H. P. Sundaresh v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax
1998-12-07
V.K.SINGHAL
body1998
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT V.K. Singhal, J.—An order of the appropriate authority dated November 25, 1994, has been assailed. By the said order in fact no decision was given either for pre-emptive purchase or not to purchase in view of the fact that the transferee was directed to furnish the copy of the order dated May 16, 1979, granting exemption for the excess vacant land. The transferee informed that clearance has been given by the urban land ceiling department but the document in support thereof was not submitted. In a case where the land is already acquired under the provisions of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976, the question of pre-emptive purchase does not arise in view of the law laid down by the apex court in the case of S. Vasudev v. State of Karnataka (SLP No. 10675-677 of 1991). 2. This writ petition has been filed mainly on the ground that the appropriate authority should have either passed the order of the pre-emptive purchase or should have given the clearance in view of the various decisions of the apex court including the case of Appropriate Authority v. Tanvi Trading and Credits Pvt. Ltd. [1991] 191 ITR 507. 3. Learned counsel for the Department has brought to my notice the judgment given in the Madras High Court in the case of Government of India Vs. Jagadish A. Sadarangani, (1996) 221 ITR 338 Mad, where the agreement was found defective by the appropriate authority and the petitioner was called upon to rectify the defect. This judgment was given after the insertion of Sub-section (4) to Section 269UC with effect from July 1, 1995. The amendment made in the section was to enable the appropriate authority to get rectified all the defects so that the power of the appropriate authority could not be restricted only either to make a pre-emptive purchase or to give no objection certificate. This judgment and Section 269UC(4) refers to the defect in the statement which could be got rectified. The question in the present matter is whether the appropriate authority could take recourse to the third alternative of not passing an order or saying that the order could not be passed for that reason. 4. This question was considered by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of RAJASTHAN PATRIKA LTD. Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS., (1995) 213 ITR 443 Raj.
4. This question was considered by the Rajasthan High Court in the case of RAJASTHAN PATRIKA LTD. Vs. UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS., (1995) 213 ITR 443 Raj. There the High Court came to the conclusion that in addition to the two options available to the appropriate authority, the third option was also available, i.e., not to act upon the invalid statement in Form No. 37-I filed by the parties after effecting the transfer and violating Section 269UC(1) and the parties had thus rendered themselves liable for an action for violating the provisions of the Act. 5. In the case of Chamundi Hotels Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs. Appropriate Authority and Others, ILR (1996) KAR 2882, where the agreement was filed without legal title, it was held that the appropriate authority's refusal to exercise power cannot be considered to be invalid. 6. The matter was also considered in the case of Tata Consulting Engineers and another Vs. Union of India and others, ILR (1994) KAR 913, wherein it was held that it is open to the authority to require the parties to the statement to rectify the statement. I have considered over the matter. 7. The judgment given in the case of Appropriate Authority and Another Vs. Tanvi Trading and Credits P. Ltd. and Others, (1991) 191 ITR 307 SC, cannot be considered as laying down an absolute proposition that the appropriate authority is debarred from adopting a third alternative. If the statement is defective it will be considered not a proper statement as in the present case, when the information was required as part of that statement, it was obligatory on the part of the petitioner to furnish the information/documents. It cannot be considered that the information required was frivolous or irrelevant. Whenever the required document or the information is not furnished nor any reason is given for not furnishing the same, the appropriate authority has no option but to consider the application itself as incomplete. In a case where the application is incomplete it will be considered as not properly filed and the appropriate authority is not required to pass any order on such incomplete statement. In the case of Chamundi Hotels Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs. Appropriate Authority and Others, ILR (1996) KAR 2882, referred to above, the NOC from the competent authority under the Urban Ceiling Act was not obtained which was required.
In the case of Chamundi Hotels Pvt. Ltd. and Another Vs. Appropriate Authority and Others, ILR (1996) KAR 2882, referred to above, the NOC from the competent authority under the Urban Ceiling Act was not obtained which was required. Whereas in the present matter, the order itself of the competent authority was not furnished. In these circumstances, I am of the view that the appropriate authority was justified in adopting the third alternative of not passing any order and it will be considered a case of not filing a complete statement as required in law which does not require passing of an order. 8. The petitioner if so desires may file the information as desired by the appropriate authority within six weeks. The appropriate authority would take into consideration the document which may be filed by the petitioner and then shall proceed to pass the order in accordance with law. The statement would be considered complete on the date when the information is furnished. 9 . The petition is dismissed.