the court of Civil Judge, Agra by the previous owners and partners of John Mills. During the pendency of the said suit, respondent M/s. Gambhir Mal Pandya Private Ltd. Co. purchased undivided 8/40 share of the plaintiffs of the said Suit No. 31 of 1940 and was substituted in place of the original plaintiffs, A preliminary decree for partition was passed in the aforesaid suit on 29. 10. 1945. Anew firm was constituted by the Johns. Munni Lal Mehra. Hira lal Patni and Gambhir Mal Pandya and this firm came to be known as john Jain Mehra and company. ( 6 ) IT appears that M/s. John and Co. , had run into financial difficulties and, therefore, they were driven to tap various sources for their business and other requirements. Munni Lal Mehra. Hira lal Patni and Gambhir Mal Pandya and this firm came to be known as john Jain Mehra and company. ( 6 ) IT appears that M/s. John and Co. , had run into financial difficulties and, therefore, they were driven to tap various sources for their business and other requirements. One Loonkaran Sethla, partner of Sethia and Company advanced the loans. On 18. 4. 1949, Original Suit, bearing No. 76 of 1949 was instituted by Loonkaran Sethia against two sets of defendants for recovery of Rs. 21. 11,500 with cost and pendente lite interest. M/s. John and Co. , and its partners were designated as defendants of the first set while Munnilal Mehra. Hira Lal Patni and Gambhir Mal pandya as well as M/s. John Jain Mehra and Co. , were referred to as the second set of defendants. During the pendency of the aforesaid Suit No. 76 of 1949, a receiver was appointed by the Civil Judge. Agra to manage and control the affairs of John Mills. A final decree in partition Suit No. 31 of 1940 was passed on 16. 7. 1964 as a result of which, the disputed bungalow No. 1, Municipal No. 21/5, Jeoni Mandi. Agra came to the lot of the respondent M/s. Gambhir Mal Pandya Private Limited Co. An application was moved for release of the said bungalow from the possession of the receiver. The said application, it appears, was rejected by the Civil Judge, Agra as well as by this Court. Honble Supreme Court ultimately allowed the application and the receiver was directed to be discharged on 28. 8. 1974. ( 7 ) IN Suit No, 76 of 1949, a preliminary decree was passed by the IInd Additional Civil Judge, agra on 5. 4. 1954 which gave rise to two First Appeals, namely, First Appeal Nos. 465 of 1954 and 65 of 1955 which were decided by this Court by a common judgment dated 22. 12. 72. Loonkaran Sethia went in appeal before the Supreme Court. Ultimately, Suit No. 76 of 1949 came to be dismissed by order dated 20. 10. 1996 passed by the Honble Supreme Court. After the discharge of the receiver on 28. 8. 1974. In pursuance of the order of Honble Supreme Court, the respondent-M/s. Gambhir Mal Pandya Private Ltd. Co. filed an application dated 6. 9. Ultimately, Suit No. 76 of 1949 came to be dismissed by order dated 20. 10. 1996 passed by the Honble Supreme Court. After the discharge of the receiver on 28. 8. 1974. In pursuance of the order of Honble Supreme Court, the respondent-M/s. Gambhir Mal Pandya Private Ltd. Co. filed an application dated 6. 9. 1974 [paper No. 11302- Ga) for possession over the disputed bungalow after ejectment of the present revisionists. This application, it appears, did not receive attention of the Court and on 16. 1. 1976, another application (paper No. 11562-Ga) was moved by the respondent M/s. Gambhir Mal pandya Private Ltd. Company. Unfortunately, again no heed or attention was paid to the two applications moved by the respondent and ultimately in the year 1983, it moved another application (paper No. 12045) along with paper Nos. 12046 and 12048, followed by the subsequent application paper No. 4/c in pursuance of which Misc. Case No. 197 of 1984 came to be registered. The present revisionists filed objections to maintain that they are not liable to be evicted from the disputed bungalow for variety of reasons and that the various applications moved by respondent M/s. Gambhir Mal Pandya Private Ltd. Co. are not maintainable. After having heard learned counsel for the parties, and taking into consideration the respective submissions of the parties, the learned Civil Judge, Agra allowed on 4. 8. 1992 the application, which was registered as Misc. Case No. 197 of 1984 and directed the present revisionists to hand over vacant possession of the disputed bungalow to the respondent-M/s. Gambhir Mal Pandya private Ltd. Company. It is in these circumstances that the present revision petition has come up before this Court. ( 8 ) TO begin with, it may be mentioned that there is no dispute about the fact that the bungalow in question was part of the properties of John Mills in respect of which a suit for partition. No. 31 of 1940 was instituted. The respondent M/s. Gambhir Mal Pandya Pvt. Ltd. Co. undoubtedly had purchased 8/40 undivided share of the plaintiffs of Suit No. 31 of 1940. The suit was decreed and after preparation of the final decree of partition, the bungalow in question had come in the lot of m/s. Gambhir Mal Pandya Pvt. Ltd. Company. No. 31 of 1940 was instituted. The respondent M/s. Gambhir Mal Pandya Pvt. Ltd. Co. undoubtedly had purchased 8/40 undivided share of the plaintiffs of Suit No. 31 of 1940. The suit was decreed and after preparation of the final decree of partition, the bungalow in question had come in the lot of m/s. Gambhir Mal Pandya Pvt. Ltd. Company. It is also an indubitable fact that a receiver was appointed to control, manage and supervise the properties of John Mills in Suit No. 76 of 1949 and that Hari Kishan Gupta, father of the present revisionists was inducted as a licensee with the permission of the Court by the receiver for a limited and specific period of two years on 17. 7. 1967. Hari Kishan Gupta enjoyed his possession over the said property as a licensee and before any action could be taken to re-enter the bungalow by the receiver under the orders of the court, after the expiry of the period of licence, Hari Kishan Gupta died on 27. 9. 1969. The present revisionists claimed that they have acquired a heritable right in the possession of the disputed bungalow after the death of their father and consequently they cannot be evicted. They also asserted that they are in possession of the bungalow in question in their own right independent of the rights of their father and that the respondent-M/s. Gambhir Mal Pandya Pvt. Ltd. Co. , cannot maintain the application for their eviction as neither of the parties, i. e. , the revisionists or the respondent was party to Original Suit No. 76 of 1949 and consequently, time-barred applications moved by the respondent-M/s. Gambhir Mal Pandya Pvt. Ltd. Co. , in the aforesaid suit for possession over the bungalow in question are not only not maintainable but misconceived. ( 9 ) IN view of the above stand taken by the revisionists before the trial court, their learned counsel sri S. K. Mehrotra urged that since the respondent-M/s. Gambhir Mal Pandya Pvt. Ltd. Co. , was not a party to Suit No. 76 of 1949, the application for delivery of possession over the bungalow in question, which was under the control and management of the receiver is not maintainable. , was not a party to Suit No. 76 of 1949, the application for delivery of possession over the bungalow in question, which was under the control and management of the receiver is not maintainable. This submission has been stated simply to be rejected for one simple reason that it overlooks the fact that the respondents M/s. Gambhir Mal Pandya was party to Suit No. 76 of 1949 as being the partner of M/s. John Jain Mehra and Co. which was defendant No. 7 in Suit No. 76 of 1949. A bare reading of paragraph 4 of the decision of the Supreme Court in AIR 1977 SC 336 , loonkaran Sethias case (supra) pertaining to final decision of Suit No. 76 of 1949 would reveal that the present respondent-M/s. Gambhir Mal Pandya Pvt. Ltd. Co. was defendant of the second set as being the partner of M/s. John Jain Mehra and Co. Under Order XXX, Rule 1, Code of civil Procedure, a firm may sue or be sued in the firm name which would encompass all the partners of the firm who may not be individually impleaded. A firm is a compendious name of all the Individual partners and if a firm is being sued, it would be a suit against each one of the partners. In this connection, a reference may be made to M/s. Ram Kumar Ram Chandra v. Dominion of India, AIR 1952 All 695 , and J. K. Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Firm Birdhichand sumermal. AIR 1958 All 176 . The respondent M/s. Gambhir Mal Pandya Pvt. Ltd. Co. , being a party to the Suit No. 76 of 1949 as a defendant of the second set, was entitled to move an application for possession over the property which has come to his possession as a result of the passing of the final decree in Suit No. 31 of 1940. The matter may be viewed with yet another angle. In Suit No. 76 of 1949, a receiver was appointed over the entire properties of the defendants of the second set by an order of the trial court. As a matter of fact, all the properties of John Mills became custodia legis. Even though. The matter may be viewed with yet another angle. In Suit No. 76 of 1949, a receiver was appointed over the entire properties of the defendants of the second set by an order of the trial court. As a matter of fact, all the properties of John Mills became custodia legis. Even though. It may be taken that neither of the parties to the present revision petition was a party to the Suit No. 76 of 1949, the fact remains that since the properties were custodia legis, an owner of the property had the right to make the application before the concerned Court to release the same in his favour after the receiver came to be discharged and the suit ultimately came to be dismissed. The respondent-M/s. Gambhir Mal pandya Pvt. Ltd. Co. , had acquired an indefeasible right to recover possession of the property which came to its lot as a result of final decree of partition. ( 10 ) ANOTHER submission made on behalf of the revisionists is that the application 4-C dated 8. 10. 84 on the basis of which. Misc. Case No. 197 of 1984 came to be registered, is barred by limitation under the provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act. According to learned counsel for the revisionists, the receiver was discharged on 28. 8. 1974 and Suit No. 76 of 1949 was dismissed on 20. 10. 1976 and, therefore, the application moved by the respondent-M/s. Gambhir Mal Pandya Pvt. Ltd. Co. , for possession in the year 1984. i. e. , beyond a period of three years from the date of order of discharge of the receiver or even from the date of dismissal of the suit is barred by limitation. This submission is the result of some fallacy. One cannot lose sight of the fact that after the discharge of the receiver on 28. 8. 1974, the respondent moved an application paper No. 11302, on 6. 9. 1974 itself, i. e. , within less than one months period. This application was followed by a number of other applications. The respondent was obviously in a state of utter desperation as no orders were being passed by the trial court in spite of the fact that its attention was being invited time and again by the respondent by moving successive applications. The last application dated 8. 10. This application was followed by a number of other applications. The respondent was obviously in a state of utter desperation as no orders were being passed by the trial court in spite of the fact that its attention was being invited time and again by the respondent by moving successive applications. The last application dated 8. 10. 1984 was in fact, in continuation of the first application dated 6. 9. 1974 and was, as a matter of fact, a sort of reminder to the Court to pass appropriate orders on its pending applications. There can be no doubt about the fact that the earlier applications dated 6. 9. 1974 and 16. 1. 1976 were well within time even according to the revisionists. The respondent has done all, whatever was possible and was within his means to invite the attention of the Court for granting him the relief of possession over the disputed bungalow. It was on account of the lethargy or inaction on the part of the Court or the defect of the system that orders could not be passed on the pending applications with expedition. ( 11 ) IT is well-settled proposition of law that in a case where it is a mistake of the Court, which allowed to pend the matter, a plea of limitation would not be an impediment in ultimately granting relief, may be beyond the so-called period of limitation. One cannot forget the maxim actus curiae neminem cravabit. meaning thereby that an act of the Court shall prejudice no one. The maxim curiae neminem cravabit an act of the Court shall prejudice no one, stands recognised by seven Judges Bench of the Apex Court in the case of A. R. Antulay v. R. S. Nayak and another, AIR 1088 SC 1531. In paragraph 83 of the majority judgment (rendered by sabyasachi Mukherji, G. L. Oza and S. Natarajan. JJ. ). It has been laid down that this maxim is founded upon justice and good sense and affords a safe and certain guide for the administration of the law. Ranganath Mishra, J. , who agreed with the majority judgment, also observed in paragraph 100 that it is a well-settled position in law that an act of the Court should not injure any of the suitors, remembering the Privy Council decision in Alexander Rodger v. Comptori D escompte De Paris. Ranganath Mishra, J. , who agreed with the majority judgment, also observed in paragraph 100 that it is a well-settled position in law that an act of the Court should not injure any of the suitors, remembering the Privy Council decision in Alexander Rodger v. Comptori D escompte De Paris. (1871) 3 PC 465, that whenever the expression act of the Court is used, it means act of the Court as a whole. B. C. Ray, J. , who too agreed with the judgments of sabyasachi Mukerji and Ranganath Misra. JJ. , also stated similarly in paragraph 114 of the judgment. Even M. N. Venkatchallah, J. , who, dissented with the majority, had stated that the best illustration of the operation of the maxim is provided by the application of the rule of nune pro tune. For Instance, if owing to the delay in what the Court should, otherwise, have done earlier but did later, a party suffers owing to events occurring in the interregnum, the Court has the power to remedy it and that the operation of the maxim is. generally, procedural (vide paragraph 139 of the Judgment ). The aforesaid maxim, which stands approved by the Apex court, has to be applied in its true spirit. Apparently, the mistake in not disposing of the applications was that of the Court and not of the respondent. If the Court does not pass orders on the pending applications, the party, who has come forward to move the grinding wheels of the vehicle on which the Court system rests, cannot be blamed for the delay and the relief for which he may otherwise, be entitled, cannot be denied to him on the plea of limitation. ( 12 ) THE plea of adverse possession in the backdrop of the facts of this case is also not available to the revisionists. Period of possession by a person inducted into the property by a receiver appointed by Court cannot be treated or tagged on for the purpose of claiming adverse possession. In Shyam Sundar Dutta v. Baikuntha Nath Banerjee (dead) by L. Rs. and others. (1994) 6 SCC 545 , it was observed by Honble the Supreme Court that the person inducted by the receiver into possession would remain only as a licensee under the receiver. In Shyam Sundar Dutta v. Baikuntha Nath Banerjee (dead) by L. Rs. and others. (1994) 6 SCC 545 , it was observed by Honble the Supreme Court that the person inducted by the receiver into possession would remain only as a licensee under the receiver. As soon as the receiver is discharged, the possession of the licensee being a limited right to remain in possession during the period when the receiver was in management of the suit property, it comes to an end. On the discharge of the receiver, the licensee has no right to remain in possession either as a tenant or a licensee. Therefore, the period of his possession cannot be treated or tagged for the purpose of claiming adverse possession. The* possession of the receiver is possession on behalf of the Court and a party cannot claim any title adverse to the opposite party when the receiver remained in possession. The respondent in that case was inducted into possession by the receiver in 1933 and he remained in possession till 1945. During that period, such possession cannot be treated to be adverse to the real owner of the property. In making the above observations, the Court also relied upon its earlier decision in P. Lakshmi Reddy v. L. Lakshmi Reddy, AIR 1957 SC 314 . Viewed from any angle, the plea of limitation, as set up by the revisionists. Is not attracted in the instant case to frustrate the relief claimed by the respondent. ( 13 ) A technical point was also raised on behalf of the revisionists by submitting that since the respondent had filed an execution application in partition Suit No. 31 of 1940, wherein the Court had passed an order that the respondent cannot execute the decree in that suit unless the respondent files an application under Order XXI, Rule 97, C. P. C. against the present revisionists, the application moved in Suit No. 76 of 1949 is not maintainable and the proper remedy of the respondent was to have moved an application under Order XXI, Rule 97, C. P. C. This submission is nothing but an attempt to hair-spilt the controversy and to shut eyes towards the realities emanating from facts and law. The property in dispute was custodia legis and there was no occasion to execute the decree passed in Suit No. 31 of 1940 without the permission of the Court as the property which was subject-matter of partition Suit No. 31 of 1940 was being managed by a receiver appointed in subsequent Suit No. 76 of 1949. Not only this, the proceedings under order XXI, Rule 97, C. P. C. can be initiated only against a person who asserts his own independent right over the property, possession of which is sought by the decree-holder. In the instant case, as would be shown presently, the revisionists were not in possession of the disputed bungalow in their own independent right but their possession was through their father who was merely a licensee. Therefore, the order passed on the execution application moved by the respondent to execute the decree in Suit No. 31 of 1940 was otiose and of no consequence. In any case. It did not debar the respondent from moving an application for possession in Suit No. 76 of 1949 after the receiver had been discharged and he was ceased to manage the property in question. ( 14 ) IN order to show that the revisionists were in possession of the disputed property in their own right independent or the right of their father, it has been asserted that an order of allotment was passed by the Rent Control and Eviction Officer in favour of Jagdish Prasad Gupta, revisionist no. 2 and consequently, the revisionists have got an innate right to continue in possession and unless their tenancy is terminated and a decree for eviction is passed or the order of allotment is cancelled, they cannot be evicted. There is no dispute about the fact that at one point of time, the disputed bungalow was allotted in favour of Jagdish Prasad Gupta. revisionist No. 2. This order of allotment has been held to be fraudulent, mala fide and illegal. The bungalow in question was in possession of late Hari Kishan Gupta, father of the revisionists. The present revisionists were living with their father. Bungalow had never fallen vacant. Occurrence of vacancy is sine qua non for exercising jurisdiction to allot a particular accommodation. In the absence of vacancy, no order of allotment can be passed, as the accommodation is not open to allotment. The present revisionists were living with their father. Bungalow had never fallen vacant. Occurrence of vacancy is sine qua non for exercising jurisdiction to allot a particular accommodation. In the absence of vacancy, no order of allotment can be passed, as the accommodation is not open to allotment. This fact was known to the revisionist and it was for this reason that the revisionist-Jagdish Prasad Gupta mentioned in his application that the allotment application was being made for regularising the possession of the revisionists. On the strength of order of allotment, a Suit No. 408 of 1973 was filed by Jagdish Prasad Gupta-revisionist No. 2 to claim the relief of injunction. The said suit was dismissed. The order of allotment was bad in law for more than one reasons. No order of allotment could be passed in respect of a properly which was custodia legis and no notice was sent before making an order of allotment to the receiver. As a matter of fact, there had occurred no vacancy and the order of allotment was passed without notifying the vacancy or ascertaining the fact whether the accommodation sought to be allotted was in fact vacant or not. Not only this, the order of allotment was passed in flagrant violation of the order of injunction passed by civil Judge. Agra whereby the Rent Control and Eviction Officer, or for that matter, the District magistrate was restrained from making an order of allotment. After the dismissal of the Suit No. 408 of 1973, the revisionists cannot base their claim to remain in possession in pursuance of the order of allotment. They filed the aforesaid suit for the relief of injunction on the ground that the disputed bungalow has been allotted to them and, therefore, they cannot be evicted. The said suit, for whatever reasons, there may be, was dismissed on 16. 2. 1978. The revisionists failed to establish their right to remain in possession of the disputed bungalow on the strength of the allotment order which for the reasons stated above was illegal and bad in law. Here, it would also not be out of place to mention that the revisionist No. 1-Girish Chand Gupta had applied for renewal of the licence which was earlier granted in favour of his late father. The licence was not renewed by the Court. Here, it would also not be out of place to mention that the revisionist No. 1-Girish Chand Gupta had applied for renewal of the licence which was earlier granted in favour of his late father. The licence was not renewed by the Court. ( 15 ) FROM the analysis of the above facts, it would be clear that the revisionists never came in possession of the disputed bungalow in their own right. It was their father late Hari Kishan gupta who was inducted as a licensee for a specific period of two years. He had agreed to hand over the possession of the disputed bungalow after the expiry of the period of licence and a fight of re-entry was given to the receiver. The licensee waived his right to get a notice or to take recourse to the Court of law for his eviction. The revisionists cannot acquire better rights than their father. The revisionists, have, of necessity, stepped into the shoes of their father and in the normal course, they had to vacate the bungalow in question no sooner the licence came to be determined or the action to evict them was to be initiated. In their attempt to cling to the property in question and with a view to procrastinate the delivery of possession or physical eviction, they had taken recourse to all sorts of manipulation and machinations. One of the revisionists was making attempt to get the licence renewed while the other revisionist made attempts to procure illegal order of allotment to regularise possession, incompatible and contradictory stands have been taken by the revisionists. They have utterly failed in establishing that they are in possession of the disputed bungalow in their own right independent of the licence which was granted to their father. ( 16 ) NOW the question is whether the revisionists can be evicted from the disputed bungalow in a summary manner or a regular suit for possession has to be filed by the respondent M/s. Gambhir mal Pandya Pvt. Ltd. Co. Since the possession of the revisionists from the disputed bungalow is through their father, they are bound by the terms and conditions contained in the Indenture executed which provides that the receiver shall have a right of re-entry on the expiry of the licence without taking recourse to any proceeding in the Court for eviction. Since the possession of the revisionists from the disputed bungalow is through their father, they are bound by the terms and conditions contained in the Indenture executed which provides that the receiver shall have a right of re-entry on the expiry of the licence without taking recourse to any proceeding in the Court for eviction. Late Hari Kishan gupta has expressly yielded to the right of re-entry and had also waived his right to get any notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Civil Judge, Agra who was managing the property through the Receiver appointed by it, has the right to re-enter the property without going into the rigmaroles of filing the suit for eviction. This aspect of the matter also came to be considered by the Supreme Court in Hira Lal Patni v. Loonkaran Sethia and others, air 1962 SC 21 . In that case also, the question of interpretation of an undertaking given to the court that mill would be vacated in favour of the prospective lessee was involved. It was held that ejectment by summary process could be made instead of by a regular suit. The summary enforcement of the undertaking taken by the Court is only a step towards the discharge of the duties of the Court in the management of the estate and it cannot be said that the Court has lost its jurisdiction in that direction merely because the property has been in the possession of a lessee or a licensee. After having referred to a number of decisions on the point, Honble supreme Court held as follows : "further citation would be redundant. These and such decisions seem to hold that a Court cannot evict a lessee from a receiver, whether he is a party to the suit or not. In exercise of its summary jurisdiction unless the lease expressly conferred a right of re-entry under the lease deed on the receiver. It is not necessary to demarcate the boundaries of the summary jurisdiction of a Court in managing an estate through a receiver, for in this case we are clearly of the opinion that the applicant was in possession of the mill under an agreed and integrated scheme for running the mills by the different partners, though he was put in possession under a document described as a lease deed. In effect the receiver, during the course of the management, entrusted each mill to one of the partners so that the mills might be properly worked under experienced hands. The appellant expressly agreed to put the receiver in possession of the mill after the expiry of three years. No question of deciding the conflicting claims of a lessee and a third party arises in this case, nor is the Court called upon to pronounce on the vested rights of a lessee in conflict with those of the receiver. But this is a simple case of a Court in the course of its administration of the estate through the agency of a receiver making a suitable provision for the running of the mills. As the agreed term had expired, the Court, in our view, could certainly direct the appellant to put the mill in the possession of the receiver. " As said above, the document executed by late Harf Klshan Gupta clearly confers a right on the court/receiver to re-enter the demised premises without any demur or objection on the part of the licensee. After the expiry of the licence, the revisionists who are the sons of late Hari Kishan gupta the original licensee are liable to be evicted from the disputed bungalow. They cannot be allowed to put any impediment or obstruction in the enforcement of the impugned order dated 4. 8. 1992 passed by Civil Judge. Agra in Misc. Case No. 197 of 1984. ( 17 ) IN the result the revision application, for the reasons stated above falls. It is devoid of any merit and substance and is accordingly dismissed.