JUDGMENT : 1. The instant writ petition has been filed challenging the order of termination of the services of the petitioner. 2. The petitioner had applied for the post of Lower Division Clerk as it had been advertised by the respondent No. 1 in the District Judgeship of Udaipur. After following the full-fledged selection process, he was given appointment on temporary basis vide order dated 22-8-96 contained in Annexure-1. The said appointment letter provided that his appointment was only on a temporary basis up to 31-12-96. He was given further extension by passing the order dated 20-5-97 up to 31-12-97 and, however, he was not allowed to work with effect from 1-1-98, hence this petition. 3. Mr. Vyas has submitted that as the petitioner has been appointed after holding a fullfledged selection process, his appointment cannot be treated as temporary and his services could not have been terminated without following the procedure established by law. 4. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that the petitioner was appointed on the post on temporary basis, thus, he cannot claim that he was having any right to the post, and he is to be treated as having been appointed in substantive capacity and his appointment came to an end automatically by efflux of the tenure stipulated in the letter extending the tenure of his service and the cannot claim any relief before this Court. 5. In State of U.P. v. Kaushal Kishore Shukla, 1991 (1) SCC 691 the Apex Court has categorically held as under:- "Under the service jurisprudence a temporary employee has no right to hold the post and his services are liable to be terminated in accordance with the relevant service rules and the terms of contract of service." 6. In a case like the instant the Court has to be satisfied as what is the legally justiciable right of the petitioner which has been infringed and for which the petitioner can resort to the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In a case like the instant the Court has to be satisfied as what is the legally justiciable right of the petitioner which has been infringed and for which the petitioner can resort to the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Supreme Court in Purshotam Lal Dingra v. Union of India, AIR 1958 SC 36 , has held that "A person can be said to acquire a lien on a post only when he has been confirmed and made permanent on that post and not earlier" and further held that "a Government servant holding a post temporarily does not have any right to hold the said post". In R.K. Mishra v. U.P. State Handloom Corporation, AIR 1987 SC 2408 Apex Court has taken the same view. 7. A temporary employee has no right to hold the post and his services are liable to be terminated without assigning any reason either under the terms of the contract providing for such termination or under the relevant statutory rules regulating the terms and conditions of temporary servants. Similarly, in Triveni Shanker Saxena v. State of U.P., AIR 1992 SC 496 ; Commissioner of Food and Supply v. Prakash Chandra Sexena, 1994 (5) SCC 177 ; Ram Chandra Tripathi v. U.P. Public Service Tribunal, 1994 (2) JT 84 ; Madhya Pradesh Hasth Shilp Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Devendra Kumar Jain, 1995 (1) SCC 638 and Kaushal Kishore Shukla (supra), the Apex Court has categorically held that incumbent to a post who has been given appointment on temporary basis, terminable without notice, has no right to hold the post and he is not entitled for any opportunity of hearing before his services are dispensed with as his termination does not amount forfeiture of any legal right. 8. In Ravi S. Naik v. Union of India, AIR 1994 SC 1558 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has placed reliance on the observations made in Malloch v. Aberdden Corporation, 1971 (2) All ER 1278, wherein it has been observed as under:- "A breach of procedure, whether called a failure of natural justice or an essential administrative fault cannot give him a remedy in the Courts, unless behind it there is something of substance which has been lost by the failure. The Court does not act in vain." 9. The Court does not act in vain." 9. In Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Raguvendra Sheshgiri Rao Kulkarni, 1998 (1) SCC 460 the Apex Court explained the difference of a permanent employee and an employee holding the post on probation and held that the services of a probationer cannot be equated with that of a permanent employee who, on account of his status, is entitled to be retained in service and his services cannot be terminated abruptly without any notice or plausible cause. "This is based on the principle that a substantive appointment to a permanent post in a public service confers substantive right to the post and the person appointed on that post becomes entitled to hold a lien on the post." However, interpreting/enforcing the terms of appointment, which provided for discharge of the said probationer from service at any time during the period of probation or extended period of of probation, without any notice or without assigning any cause, the Court held that as his termination was in consonance with the terms and conditions of his appointment letter, he cannot be heard raising grievance. 10. In State of Punjab v. Surendra Singh, 1992 (2) RRR 529 : AIR 1992 SC 1593 , the Apex Court has held that the Court must seek the adherence to the terms and conditions of the appointment and there is no reason why terms and conditions of appointments cannot be enforced in a contract of service. 11. In Hindustan Education Society v. K.P. Kalim S.K. Gulam Nabi, 1997 (5) SCC 152 the Apex Court has held that where the rules specifically provide for permanent appointment on probation for a specific period and an employee is appointed without stipulating any condition regarding probation, the inference is to be drawn that he was not appointed in substantice capacity. In Avinash Nagra v. Navodaya Vidhyalaya Samiti, 1997 (2) SCC 534 , the Apex Court has held that a society can terminate the services not only of a temporary employee but also of a permanent employee by giving him one month's notice or three months' pay and allowances in lieu thereof if the terms of appointment and rules so permit and such termination may be valid in a given case even if the principles of natural justice have not been complied with. 12. In Patna University v. Dr. 12. In Patna University v. Dr. Amita Tiwari, 1997 (7) SCC 198 , it has been held that the appointment has to be made only in consonance with the recruitment rules. Similarly, in Union Territory of Chandigarh Administration v. Managing Society, Goswami G.D.S.D.C. 1996 (1) RRR 649 (SC) : 1996 (7) SCC 665 it has been held that the terms of contract must be read and enforced in consonance with the statute and not otherwise even if the contract contains the terms contrary to the statutory provisions. Similarly, in A. Mahadaswaran v. Government of Tamil Nadu, 1996 (8) SCC 617 , it has been held that a person can have a legitimate expectation only in consonance with the statute and the rules framed thereunder and not in contravention of the same. 13. In support of his contention, Sri Vyas has placed reliance on three judgments of this Court namely, Sayed Mansoor Ali v. State of Rajasthan, 1988 (2) RLR 216; Bhanwar Lal Malwar v. State of Rasjasthan, 1990 (1) RLR 576 and R.S. Rawat v. State of Rajasthan, 1993 (1) WLC 79 , wherein it has been held that if the appointment had been made after due process of selection, such an appointment it to be considered as substantive even if it provided for appointment on temporary basis. While deciding those cases, reliance had been placed on various Supreme Court judgments, particularly, Baleshwar Das v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1981 SC 41 ; State of Uttar Pradesh v. M.J. Siddiqui, AIR 1980 SC 1098 ; Ashok Gulati v. B.S. Jain, AIR 1987 SC 424 and P.D. Agrawal v. State of U.P., AIR 1987 SC 1676 . All the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court, which have been referred to and relied upon, are on the principle of determining the seniority and the issue involved therein had been: whether the period served by an employee on temporary/officiating basis, is to be reckoned for the purpose of determining the seniorty ? 14. In M.J. Siddiqui (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court had to adjudicate upon the issue of seniority. The issue of termination of services was not involved therein and while deciding the controversy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- "One of the dominant questions to be determined in this case is whether the appellants were appointed purely on temporary basis or in a substantive capacity though against temporary posts. The issue of termination of services was not involved therein and while deciding the controversy, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed as under:- "One of the dominant questions to be determined in this case is whether the appellants were appointed purely on temporary basis or in a substantive capacity though against temporary posts. In our opinion, the High Court seems to have laid undue stress on the fact that the appellants were appointed on a temporary basis while overlooking the surrounding circumstances and the terms of advertisement and the rules, referred to above, under which the appellants were appointed...In order, therefore, to determine the nature of the appointment, we have to look to the heart and substance of the matter the surrounding circumstances, the mode, the manner and the terms of the appointment and other relevant factors. In the instant case we cannot ignore the advertisement which forms the pivotal basis...." (Emphasis added) 15. Thus, even if we apply the ratio of this judgment to determine the controversy involved in the instant case and look to the main factors as stipulated above, it cannot be said that the petitioner had been appointed on permanent basis. 16. In Baleshwar Das (supra), the Apex Court had to decide the case of struggle between various groups of engineers for seniority. The competitive claims of seniority has been mainly between three groups of engineers belonging to Uttar Pradesh Services of the Engineers (Irrigation Branch), Graduate Engineers, directly recruited by the Public Service Commission by competitive examination, Graduate Engineers once appointed in numbers but later absorbed after consultation with the Public Service Commission and the Diploma Holders later promoted as Assistant Engineers. The Hon'ble Apex Court has observed that "order of appointment to the service is decisive." The Court further observed that if the appointment is for some indefinite duration and the appointments have been approved by the Public Service Commission, if the tests prescribed have been taken and they passed it and "if probation has been prescribed and has been approved", it may be said that the post was held by the incumbent in a substantive capacity and the seniority list may be prepared in the light of the above principle. 17. 17. The other two cases, i.e., Ashok Gulati (supra) and P.D. Agarwal (supra), also, relate to seniority between direct recruits vis-a-vis promotees and the issue for adjudication before the Supreme Court has been whether the services rendered by the officers in temporary capacity would be taken into consideration while fixing their seniority. 18. The law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court is binding on this Court and all other Courts and authorities as per the mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. In Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab, 1995 (6) SCC 614 , the Hon'ble Apex Court has explained the scope of Article 141 of the Constitution of India and observed as under:- "Their Lordships decisions declare the existing law but do not invoke any fresh law, is not in keeping with the plenary function of the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, for the Court is not merely the interpreter of law as existing but much beyond that. The Court, as a wing of the State, is, by itself, a source of law. The law is what the Court says it is." 19. But a decision cannot be relied upon in support of a proposition that it did not decide. (Vide Mittal Engineering Works (Pvt) Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, 1997 (1) SCC 203 and National Insurance Corporation v. Santro Devi, 1998 (1) SCC 219 : AIR 1998 SC 1485 ). 20. In H.H. Maharaja Dhiraj Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia Bahadur v. Union of India, AIR 1971 SC 530 , the Supreme Court observed as under:- "It is difficult to regard a word, a clause or a sentence occurring in a judgment of this Court, divorced from its context, as containing a full exposition of the law on a question when the question did not even fall to be answered in that judgment." 21. Similarly, in M/s Amar Nath Om Prakash v. State of Punjab, 1985 RRR 232 : AIR 1985 SC 218 , the Supreme Court has observed that it is needless to repeat the often quoted truism of Lord Halsbury that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides and not for what may seem to follow logically from it. 22. 22. It is a settled proposition of law that if an issue neither was raised nor argued, and a discussion by the Court after pondering over the issue in depth would not be a precedent binding on the Courts (Vide Rajpur Rauda Meha v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1980 SC 1707 ). 23. In Sarva Sharmik Sangh, Bombay v. Indian Hume Pipe Company Ltd., 1993 (2) SCC 386 the Apex Court has observed that the observations made in a judgment must be understood in the facts and circumstances of that case. It cannot be treated as having any binding force if a question raised now in a case where the earlier judgment is sought to be relied upon, has neither been in issue nor considered in that judgment. 24. Similarly, in CIT v. Sun Engineering Works (P) Ltd., 1992 (4) SCC 363 , the Apex Court had made the following observations:- "It is neither desirable nor permissible to pick out a word or a sentence from the judgment of this Court, divorced from the context of the question under consideration and treat it to be the complete 'law' declared by this Court. The judgment must be read as a whole and the observations from the judgment have to be considered in the light of the questions which were before this Court. A decision of this Court takes its colour from the question involved in the case in which it is rendered and while applying the decision to a later case, the Courts must carefully try to ascertain the true principle laid down by the decision of this Court and not to pick out words or sentences from the judgment, divorced from the context of the questions under consideration by this Court to support their reasonings." 25. In all the cases referred to above, the issue before the Hon'ble Supreme Court was fixing the inter se seniority of various groups of officers and in none of these cases the issue of termination of the services of the temporary employees was involved. The aforesaid judgments have no applicability and cannot provide for any guideline while determining the nature of the appointment of the petitioner in the instant case. 26. The aforesaid judgments have no applicability and cannot provide for any guideline while determining the nature of the appointment of the petitioner in the instant case. 26. On the contrary, in Prabhat Kumar Sharma v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 1996 (10) SCC 62 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed that if the rules provide that even for making a temporary/ad hoc appointment a particular procedure is to be followed and it provides for inviting applications by advertisement then even the short-terms/leave vacancies have to be filled up by inviting applications. The Apex Court has approved the Full Bench judgment of Allahabad High Court in Ku. Radha Raizada v. Committee of Management, Smt Vidyawati Darbari Inter College, 1994 (3) UPLBEC 1551 , wherein it has been held that even for filling up the short term/leave vacancies the procedure of selection is to be followed and the advertisement of vacancies should be made at least in two local newspapers having wide circulation in that area and the candidates should be selected after they face the selection committee. The Apex Court approved the law laid down therein as it was to ensure a fair selection and to avoid chances of nepotism and further to prevent the back-door entries. The Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as under:- "With a view to allow the institute to appoint teachers on ad hoc basis so as to avoid the hardship to the students..... Such ad hoc appointments should, also, be made in accordance with the procedure prescribed ......Any appointment made in transgression thereof is illegal appointment and is void and confers no right on the appointee. It is an in- built procedure to avoid manipulation and nepotism in selection and appointment of teachers by management.....Public interest demands that the teachers, selection must be in accordance with the procedure prescribed.... and for cogent and valid reasons the High Court has held that the order will supplement the power to select and appoint ad hoc teachers as per the procedure prescribed." 27. The aforesaid quotations may give an impression that to follow the full fledged procedure of selection for appointment even in case of temporary employment, is required only where the statutory rules provide for it. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3261 of 1994, Dr. Aruna Pandey v. Malviya Regional Engineering College, Jaipur, decided on 27-2-1998). It is not so. The aforesaid quotations may give an impression that to follow the full fledged procedure of selection for appointment even in case of temporary employment, is required only where the statutory rules provide for it. (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3261 of 1994, Dr. Aruna Pandey v. Malviya Regional Engineering College, Jaipur, decided on 27-2-1998). It is not so. In fact it is the mandatory requirement of Article 16 of the Constitution of India that even for ad-hoc/temporary employment, the applications should be invited by the public notice. This aspect was considered by the Supreme Court in State of Haryana v. Pyara Singh, 1992 (2) SCC 118, wherein the concluding part runs as under:- "(47) Thirdly, even where an ad hoc or temporary employment is necessitated on account of the exigencies of administration, it should ordinarily be drawn from the employment exchange unless it cannot brook delay in which case the pressing cause must be stated on the file. If no candidate is available or is not sponsored by the employment exchange, some appropriate method consistent with the requirements of Article 16 should be followed. In other words, there must be a notice published in the appropriate manner calling for applications and all those who apply in response thereto should be considered fairly..." "(49) If for any reason, an ad hoc or temporary employee is continued for a fairly long span, the authorities must consider his case for regularisation..." (Emphasis added) 28. Thus, if a person has been appointed even temporarily without following the procedure, his entry would be deemed to be by back-door and he cannot be considered for regularisation. Same inference can be drawn from the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Raj Kishore Vishwakarma v. Union of India, 1997 (11) SCC 619 . 29. In view of the above, I am of the considered opinion that the judgments of this Court in Sayed Mansoor Ali (supra), Bhanwar Lal Malwar (supra) and R.S. Rawat (supra) run counter to the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above and there is no scope of giving any weightage to the said judgments, particularly after the decision in Pyara Singh (supra) and the said judgments should be considered to have impliedly been repelled by the aforesaid judgment. 30. 30. Therefore, it cannot be held that as the petitioner was appointed after following the selection process and preparation of the select list, he can be treated to have been appointed on substantive basis. 31. The instant case is squarely covered by the judgment of the Hon'ble Court in Director, Institute of Management Development, U.P. v. Smt. Pushpa Srivastava, 1992 (4) SCC 33 wherein the Court observed as under:- "To our mind, it is clear that where the appointment is contractual and by efflux of time the appointment comes to an end, the respondent could have no right to continue in the post." 32. The initial appointment of the petitioner vide order dated 22-8-96 provided that his appointment was purely on ad hoc and temporary basis liable to be terminated without notice and it was only upto 31-12-96. Petitioner's services were extended vide order dated 20-5-97 only upto 31-12-97. The petitioner's services were governed not by the recruitment rules but merely by the terms of the contract, i.e. appointment letter and, thus, his services came to an end automatically by efflux of time, i.e. after 31-12-97 and, therefore, the question of termination of his services did not arise. 33. The question is devoid of any merit and hence dismissed.Petition dismissed.