Judgment :- 1. The plaintiff in O.S. No. 106/80 on the file of the District Munsif, Devakottai, is the appellant. He filed the suit against the respondent in the second appeal for declaration and recovery of possession of the suit property on the following averments: The suit property was situate in Pillaiyarandal Village in the hamlet of Chinnavengavayal. The suit village was granted as Iruwaram Pannai Inam Village under T.D. No. 867. The appellant was Inamdar in continuous possession and enjoyment. It had also obtained prescriptive title. After 1947 Act the nearby villagers began to encroach the land in the suit village claiming kudiwaram rights in those lands. The appellant filed a suit O.S. No. 151/57 before the District Munsif, Devakottai, for declaration and recovery of possession and the said suit was decreed and the appeal preferred by the defendants in that suit and the Letters Patent Appeal in the High Court, Madras, ended in favour of the appellant. Notwithstanding that some of the defendants in the suit again attempted to disturb the possession of the appellant necessitating the filing of another suit in O.S. No. 360/67 by the appellant for a permanent injunction against them and a decree was passed on 12.9.1973. In the Settlement proceedings also patta was granted in favour of the appellant, the respondent in the Second Appeal committed trespass into the suit property on 10.2.1973 and attempted to construct a house. The appellant preferred a complaint to the police and in the police enquiry, the respondent gave an undertaking that he would not construct a house. On such assurance having been given, further proceedings were stopped. However, when the trustee of the appellant temple was not in town in the month of February-March, 1973 the respondent constructed a house in the suit property and also a cattle shed. There was a notice issued for which there was no response. The suit was therefore filed. 2. The respondent resisted the suit contending inter alia that he was not a party in the earlier suits, that the decrees in those suits would not bind him and that the house and the cattle shed were in S. No. 236 in Pillaiyarandal Village. Patta had been granted to the appellant, but the same having been done without the knowledge of the respondent, would not affect the respondents right or possession of the suit property. Patta had been granted to the appellant, but the same having been done without the knowledge of the respondent, would not affect the respondents right or possession of the suit property. The alleged attempt to commit trespass and the complaint to the police and the undertaking alleged to have been given by the respondent were all false. The respondent has constructed a thatched house in the suit property long back and residing there continuously for more than the statutory period to the knowledge of the appellant. After sometime, he removed the thatched shed and constructed a tiled house. He was residing in that house openly without any objection continuously for more than the statutory period and he had acquired title by prescription. The notice had been suitably replied. There was no cause of action for the suit. He was also paying tax for the suit property for a long time. The suit has been filed by the appellant and to grab his property under threat. The suit was liable to be dismissed. 3. The trial Court framed the necessary issues on the pleadings and on the oral and documentary evidence found that the appellant had title to the suit property that it had been correctly described in the plaint, that the respondent had committed trespass, that the suit property was not a village natham, that the respondent had not acquired prescriptive title to the suit property and that the appellant was entitled to the reliefs prayed for. 4. Against the decision of the trial Court, the respondent filed appeal in A.S. No. 47/81 before the Subordinate Judges Court, Devakottai. The learned Subordinate Judge by his judgment and decree dated 17.12.1981 set aside the decision of the trial Court, allowed the appeal and dismissed the suit holding that the appellant herein had not described the property in the plaint, that it had not established its title, that the respondent had not proved his possession for over the statutory period, that in any event, he was entitled to have his possession protected in view of the failure on the part of the appellant to prove its title and that the appellant was not entitled to the reliefs prayed for in the suit. Aggrieved, the present Second Appeal has been filed. 5. At the time of the admission the following substantial questions of law were raised for decision in the Second Appeal: 1. Aggrieved, the present Second Appeal has been filed. 5. At the time of the admission the following substantial questions of law were raised for decision in the Second Appeal: 1. Whether Exs.A-1 to A-4 are not admissible under Sections 41 to 43 of the Evidence Act to prove title of the applicant? 2. Whether the appellant is not entitled to recover the suit property as the prior possessor, when defendants had not proved twelve years possession? and 3. Whether the grant of ryotwari patta under Section 26 of the Act 1963 can be questioned in a civil suit, particularly when the respondent had not appealed against the order of the Settlement Officer? 6. Pending Second Appeal the respondent died and by a separate order in the applications taken out by the appellant herein, the legal representatives of the deceased respondent have been brought on record as respondents 2 to 5. Pending Second Appeal the then trustee S.P. Palaniappa Chettiar died and the successor P.L. Alagappans name has been substituted in the place of the erstwhile trustee. 7. Mr. AR.L. Sundaresan, learned counsel for the appellant, submitted that the lower Appellate Court erred in holding that the suit property had not been properly described overlooking that what all Rule 3 of Order 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure required was that the plaint should contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it. As regards the title, the learned counsel submitted that the lower Appellate Court erred in holding that Exs.A-1 to A-4, the judgments in the prior suits, were inadmissible under Sections 41 to 44 of the Evidence Act. According to the learned counsel, the earlier judgments had upheld the title of the appellant in the suit property and that they were not only admissible under Section 13 of the Evidence Act, but also they were admissible to prove the fact that the appellant had in execution taken delivery of the property through Court and had been in possession within twelve years and therefore, as a person in prior possession, the appellant was entitled to the suit property. The learned Judge overlooked that Ex.A-5, the certified copy of the delivery warrant and the athakshi in E.P. No. 615/61 in O.W. No. 151/57 was not objected to when produced as being a certified copy and therefore, it could not be discarded as having been marked wrongly in the trial Court. The lower Appellate Court ought to have held that Ex.A-6 order granting patta in favour of the appellant had become final in so far as the respondent were concerned. Having held that the first respondent had not proved adverse possession and prescription, it ought to have held that he was liable to be evicted in view of the orders passed in Exs.A-6 and A-5. 8. Countering the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellant, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that Exs.A-1 to A-4 relied on by the appellant were totally inadmissible in evidence as not being relevant under Section 13 of the Evidence Act. The learned counsel also submitted that the appellant had not proved its title and that the construction had been put up even in 1961. The learned counsel has relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court in State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh and others ( 1983 3 SCC 118 ). 9. It has been found by both the Courts below that the first respondent/defendant had not established his possession for over the statutory period entitling him to claim title by adverse possession. If it is found that the appellant had title to the property, then, on the basis of the title of the appellant, the respondents will have to be thrown out. The first respondent did not attempt to prove superior title. The lower Appellate Court had dismissed the suit on the ground that the appellant had not identified the property and that the earlier proceedings would not bind the first respondent. It had protected the possessory title of the first respondent. So far as the title is conceded, it is practically concerned that the appellant was given patta under Ex.A-6. As has been rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, the identity of the property is not in dispute. May be in the earlier proceedings the first respondent was not a party. So far as the title is conceded, it is practically concerned that the appellant was given patta under Ex.A-6. As has been rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the appellant, the identity of the property is not in dispute. May be in the earlier proceedings the first respondent was not a party. However, the decision in the earlier proceedings would be relevant for the purposes of finding out the title of the appellant to the suit property. So far as Ex.A-6 is concerned, it should be taken as a judgment in rem. The first respondent did not choose to get himself impleaded in the Settlement proceedings and in my view Ex.A-6 is conclusive as regards the title of the appellant. Admittedly, in the earlier proceedings the appellant had taken possession of the suit property in execution. Unless it was pleaded and proved that in the earlier execution proceedings the appellant took possession of the suit property by practice of fraud, the factum of the appellant having taken possession should stand. The approach of the lower Appellate Court in rejecting the evidence afforded by Exs.A-1 to A-4 is clearly erroneous. 10. In State of Bihar v. Radha Krishna Singh and others already referred to, in paragraph 124 the Supreme Court has observed as follows: “A judgment in rem like judgments passed in probate, insolvency, matrimonial or guardianship or other similar proceedings, is admissible in all cases whether such judgments are inter partes or not. But, a judgment in person am which is not inter partes is inadmissible in evidence except for the limited purpose of proving as to who the parties were and what was the decree passed and the properties which were the subject matter of the suit.” At least to the limited extent stated by the Supreme Court Exs.A-1 to A-4 in the instant case would have relevancy. In my view, the decision in Ex.A-6 giving patta to the appellant will amount to a judgment in rem and it has to be held that the appellant had title. 11. In my view, the decision in Ex.A-6 giving patta to the appellant will amount to a judgment in rem and it has to be held that the appellant had title. 11. Section 43 of the Evidence Act runs as follows: “Judgments, Orders or decrees other than those mentioned in Sections 40, 41, 42, are irrelevant, unless the existence of such judgment, order or decree, is a fact in issue, or is relevant under some other provision of this Act.” In my view, the judgments relied on in the present proceedings, viz. , Exs.A-1 to A-4 fulfil the conditions of Section 43 and therefore they are relevant under Section 13 of the Evidence Act. 12. It was held in John Caiorane v. Hurrosoondurri Debin (4 WR PC 103) = (1854 57) 6 MIA 494) that in some cases decision from a Bench or a Tribunal must be given due deference. 13. In its recent judgment in Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanam v. K.M. Krishnaiah (1998 2 L.W. 310 = JT 1998 (2) SC 231) dealing with the scope of Sections 13, 40 and 41 of the Evidence Act, the Supreme Court had this to say: “A party could rely upon a previous judgment not inter partes to show his title in the suit property even though the other party was not party to the earlier suit.” In that case in almost identical circumstances it was argued for the plaintiff/respondent that in an earlier judgment rendered in favour of the appellant before the Supreme Court the plaintiff/respondent was not a party and hence any findings as to the appellants title given therein was not admissible as evidence against the plaintiff in that suit. Rejecting this contention the Supreme Court in paragraph 9 stated as follows: “In our view, this contention is clearly contrary to the rulings of this Court as well as those of the Privy, Council. In Srinivas Krishna Rao Kongo v. Narayan Devi Kongo and others ( AIR 1954 SC 379 ), speaking on behalf of a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court, Venkatarama Ayyar, J. held that a judgment not inter partes an admissible in evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act as evidence of an assertion of a right to property in dispute. A contention that judgments other than those falling under Sections 40 to 44 of the Evidence Act were not admissible in evidence was expressly rejected. Again B.K. Mukherjee, J. (as he then was) speaking on behalf of a Bench of four learned Judges in Sitaldas v. Sant Ram and others ( AIR 1954 SC 606 ) held that a previous judgment not inter partes, was admissible in evidence under Section 13 of the Evidence Act as a ‘transaction’ in which a right to property was ‘asserted’ and ‘recognised’. In fact, much earlier, Lord Lindley held in the Privy Council in Binamoni v. Brajmohini (1902) ILR Cal. 190 (198) (PC) that a previous judgment, not inter partes was admissible in evidence under Section 13 to show who the parties were, what the lands in dispute were and who was declared entitled to retain them. The criticism of the judgment in Binamoni v. Brajmohini and Ram Ranjan Chakerbati v. Ram Narain Singh (1895 ILR 22 Cal. 533 (PC)) by Sir John Woodroffe in his commentary on the Evidence Act (1931 P.181) was not accepted by Lord Blanesburgh in Collector of Gorakhpur v. Ram Sundar (AIR 1934 P.C. 157 = 61 IA 286).” The Supreme Court ultimately held that the judgment in the previous suit was evidence enough to prove the title of the appellant before the Supreme Court in regard to the suit property therein even though the plaintiff/respondent was not a party to that suit. 14. Having regard to the discussion above it has to be held that the appellant in the present case has proved its title to the suit property and the first respondent and on his death the other respondents have to bow to the appellants superior title. 15. During the arguments it was suggested to the parties to have the area in the occupation of the respondents valued and the value be paid over to the appellant trust for being utilised for its trust activities. Unfortunately, this suggestion was not accepted. 16. In the result, the substantial questions of law are answered in favour of the appellant and the Second Appeal is allowed. The judgment and the decree of the lower Appellate Court are set aside and those of the trial Court restored. There will, however, be no order as to costs.