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1998 DIGILAW 788 (PAT)

Laxman Prasad Sharma v. State Of Bihar

1998-11-16

N.K.SINHA

body1998
Judgment N.K.Sinha, J. 1. The petitioner is the Registrar of Lalit Narain Mithila University (hereinafter the University), Darbhanga. In this application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter the Code) he seeks quashing of the order dated 2.8.1997 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate taking cognizance against him under Section 304-A of the Indian Penal Code in Lalit Narain Mithila University PS. Case No. 100 of 96 involving the death by electrocution of a girl student in a University hostel. 2. The application is being disposed of at the admission stage itself after hearing the learned Counsel for the parties and on perusal of the case diary. Only such of the facts need be stated as are necessary for appreciating the controversy raised which revolve round the question whether the Registrar of the University could be criminally prosecuted for the death by electrocution of an inmate of the hostel. 3. Both Sunita Kumari (informant) and her friend Archana Kumari (deceased) were students of the University and residing in Kamla hostel. On 15.7.1996 at about 11.30 a.m. the informant and her friends all inmates of the same hostel were sitting and reading magazines. Meanwhile the deceased sustained electric shock while spreading her clothes after taking bath on the iron wire meant for the said purpose and on her shouts the informant saw the deceased attached with the said wire. Thereafter one of them Sushma Kumari threw a danda on the wire and consequently the deceased got detached from the wire and fell down. The deceased was unconscious. She was first taken to a Doctor and thereafter to an Arogya Niketan and on their advice was removed to the Darbhanga Medical College and Hospital where she was declared dead. The fardbeyan giving the above description of the occurrence by Sunita Kumari was recorded on the very date of occurrence at about 1 p.m. in the hospital itself. The fardbeyan further alleged that the officials of the University were informed both verbally and in writing of the leakage of the electric current in the iron wire in the hostel but they paid no need to the same and the death had been caused on account of their negligence. The police after investigation charge-sheeted the petitioner and four others under Section 304-A, IPC. 4. The police after investigation charge-sheeted the petitioner and four others under Section 304-A, IPC. 4. Learned Counsel for the petitioner argued that even if the allegations made in the FIR are taken on their face value and in their entirety no offence under Section 304-A, IPC is disclosed against the petitioner. The contention is that the above allegations as also the materials collected by the police in course of police investigation do not disclose the presence of ingredients for such an offence alleged to have been committed by the petitioner. That the deceased was electrocuted while spreading her wet clothes on the iron rod through which electric current was passing is beyond dispute. What the petitioner denies is that it was the result of his rash and negligent act. 5. According to the FIR the contents of which have also been supported by witnesses in their statements recorded in course of police investigation, the fact that at times electric current used to pass through the iron wire meant for spreading clothes in the hostel and almirah, etc. had been brought to the notice of accused Mira Rani, Hostel Superintendent, both verbally and in writing. When the Hostel Superintendent did not pay any attention and observed that they (hostel inmates) were so delicate that they would die on account of receiving the current, the inmates of the hostel had brought this fact to the knowledge of the Dean Students Welfare Officer, who had given assurance that the work would be done. However, when this did not produce the desired result the hostel inmates had brought it to the knowledge of the kul sachiw (Registrar) both orally and in writing and the Registrar had told them that he could do something in the matter only after talking to the Hostel Superintendent and the Dean of Student Welfare. The petitioner denies that he had ever received any complaint either verbally or in writing from the inmates of the hostel as mentioned above. However, this is a stage where the allegations made in the FIR and supported in course of police investigation must be taken on their face value and cannot be disbelieved. The petitioner denies that he had ever received any complaint either verbally or in writing from the inmates of the hostel as mentioned above. However, this is a stage where the allegations made in the FIR and supported in course of police investigation must be taken on their face value and cannot be disbelieved. Assuming that the fact that electric current on occasions passed through the iron wire used for drying clothes by the hostel inmates was brought to the knowledge of the petitioner and he had told the inmates that he could do something in the matter only after speaking to the Hostel Superintendent and the Dean of Student Welfare and assuming in favour of the prosecution that after giving the aforesaid assurance, he did nothing in the matter, can his omission make him liable under Section 304-A, IPC ? In this connection it may be mentioned that police after investigation has charge sheeted not only the petitioner but also Mira Rani, Hostel Superintendent, Braj Nandan Yadav, Dean of Student Welfare and Narendra Kumar Choudhary, Executive Engineer, Electricity. 6. I have referred to this fact in view of the submission made on behalf of the petitioner that the rash or negligent act mentioned in Section 304-A, IPC means an act which is the immediate cause of death and not only any act or omission which can at the most be said to be a remote cause of death. In other words the rash or negligent act must be the direct or proximate cause of death. Section 304-A, IPC reads as follows : "304-A. Causing death by negligence. Whoever causes the death of any person by doing any rash or negligent act not amounting to culpable homicide shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine or with both." The Supreme Court in Mohd. Rangawalla. v. Maharashtra State, AIR 1965 SC 1616 observed that what Section 304-A requires is causing of death by doing any rash or negligent act and this means that death must be the direct or proximate result of the rash or negligent act. Rangawalla. v. Maharashtra State, AIR 1965 SC 1616 observed that what Section 304-A requires is causing of death by doing any rash or negligent act and this means that death must be the direct or proximate result of the rash or negligent act. Their Lordships also referred to the observations made by Sir Lawrence Jenkins while interpreting Section 304-A in Emperor v. Omkar Rampratap, 4 Bom LR 679 which reads as follows : "To impose criminal liability under Section 304-A, IPC, it is necessary that the death should have been the direct result of a rash and negligent act of the accused, and that act must be the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of anothers negligence. It must be the causa causans; it is not enough that it may have been the causa sine quanon." The Apex Court then proceeded to observe that the aforementioned view has been generally followed by High Courts in India and in their opinion the right view to take of the meaning of Section 304-A and refrained from referring to other decisions as the said view had been generally accepted. The Apex Court then proceeded to acquit the appellant of the offence under Section 304-A on the ground that the death in the case was not directly the result of a rash or negligent act on the part of the appellant and was not the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of anothers negligence. Learned Counsel appearing for the State did not refer to any decision of the Apex Court taking contrary view in the matter. 7 As we all know the Registrar of a University is in overall incharge of the administration. There is a Hostel Superintendent in every hostel to look after the administration of the hostel and a Dean of Student Welfare to look after the welfare of students including the inmates living in the hostel. The hostel where the incident took place had a Hostel Superintendent and the inmates of the hostel had brought to the knowledge of the Hostel Superintendent as also the Dean of Student Welfare that on occasions electric current used to pass through the iron wires. The hostel where the incident took place had a Hostel Superintendent and the inmates of the hostel had brought to the knowledge of the Hostel Superintendent as also the Dean of Student Welfare that on occasions electric current used to pass through the iron wires. All that has been alleged against the Registrar of the University namely the petitioner is that when he was approached along with the complaint he had only stated that he could do something in the matter only after talking to the Hostel Superintendent and the Dean of Student Welfare. It may be recalled that not only the Hostel Superintendent and the Dean of the Student Welfare but also the Electrical Executive Engineer have also been charge-sheeted along with the petitioner. It was argued on behalf of the petitioner that even if the allegations which the petitioner denies are believed, it could at best expose the petitioner as the Registrar of the University for dereliction of duty. It could, in his opinion in no case expose the petitioner to any criminal liability. The contention of the Counsel for the petitioner appears to be well founded and supported by the judgment of the Apex Court in Md. Rangawallas case (supra). 8. Learned Counsel for the State referred to para 18 of the case diary and some other paragraphs in support of the contention that the inmates of the hostel had given necessary information to the Registrar and the Electrical Executive Engineer and advanced the argument that whether or not any criminal liability on the part of the petitioner is disclosed should be left to be determined when the stage of framing of charge is reached. It is true that the impugned order taking cognizance was passed under Section 190(l)(b) of the Code and the stage of framing of charge under Sections 239 and 240 of the Code in trial of warrant cases by Magistrate in cases instituted on police report had not been reached. This is evident from the impugned order dated 2.8.1997 whereby the Court had directed issue of summons against the accused persons for their appearance. This is evident from the impugned order dated 2.8.1997 whereby the Court had directed issue of summons against the accused persons for their appearance. However, I am not inclined to dispose of the application with liberty to the petitioner to raise the points available to him at the time of framing of charge for the reason that Counsel for the parties including the State were heard at length and the contents of the case diary had also been referred to by them. 9. For the reasons already mentioned it appears that there is no allegation that the petitioner had committed any rash or negligent act which had caused the death of the deceased by electrocution within the meaning of Section 304-A, IPC and hence the order taking cognizance and the criminal prosecution of the petitioner for the said offence is an abuse of the process of the Court and its quashing is necessary to secure the ends of justice. I order accordingly and allow this application.