JUDGMENT 1. - The above mentioned writ petitions have been filed by the workers to challenge the order dated 9-12-1996 whereby the respondent-Corporation directed their retirement w.e.f. 14-12-1996 under the Voluntary Retirement Scheme. 2. The undisputed facts are that the petitioners were appointed as unskilled workers in the respondent-Corporation at Sanu Lime Stone Project, Jaisalmer. There was a voluntary retirement scheme in the Corporation under which the employees could seek voluntary retirement on completing 10 years service or attaining 40 years of age. The petitioners sought voluntary retirement by making applications on different dates. Sanga Ram filed application on 10-5-1995, Mohabat Khan & Deene Khan on 10-6-95, Mooli, Nakta Ram, Daula Ram and Babu Ram on 9-6-95. They stated in their applications that if the amount of provident fund and gratuity was paid within three months, encashment of the leave standing to their credit was made and Rupees 20,000/- were also paid they may be retired. Mohabat Khan, Nakta Ram and Mooli wanted their retirement to be accepted from 30-6-95, whereas Daula Ram, Babu Ram and Deene Khan prayed that the request of their retirement be accepted from 10-6-95. Their request for voluntary retirement was accepted on 9-12-1996, to take effect from 14-12-96 by the impugned order. 3. It has been averred in the writ petitions that before the order dated 9-12-1996 was passed the petitioners had withdrawn their request of voluntary retirement and therefore, the order dated 9-12-1996 could not be passed and is illegal. In the writ petitions of Daula Ram and Babu Ram there is an additional averment that the respondents had already rejected their request of voluntary retirement. 4. In the reply filed in all the cases the respondents' case is that the writ petitions are not maintainable as the respondent corporation is not instrumentality of State and also because the contract of service with the petitioners was a private contract and the remedy lies under the specific Relief Act. It has been averred that there is no provision in the V.R.S. enabling the employees to withdraw the request once made for voluntary retirement and, therefore, even if the petitioners made application recalling their request of retirement they could not be acted upon. It has been averred that there is no provision in the V.R.S. enabling the employees to withdraw the request once made for voluntary retirement and, therefore, even if the petitioners made application recalling their request of retirement they could not be acted upon. It has been stated that the request of the petitioners for retirement had been accepted on 7-12-96 and by that date the letters withdrawing the request for voluntary retirement had not reached the respondents. 5. Mr. Khatri, learned counsel for the petitioners contended that even without a specific provision in the voluntary retirement Scheme, the petitioners had a right to withdraw their request of voluntary retirement before the acceptance was conveyed to them. His further submission was that the petitioners' request for retirement was to take effect from the date mentioned in their applications and when their request was not accepted from that date, the respondents had no right to retire them from any other date. Pointing out that in two cases the respondents had even rejected the applications of the petitioners for voluntary retirement, he contended that the respondents could not thereafter accept their request of retirement as the applications were not pending. It was argued by Mr. Khatri that the petitioners had a right to withdraw their request of retirement before the date of relieving which was 14-12-1996 and the respondents cannot compel the petitioners to proceed on retirement even after they withdrew the applications before that date. He placed reliance on the cases of Power Finance Corporation Ltd. v. Pramod Kumar Bhatia, (JT 1997 (4) SC 300) , Punjab National Bank v. P.K. Mittal, AIR 1989 SC 1083 , Satya Veer Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 1987 (5) Serv LR 165 , Tej Bahadur Singh v. Bharat Pump & Compressors Ltd., 1994 (5) Serve LR 441 , Vedpathi Dinesh Kumar v. North Zone Cultural Centre, 1991 (3) Serv LR 214 and Abhaya Charan Patnaik v. State of Orissa, 1973 (1) Serv LR 406 . 6. On the other hand Mr. Singhvi contended that without a specific provision in the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, the petitioners did not have a right to withdraw their request of voluntary retirement. 6. On the other hand Mr. Singhvi contended that without a specific provision in the Voluntary Retirement Scheme, the petitioners did not have a right to withdraw their request of voluntary retirement. His submission, with regard to the contention that the request of two employees had already been rejected, was that the letter was never addressed to those employees and it was a secret official correspondence of which the petitioners cannot take advantage. Citing the office notes, Mr. Singhvi urged that the applications of retirement had been accepted on 7-12-1996 by the Managing Director and the request of the petitioners to withdraw their applications was received after that date. According to him, once the request of the employees was accepted they stood retired. Mr. Singhvi's further contention was that between the petitioners and respondents there was a private service contract and, therefore, the writ petitions under Art. 226 of the Constitution do not lie. He relied on the case of P. Radhakrishna Naidu v. Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1977 SC 854 . 7. In reply, Mr. Khatri cited the case of S.L. Soni v. Rajasthan State Mineral Development Corporation, 1985 (1) WLN 318 to emphasise that the writ petitions are maintainable as the respondent is the instrumentality of the State under Art. 12 of the Constitution of India. 8. I have given the matter my thoughtful consideration. 9. First, it is to be seen if the writ petitions are maintainable. This Court in the case of S.L. Soni (supra) has held that the Rajasthan State Mineral Development Corporation Ltd. (respondent) is State for the purpose of Art. 12 of the Constitution of India and the employees of the Corporation, fall within the ambit of public employment, and the employees are therefore entitled to invoke the same standards as are applied by the Government while dealing with its employees under Art. 311 of the Constitution of India. This judgment is based on the various judgments of the Apex Court. 10. In the case of Sukdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, (1975) 1 SCC 421 the Apex Court has held that the employment under Public Corporations established by statutes is public employment and the employees of such corporations are entitled to the protection which appertains to public employment. 10. In the case of Sukdev Singh v. Bhagat Ram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, (1975) 1 SCC 421 the Apex Court has held that the employment under Public Corporations established by statutes is public employment and the employees of such corporations are entitled to the protection which appertains to public employment. In this connection, the observations of the Apex Court in the case of Managing Director, U.P. Warehousing Corporation v. Vijay Narayan Vajpayee, AIR 1980 SC 840 deserve to be reproduced hereunder (at page 845 & 846) : "I find it very hard indeed to discover any distinction on principle, between a person directly under the employment of the Government and a person under the employment of an agency or instrumentality of the Government or a Corporation, set up under a statute or incorporated but wholly owned by the Government. It is self evident and trite long since ceased to be confined to the exaction of taxes and the defence of its frontiers. It is now the function of the State to secure social economic and political justice', to preserve `liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship', and to ensure `equality of status and of opportunity'. That is the proclamation of the people in the preamble to the Constitution. The desire to attain these objectives has necessarily resulted in intense Government activity in manifold ways. Legislative and executive activity have reached very far and have touched very many aspects of a citizen's life. The Government, directly or through the Corporations, set up by it or owned by it, now owns or manages, a large number of industries and institutions. It is the biggest builder in the country. Mammoth and minor irrigation projects, heavy and light engineering projects, projects of various kinds are undertaken by the Government. The Government is also the biggest trader in the country. The State and multitudinous agencies and Corporations set up by it are the principal purchasers of the produce & the products of our country and they control a vast and complex machinery of distribution. The Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, Corporations set up by the Government under statutes and Corporation incorporated under the Companies Act but owned by the Government have thus become the biggest employers in the country. The Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, Corporations set up by the Government under statutes and Corporation incorporated under the Companies Act but owned by the Government have thus become the biggest employers in the country. There is no good reason why, if Government is bound to observe the equality clauses of the Constitution in the matter of employment and in its dealings with the employees, the Corporations set up or owned by the Government should not be equally bound and why, instead, such Corporations could become citadels of patronage and arbitrary action. In a country like ours which teems with population, where the State, its agencies, its instrumentalities and its Corporations are the biggest employers and where millions seek employment and security, to confine the applicability of the equality clauses of the Constitution, in relating to matters of employment, strictly to direct employment under the Government is perhaps to mock at the Constitution and the people. Some element of public employment is all that is necessary to take the employee beyond the reach of the rule which denies him access to a Court to enforce a contract of employment and denies him the protection of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution. After all employment in the public sector has grown to vast dimensions and employees in the public sector often discharge as onerous duties as civil servants and participate in activities vital to our country's economy. In growing realisation of the importance of employment in the public sector, the Parliament and the Legislatures of the States have declared persons in the services of local authorities, Government Companies and statutory Corporations as public servants and extended to them by express enactment the protection usually extended to civil servants from suits and prosecution. It is, therefore, but right that the independence and integrity of those employed in the public sector should be secured as much as the independence and integrity of civil servants". 11. In view of the legal position propounded in the aforementioned cases it is futile to urge that the contract between the petitioners and the respondent was private service contract and the petitioners cannot invoke the extra ordinary jurisdiction of this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution. 12. In the applications, the petitioners had mentioned particular dates on which they wanted to be retired. 12. In the applications, the petitioners had mentioned particular dates on which they wanted to be retired. As already stated, Nakta Ram, Mooli and Mohabat Khan wanted that they should be retired from 30-6-1995. They had filed the applications on 9-6-95. Similarly the other petitioners wanted to be retired from 10-6-95 i.e. immediately after they filed applications. It is obvious that no decision was taken on the applications of the petitioners for about 11/2 year. Such a long period cannot be said to be a reasonable period for taking decision in such matter, moreso when the petitioners had specified the dates from which they wanted to be retired. The contention of Mr. Khatri, that the respondents could not defer the decision for indefinite period on the applications, cannot be said to be without substance. 13. It is on record that all the petitioners had put in applications before their immediate officer at Jaisalmer on 3-12-96/4-12-96 stating that their request of voluntary retirement should be treated as withdrawn. In their applications they stated that their request was not accepted for one and a half year and now they did not want to retire. These applications were forwarded by the immediate officer of the petitioners vide letter dated 6-12-1996 to the Project Manager, Jaisalmer who forwarded them to the Jaipur Office. The fact that they did not reach the Jaipur Head Office before 7-12-96 does not disentitle the petitioners to have the benefit of withdrawal of their request of retirement. It was for the Jaisalmer office to inform the Head Office at Jaipur immediately that the employees had withdrawn their request of retirement. Once the employees conveyed their intention to withdraw the request of retirement to the immediate officer obviously it was made known to the Jaisalmer office of the respondent. It will have to be accepted that the petitioners had withdrawn their request of retirement before their applications for voluntary retirement was accepted by the C.M.D. at Jaipur on 7-12-1996. 14. In the case of Power Finance Corpn. v. Pramod Kumar, (JT 1997 (4) SC 300) (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that jural relationship does not come to an end till an employee is really relieved by the employer. The observations made by their Lordships at para 7 are reproduced hereunder : "7. 14. In the case of Power Finance Corpn. v. Pramod Kumar, (JT 1997 (4) SC 300) (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly held that jural relationship does not come to an end till an employee is really relieved by the employer. The observations made by their Lordships at para 7 are reproduced hereunder : "7. It is now settled legal position that unless the employee is relieved of the duty, after acceptance of the offer of voluntary retirement or resignation, jural relationship of the employee and the employer does not come to an end. Since the order accepting the voluntary retirement was a conditional one, the conditions ought to have been complied with. Before the conditions could be complied with, the appellant withdrew the scheme. Consequently, the order accepting voluntary retirement did not become effective. Thereby no vested right has been created in favour of the respondent. The High Court, therefore, was not right in holding that the respondent has acquired a vested right and, therefore, the appellant has no right to withdraw the scheme subsequently." 15. It is significant to point out that even by the order dated 9-12-1996 the respondents accepted the resignation of the applicants from 14-12-96 on which date they were to be relieved. It is not in dispute that the applications of all the petitioners to withdraw their request of voluntary retirement had reached the office of the respondent much before they were relieved. It is not of any significance that the C.M.O. had passed orders of acceptance of retirement on 7-12-96 on the note sheet. Since the petitioners had not been relieved on 7-12-1996, and even according to the respondents their applications for withdrawal had reached the office of the respondents on 9-12-1996, the order retiring the petitioners on 14-12-1996 is clearly illegal, in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Power Finance Corporation (JT 1997 (4) SC 300) (supra). 16. There is reason to believe that the action of the respondents in making the order dated 9-12-96 is not bona fide. Babu Ram had made application withdrawing his request of voluntary retirement on 28-8-95 (Anx. 3 writ petition No. 4559/96) which was forwarded to the head office on 1-9-95. 16. There is reason to believe that the action of the respondents in making the order dated 9-12-96 is not bona fide. Babu Ram had made application withdrawing his request of voluntary retirement on 28-8-95 (Anx. 3 writ petition No. 4559/96) which was forwarded to the head office on 1-9-95. It is surprising that even after the reaching of the application for withdrawal in September, 1995 he has been retired by the impugned order on the basis of his application made in June, 1995. This clearly shows that there was no objectivity in the action of the respondents. 17. In the writ petitions of Babu Ram and Daula Ram the petitioners have filed a copy of the letter dated 1-11-95 written by the head office to the Jaisalmer Office intimating them that the request of Daula Ram and Babu Ram under Voluntary Retirement Scheme has not been accepted by the management and they may be informed accordingly. It is obvious that the respondents had already rejected the application for voluntary retirement of these two petitioners in November, 1995. The respondent's contention that how could the petitioners get the copies of the letter sent to the Jaisalmer office is not required to be gone into. But, it is certain that the letter dated 1-11-95 was written in connection with the applications of these two petitioners and it w stated therein that the petitioners be informed o the decision of the management. It can safely be said that the Jaisalmer office had a duty to inform the petitioners about the letter dated 1-11-95. The relevant question is not how they got the copy of the letter of the internal correspondence but the relevant question is that the management had taken decision not to accept the request of the petitioners for voluntary retirement and their applications had been rejected. 18. In this connection it was also contended by Mr. Singhvi that if the petitioners knew about this letter there could not be any occasion for them to make fresh application on 3-12-96 withdrawing their request of retirement. Making of fresh application on 3-12-96 cannot be treated a circumstance against the petitioners. 18. In this connection it was also contended by Mr. Singhvi that if the petitioners knew about this letter there could not be any occasion for them to make fresh application on 3-12-96 withdrawing their request of retirement. Making of fresh application on 3-12-96 cannot be treated a circumstance against the petitioners. It is evident that the various other employees had made such application on that date and as the petitioners had not been given any written order of the rejection of their applications seeking voluntary retirement they might have thought it proper to make fresh applications. This fact cannot be lost sight of that the petitioners are illiterate persons. They are not expected to understand the implications of making applications again. 19. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances, I am of opinion that the respondents were not justified in not considering the request of the petitioners for withdrawal of the resignation submitted by them. The order dated 9-12-96 retiring the petitioners under the voluntary retirement scheme is illegal and is liable to be set aside. 20. In the result, the writ petitions are allowed. The respondents are directed to consider the application of the petitioners whereby they withdrew their request of voluntary retirement, and pass appropriate orders in the light of the observations made above within six weeks. No order as to costs.Petition allowed. *******