PRABODHBHAI C. DAVE v. STATE — 1998 DIGILAW 792 (GUJ)

J. M. PANCHAL, J. ( 1 ) BY means of filing this petition under Art. 226 of the constitution, the petitioner has prayed to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction declaring that the acquisition proceedings initiated in respect of the disputed lands. i. e. , land bearing Survey No. 879 admeasuring. 2 Hectares of Ares. and 0. 5 sq. metres, as well as the land hearing Survey No. 897, admeasuring I Hectare 79 Ares and 56 sq. mtrs. situated within the revenue limits of village Samalpati, Taluka Patan, District Mehsana, have lapsed as the Special Land Acquisition Officer and Deputy Collector, Patan, failed to make award under Sec. 11 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. ("the Act" for short) within the period of two years from the date of publication of the declaration made Sec. 6 of the Act. The petitioner has also prayed to declare that the award made under by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and Deputy Collector, Patan, on 21/09/1990 with regard to land bearing Survey No. 879 is illegal, improper and unjust. The petitioner has further prayed to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ of prohibition or any other appropriate writ, order or direction restraining the respondents, their agents and servants from making award with regard to the land bearing Survey No. 897. The petitioner has further urged to issue a writ of mandamusor any other appropriate writ or order directing the respondents, their agents and servants to return possession of the land bearing Survey No. 879, admeasuring 2 Hectares 58 Ares, and 0. 5 sq. meters, as well as the land bearing Survey No. 897, admeasuring 1 Hectare 79 Ares and 56 sq. mtrs. situated within the revenue limits of village Samalpati. Taluka Patan, District Mehsana to the petitioner. ( 2 ) THE petitioner asserts that he is the owner of the land bearing Survey No. 879, admeasuring 2 Hectares 58 Ares, and 0. 5 sq. metres as well as the land bearing survey No. 897, admeasuring 1 Hectare. 79 Ares and 56 sq. mtrs. situated within the revenue limits of village Samalpati. Taluka Patan, District Mehsana. ( 2 ) THE petitioner asserts that he is the owner of the land bearing Survey No. 879, admeasuring 2 Hectares 58 Ares, and 0. 5 sq. metres as well as the land bearing survey No. 897, admeasuring 1 Hectare. 79 Ares and 56 sq. mtrs. situated within the revenue limits of village Samalpati. Taluka Patan, District Mehsana. On proposal being made, the State Government was satisfied that the lands belonging to the petitioner and others situated at village Samalpati, Taluka Patan, District Mehsana, were likely to be needed for public purpose of North Gujarat University Campus, patan. Accordingly, notification under Sec. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ("act" for short), was issued, which was published in the Government Gazette on 22/04/1987. The land owners were served with notices under Sec. 4 of the Act. They had filed their objections against the proposed acquisition. After considering objections, which were raised by the land owners, the Special Land Acquisition officer and Deputy Collector, Patan, had submitted his report to the State Government as contemplated by Sec. 5a (2) of the Act. On consideration of the report submitted by the Special Land Acquisition Officer, the State Government was satisfied that the lands mentioned in the notification which was issued under Sec. 4 (1) of the act were needed for the public purpose of North Gujarat University Campus. Accordingly, declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act was made which was published in the Official Gazette on 12/05/1988. The said declaration was also published in the daily, "gujarat Samachar", dated 23/05/1988. By the said notification the State Government had also invoked urgency clause under Sec. 17 (1) of the Act directing the Collector to take possession of all the lands specified in Government notification dated 22/04/1988 on expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice relating to the said lands under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 9 of the Act. Copies of declaration made under sec. 6 and notification issued under Sec. 17 (1) of the act are produced by the petitioner collectively at Annexure "a" to the petition. Interested persons were thereafter served with notices under Sec. 9 of the Act for the purpose of determination of compensation. Meanwhile, Special Civil Application no. 2774 of 1988 was filed in the High Court by Patel Virchandabhai Madabhai and 39 others challenging the acquisition proceedings. Interested persons were thereafter served with notices under Sec. 9 of the Act for the purpose of determination of compensation. Meanwhile, Special Civil Application no. 2774 of 1988 was filed in the High Court by Patel Virchandabhai Madabhai and 39 others challenging the acquisition proceedings. The petition was placed for admission hearing before the Division Bench on 3/06/1988 and the Division Bench had passed the following order :"notice pending admission and as to interim relief returnable on 20-6-1988. In the meanwhile, by way of ad interim injunction the respondents are restrained from taking possession the the land of the petitioners till 22/06/1988. Direct service. "the present petitioner had not filed any petition challenging acquisition proceedings and handed over possession of two Survey numbers belonging to him on 24/06/1988. Special Civil Application No. 2724 of 1998 filed by Mr. V. M. Patel and others again came up for hearing before the Division Bench comprising A. P. Ravani. J. (as he then was) and K. R. Vyas. J. on 9/09/1993. The learned Counsel for the respondents raised objection to the maintainability of the joint petition by 40 individuals. Having regard to the facts of the case, the Division Bench passed the following order on 9/09/1993 : -. "the learned Counsel for the respondents have objected to the maintainability of the petition on the ground that joint petition filed by forty individual land holders is not maintainable. The challenge to the legality and validity of the acquisition proceedings on various grounds will be required to be examined from the standpoint of each individual land holder. It may be that qua particular individual certain grounds may be upheld by the Court and qua certain other individuals the grounds advanced may not be upheld by the Court. In such an eventuality, it would not be possible even for the. Court to pass a final effective order. Moreover, it is submitted that it will be difficult for the respondents to meet with the case of all the petitioners effectively in a joint petition. In our opinion, there is much substance in the objection raised on behalf of the respondents. Learned Counsel for the petitioners state that the petitioners are inclined to file separate petition, however, the petitioners may be granted time for filing separate petition and for making request for withdrawing this petition. Time granted. The petitioners are directed to file separate petition latest by 3/10/1993. Learned Counsel for the petitioners state that the petitioners are inclined to file separate petition, however, the petitioners may be granted time for filing separate petition and for making request for withdrawing this petition. Time granted. The petitioners are directed to file separate petition latest by 3/10/1993. At that time, the question with regard to disposing of this petition will be considered. Interim relief granted earlier is ordered to continue till 5/10/1993. in view of above referred to directions requiring the petitioners of Special Civil application No. 2774 of 1988, to file separate petitions. Special Civil Application nos. 12629 of 1993 and others were filed in the Court. Special Civil Application no. 12629 of 1993 and other cognate matters were heard by Division Bench comprising A. P. Ravani, J. (as he then was) and N. N. Mathur, J. on 10/08/1994. The Division Bench, by judgment and order dated 10/08/1994, dismissed all the petitions but continued the interim relief upto 10/10/1994 to enable the petitioners to approach the higher forum. Thereupon. Special Leave Petition (C) nos; 19097 of 1994 with Special Leave Petitions (C) Nos. 19200 of 1994 and 19080 of 1994 were instituted before the Supreme Court. The Special Leave Petitions were dismissed by the Supreme Court by an order dated 21/11/1994. Meanwhile, an award was made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and Deputy Collector, patan; under Sec. 11 of the Act with reference to land bearing Survey No. 879 on 21/09/1990 and with reference to land bearing Survey No. 89 7/05/1992. The petitioner has averred that the Special Land Acquisition Officer and deputy Collector, Patan, did not make awards within the period of two years from the date of publication of declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act and therefore, acquisition proceedings have lapsed. The petitioner claims that he addressed a letter dated 23/06/1998 to the Special Land Acquisition Officer and Deputy Collector, patan, asking him to hand over possession of two survey numbers to him. The said letter is produced by the petitioner at Annexure "c" to the petitioner. The petitioner was not handed over possession of the lands by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and Deputy Collector, Patan. The petitioner has, therefore, filed the present petition and claimed reliefs to which reference is made earlier. ( 3 ) MR. The said letter is produced by the petitioner at Annexure "c" to the petitioner. The petitioner was not handed over possession of the lands by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and Deputy Collector, Patan. The petitioner has, therefore, filed the present petition and claimed reliefs to which reference is made earlier. ( 3 ) MR. S. S. Vora, Registrar, North Gujarat University, has filed affidavit-in-reply on behalf of respondent No. 3 controverting the averments made in the petition. In the reply, it is stated that the petitioner has only I/63rd share approximately in the land bearing Survey No. 879/2, whereas there are other co-sharers so far as the land bearing Survey No. 879/1 is concerned and, therefore, the petition should not be entertained. It is averred that one Virchand Patel had challenged the acquisition proceedings in Special Civil Application No. 4314 of 1990 and while dismissing the said petition the Division Bench of this Court held that there was a stay of action or proceedings contemplated by Explanation to Sec. 11a of the Act as a result of which the present petition should be dismissed. It is further claimed in the reply that a sum of Rs. 61,932. 00 was deposited for acquisition of land bearing Survey no. 879 by the North Gujarat University on 19/06/1988 which is payable to the claimants whose interests were acquired and the final award declared on 21/09/1990, cannot be treated as having been made after the period of two years from the date of making of declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act. By filing the reply, the deponent of the affidavit-in-reply has demanded dismissal of the petition. ( 4 ) THE petitioner has filed affidavit-in-rejoinder reiterating what is stated by him in the petition. In the rejoinder, it is claimed that the assertion made on behalf, of respondent No. 3 that the petitioner has meagre interest in the disputed lands is not correct. The petitioner has also filed further rejoinder mentioning in detail as to how he has major share and interest in the lands concerned. However, for the purpose of deciding the present petition, it is not necessary to refer to the contents of rejoinders in detail and, therefore, we have not made detailed reference to those rejoinders. ( 5 ) MR. P. R. Patel, Deputy Collector, Prant Office, Patan. However, for the purpose of deciding the present petition, it is not necessary to refer to the contents of rejoinders in detail and, therefore, we have not made detailed reference to those rejoinders. ( 5 ) MR. P. R. Patel, Deputy Collector, Prant Office, Patan. has filed reply affidavit, and stated that, in view of the interim relief granted by the High Court in Special civil Application No. 2774 of 1988, the awards, which were made on 21/09/1990 and 30/05/1992, cannot be treated as having been made after a period of two years from the date of publication of declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act. It is further mentioned by Mr. Patel in his reply affidavit that. in view of the orders passed by the Court in Special Civil Application Nos. 12629 of 1993 and other cognate matters, there is no substance in the contention that the awards were made after period of two years from the date of publication of declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act and the petition should be dismissed. ( 6 ) THE petitioner has filed affidavit-in-rejoinder to the affidavit-in-reply filed by Mr. P. R. Patel and asserted that as the awards were made after period of two years from the date of publication of declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act, the reliefs aimed in the petition should be granted. ( 7 ) MR. M. R. Bhatt, learned Counsel tor the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner had voluntarily surrendered possession of lands bearing Survey Nos. 879 and 897 to the Competent Authority on 24/06/1988, whereas the Special Land acquisition Officer and Deputy Collector had made award on 21/09/1990 with reference to land bearing Survey No. 879 and another award on 30/05/1992 with reference to land bearing Survey No. 897, and, as the awards were made after a period of two years from the date of publication of declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act, the acquisition proceedings should be treated as having lapsed. It was stressed that the petitioner had not initiated any proceedings with reference to action to be taken pursuant to declaration made under Sec. 6 of the Act and, therefore, the awards made on 21/09/1990 and 30/05/1992 should be treated as made beyond the period prescribed by Sec. 11a of the Act. It was stressed that the petitioner had not initiated any proceedings with reference to action to be taken pursuant to declaration made under Sec. 6 of the Act and, therefore, the awards made on 21/09/1990 and 30/05/1992 should be treated as made beyond the period prescribed by Sec. 11a of the Act. What was asserted was that, in other petitions, stay against dispossession and not stay against making of the award was granted by the Court and, therefore, while computing the period of two years referred to in Sec. 11 A of the Act, the period during which the stay against dispossession was in force should not be excluded. It was also emphasized that the principle propounded by the Supreme Court in the case of Abhey Rum (Dead) by LRs. and ors. v. Union of India and Ors. , reported in 1997 (5) SCC 421 , to the effect that stay obtained by some of the claimants prohibiting the authorities from publication of declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act would be applicable to others also who had not obtained stay in that behalf, should not be made applicable to the facts of the case, because, the Supreme Court was concerned with interpretation of Secs. 5a (2) and 6 of the Act and not with Sec. 11 A of the Act. It was also urged that. in absence of any averments made by the Special Land Acquisition Officer and Deputy collector. Patan. in his reply-affidavit to the effect that he was morally restrained from making awards with reference to the disputed lands, as stay was obtained by some of the claimants prohibiting the authorities from taking possession of their lands, it should be held that the acquisition proceedings have lapsed. It was vehemently pleaded by the learned Counsel for the petitioner that though in other matters, there was stay order or injunction against dispossession which was operative from the year 1988 to 1994. no stay or injunction was obtained by the petitioner against any of the respondents as a result the awards were made by the respondent no. 2 in the year 1990 and 1992, i. e. , much prior to vacation of the stay and, therefore. Explanation to Sec. 11a of the Act would not be applicable to the facts of the case. ( 8 ) MR. S. N. Shelat. 2 in the year 1990 and 1992, i. e. , much prior to vacation of the stay and, therefore. Explanation to Sec. 11a of the Act would not be applicable to the facts of the case. ( 8 ) MR. S. N. Shelat. learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the respondents asserted that the urgency clause contemplated by Sec. 17 (1) of the Act was invoked by the State Government vide notification dated 12/05/1988 directing the Collector to take possession of the lands specified in the Government notification dated 22/04/1987 on expiration of 15 days from the publication of the notices relating to the said lands under sub-sec, (i) of Sec. 9 of the Act, and possession of the lands belonging to the petitioner was taken on 24/06/1988 as a result of which the lands stood vested in the State Government and, therefore. Sec. 11 A of the Act would not apply to the facts of the case. The learned Counsel for the State government submitted that the stay was obtained by some of the claimants and. therefore, the Special Land Acquisition Officer would have been justified in not making award till the stay was vacated, and as such the awards made on 21/09/1990 and 30/05/1992 cannot be treated as made after a period of two years from the date of publication of declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act. The learned counsel for the respondents highlighted that the stay granted by the Court was vacated when the Special Leave Petitions were dismissed by the Supreme-Court on 21/11/1994 and, therefore, the awards made on 21/09/1990 and 30/05/1992 cannot be treated as made after period of two years from the date of publication of declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act, so as to entitle the. petitioner to claim the reliefs mentioned in the petition. In support of his submissions, the learned Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on (i) Abhey Ram (Dead) by lrs. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. . reported in 1997. (5) SCC 421; (ii) L; N. Venkatesan v. Slut? of. Tamil Nadu, reported in, AIR. 1997 SC 2426, (iii) Municipal corporation of Delhi v. Lichho Devi and Ors. In support of his submissions, the learned Counsel for the respondents placed reliance on (i) Abhey Ram (Dead) by lrs. and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors. . reported in 1997. (5) SCC 421; (ii) L; N. Venkatesan v. Slut? of. Tamil Nadu, reported in, AIR. 1997 SC 2426, (iii) Municipal corporation of Delhi v. Lichho Devi and Ors. , reported in AIR 1997 SC 3474 ; (iv) Venkataswamappa v. Special Deputy Commissioner (Revenue), reported in AIR 1997 SC503; (v) Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya v. State of Gujarat, reported in 1991 (4) SCC 531 : [1992 (2) GLR 1591 SC)]; (vi) Awadh Bihari Yadav v. State of Bihar, reported in AIR 1996 SC 122 ; (vii) U. P. Jal Nigam, Lucknow through its Chairman and Anr. v. M/s. Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. , Lucknow Ors,, reported in AIR 1996 SC 1170 ;, (viii) Allahabad Development Authority v. Nasiruzzaman and ors. , reported in 1996 (6) SCC 424 ; (ix) Satendra Prasad Jain and Ors. v. State of v. P. and Ors. , reported in 1993 (4) SCC 369 . ( 9 ) WE have heard learned Counsels appearing for the parties at length. ( 10 ) AS possession of the lands was taken pursuant to invocation of urgency clause under Sec. 17 ( 1) of the Act in the present case, the first question which arises for consideration is whether the provisions of Sec. 11 A of the Act would be applicable to the facts of the present case. Annexure "a" to the petition would indicate that the State Government had issued notification. under Sec. 17 (1) of the act directing the Collector to take possession of all the lands specified in Government notification dated 22/04/1987. It means that a direction was given to the Collector to take possession before making of the award. Pursuant to. this notification, possession of the lands bearing Survey Nos. 897 and 879 belonging to the petitioner was taken on 24/06/1988. Before answering the question posed for consideration, it would be necessary to refer to provisions of Secs. 6, 11, 11 A, 16 and 17 (1) of the Act as well as the scheme contemplated by those provisions. The relevant provisions are as under :"6. 897 and 879 belonging to the petitioner was taken on 24/06/1988. Before answering the question posed for consideration, it would be necessary to refer to provisions of Secs. 6, 11, 11 A, 16 and 17 (1) of the Act as well as the scheme contemplated by those provisions. The relevant provisions are as under :"6. Declaration that land is required for a public purpose : (1) Subject to the provisions of Part VII of this Act, when the appropriate" government is satisfied, after considering the report, if any, made under Sec. 5a sub- sec. (2), that any particular land is needed for a public purpose, or for a Company, a declaration shall be made to that effect under the signature of a Secretary to such government or of some officer duly authorised to certify its order and different declarations may be made from time to time in respect of different parcels of any land covered by the same notification under Sec. 4. sub-sec. (1) irrespective of whether one report or different reports has or have been made (wherever required) under Sec. 5a sub-sec. (1) :- Provided that no declaration in respect of any particular land covered by a notification under Sec. 4, sub-sec. (1), - (i) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment and validation) Ordinance, 1967, but,before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, shall be made after the expiry of three years from the date of the publication of the notification; or (kk) published after the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. shall be made after the expiry of one year from the date of the publication of the notification :provided further that no such declaration shall he made unless the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid by a Company, or wholly or partly out of public revenues or some fund controlled or managed by a local authority. Explanation I :- In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Sec. 4. sub-sec: (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. Explanation I :- In computing any of the periods referred to in the first proviso, the period during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Sec. 4. sub-sec: (1), is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. Explanation 2 :- Where the compensation to be awarded for such property is to be paid out of the funds of a Corporation owned or controlled by the State, such compensation shall be deemed to be compensation paid out of public revenue. (2) Every declaration shall be published in the Official Gazette and in two daily newspapers circulating in the locality in which the land is situated of which at least one shall be in the regional language, and the Collector shall cause public notice of the substance of such declaration to be given at convenient places in the said locality (the last of the dates of such publication and the giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to as the date of the publication of the declaration), and such declaration shall stale the district or other territorial division in which the land is situate, the purpose for which it is needed, its approximate area and where a plan shall have been made of the land, the place where such plan may be inspected. (3) The said declaration shall be conclusive evidence that the land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company, as the case may be, and, after making such declaration, the appropriate Government may acquire the land in manner hereinafter appearing. ( 11 ) ENQUIRY and award by Collector :- (I) On the day so fixed, or on any other day to which the enquiry has been adjourned, the Collector shall proceed to enquire into the objections, if any which any person interested has staled pursuant to a notice given under Sec. 9 to the measurements made under Sec. 8, and to the value of the land at the dale of publication of the notification under Sec. 4, sub-sec. (1), and into the respective interest of the persons claiming the compensation and shall make an award under his hand of - (I) the true area of the land; (ii) the compensation which in his opinion should he allowed for the land; and (iii) the apportionment of the said compensation among all the persons known or believed to be interested in the land, of whom, or of whose claims, he has information, whether or not they have respectively appeared before him :provided that no award shall be made by the Collector under this sub-section without the previous approval of the appropriate Government or of such officer as the appropriate Government may authorise in this behalf :provided further that it shall be competent for the appropriate Government to direct that the Collector may make such award without such approval in such class of cases as the appropriate Government may specify in this behalf. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sec. (1), if at any state of the proceedings, the Collector is satisfied that all the persons interested in the land who appeared before him have agreed in writing on the matters to be included in the award of the Collector in the form prescribed by rules made by the appropriate Government, he may, without making further enquiry, make an award according to the terms of such agreement. (3) The determination of compensation for any land under sub-sec. (2) shall not in any way affect the determination of compensation in respect of other lands in the same locality or elsewhere in accordance with the other provisions of this Act. (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Registration Act, 1908, no agreement made under sub-sec, (2) shall be liable to registration under that Act. ( 12 ) A. Period within which an award shall be made :- The Collector shall make an award under Sec. 11 within a period of two years from the publication of the declaration and if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse :provided that in a case where the said declaration has been published before the commencement of the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984, the award shall be made within a period of two years from such commencement. Explanation :- In computing the period of two years referred to in this Section, the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court shall be excluded. 16. Power to take possession :- When the Collector has made an award under Sec. 11, he may take possession of the land, which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the government free from all encumbrances. 17. Special powers in cases of urgency :- (1) In case of urgency, whenever the appropriate Government so directs, the collector, though no such award has been made, may on the expiration of fifteen days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Sec. 9, sub-sec. (1), take possession of any land needed for public purpose. Such land shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. "the Scheme contemplated by the above referred to provisions is that after declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act is published, the Collector has to serve notice to the interested persons and after determining compensation, he has to make an award as envisaged by Sec. 11 of the Act. After the award is made the Collector has authority to take possession of the land and once possession is taken, the land vests absolutely in the government free from all encumbrances. Under Sec. 16, three important expressions, namely, "taken possession", "vest absolutely" and "free from encumbrances" have been used. The very next moment after the property is actually taken possession of, it becomes vesied in the Government and even if the ex-owner thereafter enters upon the property and resumes possession, such an act on his part does not have the effect of obliterating the consequences of vesting. Under Sec. 16, possession can be taken only after an award has been made under Sec. 11, but under Sec. 17 (1) of the Act, possession can be taken on the expiry of 15 days from the date of publication of the notice mentioned in Sec. 9 (1 ). although no award has been made. Ordinarily, possession of any land notified for acquisition is taken when the Collector has made an award under Sec. 11 and not before it. But an exception is provided under Sec. 17 (1 ). although no award has been made. Ordinarily, possession of any land notified for acquisition is taken when the Collector has made an award under Sec. 11 and not before it. But an exception is provided under Sec. 17 (1 ). In cases of urgency, if the Government so directs, the Collector may, though no award has been made under Sec. 11, on the expiration of 15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Sec. 9 (1) take possession of the land and the land shall thereupon vest absolutely with the Government free from all encumbrances. In the case of The Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. The delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344 , the word "vest" is interpreted and it is held that in the cases contemplated by Secs. 16 and 17, the property acquired becomes the property of the Government without any conditions or limitations as to title or possession. It means that irrespective of the fact that the award is not made,within a period of two years from the date of publication of declaration under sec. 6 of the Act, the property would absolutely vest in the Government if possession of the land is taken either under Sec. 16 or Sec. 17 and the fact that award is not made within two years would not have the effect of obliterating the consequences of vesting nor would affect the validity of notification under Sec. 4 (1) or declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act. In Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh and Anr. v. Sri Avinosh sharma, AIR 1970 SC 1576 , the Supreme Court has ruled that after possession has been taken pursuant to a notification under Sec. 17 (1), the land is vested in the government and the notification cannot be cancelled under Sec. 21 of the General clauses Act nor can the notification be withdrawn in exercise of powers of the Land acquisition Act under Sec. 48. What is emphasized therein is that when the possession of the land is taken under Sec. 17 (1), the land vests in the Government and there is no provision by which land statutorily vested in the Government reverts to the original owner by mere cancellation of the notification. However, this point is no more res integra and stands answered against the petitioner by catena of decisions of the Supreme Court. However, this point is no more res integra and stands answered against the petitioner by catena of decisions of the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has interpreted the provisions of Secs. 11a, 17 (1) and 48 of the Act in the case of Awadh Bihari Yadav (supra), and held that, once the Government has taken possession of the land in question under Sec. 17 (1) of the Act, Sec. 11a of the Act is not attracted and acquisition proceedings would not lapse even if no award was made within the period prescribed by Sec. 11 A of the Act. While propounding the above referred to principle, the supreme Court relied on its earlier decision rendered in the case of Satendra Prasad jain and Ors. v. State of U. P. and Ors. , reported in 1993 (4) SCC 369 , wherein, it is held as under :"ordinarily, the Government can take possession of the land proposed to be acquired only after an award of compensation in respect thereof has been made under sec. 11. Upon taking of the possession, the land vests in the Government, that is to say, the owner of the land loses to the Government the title to it. This is what Sec. 16 states, The provisions of Sec. 11 A are intended to benefit the land owner and ensure that the award is made within a period of two years from the date of the Sec. 6 declaration. In the ordinary case, therefore, when Government fails to make an award - within two years of the declaration under Sec. 6, the land has still not vested in the government and its title remains with the owner, the acquisition proceedings are still pending, and by virtue of the provisions of Sec. 11a, lapse. When Sec. 17 (1) is applied by reason of urgency. Government takes possession of the land prior of the making of the award under Sec. 11 and thereupon the owner is divested of the title to the land which is vested in the Government. Section 17 (1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly, Sec. 11a can have no application to cases of acquisition under Sec. 17, because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said act by which land statuorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner. Section 17 (1) states so in unmistakable terms. Clearly, Sec. 11a can have no application to cases of acquisition under Sec. 17, because the lands have already vested in the Government and there is no provision in the said act by which land statuorily vested in the Government can revert to the owner. "again, in the case of U. P. Jal Nigam (supra), the Supreme Court considered the effect of taking possession of land under Sec. 17 (2) of the Act before declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act was made. It is ruled therein that once possession is taken under Sec. 17 (2) of the Act, the land stands vested in the Government and unless notification withdrawing acquisition is passed the acquisition would not lapse even if the award is not passed within the period prescribed in Sec. 11a of the Act. In the case of Allahabad Development Authority (supra), the Supreme Court has held that Sec. 11a of the Act does not apply to the cases of acquisition under Sec. 17 where possession is already taken and the lands stand vested in the State. What is highlighted therein is that, if urgency clause contemplated by Sec. 17 of the Act is invoked, notification under Sec. 4 (1) of the Act and declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act would not lapse due to failure to make award within two years from the date of declaration. Having regard to the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in the above referred to decisions, we are of the opinion that Sec. 11a would not apply to the facts of the present case as after handing over of the possession, the lands stood vested in the Government free from all encumbrances. Once the lands stand vested in the State free from all encumbrances, there is no question of divesting the land and revesting the land in the erstwhile owner. The only right the erstwhile owner has is as to the determination of the compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act. After the vesting has taken place, the question of lapse of notification under Sec. 4 (1) and the declaration under Sec. 6 would not arise. The only right the erstwhile owner has is as to the determination of the compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act. After the vesting has taken place, the question of lapse of notification under Sec. 4 (1) and the declaration under Sec. 6 would not arise. The whole basis of the present petition is that notification under Sec. 4 (1) and declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act should be treated as having lapsed because the Special Land acquisition Officer and Deputy Collector, Patan, did not make award within two years from the date of publication of declaration made under Sec. 6 of the Act. As we have held that Sec. 11 A does not apply to the facts of the present case, notification under Sec. 4 (1) and declaration under Sec. 6 cannot be treated as having lapsed even if it is assumed that there was failure on the part of the Special Land acquisition Officer to make award within two years from the date of publication of declaration. Therefore, on this ground alone, the petition is liable to be rejected. However, as other contentions have been urged, we think it proper to deal with them while disposing of this petition. ( 13 ) FROM the facts which have been mentioned in the introductory part of the judgment, it is evident that Special Civil Application No. 2774 of 1988 was filed by several persons. Admittedly, they were owners of lands bearing Survey Nos. 881, 896, 883, 884, 886, 858, 857, 809, 860, 861, 862, 863, 866,872,873,874,877 and 878, which were also notified in declaration made under Sec. 6 of the Act. It may be mentioned that the lands bearing Survey Nos. 879 and 897 belonging to the petitioner were also notified in the said declaration which was issued under Sec. 6 of the Act. In Special Civil Application No. 2774 of 1988, ad-interim injunction was granted by the Court on 3/06/1988 restraining the respondents from taking possession of the lands of the petitioners of said petition till 22/06/1988. Thereafter, direction was given by the Court to file separate petitions and interim relief granted was continued till 5/10/1993. All the petitions were dismissed by judgment dated 10/08/1994 but the interim relief granted earlier was continued by the Court upto 10/10/1994 to enable the petitioners of those petitions to approach the higher forum. Thereafter. Thereafter, direction was given by the Court to file separate petitions and interim relief granted was continued till 5/10/1993. All the petitions were dismissed by judgment dated 10/08/1994 but the interim relief granted earlier was continued by the Court upto 10/10/1994 to enable the petitioners of those petitions to approach the higher forum. Thereafter. Special Leave Petitions were moved by the petitioners of those petitions and Special Leave Petitions were dismissed by the Supreme Court on 21/11/1994. Under the circumstances, the question which arises for consideration is whether the period during which the interim injunction obtained by some of the land owners in Special Civil Application no. 12629 of 1993 and other cognate matters, restraining the respondents from taking possession of the lands covered by declaration made under Sec. 6 of the Act which was published on 12/05/1988, should be excluded in computing the period of two years referred to in Sec. 11a of the Act. It is clear from the provisions of sec. 11a that the Collector is required to make an award under Sec. 11 within a period of two years from the publication of the declaration and, if no award is made within that period, the entire proceedings for the acquisition of the land shall lapse. However, Explanation to Sec. 11a provides for exclusion of the period during which any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed by an order of a Court. The main provision of Sec. 11 A provides that the Collector shall make an award under Sec. 1-1 within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration and if the Legislature wanted to confine the exclusion of only that period during which the passing of the award was stayed, nothing prevented it from doing so. However, instead of excluding the period during which the passing of award was stayed, the Legislature has provided for exclusion of the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the declaration is stayed by an order of the Court. The expression "any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration" is of much wider import. All actions and proceedings required to be taken not only under Secs. The expression "any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration" is of much wider import. All actions and proceedings required to be taken not only under Secs. 7 to 10, but also those required to be taken for the passing of the award under Sec. 11 and taking of possession under Secs. 16 and 17 of the Act are covered by the explanation to Sec. 11a. If any of those actions or proceedings are stayed, the period during which such stay is in operation, is required to be excluded under the explanation for computing period of two years within which the award is to be made. The actions or proceedings are not confined to actions or proceedings to be taken after making of the declaration under Sec. 6 and before the passing of the award under Sec. 11. Making of the award under Sec. 11 and taking of the possession under Sec. 16 or Sec. 17 are actions or proceedings in pursuance of the declaration under Sec. 6. Possession taken either under Sec. 16 or under Sec. 17 is in pursuance of the declaration under Sec. 6. Therefore, interim relief granted by High Court restraining the Land Acquisition Officer from taking possession of the lands of some persons would amount to staying of action or proceeding as contemplated by explanation to Sec. 11a and the period during which the interim relief was in force, will have to be excluded for the purpose of computing the period of two years for passing award under Sec. 11. The expression "any action or proceedings to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration" has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Y. N. Nendoliya (supra) to mean that the period of injunction obtained by the land holders from the High Court restraining the land acquisition authorities several writ petitions were filed in the High Court challenging the said declaration. The primary contention was that the declaration having been published after three years, was barred by law. Similar to the appellants, several other persons had also approached the High Court challenging the declaration. The primary contention was that the declaration having been published after three years, was barred by law. Similar to the appellants, several other persons had also approached the High Court challenging the declaration. The validity of notification issued under Sec. 4 (1) as well as declaration made under Sec. 6 of the Act was upheld by the Full Bench of the High Court in another case on the ground that some of the land owners whose land was covered under the common notification under Sec. 4 (1) had already approached the High Court and obtained stay of further proceedings including publication of declaration under Sec. 6, and as a consequence the period during which, the Stay obtained continued stood excluded by operation of Explanation II to Sec. (1) of the Act. In view of the Full Bench judgment, the petition filed challenging declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act was dismissed. While disposing of Special Leave Petition, the Supreme Court has held, in paragraph 9 of the reported judgment, as under :"9. Therefore, the reasons given in 5. R. Gupta v. Union of India are obvious with reference to the quashing of the publication of declaration under Sec. 6 vis-a-vis the writ petitioners therein. The question that arises for consideration is whether the stay obtained by some of the persons who prohibited the respondents from publication of the declaration under Sec. 6 would equally be extendible to the cases relating to the appellant. We proceed on the premise that the appellants had not obtained any stay of the publication of the declaration but since the High Court in some of the cases has, in fact, prohibited them as extracted hereinbefore, from publication of the declaration, necessarily, when the Court has not restricted the declaration in the impugned orders in support of the petitionerstherein, the officers had to hold back their hands till the matters were disposed of. In fact, this Court has given extended meaning to the orders of stay or proceeding in various cases, namely, Yusufbhai noormohmed Nendolia v. State of Gujarat, Hasraj H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra, sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka, Gandhi Grab Nirman Sahkari samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Govt. of Karnataka and Roshnara Begum v. Union of India. of Karnataka and Roshnara Begum v. Union of India. The words stay of the action or proceeding have been widely interpreted by this Court to mean that any type of the orders passed by this Court would be an inhibitive action on the part of the authorities to proceed further. When the action of conducting an enquiry under Sec. 5a was put in issue and the declaration under Sec. 6 was questioned, necessarily unless the Court holds that enquiry under Sec. 5a was properly conducted and the declaration published under sec. 6 was valid, it would not be open to the officers to proceed further into the matter. As a consequence, the stay granted in respect of some would be applicable to others also who had not obtained stay in that behalf. We" are not concerned with the correctness of the earlier direction with regard to Sec. 5a enquiry and consideration of objections as it was not challenged by the respondent Union. We express no opinion on its correctness, though it is open to doubt. " ( 14 ) IN view of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, it is evident that the stay obtained by some of the persons who prohibited the respondents from taking possession would equally be extendible to the case relating to the petitioner because it would not have been open to the officers to proceed further with the matter in respect of lands of petitioner only. While laying down the above referred proposition of law, the Supreme Court has proceeded on premise that the appellant several writ petitions were filed in the High Court challenging the said declaration. The primary contention was that the declaration having been published after three years, was barred by law. Similar to the appellants, several other persons had also approached the High Court challenging the declaration. The primary contention was that the declaration having been published after three years, was barred by law. Similar to the appellants, several other persons had also approached the High Court challenging the declaration. The validity of notification issued under Sec. 4 (1) as well as declaration made under Sec. 6 of the Act was upheld by the Full Bench of the High Court in another case on the ground that some of the land owners whose land was covered under the common notification under Sec. 4 (1) had already approached the High Court and obtained stay of further proceedings including publication of declaration under Sec. 6, and as a consequence the period during which, the stay obtained continued stood excluded by operation of Explanation II to Sec. (1) of the Act. In view of the Full Bench judgment, the petition filed challenging declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act was dismissed. While disposing of Special Leave Petition, the Supreme Court has held, in paragraph 9 of the reported judgment, as under :"9. Therefore, the reasons given in B. R. Gupta v. Union of India are obvious with reference to the quashing of the publication of declaration under Sec. 6 vis-a-vis the writ petitioners therein. The question that arises for consideration is whether the stay obtained by some of the persons who prohibited the respondents from publication of the declaration under Sec. 6 would equally be extendible to the cases relating to the appellant. We proceed on the premise that the appellants had not obtained any stay of the publication of the declaration but since the High Court in some of the cases has, in fact, prohibited them as extracted hereinbefore, from publication of the declaration, necessarily, when the Court has not restricted the declaration in the impugned orders in support of the petitionerstherein, the officers had to hold back their hands till the matters were disposed of. In fact, this Court has given extended meaning to the orders of stay or proceeding in various cases, namely, Yusufbhai noormohmed Nendolia v. State of Gujarat, Hasraj H. Jain v. State of Maharashtra, sangappa Gurulingappa Sajjan v. State of Karnataka, Gandhi Grah Nirman Sahkari samiti Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, G. Narayanaswamy Reddy v. Govt. of Karnataka and Roshnara Begum v. Union of India. of Karnataka and Roshnara Begum v. Union of India. The words stay of the action or proceeding have been widely interpreted by this Court to mean that any type of the orders passed by this Court would be an inhibitive action on the part of the authorities to proceed further. When the action of conducting an enquiry under Sec. 5a was put in issue and the declaration under Sec. 6 was questioned, necessarily unless the Court holds that enquiry under Sec. 5a was properly conducted and the declaration published under sec. 6 was valid, it would not be open to the officers to proceed further into the matter. As a consequence, the stay granted in respect of some would be applicable to others also who had not obtained stay in that behalf. We are not concerned with the correctness of the earlier direction with regard to Sec. 5a enquiry and consideration of objections as it was not challenged by the respondent Union. We express no opinion on its correctness, though it is open to doubt. " ( 15 ) IN view of the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court, it is evident that the stay obtained by some of the persons who prohibited the respondents from taking possession would equally be extendible to the case relating to the petitioner because it would not have been open to the officers to proceed further with the matter in respect of lands of petitioner only. While laying down the above referred proposition of law, the Supreme Court has proceeded on premise that the appellant in that case had not obtained any stay of publication of declaration. The expression "the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the notification issued under Sec. 4 sub-sec. (1) is stayed" appearing in Explanation- 1 to Sec. 6 is almost similar to the expression "the period during which any action or proceeding to be taken in pursuance of the said declaration is stayed". The submission that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Abhey Ram (supra) interprets Secs. 5a and 6 of the Act and, therefore, the same should not be made applicable while interpreting Sec. 11a of the Act, cannot be accepted. The submission that the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Abhey Ram (supra) interprets Secs. 5a and 6 of the Act and, therefore, the same should not be made applicable while interpreting Sec. 11a of the Act, cannot be accepted. The Supreme court, as a matter of principle, has laid down that the stay obtained by some of the claimants who prohibited the authorities from taking action or proceeding under the Act would equally be extendible to others who had not obtained stay in that behalf and, therefore, the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of abhey Ram (supra) cannot be brushed aside on the ground that the Supreme Court was concerned with the interpretation of Secs. 5a (2) and 6 of the Act and not with interpretation of Sec. HA of the Act. The reason. as to why stay of possession obtained by some of the persons would equally be extendible to the case of those who had not obtained stay is that when the stay of dispossession or order. of status quo has been obtained, the authorities are inhibited from completing the acquisition proceedings and the law requires that if the award is made, the authorities have also to deposit the amounts of compensation with the Collector. That amount would remain unutilised for years together till the judicial case is decided and Stay is vacated. So, it has to be held that once such an order is made by which the constraint is put on the authorities of whatsoever nature by an order of the Court, the period during which the stay remains in operation has to be excluded. The underlying , principle for exclusion of period during which any action of proceeding is stayed by an order of the Court as envisaged by Explanation I to Sec. 6 is same as contemplated by Explanation to Sec. 11a of the Act. Therefore, decision in Abhey rams case (supra) would apply with all force to the facts of the present case also. In view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Abhey ram (supra), the period during which others had obtained injunction restraining the respondents from taking possession will have to be excluded while computing the period of two years referred to in Sec. 11a of the Act in the case of the petitioner also. In view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Abhey ram (supra), the period during which others had obtained injunction restraining the respondents from taking possession will have to be excluded while computing the period of two years referred to in Sec. 11a of the Act in the case of the petitioner also. It is true that, in the present case, the awards were made on 21/09/1990 and 30/05/1992, i. e. , before the period of expiration of interim relief. However, merely because the awards were made prior to expiry of period of injunction, it cannot be said that they are not made within the period of two years from the date of publication of declaration under Sec. 6 of the Act, because the period of limitation would begin from the day on which the stay is vacated by the court and not earlier. Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that two awards made by the Special Land. Acquisition Officer and Deputy Collector, Patan, cannot be treated as having been made after the period of two years from the date of publication of declaration under sec. 6 of the Act so as to entitle the petitioner to claim the reliefs mentioned in the petition. The petition, therefore, cannot be entertained and is liable to be rejected. ( 16 ) NO other point is urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of this petition. ( 17 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the petition tails and is dismissed. Rule is discharged with no order as to costs. .