S. K. KESHOTE, J. ( 1 ) THIS revision application by the defendant petitioner arises from the order of the Civil Judge (S. D.), Porbandar dated 31. 1. 1994 in Regular Civil Suit No. 52/92 below Ex. 34 under which the review application filed by the plaintiff-respondent has been allowed and the defendant-petitioner is ordered to produce the document mentioned in the application below Ex. 19 within 15 days from the date of the order. ( 2 ) THIS civil revision application has come up for admission before this Court on 6. 5. 1994. On this date, the notice has been issued to the respondent and in the meanwhile the proceedings of civil suit were stayed, then this revision application has been admitted on 1. 8. 1994 and the order impugned in this civil revision application was ordered be stayed. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the parties are in agreement that the suit itself out of which this revision application has arisen is still pending in the Trial Court. ( 4 ) THE facts of the case which are not in dispute are that the plaintiffs respondents No. 1, 2 and 3 filed the suit for permanent injunction being Regular Civil Suit No. 52/92 against the defendant-petitioner and one other defendent. Along with the suit an application has also been filed for grant to temporary injunction. The learned Trial Court has granted ex parte interim injunction in the matter and Ex. 5 was kept for final hearing. During the pendency of the final hearing on the Ex. 5 the plaintiffs respondents filed an aplication ex. 19 for production of document enumerated therein by the defendant petitioner. That application was came to be rejected by the Trial Court on 23. 11. 1992. One of the contention raised in the reply to the aforesaid application by the defendant petitioner was that for want of notice to the defendant petitioner the suit itself is not maintainable. Against this order of the learned Trial Court dated 23. 11. 1992, the plaintiff respondents filed Civil revision application before this Court and the learned counsel for the parties are not at variance that the civil revision application has been dismissed by this Court. So the order of the learned Trial Court dated 23. 11. 1992 has attained finality. Against this order of the learned Trial Court dated 23. 11. 1992, the plaintiff respondents filed Civil revision application before this Court and the learned counsel for the parties are not at variance that the civil revision application has been dismissed by this Court. So the order of the learned Trial Court dated 23. 11. 1992 has attained finality. ( 5 ) THE plaintiffs-petitioners filed an application for the review of the order of the trial Court dated 23. 11. 1992 and this review application has come for consideration in the Trial Court after the transfer of the predecessor in office. The hew office has considered this review application and under the impugned order dated 31. 1. 1994 the same has been accepted and the order dated 23. 11. 1992 rejecting the application of plaintiffs respondents below Ex. 19 has been recalled and the direction for production of the document has been given to the defendant-petitioner. Hence this revision application before this Court. ( 6 ) THE learned counsel for the defendant-petitioner contended that once the learned trial Court has passed the order below Ex. 19 and that order has been confirmed by this court in the revision application, the learned Trial Court has no jurisdiction to recall its earlier order. It has next been contended that in the same proceedings at the different stages the principles of res judicata are applicable and once an order has been passed by the learned Trial Court the same could not have been reviewed. Lastly it is urged that once the order of the learned Trial Court has been confirmed by this Court in the revision application it has merged in the order of this Court and the learned Trial Court could not have reviewed its earlier order. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Shankar ramchandra Abhayankar vs. Krishnaji Dattacharya Bapat reported in 1969 (2) SCC 74 . ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that it is a just and reasonable order, which has been passed by the Court below to which no exception may be made by this Court. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that it is a just and reasonable order, which has been passed by the Court below to which no exception may be made by this Court. It has next been contended that the review application has been filed earlier to filing of the civil revision application before this Court against the order of the learned Trial Court dated 23. 11. 1992. Merely because the revision has been decided earlier in point of time then the review application has come up for hearing, the learned Trial Court is not divested of its jurisdiction to review this order. It has next been contended that these are the procedual matters and where the learned Trial Court has considered it to be a fit case to review its earlier orders to which no exception could be taken. Lastly, it is next been contended that the Trial Court has not committed any material irregularity in exercise of its jurisdiction in passing of the impugned order which calls for the interference of this Court under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 8 ) I have given my thoughtful consideration to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties. ( 9 ) THE application Ex. 19 was filed by the plaintiffs-respondents praying therein for the direction for the defendant-petitioner to produce documents mentioned therein in the suit. These documents were prayed to be produced as they were stated to be relevant for the decision of the application filed by them for grant of temporary injunction. This application was came to be rejected by the learned Trial Court under its order dated 23. 11. 1992. One of the reasons given by the learned Trial Court for rejection of the application was that before filing of the suit the plaintiffs respondents have not given any notice to the defendant petitioner under Sec. 253 of the Gujarat Municipalties Act, 1963. So, the Court has doubted the maintainability of the suit itself. The parties are also not at variance that against that order of the learned Trial Court the plaintiff-respondent filed civil Revision Application No. 142/93 before this Court which was came to be rejected on 23. 7. 1993. ( 10 ) I find from the record of this revision application that the review application appears to be of date 16. 12. The parties are also not at variance that against that order of the learned Trial Court the plaintiff-respondent filed civil Revision Application No. 142/93 before this Court which was came to be rejected on 23. 7. 1993. ( 10 ) I find from the record of this revision application that the review application appears to be of date 16. 12. 1992 and on which date this review application has been filed does not come out from the record. But it has come on the record that copy of the same has been given to the counsel for the defendant-petitioner on 16. 12. 1992. In these facts I proceed in the matter with the acceptance that this review application has been filed before filing of the revision application by the plaintiff respondent in this Court against the order of the learned Trial Court dated 23. 11. 1992. ( 11 ) THE review application appears to have not been pressed at appropriate time or same was kept pending for the reason that civil revision application was pending in this court against the order of the learned Trial Court dated 23. 11. 1992 or worst position may that the plaintiff-respondent have deliberately kept it pending in the hope that by passing of the time, new presiding officer will take over. Whatever may be the reasons for keeping this review application pending till the day on which the civil revision application has been decided by this Court, but the one fact is there on which there is no dispute between the parties that this review application has been decided much after the decision of this Court in the civil revision application No. 142/93. ( 12 ) I find sufficient merits in the contention of the learned counsel for the defendent petitioner that the earlier order of the learned Trial Court has merged in the order of this Court so far as the Trial Court is concerned. The substance of the matter is that from the date of filing of the review application till the date on which the civil revision application has been decided by this Court it remained pending in the Trial court. The plaintiff-respondent simultaneously availed of the two remedies against the order of the learned Trial Court dated 23. 11. 1992. That is a review application before the same Court and the civil revision application before this Court. The plaintiff-respondent simultaneously availed of the two remedies against the order of the learned Trial Court dated 23. 11. 1992. That is a review application before the same Court and the civil revision application before this Court. Availing of these two remedies against the impugned order is difficult to appreciate. However, the more objectionable and serious is the fact where after dismissal of the civil revision application the plaintiff respondent have pressed the review application and the learned Trial Court has also accepted the same. The earlier order of the learned Trial Court of which the plaintiff respondent sought review has already been affirmed by this Court in civil revision application. Once this Court has affirmed the order of the learned Trial Court, the Trial Court has no jurisdiction to review that order. I fail to see any justification in the approach of the learned Trial Court to review that order. Merely, on the change of the officer the orders cannot be reviewed in the manner in which it has been done in the present case. I do not mean to say or suggest that in appropriate case the review of the vrders passed by the Court itself are not permissible but in the peculiar facts of this case i. e. where this Court has not interfered with the order of the learned Trial Court ordinarily it is not open to the learned Trial Court to review its own order. In the civil revision application under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure this Court has very very limited power of judicial review of the orders passed by the Courts subordinate to it. The endevour of this Court under Sec. 115 of Code of Civil Procedure is that the matter may not be decided by it on merits so that in the appropriate case the impugned order of the learned Trial Court may be challenged by the aggrieved party in the memo of appeal filed against the final decision in the case given by the Trial Court. Sub-sec. Sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 105 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides that save as otherwise expressly provided, no appeal shall lie from any order made by the Court in exercise of this original jurisdiction but, where a decree is appealed from any error, defect or irregularity in any order, effecting the decision of the case may be set forth as a ground of objection in the memo of appeal. The order of the learned Trial Court can only be interfered with by this court when it falls within the four corners of Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In case, where the civil revision application has been decided by this Court against an order of the learned Trial Court only on the ground that it is a case which does not fall under sec. 115 of Code of Civil Procedure, than certainly that order can be challenged by the aggrieved party in an appeal to be filed against the final decision come in the suit. But in case, where in the civil revision application this Court has decided the matter on merits then in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of case of Shankar ramchandra Ahhyankar vs. Krishnaji Dattacharya Bapat reported in 1969 (2) SCC 74 (Supra) that order will merge in the order of this Court and in that case it may not be open and permissible to the aggrieved party to challenge that order again by setting forth the ground of challenge thereto in the memo of appeal to be filed against the final decision given in the suit. So, this distinction has to be kept in mind and if we go by that distinction, then too I am satisfied that even if a revision application against the order of the learned Trial Court is dismissed by this Court on the ground that no error of jurisdiction is committed in passing of the said order by the Court below, leaving apart the question that it may be permissible to the aggrieved party to challenge that order in the appeal to be filed against the final decision in this Court or before appellate Court, the trial Court has no jurisdiction to review this order. I am not expressing any final opinion here that in the case where against the final decision of the Trial Court appeal lies to the district Court this decision may be taken to be as if this Court has decided that the order of the learned Trial Court, can be challenged in the first appeal as the same has been confirmed by this Court in the revision application on the ground that the same is not maintainable, The entertainment of the review petition in the facts and circumstances of this case by the learned Trial Court was an affront to the order of this Court. Moreover, the judicial discipline is also one of the important as all the Courts are to maintain it. If such a course is made permissible then the judicial propriety will no more there in the system. In the case of Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm and Another vs. K. Santhakumaran and Ors. , 1998 (7) SCC 386 their Lordship of Supreme Court while dealing with to some what similar case held that: "4. The manner in which the learned Single Judge of the High Court exercised the review jurisdiction, after the special leave petitions against the self same order had been dismissed by this Court after hearing learned counsel for the parties, to say the least, was not proper. Interference by the learned Single Judge at that stage is subversive of judicial discipline The High Court was aware that the SLPs against the orders dated 7. 1. 1987 had already been dismised by this court. The High Court, therefore, had no power or jurisdiction to review the selfsame order, which was the subject-matter of challenge in the SLPs in this court after the challenge had failed. By passing the impugned order on 7. 4. 1994, judicial propriety has been sacrificed. After the dismissal of the special leave petitions by this Court, on contest, no review petitions could be entertained by the High Court against the same order. The very entertainment of the review petitions, in the facts and circumstance of the case, was an affornt to the order of this Court. We express our strong disapproval and hope that would be no occasion in the future when we may have to say so. The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, under the circumstances, was palpably erroneous. The very entertainment of the review petitions, in the facts and circumstance of the case, was an affornt to the order of this Court. We express our strong disapproval and hope that would be no occasion in the future when we may have to say so. The jurisdiction exercised by the High Court, under the circumstances, was palpably erroneous. The respondents who approached the High Court after the dismissal of their SLPs by this Court, abused the process of the Court and indulged in vexatious litigation. We strongly deprecate the matter in which the review petitions were filed and heard in the High Court after the dismissal of the SLPs by this Court. The appeals deserve to succeed on that short ground. The appeals are, consequently, allowed and the impugned order dated 7. 4. 1994 passed in the review petitions is hereby set aside. The respondents shall pay Rs, 10,000 as costs". ( 13 ) IN these facts of the case and position of law as emerges from the decision of the honble Supreme Court in the case of Abbai Maligai Partnership Firm and Another vs. K. Santhakumaran and Ors. , 1988 (7) SCC 386 (Supra) the impugned order of the learned trial Court cannot be allowed to stand. In the result this civil revision application succeed and same is allowed. The order of the Civil Judge (S. D.), Porbandar dated 31. 1. 1994 in R. C. S. No. 52/92 below 34 is quashed and set aside with costs, which is assessed at Rs. 2000/- .