JUDGMENT : S. N. Jha, J.- The petitioners are army personnel. Two of them, namely, Sheo Shanker Prasad Singh and Petrus Purty have since retired. The third one, namely, E.V.Jeevarajan is still in active service. They have challenged the maintainability of the General Court Martial proceedings on the ground of bar of limitation. 2. The petitioners had earlier come to this court making a similar grievances in Cr.W.J.C.Nos. 250-252 of 1998 [reported in 1998(3) PLJR 163 ]. In its ORDER :dated 29.7.98 this Court held that whenever a plea of bar of limitation is raised, the same is required to be disposed of by a reasoned ORDER :and communicated to the person concerned, and accordingly disposed of the writ petitions with a direction to the authority to supply a copy of the ORDER :by which the plea of bar has been rejected. Copy of the ORDER :(in fact, it is a single word ORDER :"rejected") has since been served on them. 3. Before I come to the controversy regarding the bar of limitation and state the relevant facts in that regard, I may dispose of the argument on the question as to whether the aforesaid direction of this court has been complied with by the authority or not. Mr. Mihir Kumar Jha, learned counsel for the petitioners, contended that in terms of the aforesaid ORDER :of this Court the concerned authorities were duty bound to pass a reasoned ORDER :but, curiously, a one-word ORDER :of rejection has been communicated which cannot be said to be compliance of the ORDER :at all. Mr. Jha submitted that in the circumstances the matter may be sent back to the respondent authority for passing a fresh ORDER :setting out the reasons for rejecting the plea of bar of limitation. 4. It is true that one-word rejection cannot be said to be reasoned ORDER :. The moot point, however, is whether reasons are required to be recorded at all. The point is not res integra. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in S. N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1984, has held in no uncertain terms that at the stage of recording of findings and sentence, the Court Martial is not required to record its reasons. The point is not res integra. A Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in S. N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India, AIR 1990 Supreme Court 1984, has held in no uncertain terms that at the stage of recording of findings and sentence, the Court Martial is not required to record its reasons. Before I refer to the conclusion arrived at by the Court, I may cite the provisions of Rules 61 and 62 of the Army Rules, 1954, so far as relevant, applicable to General and District Court Martial proceedings (in these cases we are concerned with General Court Martial) as hereunder : "61.Consideration of finding.--(1) The Court shall deliberate on its finding in closed court in the presence of the judge-advocate. (2) The opinion of each member of the Court as to the finding shall be given by word of mouth on each charge separately. 62. Form, record and announcement of finding.--(1) The finding on every charge upon which the accused is arraigned shall be recorded and except as provided in the rules, shall be recorded simply as a finding of "Quality" or of "Not Quality" … … … … … (10) The finding on each charge shall be announced forthwith in open Court as subject to confirmation." It may be pointed out here that the relevant provisions regarding form and record of finding applicable to summary Court Martial as contained in Rule 121 (1) of the Army Rules is in similar terms as hereunder : "The finding on every charge upon which the accused is arraigned shall be recorded, and except as mentioned in these rules, such finding shall be recorded simply as a finding of "Guilty" or of "Not Guilty". The corresponding provision regarding summary General Court Martial as contained in Rule 161 is no different. The said rule runs as follows : "The Court shall then be closed to consider its finding. If the finding on any charge is "Guilty" the court may receive any evidence as to previous convictions and character which is available. The Court shall then deliberate in closed Court as to its sentence." 5. In S. N. Mukherjee Vs. The said rule runs as follows : "The Court shall then be closed to consider its finding. If the finding on any charge is "Guilty" the court may receive any evidence as to previous convictions and character which is available. The Court shall then deliberate in closed Court as to its sentence." 5. In S. N. Mukherjee Vs. Union of India (supra) after referring to the various provisions of the Army Act and the rules the Supreme Court observed (at pages 1998-99 of the report) that from the provisions referred to above it is evident that the judge-advocate plays an important role during the course of trial at a General Court Martial and he is enjoined to maintain an impartial position. The Court Martial records its finding after judge-advocate has summed up the evidence and has given its opinion upon the legal bearing of the case. The members of the Court have to express their opinion as to the finding by word of mouth on each charge separately and the finding on each charge has to be recorded simply as a finding of Guilty or of Not Guilty. It is also required that the sentence should be announced forthwith in open Court. It is only under Rule 66(1) of the Rules that reasons are required to be recorded in making recommendation for mercy. There is no such requirement in other provisions relating to recording of finding and sentence. Rule 66(1) proceeds on the basis that there is no such requirement in other provisions relating to recording of finding and sentence because if such a requirement was there it would not have been necessary to make specific provisions for recording of reasons in making recommendation for mercy. Having said so, their Lordship concluded : "In our opinion, therefore, at the stage of recording of finding and sentence the Court Martial is not required to record its reasons and at that stage reasons are only required for the recommendation to mercy if the Court Martial makes such a recommendation." 6. Having said so, their Lordship concluded : "In our opinion, therefore, at the stage of recording of finding and sentence the Court Martial is not required to record its reasons and at that stage reasons are only required for the recommendation to mercy if the Court Martial makes such a recommendation." 6. Earlier, another Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Som Datt Datta vs. Union of India, AIR 1969 Supreme Court 414, had occasion to consider a similar question in the context of the controversy as to whether the confirming appellate authority is required to give reasons and it was held (at page 421-422 of the report):- "It is manifest that there is no express obligation imposed by section 164 or by section 165 of the Army Act on the confirming authority or upon the Central Government to give reasons in support of its decision to confirm the proceeding of the Court Martial." These observations made in the context of the Army Act were followed by observations of general nature as hereunder: Apart from any requirement imposed by a statute or statutory rule, expressly or by necessary implication, we are unable to accept the contention that there is any general principle or any rule of natural justice that the statutory tribunal should always and in every case give reasons in support of its decision." 7. I am afraid, with due respect to the learned Judge, the direction issued in Cr.W.J.C. Nos. 250-252 of 1998 [reported in 1998(3) PLJR 163 ] was not in accordance with law, in view of the pronouncement of the Apex Court referred to above. If at the stage of recording of finding and sentence the Court Martial is not required to record its reasons, surely, at the preliminary or intermediate stage of the trial, it cannot be said that it is required to record its reasons. It is open to the person aggrieved by the findings and sentence of the court martial to challenge the validity of the trial in an application under Article 32/226 of the Constitution and urge the plea of bar of limitation and at that stage the plea can be gone into on the basis of material produced by the parties. 8. It is open to the person aggrieved by the findings and sentence of the court martial to challenge the validity of the trial in an application under Article 32/226 of the Constitution and urge the plea of bar of limitation and at that stage the plea can be gone into on the basis of material produced by the parties. 8. In fairness to the counsel for the petitioners, I must notice a decision of this Court, to which I was a party, in the case of Manoj Kumar Sarraf vs. Magadh Stock Exchange Association, 1995(1) PLJR 617 , relied upon by him in support of the proposition that the Court Martial should have recorded reasons for rejecting the plea of bar of limitation. In that case the petitioners were aggrieved by the decision of the Management Board of the Magadh Stock Exchange declaring them as defaulters. This Court observed that having regard to the complex and intricate nature of the functioning of the Stock Exchange, if reasons had been indicated in respect of the petitioners, all of whom admittedly did not stand on the same footing, it would have been more convenient for this Court to consider their cases. The situation in the present case is entirely different and the decision is of no help to the petitioners. 9. The desirability of passing reasoned ORDER :by administrative authorities hardly needs emphasis. In S. N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India (supra) itself, after referring to the various decisions on the point, the Supreme Court observed (at pages 1996-97 of the Report) that keeping in view the expanding horizons of principles of natural justice, the requirement to record reasons can be regarded as one of the principles of natural justice. The Court, however, clarified that such a requirement can be dispensed with by the statute either expressly or by necessary implication, and if the Statute does not require reasons to be recorded by the administrative authorities, it cannot be said to be requirement of law that they must record or assign reasons. It would, thus, follow that while ORDER :s passed by administrative authorities, not governed by any Statute, should ordinarily contain reasons, where such ORDER :s are passed under a Statute, whether reasons are required to be recorded in the ORDER :or not would depend on the terms of the statute. It would, thus, follow that while ORDER :s passed by administrative authorities, not governed by any Statute, should ordinarily contain reasons, where such ORDER :s are passed under a Statute, whether reasons are required to be recorded in the ORDER :or not would depend on the terms of the statute. It was on this reasoning that the court held in the aforementioned cases that under the Army Act or Rules, at the stage of recording of finding and sentence and even at the stage of confirmation of the findings and sentence, the reasons are not required to be stated. In S. N. Mukherjee vs. Union of India (supra) the court observed (at page 2000 of the Report), in ORDER :to protect the rights of an aggrieved person, that it is open to the person aggrieved by such finding or ORDER :to challenge the validity of the same either before the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution or before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution and obtain appropriate relief in such proceeding. 10. It may not be out of place here that by reason of the provisions of section 153 of the Army Act, no finding or sentence of a general district or summary general court martial has a binding effect or becomes operative unless it is confirmed by the competent authority as provided by the Act. 11. The discussion on the point would not be complete without reference to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Major A. Hussain, AIR 1998 Supreme Court 57 : (1998) 1 SCC 537 . 11. The discussion on the point would not be complete without reference to a recent decision of the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Major A. Hussain, AIR 1998 Supreme Court 57 : (1998) 1 SCC 537 . After observing that though Court Martial proceeding are subject to judicial review by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, but not subject to the superintendence of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution, their Lordships observed (at page: 549 of SCC):- "If a court martial has been properly convened and there is no challenge to its composition and the proceedings are in accordance with the procedure prescribed, the High Court or for that matter any Court must stay its hands....if one looks at the provisions of law relating to court martial in the Army Act, the Army Rules, Defence Service Regulations and other Administrative Instructions of the Army, it is manifestly clear that the procedure prescribed is perhaps equally fair if not more than a criminal trial provides to the accused." 12. In the above premises, I do not find any error in the rejection of the plea of the bar of limitation by a non-speaking ORDER :and, accordingly, I do not find any justification to remit the matter back to the concerned authority for passing a reasoned ORDER :, as suggested at the Bar. 13. I would now advert to the merit of the case. In ORDER :to appreciate the nature of the controversy, it would be appropriate to briefly state the respective cases of the parties. The facts of the case may be noticed from the writ petition in Cr.W.J.C.No.510 of 1998 which has been argued as the representative case. 14. The dispute has its origin in the selection of Sepoys, Drivers, Cooks etc. carried out by the Army Service Corps (ASC) Centre (North) Gaya. A Board consisting of Sheo Shankar Prasad Singh, Petitioner in Cr.W.J.C.No. 510 of 1998 as its Presiding Officer and others was constituted to screen and select the candidates for recruitment. The Board conducted screening tests of the candidates between December 1994 and January 1995. In March 1995 a pseudonymous complaint in the name of one Ghanshyam Meena, Member Panchayat Samiti, District Dasua (Rajasthan State) was received by Brigadier Rajpal, the then Commandant ASC Centre (North) Gaya, alleging irregularities committed in enrolment of recruits. The Board conducted screening tests of the candidates between December 1994 and January 1995. In March 1995 a pseudonymous complaint in the name of one Ghanshyam Meena, Member Panchayat Samiti, District Dasua (Rajasthan State) was received by Brigadier Rajpal, the then Commandant ASC Centre (North) Gaya, alleging irregularities committed in enrolment of recruits. In course of investigation it transpired that one of the recruits Nirbhay Singh had been enrolled on the strength of fake educational certificate. The inquiry/investigation further disclosed other irregularities. A Scrutiny Board was accordingly constituted on 16.3.95. On 2.4.95 the Scrutiny Board submitted its report pointing out as many as the ten irregularities committed in the enrolment. The Sub-Area Commandant, Bihar & Orissa Sub Area, Danapur on 12.4.95 constituted a Court of Inquiry. The Court of Inquiry submitted its opinion on 9.5.95. The opinion was placed before the Commandant, Bihar & Orissa Sub-Area on 19.8.95. Brigadier Malhotra recommended disciplinary action against the petitioner and others. The recommendation was placed before the General Officer Commanding (GOC), Madhya Pradesh, Bihar & Orissa Sub-Area, Jabalpur (hereinafter referred to as GOC, Jabalpur), who by his ORDER :dated 9.10.95 directed that disciplinary action be taken against the petitioners and one Lt. Col. Bhushan Kumar. Soon after on 31.1.96 petitioner Sheo Shanker Prasad Singh superannuated from service. He was, however, kept in Military custody invoking the provisions of section 123 of the Army Act which provides that when offence under that Act has been committed by any person while subject to the Act, and he has ceased to be so subject, he may be taken into and kept in military custody and tried and punished for such offence as if he continued to be so subject. On 10.2.98 charge sheet was framed detailing as many as 11 charges falling under sections 32 (f) and 63 of the Army Act read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The convening ORDER :with respect to the assembly of General Court Martial was issued by GOC Jabalpur, Major General Sukhvir assembled on 13.5.98 (There is a dispute in this regard to which I shall come later in this JUDGMENT :). The convening ORDER :with respect to the assembly of General Court Martial was issued by GOC Jabalpur, Major General Sukhvir assembled on 13.5.98 (There is a dispute in this regard to which I shall come later in this JUDGMENT :). It appears that the proceeding before the General Court Martial was adjourned on 14.5.98 till further ORDER :s for the purpose of making a reference to the Commanding Officer in respect of the jurisdiction to try petitioner Pertus Purty, who had been discharged from service on 31.1.98 but in the charge-sheet dated 10/14.2.98 and the convening ORDER :dated 12.4.98 had been shown as holding a Junior Commission in the Army. The Court Martial re-assembled on 16.6.98. On 18.6.98 the petitioners raised the plea of bar of limitation in terms of section 122 of the Army Act, which was rejected on 19.6.98. The petitioner came to this Court, as mentioned at the outset in Cr.W.J.C. Nos.250-252 of 1998. In the meantime, on 20.6.98 an arraignment ORDER :was passed. On 29.7.98 the aforesaid writ petitions were disposed of with a direction to serve copy of the ORDER :rejecting the plea of bar of limitation, as mentioned above. On 6.8.98 copy of the rejection ORDER :was served on the petitioners. 15. Mr. Mihir Kumar Jha submitted that in terms of the provisions of section 122 of the Army Act no person subject to that Act can be tried by Court Martial for any offence after expiration of period of three years reckoned from the date of offence, or, where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved or to the authority competent to initiate action, from the day on which such offence comes to knowledge of such person or authority. In the present case the offence was allegedly committed between December 1994 and January 1995 and in any view the commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the entire hierarchy of Army upto the Chief of the Army Staff, including GOC, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar & Orissa Area, Jabalpur, in the month of March 1995 itself, the trial is therefore barred by limitation. Mr. Jha submitted that the trial is deemed to commence from the date when arraignment ORDER :is passed. Since in the present case arraignment ORDER :was passed on 20.6.98, the commencement of the trial must be held to be beyond the period of three years. Mr. Jha submitted that the trial is deemed to commence from the date when arraignment ORDER :is passed. Since in the present case arraignment ORDER :was passed on 20.6.98, the commencement of the trial must be held to be beyond the period of three years. Mr. Jha submitted that inasmuch as copies of the Signal Message dated 7.4.95 (Annexure-3), report of the Scrutiny Board dated 3.4.95 (Annexure-4), the opinion/findings of the Court of Inquiry dated 9.5.95 (Annexure-6) had been sent to different offices/ authorities including Head office, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar & Orissa Area Jabalpur, it would be presumed that the authorities concerned including GOC Jabalpur, had knowledge of the commission of the offences on the respective dates. Mr. Jha pointed out that the names of petitioner Sheo Shanker Pd. Singh and Petrus Purty, in particular, were mentioned in paragraph 6 of the opinion of the Court of Inquiry dated 9.5.95 leaving no room for doubt that not only the authority had knowledge about the commission of the offence but also the names of the offenders. The offence having come to the knowledge of the authority including the GOC, Jabalpur, who is said to be the competent authority, he could not have bid time to decide about the action to be taken against the petitioners until 8.10.95. The date of the ORDER :of the GOC, 8.10.95, therefore cannot be said to be the reckoning date from which period of limitation could commence. Mr. Jha submitted that as a matter of fact the authorities never disclosed to the petitioners as to from which date the period of three years would commence. It is only in the counter affidavit in which they have for the first time taken the stand that the period would commence from 8.10.95. 16. Mr. Ajay Kumar Tripathy, learned Additional Standing Counsel, Central Government, appearing for the respondents submitted that in the present case the period of three years would commence from the date on which the identity of the offenders became known to the authority competent to initiate action under section 122(1)(e) and not from either the date of offence or the date of knowledge of the commission of offence. He stated that, no doubt, the Court of Inquiry in its opinion dated 9.5.95 mentioned the petitioners Sheo Shanker Pd. Singh and Petrus Purty but that came to the knowledge of the GOC, Jabalpur, only in October, 1995. He stated that, no doubt, the Court of Inquiry in its opinion dated 9.5.95 mentioned the petitioners Sheo Shanker Pd. Singh and Petrus Purty but that came to the knowledge of the GOC, Jabalpur, only in October, 1995. He pointed out that at the first instance the said opinion/findings was placed at the first instance before the Commanding Officer, Bihar & Orissa Sub Area, Danapur, who made his recommendation to the GOC on 9.8.95 and it was only on 9.10.95 that the GOC passed the ORDER :regarding the disciplinary action against the petitioners. Mr. Tripathy contended that the trial is deemed to commence from the first day of assembly of General Court Martial and not from the date when arraignment ORDER :is passed, and since in the present case the General Court Martial assembled for the first time on 13.5.98, the proposed trial of the petitioners is well within the period of limitation. He refuted the submission of the counsel for the petitioners that the period of limitation would commence from the date of offence or from the date of knowledge of the commission of offence in all cases. It was contended that unless the names of the offenders also are known to the person aggrieved by the offence or authority competent to initiate action, no ORDER :regarding disciplinary action by general court martial can be passed. Mr. Tripathy made light of the alternative submission of the counsel for the petitioners that the period of limitation would commence from 7.3.95, when Ghanshyam Meena sent his complaint, pointing out that it was a pseudonymous complaint, and more importantly, Ghanshyam Meena cannot be said to be "person aggrieved" as he had no personal grievance, he had merely pointed out certain irregularities committed in course of scrutiny and selection. Mr. Tripathy submitted that the expression "person aggrieved" has a different connotation and in the context refers to offences committed against an individual, such as, misbehaviour. 17. The controversy as to when the trial by court martial commences under the Army Act/Rules is no longer res-integra. The question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Major Ganeral Madan Lal Yadav, (1996) 4 SCC 127 . 17. The controversy as to when the trial by court martial commences under the Army Act/Rules is no longer res-integra. The question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Major Ganeral Madan Lal Yadav, (1996) 4 SCC 127 . The Court observed (at page 136 of the Report) that trial means act of proving or judicial examination or determination of the issue including its own jurisdiction or authority in accordance with law or adjudging guilt or innocence of the accused including all steps necessary thereto. The trial commences with the performance of the first act or steps necessary or essential to proceed with the trial. The Court further observed that under the Army Act, constitution of Court Martial for trial of an offence under the Act is a pre-condition for commencement of trial. The relevant provisions of the Army Rules were succinctly summed up in these words (at page 137 of the Report):- "Members of the court martial and the presiding officer on nomination get jurisdiction to try the person for offence under the Act. On their assembly, the accused has the right to object to the nomination of any or some of the members of the court martial or even the presiding officer. On the objection (s) so raised, it is to be dealt with and thereafter the preliminary report recorded after summary trial and the charge framed would be considered. The charge is required, if need be or asked by the accused to be read over and could be objected by the accused and found tenable, to be amended. Thereafter the accused would be arraigned and in his presence the trial would begin. The accused may plead guilty or not guilty. If he pleads guilty, the procedure prescribed under Rule 54 should be followed and if he pleads not guilty, procedure prescribed under Rule 56 is to be followed. Before actual trial begins, oath would be administered to the members of the court martial, the Judge-Advocate and the staff. The regular trial begins and ends with recording the proceedings either convicting and sentencing or acquitting the accused." The Court observed that from the scheme of the Act and the Rules, two views are possible while considering as to when trial commences. The regular trial begins and ends with recording the proceedings either convicting and sentencing or acquitting the accused." The Court observed that from the scheme of the Act and the Rules, two views are possible while considering as to when trial commences. The broader view is that the trial commences the moment the General Court Martial assembles for proceeding with the trial, consideration of the charge and arraignment of the accused to proceed further with the trial including all preliminaries like objections to the inclusion of the members of the court martial, reading out the charge/charges, amendment thereof etc. The narrow view is that trial commences with the actual administration of oath to the members etc. and to the prosecution to examine the witnesses when the accused pleads not guilty. The Court preferred the broader view as the correct view in the following words (pages 137, 138 and 139 of the Report:- "We are of the considered view that from a conspectus of the scheme of the Act and the Rules, the broader view appears to be more conducive to and consistent with the scheme of the Act and the Rules. The trial therefore, must be deemed to have commenced the moment the GCM assembles and examination of the charge is undertaken. We hold that the trial commences the moment GCM assembles to consider the charge and examines whether they would proceed with the trial." 18. In the light of the above decision of the Supreme Court it has to be held that in the present case the trial commenced on 13.3.98 when the General Court Martial assembled for the first time. I may mention here that there was some dispute at the bar as to when the General Court Martial assembled for the first time. According to the petitioners it was on 16.6.98. Mr. Tripathy pointed out that from the forwarding letter dated 13.6.98 (Annexure-14 to the writ petition) and the ORDER :of the GOC Jabalpur dated 9.6.98, annexed thereto, it is apparent that General Court Martial assembled at Danapur on 13.5.98 when it discovered certain defect in the description of petitioner Petrus Purty and decided to adjourn the proceedings till further ORDER :s. The date 16.6.98 was the date of reassembly as ORDER :ed by the GOC. The submission of Mr. Tripathy appears to be correct. The submission of Mr. Tripathy appears to be correct. I am satisfied from the abovesaid ORDER :dated 9.6.98, letter dated 13.6.98 (Annexure-14), that the General Court Martial assembled for the first time on 13.5.98 and accordingly hold that the trial in the present case commenced on 13.5.98. 19. The question which then arises for consideration is as to when the period of limitation of three years provided under section 122 of the Army Act commenced. 20. At this stage the provisions of section 122 of the Army Act may be noticed, so far as relevant, as hereunder: "122. Period of limitation for trial.--(1) Except as provided by sub-section (2), no trial by court-martial of any person subject to this Act for any offence shall be commenced after the expiration of a period of three years and such period shall commence- (a) on the date of the offence; or (b) where the commission of the offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the authority competent to initiate action, the first day on which such offence comes to the knowledge of such person or authority, whichever is earlier; or (c) where it is not known by whom the offence was committed, the first day on which the identity of the offender is known to the person aggrieved by the offence or to the authority competent to initiate action whichever is earlier. 21. Mr. Mihir Kumar Jha submitted that from a bare reading of different clauses of section 122(1) it is apparent that the period of limitation is to be reckoned from the date of the offence at the first instance; it is only when the commission of the offence is not known to the person aggrieved or to the competent authority, that it would commence from the date of knowledge to such person or authority. Counsel emphasised that the words "whichever is earlier" occurring in clause (b) makes it clear that if the knowledge of the person aggrieved was earlier in point of time than the knowledge of competent authority, the period is to be reckoned from the date of knowledge of the person aggrieved and not of the authority competent to initiate action. Counsel submitted that the different clauses of the section are not mutually exclusive. Counsel submitted that the different clauses of the section are not mutually exclusive. Clause (b) would apply only if clause (a) is not applicable and, similarly, clause (c) would apply if clause (b) is not applicable. 22. Mr. Mihir Kumar Jha thus submitted that in the present case the limitation would be deemed to commence, if not from the date on which screening/selection was made between December 1994 and January 1995, from the date of knowledge to Ghanshyam Meena, which was prior to 7.3.95 (the date when he sent his written complaint alleging irregularities), and if that is also not accepted, from the date when the irregularities came to the knowledge of the competent authority. Mr. Jha took pains to submit that the signal message regarding the irregularities having been sent, amongst others, to the Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Orissa Area Head Office at Jabalpur on 2.4.95 and similarly, copies of the reports of the Scrutiny Board dated 3.4.95 and the Court of Inquiry dated 9.5.95 having also been sent to the Head Office, the competent authority, namely, the GOC. Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Orissa Area, Jabalpur, would be deemed to have knowledge of the offence prior to the aforesaid dates and, therefore, the commencement of the trial, reckoned even with respect to the date when the General Court Martial first assembled, would be beyond a period of three years and, therefore, barred by limitation. 23. At this stage I would briefly refer to the relevant provisions relating to General Court Martial proceedings as contained in section 2 of Chapter V of the Army Rules. Rule 37 provides for convening of General and District Court Martial and appointment of officers to form the same. Rule 38 contemplates adjournment for want of sufficient number of officers. Rule 39 lays down the disqualification and eligibility of the officers. Rule 40 envisages composition of the General Court Martial. Rule 41 prescribes the procedure to be followed on the date when the Court Martial assembles for the first time. Rule 42 contemplates a preliminary enquiry on the point that as to whether the offender is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court Martial or not. Rule 43 prescribes the procedure of trial, challenge and swearing. Rule 41 prescribes the procedure to be followed on the date when the Court Martial assembles for the first time. Rule 42 contemplates a preliminary enquiry on the point that as to whether the offender is subject to the jurisdiction of the Court Martial or not. Rule 43 prescribes the procedure of trial, challenge and swearing. If the Court Martial is satisfied that the provisions of Rules 41 and 42 have been complied with, it shall cause the accused to be brought before the Court and the prosecutor is then to take his due place in the Court. Under Rule 45 oath is to be administered to the members of the Court Martial. Similar oath is to be administered to the Judge-Advocate and other officers under Rules 46 and 47. Rule 48 mentions about arraignment of accused. It lays down that after the members of the Court Martial and other persons are sworn or affirmed, as mentioned above, the accused shall be arraigned on the charges against him which shall be read out and if necessary translated to him in his mother tongue and he shall be required to plead separately to each charge. Rule 49 deals with objection by the accused to be charged and Rule 50 amendment of the charge if necessary. Rule 51 gives him right to take a special plea on the jurisdiction of GCM and under Rule 52 he can plead guilty or not guilty. Rule 53 deals with "plea in bar" and Rule 54 with "procedure after plea of guilty". Rule 56 deals with plea of not guilty, application and adduction of evidence by the prosecution. Rule 57 deals with plea of no case and Rule 58 with "close of case for the prosecution and procedure for defence where accused does not call witness". Rule 59 deals with the "defence where the accused calls witnesses" and Rule 60 with "summing up of the case by the Judge Advocate". Rule 61 deals with "consideration of finding" and Rule 62 with "form, record and announcement of finding". Rule 63 concern "procedure on acquittal" and Rule 64 "procedure on conviction". Rule 65 gives power to the Court Martial to impose sentence and Rule 66 deals with recommendation for mercy. Rule 67 deals with "announcement of sentence and signing and transmission of proceedings". 24. Rule 63 concern "procedure on acquittal" and Rule 64 "procedure on conviction". Rule 65 gives power to the Court Martial to impose sentence and Rule 66 deals with recommendation for mercy. Rule 67 deals with "announcement of sentence and signing and transmission of proceedings". 24. The narration of the relevant provisions would not be complete without reference to the provisions of section 109 of the Army Act which lays down that a General Court Martial may be convened by the Central Government or the Chief of the Army Staff or by any officer empowered in this behalf by warrant of the Chief of the Army Staff. It may be pointed out here that the Act contemplates four kinds of Court Martial, namely, (a) General Courts Martial, (b) District Courts Martial, (c) Summary General Courts Martial, and (d) Summary Courts martial. It is not necessary to notice the other provisions regarding power to convene District Court Martial, Summary General Court Martial or Summary Court Martial as we are concerned with General Court Martial in these cases. 25. Although there is no dispute that the decision to take disciplinary actions against the petitioners and the convening ORDER :was passed by the GOC, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar & Orissa Area, Jabalpur, a doubt was sought to be raised as to whether an authority lower in rank was not competent to take such decision and convene General Court Martial. It was pointed out on behalf of the petitioners that while the Commanding Officer of the Army Service Corps (ASC), Gaya, where the petitioners were then posted is of the rank of Colonel, the Commanding Officer of the Bihar & Orissa Sub Area Danapur, is of the rank of Brigadier and since both of them had full knowledge of the offence, the final decision in the matter had to be taken by the GOC, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar & Orissa Area, Jabalpur. Mr. Ajay Kumar Tripathy in this connection drew my attention to the provisions of sections 83 and 84 of the Army Act. Mr. Ajay Kumar Tripathy in this connection drew my attention to the provisions of sections 83 and 84 of the Army Act. He pointed out that while under section 83, a Brigadier or an equivalent Commander or such other person as is, with the consent of the Central Government specified by the Chief of the Army Staff, is competent to proceed against an officer below the rank of Field Officer, a Junior Commissioned Officer, or a Warrant Officer, under section 84 only an Area Commander, meaning thereby an officer of the rank of Major General is competent to proceed against an officer below the rank of Lieutenant Colonel (i.e. Major and officers of lower ranks). It was submitted that if an officer below the rank of Major General i.e. Brigadier is not competent to proceed against an officer of the rank of Major, it is obvious that he cannot proceed against an officer of the rank of Lieutenant Colonel held by petitioner Sheo Shanker Prasad Singh at the relevant time. 26. Mr. Mihir Kumar Jha submitted that the provisions of sections 83 and 84 envisages power of the Brigadier or Major General, as the case may be, "to punish" officers of the ranks as mentioned therein and are not relevant to the question of their competence to take disciplinary action or convene a general court martial. I am afraid, the submission is wholly misconceived. The relevant words in both the sections 83 and 84 are "An officer having power not less than...may in the prescribed manner proceed against an officer....and award one or more of the following punishments". In other words, sections 83 and 84 envisages and confer not only power to punish but also power "to proceed". It is, therefore, obvious that decision to take disciplinary action and convene general court martial could be taken only by the General Officer Commanding (GOC), Madhya Pradesh, Bihar & Orissa Area, Jabalpur. 27. Rule 37 of the Army Rules, which has been briefly noticed above, may at this stage be quoted because it has a bearing on the question of limitation. The rule so far as relevant runs as follows: "Rule 37. 27. Rule 37 of the Army Rules, which has been briefly noticed above, may at this stage be quoted because it has a bearing on the question of limitation. The rule so far as relevant runs as follows: "Rule 37. Convening of General and District Courts-Martial.--(1) An officer before convening a general or district court martial shall first satisfy himself that the charges to be tried by the court are for offences within the meaning of the Act, and that the evidence justifies a trial on those charges, and if not so satisfied, shall ORDER :the release of the accused, or refer the case to superior authority. (2) He shall also satisfy himself that the case is a proper one to be tried by the kind of court-martial which he proposes to convene. (3) The officer convening a court-martial shall appoint or detain the officers to form the Court and may also appoint or detail such waiting officers as he thinks expedient. He may also, where he considers the service of an interpreter to be necessary, appoint or detail an interpreter to the Court. … … … … … … Form the perusal of the afore-quoted provisions it would appear that a duty is cast upon the officer convening a general court martial to satisfy himself before he convenes the court that the charges to be tried by the court are for offences within the meaning of the Act and that the evidence justifies a trial on those charges. He is also required to satisfy himself that the case is a proper one to be tried by the kind of court martial--general court martial or district court martial or summary general court martial etc.--which he proposes to convene. The convening ORDER :, therefore, is not required to be passed mechanically without application of mind. It thus cannot be said that simply on the basis of receipt of information, which may be general in nature, the authority is supposed to jump to the conclusion and decide as to the nature of the disciplinary action to be taken in the matter and the manner in which such action is to be taken. 28. There is no material on the record to suggest that the GOC had knowledge about the commission of the offence prior to October, 1995. 28. There is no material on the record to suggest that the GOC had knowledge about the commission of the offence prior to October, 1995. Even if it be assumed that the GOC, Madhya Pradesh, Bihar & Orissa Area, Jabalpur, had come to know about the irregularities committed in course of screening and selection of the recruits at the Army Service Corps, Gaya, he was not supposed to decide the course of action on the basis of such information. As noted above, on receipt of the report of the Screening Board dated 3.4.95, on 12.4.95 the Commanding Officer, Bihar and Orissa Sub-Area, Danapur, constituted a Court of Inquiry which submitted its report on 9.5.95. The proceedings of the Court of Inquiry are in the nature of investigation by the police under the Code of Criminal Procedure. When the irregularities were detected by the Screening Board, the Commanding Officer, Danapur, thought it appropriate to get an Inquiry (or investigation) held by the Court of Inquiry. It was only after the Court of Inquiry found prima facie and findings were placed before him that he on 9.8.95 made a recommendation to the GOC Jabalpur for disciplinary action on which the GOC Jabalpur passed his ORDER :s on 9.10.95. The actual ORDER :convening the general court-martial was passed on 22.4.98 by him. 29. There is another aspect of the matter which I would like to indicate. Section 122 of the Army Act contemplates the knowledge as to the date of offence and knowledge as to the name(s) of the offender. When there is no doubt about the identity of the offender, such as in cases where a person subject to the Army Act beats or maltreats any person or commits riot or trespass or defiles any place of worship, described as offences under Section 64(a) and (b), the date of offence or the knowledge as to the date of offence would be the determining factor. In cases, however, where there may be doubt as to the identity of the offender, it is but appropriate that unless prima facie case is found against the person concerned, the decision to take disciplinary action against him cannot be taken. As noted above, Rule 37 of the Army Rules casts a duty upon the competent authority to satisfy himself that a proper case is made out for trial by the court martial. As noted above, Rule 37 of the Army Rules casts a duty upon the competent authority to satisfy himself that a proper case is made out for trial by the court martial. It would be tautology to say that there cannot be a trial without the offender in the dock. Thus unless identity of the offender is established, prima facie, he cannot be subjected to court-material. I, therefore, find substance in the stand of the respondents that the period of limitation should be deemed to commence from the date of receipt of the report of the Court of Inquiry, along with the recommendation of the Commanding Officer, Danapur, disclosing prima facie case against the petitioner, by the GOC, Jabalpur sometime in the month of October, 1995 on which he eventually passed the ORDER :on 9.10.95. The trial in the present case had commenced on 13.5.98 when the general court martial assembled for the first time, as held above, it must be held that the trial of the petitioners is within the period of limitation. 30. In P.D. Jambhekar vs. State of Gujarat, AIR 1973 Supreme Court 309, which was relied on by Mr. Tripathy in support of his contention that the period of limitation in filing complaint commenced on the date when all material facts are brought to the knowledge of the competent authority, factory worker had met with an accident on 27.2.68 while cleaning the clip stentering machine with a rag near the delivery site. Section 21(1)(iv)(c) of the Factories Act, 1948 for violation of which the complaint was made, laid down that every dangerous part of the machinery should be securely fenced by safe-guards of substantial construction which should be kept in position while the parts of machinery which are fenced are in motion or in use. The report with respect to the said accident was received by the Inspector of Factories on the very next day on 28.2.68. The Inspector, however, visited the factory on 30.7.68 and after making the enquiry of the accident filed the complaint on 20.9.68 alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 92 of the Factories Act. The report with respect to the said accident was received by the Inspector of Factories on the very next day on 28.2.68. The Inspector, however, visited the factory on 30.7.68 and after making the enquiry of the accident filed the complaint on 20.9.68 alleging commission of offence punishable under Section 92 of the Factories Act. A question arose as to whether the prosecution was barred by limitation in view of the provisions of Section 106 of the Act which provides that no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under the Act unless complaint thereof is made within three months of the date of which the alleged commission of the offence came to the knowledge of the Inspector. The Supreme Court found that the report submitted to the Inspector of Factories on 28.2.68 only indicated that an accident had taken place to the worker who was cleaning the clip stentering machine with a rag in his right hand near the bevel gear which was a dangerous part of the machinery. The report also indicated that the part of the machinery was moved by mechanical power and the accident took place when the worker was cleaning the machine. The report, however, did not state that the dangerous part of the machine was in such position or of such construction as to be seen to every person employed in the factory as they would be securely fenced. Nor it was stated that the dangerous part of this machinery was not securely fenced by safeguards of substantial construction or that they were not kept in position while the parts of the machinery they were fencing, were in motion or in use. The question which fell for consideration before their lordships was whether the report revealed all the necessary material that go to constitute the offence. In view of the contents of the report their Lordships held that from reading of the report it could not be said that an offence under section 21(1)(iv)(c) had been committed and the Inspector of Factories, therefore, cannot be said to have acquired knowledge of the commission of the crime when he received the report. He gathered necessary information and knowledge only on 30.7.68 in course of his enquiry. On these facts the complaint was held to be within the period of limitation. 31. I must now notice the decisions relied upon by Mr. He gathered necessary information and knowledge only on 30.7.68 in course of his enquiry. On these facts the complaint was held to be within the period of limitation. 31. I must now notice the decisions relied upon by Mr. Mihir Kumar Jha on behalf of the petitioners. Mr. Jha firstly, placed reliance on Surinder Mohan Vikal vs. Ascharj Lal Chopra, AIR 1978 Supreme Court 986. The case had arisen out of prosecution under Section 500 IPC. The point at issue was when the period of limitation commences whether from the date of filing complaint under Sections 406/420 IPC (giving rise to the impugned prosecution) or from the date of acquittal. The Supreme Court held that the limitation commenced from the date of filing complaint and from the date of his acquittal. The point being entirely different, the decision is of no help to the petitioners whatsoever. Mr. Jha next relied on Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal vs. Usha Ranjan Roy Chaudhary, AIR 1986 Supreme Court 1655. In the case, the accused persons, who were Army Officers, had been tried by the Special Judge for offences with respect to which both the ordinary criminal court and the Court martial had concurrent jurisdiction. The procedure laid down in the Criminal Courts and Court Martial (Adjustment of Jurisdiction) Rules, 1952 framed under Section 549(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, admittedly was not followed. One of the justification in support of the trial by the Special Judge under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure without complying with the procedure prescribed in the aforesaid Rules was that the period of three years contemplated by Section 122 of the Army Act having expired during the pendency of the proceedings in the High Court, the Court Martial would have had no jurisdiction to try the accused and, therefore, the trial held by the ordinary criminal court could not be said to have been vitiated by reason of such non-compliance of the relevant rules. The Supreme Court rejected the contention holding that the ordinary Criminal Court would have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and to try the accused in a matter where the procedure prescribed by the aforesaid rules had not been followed. The Supreme Court rejected the contention holding that the ordinary Criminal Court would have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case and to try the accused in a matter where the procedure prescribed by the aforesaid rules had not been followed. The Court observed that the initial lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance and try the case would of logical necessity vitiate the trial and ORDER :of conviction and sentence would therefore be liable to be quashed. This decision also is of no avail to the petitioners. Mr. Jha then relied on two decisions of this Court in Sheo Nandan Singh vs. Suraj Deo Singh, 1979 BBCJ 226 and Bihari Lal Kejariwal vs. Yogendra Prasad, 1984 PLJR 298 . The former case arose out of prosecution under Section 188 IPC for disobedience of an ORDER :under Section 144 Cr.P.C. The facts of the case were that a proceeding under Section 144 Cr.P.C. was initiated on 19.11.73. Notice of the proceeding was served on the petitioners on 21.11.73. On 23.11.73 the opposite party filed a petition alleging that after service of the notice the petitioners had violated the prohibitory ORDER :s on 22.11.73 by harvesting the paddy crops and amalgamating a portion of the land in dispute with their lands. On the same day i.e. 23.11.73 the magistrate called for a report from the police. The Police Officer entrusted with the enquiry visited the place of occurrence on 24.11.73 and submitted his report on 26.11.73 stating that the petitioners had harvested the crops and also amalgamated the disputed land with their lands after service of notice of the proceeding on 22.11.73. The cognizance of the offence was eventually taken on 30.6.75. This Court held that the period of limitation of one year commenced from the date when the offence was brought to the notice of the magistrate and since on 26.11.73 the magistrate had knowledge about the occurrence, but did not take cognizance within a period of one year, the cognizance was barred by limitation. The case of Bihari Lal Kejariwal vs. Yogendra Prasad (supra) arose out of prosecution under Section 429 IPC. The facts were that on 28.9.73 cloth pieces worth Rs. 7080.57 were supplied to the accused-opposite party. On 25.5.74 he deposited Rs. 3000/-. The case of Bihari Lal Kejariwal vs. Yogendra Prasad (supra) arose out of prosecution under Section 429 IPC. The facts were that on 28.9.73 cloth pieces worth Rs. 7080.57 were supplied to the accused-opposite party. On 25.5.74 he deposited Rs. 3000/-. The complainant waited for months together expecting that the accused would deposit the balance amount until November, 1977 when he realised that the goods had been misappropriated. On 17.11.77 he filed a complaint on which cognizance was taken for the offence under Section 420 IPC. The ORDER :was quashed by the Session Judge on the ground that no offence of cheating was made out. Before this Court a plea was taken on behalf of the complainant that the facts of the case made out an offence punishable under Section 409 IPC. On behalf of the accused it was argued that the offence punishable under Section 406 of the Penal Code at best could be said to be made out and since cognizance had been taken after three years, the cognizance was barred. This Court held that the offence became known to the complainant only in November 1977 because prior to that he remained under hope and expectation that payment would be made. In this background this Court observed that where the commission of offence was not known to the person aggrieved by the offence the period of limitation commence from the first date on which such offence comes to his knowledge. This decision has been cited to substantiate the argument regarding the first day of knowledge but, on facts, in the present case I have already held above that the competent authority came to know the full facts about the offence and offenders only in October, 1995. The decision is of no help to the petitioners. Mr. Jha also placed reliance on a decision of Delhi High Court in R. S. Arora vs. State, 1987 Cr.L.J. 1215. That was a case of prosecution under the Seeds Act. The prosecution was challenged on the ground that the sample of the seed had been taken by the Seed Inspector on 5.1.84 which, on examination by the Seed Analyst, was found to be sub-standard on 1.3.84. That was a case of prosecution under the Seeds Act. The prosecution was challenged on the ground that the sample of the seed had been taken by the Seed Inspector on 5.1.84 which, on examination by the Seed Analyst, was found to be sub-standard on 1.3.84. The prosecution was lodged on 1.8.84, the Delhi High Court held that the period of limitation would commence not from the date when sample was taken but from the date when the Seed Analyst submitted his report to the Seed Inspector. The date of submission of the report being 1.3.84, the prosecution lodged on 1.8.84 was within the period of limitation of six months and therefore, the cognizance was not time barred. The decision has been cited on the point that the limitation runs from the date of knowledge of the competent authority. Under the Seeds Act, it is the Seed Inspector who is competent to file complaint and. therefore, the date of knowledge by him was taken to be the starting point of limitation. I have already, dealt with this aspect earlier. Mr. Jha lastly relied on Henken Singh vs. State of Punjab, 1987 Cr.L.J. 1332. That was a case of prosecution under Section 420 of the Penal Code. The complainant alleged to have been cheated by the accused-petitioner in the year 1962. According to him, however, he learnt about the cheating only on 10.7.80. The point for consideration was whether the period of limitation would commence from the date of offence or the date of knowledge. The Punjab and Haryana High Court held that the complainant having realised for the first time on 10.7.80 that he has been cheated by the accused, the limitation would commence from the date of such knowledge on 10.7.80. The Court, however, held on facts that as the Challan had been submitted in Court on 13.2.85 on which cognizance was taken on 16.4.85, the cognizance was barred by limitation. It would thus appear that the decision in all the cases, relied upon by the counsel, was rendered on different facts and in different background and context, and none of them is of any assistance to the petitioners. 32. Mr. It would thus appear that the decision in all the cases, relied upon by the counsel, was rendered on different facts and in different background and context, and none of them is of any assistance to the petitioners. 32. Mr. Jha submitted that although the provisions of Section 122 are in pari materia with those of sections 468 and 469 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, while under Section 473 of the Code, the Court can take cognizance of the offence even after expiry of the period of limitation if it is satisfied on the facts and circumstances of the case, the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice, there is no such corresponding provision in Section 122 of the Army Act. This submission is a proposition of law, is correct but has no relevance in the present case since the commencement of the trial has been held to be within the period of limitation. 33. The contention of the counsel for the petitioners is accordingly rejected and the point is answered against the petitioners. 34. Having thus rejected the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioners and held that the impugned court martial proceedings do not suffer from any infirmity on the ground of limitation, these writ petitions must be dismissed and I ORDER :accordingly.